HISTORY’S WOUND: COLLECTIVE TRAUMA AND THE ISRAEL/PALESTINE CONFLICT

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History’s Wound: Collective Trauma and the Israel/Palestine conflict

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Abstract

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In considering the Israel-Palestine conflict, focus has remained on conventional major issues: borders, settlements, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugee rights and water. Should there be one binational state, or two states for two peoples? Yet this is a conflict that is sustained by factors more profound than the dispute over limited resources or competing nationalisms. The parties’ narratives, continually rehearsed, speak of a cataclysmic event or chain of events, a collective trauma, which has created such deep suffering and disruption that the rehearsers remain ‘frozen’ amid the overarching context of political violence.

This study offers a critical analysis of the concept of collective trauma together with the role of commemorative practices, including core contemporary canonical days of memory, and asks to what extent they may hinder progress in the resolution of an intractable conflict, such as the Israel/Palestine conflict. Without addressing the powerful traumatic current that underpins a chronic conflict, no amount of top-down formal peace-making is likely to be sustainable.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The traumatic impact of war and violence on health, specifically on the mental health of individuals and groups, has been regularly noted by the World Health Organization and other international agencies.¹ These repeated observations are common sense, but accounting for their lack of impact on human behavior is a challenge of the tallest order.

In such reports, conflict-engendered trauma is typically described in terms of its devastating immediate effects, and mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) interventions are typically geared towards toward the immediate, post-conflict-only situation in which ‘there remains an unfortunate divide between the discourse of policy makers and non-government organisations on one side, and the dominant academic discourse in psychiatry and psychology (with a focus on [long-term] psychological trauma) on the other’ (Ventevogel, DeMarinis, Pérez-Sales and Silove, 2013, p. 228). The lack of cohesion is not only the result of a multitude of agencies and interdisciplinary approaches to the question of how to address the humanitarian effect of conflict on civilians and societies; there is also a critical lack of consensus on the core concept of psychological trauma in itself.
Meanwhile, over a longer trajectory, chronic ongoing conflicts have the potential to saturate the ethos of societies, spinning out as they widen their locus of suffering. In the case studies at the heart of this inquiry, Israel and Palestine (Chapters Four through Six) both societies ‘behave as “trauma organized” societies, where violence is tolerated as a normal way of life’ (Hallaq, 2003). Choosing to study this conflict in this way places this study as part of a trend, whereby increasingly, over the last ten years, ‘international relations (IR) scholars have become interested in understanding traumatic events and the ways in which they are experienced, felt, perceived, memorialized and forgotten, as well as how they influence—and are influenced by – norms, identities and interests in world politics’ write Resende and Budryte (2014, loc. 245). This intellectual trend is one that accepts implicitly the Eurocentric notion of trauma as an underpinning for further inquiries; yet, as the author has indicated—through the account above of the emergence of psychological trauma and subsequent attempts to medicalize trauma by through psychiatric assessment—the core concept itself remains highly contested and in a state of evolution.

This chapter sets the scene of our inquiry, with an analysis of the saliency of psychological concepts of trauma as a prequel to examining their wider sociological dimensions, in particular the systemic operationalization to perpetuate inter- and intra-state/non-state actor ‘intractable’² conflicts. In particular, we will seek to synthesize and elucidate divergent conceptualizations of this inchoative paradigm, charting its phenomenological adoption by the emergent field of psychiatry through to social and political
psychology, in order to contribute an original integrated approach towards peacebuilding.

The ‘archaeology’ of trauma (from the Greek τραύμα = in the sense of ‘a wound’, in this case to the mind or memory) is one that has undergone significant paradigm shifts and accreditations in the relatively recent history of the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry as a whole; to add further complexity, this ‘free-floating signifier’ has expanded laterally in its invocation by historians, political scientists, sociologists, social and political psychologists, anthropologists, criminologists and critical and literary theorists. In the words of Kirmayer, Lemelson and Barad (2007) trauma ‘can be seen at once as a sociopolitical event, a psychophysiological process, a physical and emotional experience, and narrative theme in explanations of individual and social suffering’ (location 160-165). Not only can it be viewed from multiple perspectives, but it may also require all of their services, as Danieli (2009) notes:

Massive trauma causes such diverse and complex destruction that only a multidimensional, multidisciplinary integrative framework is adequate to describe it ... An individual’s identity involves a complex interplay of multiple spheres or systems. ... Each dimension may be in the domain of one or more disciplines, which overlap and interact, such as biology, psychology, sociology, economics, law, anthropology, religious studies and philosophy ... These systems coexist to create a continuous conception of life from past through present to the future. (Danieli, 2009, p. 351).
Yet what we mean when we say 'trauma' continues to be an evolving concept and the subject of both ontological and epistemological controversy. Taking up Foucault’s structuralist, non-teleological concept of ‘genealogy’ (outlined in the philosopher’s essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’), Ruth Leys gives a gripping account of the ebbs and flows of trauma theory in her two seminal works, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (2000) and *From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After* (2009) as she exposes ‘the structural repetitions that have successive theorizations of psychic trauma, the tendency for certain theoretical and indeed empirical difficulties and tensions to surface again and again at different historical moments or cruxes’ (Leys, 2010, p. 657). For Leys, ‘from the central moment of its invention in the late nineteenth century the concept of trauma has been fundamentally unstable, balancing uneasily—indeed veering uncontrollably—between two ideas, theories, or paradigms’ (2000, p. 297) that she refers to as ‘mimetic’ and ‘antimimetic’. The ‘mimetic’ Freudian model refers to the subject’s amnesiac ‘hypnotic imitation or identification’ with the unrecollected trauma stressor, which ‘shatters or disables the victim’s cognitive and perceptual capacities so that the experience never becomes part of the ordinary memory system’ causing the victim ‘to act it [the traumatogenic event] out or in other ways imitate it’ (Leys, 2000, p. 298). The inability to remember, and the possibility of ‘false memories’ has controversial implications for victims’ ability to testify about their trauma; it may also lead to the condition of ‘survivor guilt’, as ‘mimetic theory posits a moment of identification with the aggressor, the victim is imagined as
incorporating and therefore sharing the feelings of hostility directed toward herself’ (Leys, 2000, p. 298).

Antimimetic theory, conversely, places the subject at a remove from the traumatogenic event; she becomes ‘a spectator of the traumatic scene, which she can therefore see and represent to herself and others’ and chimes with our current notion that ‘trauma is a purely external event that befalls a fully constituted subject’. Different from mimetic theory’s ‘assumption of an identification with the aggressor, the antimimetic theory depicts violence as purely and simply an assault from without’ (Leys, 2000, p. 299). For Leys, the problem with this proposition remains identical, inasmuch as the victim’s testimony against trauma may be discredited, since the damaged psyche may not be able to recollect accurately or recover from the event, despite ‘the advantage of portraying the victim of trauma as in no way mimetically complicitous with the violence directed against her’ (Leys, 2000, p. 299). A further issue, according to Leys, is that the antimimetic hypothesis ‘also lends itself to various positivist or scientistic understandings of trauma’ (2000, p. 299) discernable since ‘survivor guilt’, formerly listed as one of the optional criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA)’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-III, was omitted in the 1987 revision, DSM-III-R. As we shall see later in the discussion of trauma assessment (in section 2 below) diagnosticians abandoned the psychoanalytic approach and ‘reverted instead to the descriptive-nosological approach of an earlier, Kraepelinian⁴ psychiatry’ (Leys, 2009, p. 183 ). In terms of trauma genealogy, asserts Leys, this
constitutes a turning point, almost an epistemic break. It occurred just as trauma studies began to burgeon in popularity and ’extended far beyond the boundaries of American psychiatry, literary-critical theory, queer theory, and legal thought’ to take on a radically ’antimimetic’ approach (Leys, *ibid*). From then on, ’trauma specialists began with almost missionary zeal to substitute shame as the emotion that best defined the traumatic state’. In contemporary parlance, shame is ’viewed today as the affect of disempowerment, the chief emotional consequence of social injustice and inequality’ (Leys, *ibid*). While Leys’ stance purports to be that of the impartial epistemological genealogist, it seems that the ’truth’ that she wishes to expose is the abandonment of the psychoanalytic understanding of trauma in favour of contemporary approaches that she decries as ’scientistic’ ’materialist’ and ’positivist’.

The ’split genealogy’ of trauma is evident not only in the psychoanalytic-psychiatric standoff; social constructionists such as Jeffrey Alexander argue that ’trauma is not something naturally existing; it is something constructed by society’ (Alexander, in Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser and Sztompa, 2004b, p. 2). Fassin and Rechtman (2009) concur, as they offer a Foucauldian exploration in *The Empire of Trauma* of the social and political consequences of the ’naturalization’ of the trauma concept. For Alexander, psychoanalytical theories of trauma are merely ’scholarly discussions’ of ’lay trauma theory’ (p. 3) while collective trauma concepts, such as those developed by Kai Erikson (1976) and Arthur Neal (2005) represent the ’Enlightenment versions’ of ’lay trauma theory’, whereby trauma is ’a kind of rational response to abrupt change’ (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b,
Both approaches, argues Alexander, share a ‘naturalistic fallacy’ since ‘events are not inherently traumatic. Trauma is a socially mediated attribution’ (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b, p. 8). Seemingly, when trauma is deconstructed, there nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so:

… while every argument about trauma claims ontological reality, as cultural sociologists we are not primarily concerned with the accuracy of social actors’ claims, much less with evaluating their moral justification. We are concerned only with how and under what conditions the claims are made, and with what results. It is neither ontology nor morality, but epistemology, with which we are concerned. (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b, p. 9)

It is further argued that the entire notion of trauma (including the idea of collective trauma) is a “purely Western” social construct, a culturally conditioned historical product’ (Young, 1995) owing its genesis to the proponents of psychology, psychiatry and neurology in 19th and early 20th century Germany and Austria. Ethnographer Rosemary Sayigh, decrying the Palestinian Nakba’s exclusion from trauma literature, criticizes the latter for its ‘lack of critical self-reflection, undertaken without theorizing … the relationship between the West and the non-West … trauma genre scholars never theorize the field in terms of global power asymmetry or ethnography’s origins as a Western method of studying the non-Western world’ (Sayigh, 2013, pp. 53-54). Commenting that although ‘the trauma genre began with the Holocaust studies of [Cathy] Caruth and [Shoshana] Felman and [Dori] Laub, it is the three volumes edited by Arthur Kleinmann,
Veena Das, and others—Social Suffering (1997), Violence and Subjectivity (2000) and Remaking a World (2001)—which are generally recognized as the foundational references of the trauma genre’ (Sayigh, 2013, p. 53) she takes the editors to task for not looking to the causes of war trauma, alleges that they see “historical memories of suffering” … as potential causes of violence … rather than as results of violence’ and finally that ‘their work pays little attention to [ongoing] colonialism as a cause of world suffering’ (Sayigh, 2013. p. 54). In particular she objects to Kleinmann and Das’s description of “a new political geography” … marking off certain areas as “violence prone” [that] disconnects violence in those areas from historic centers of international military, political, and economic power. …. The neglect of colonialism … is reproduced throughout the trauma genre in the form of micro-level and, for the most part, ahistorical case studies’ (Sayigh, 2013. pp. 54-55).

Yet despite their salient accusations, such dismissals distract from the existence of psychic pain, and do not do justice to the complex and powerful diversification of trauma theory across disparate fields of knowledge and expertise. Without decrying the excavations of trauma genealogists and exposés of social constructionists, the researcher believes that the baby cannot, so to speak, be cast aside in preference to an analysis of the bathwater; ontologically, psychic pain is to be found, in almost all times in all societies and also on the individual level; the how and why of its transmission to the cultural collectivity is the fruit of epistemological construction. It is not the existence of psychic pain that is in dispute, but rather its aetiology, its nosology, and its phenomenological
presentation, which may differ interculturally; how or whether it can be
diagnosed; whether it is recognized by the self and/or others, whether or not
it may be spoken of, acknowledged or displayed; also the hypotheses or
theories attached to its amelioration. As Hacking (1999) asserts, ‘We need
to make room, especially in the case of our most serious
psychopathologies, for both the constructionist and the biologist … spaces
in which each can work’ (p. 109).

However, without reference to the clinical antecedents, we cannot speak at
all of trauma; the psychiatric and psychoanalytic fields gave rise its
conceptualization and classification. In the following sections, I will therefore
discuss (1) trauma’s epistemology, and, (2) the growth of medical models of
trauma. The sociological conception of trauma, a construct that is dependent
on prior clinical dimensions for intellectual sustenance, will be discussed in
Chapter Two.

1.1 Historical emergence of trauma

_Says He, who more wit than the Doctor had, Oppression will make a wise man Mad_


Any examination of the notion of societal or individual psychic trauma
requires us to re-examine the historical emergence of the concept of the
damaged mind itself, and its uncertain liberation from ‘non-medical’ notions
of madness, such as demonic possession or supernatural torment, which
course through Western culture from Oedipus to Shakespeare’s Lear and his
Another manifestation of madness was ‘hysteria’. Notes Micale (2010, p. 117):

From Graeco-Roman times onward, hysteria – the disease of the wandering womb – had been associated exclusively with adult women … for centuries the nervous disorders – hypochondriacal melancholia during the Renaissance, “the vapors” of Enlightenment France, or Victorian neurasthenia – were believed to be the province of the affluent, educated and sophisticated.

However, comments Roy Porter, on balance:

… derangement was more commonly viewed as diabolic, schemed by Satan and spread by witches and heretics. In his *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), the Oxford don Robert Burton thus identified the Tempter as the true author of despair and suicide … His contemporary, the Anglican clergyman Richard Napier, who doubled as a doctor and specialized in healing those ‘unquiet of mind’, found that many who consulted him were suffering from religious despair …(Porter, 2002, p. 19).

Michel Foucault⁵ records how in 15th century Germany, ships of ‘Holy Fools’, *Narrenschiff*:

… drifted from one town to another with their senseless cargo.

An itinerant existence was often the lot of the mad. It was common practice for towns to banish them from inside the city walls, leaving them to run wild in the distant countryside or entrusting them to the care of travelling merchants or pilgrims.
… They were often entrusted to the care of the river boatmen.

(Foucault, 2009, p. 9)

However, by the mid-17th century, the 'mad' were no longer so itinerant, and more substantial institutions for confinement were constructed, such as the infamous Hospital of Bethlem ('Bedlam'), which was rebuilt in various locations around London and survives to this day as Bethlem Royal Hospital, one of the institutions of the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust.  

The 18th century ‘age of reason’ led to the ‘secularization’ and ‘pathologisation’ of the unreasonable, as both Porter and Foucault note; *homo rationalis* in the new classical age drew more strongly on the ancient Greeks as the initiators of ‘medicalizing madness’, since ‘medicine thus excluded the supernatural by definition’ (Porter, 2002, p. 37). Cartesian dualism did not allow for insanity to be the work of the devil; Lockean thought rendered mental disturbance ‘essentially delusional, a fault in cognition rather than in will or passion’ (Porter, 2002, p. 60). For Foucault, this era also marked ‘the great confinement’ of the mad and the poor, although Porter contests that asylums have always existed throughout history to some degree and there was no ‘spectacular surge in institutionalization – it did not become the automatic solution. Different nations and jurisdictions acted dissimilarly’ (Porter, 2002, p. 93).

These early asylums, however, did become the birthplace of the new field of psychiatry and of the development of diagnoses of mental disturbance, or ‘*névrose hystéro-traumatique*’ (‘hysteria’, as it came to be known)”
through the work of Jean-Martin Charcot (1823-1893), who was professor of neurology at the psychiatric hospital of Pitié-Salpêtrière in Paris. Van der Kolk, Weisaeth and van der Hart (in van der Kolk, McFarlane and Weisaeth, 1996) assert that French researchers Briquet and Tardieu connected ‘hysteria’ with childhood trauma (mainly sexual trauma) as early as 1859 and 1878 respectively, but the diagnoses proved to be highly controversial. Charcot’s work was the more celebrated for making the hysteria-trauma connection during his research on patients at the Pitié-Salpêtrière. Charcot noted ‘how traumatically induced ‘choc nerveux’ could put patients into a mental state similar to that induced by hypnosis’ (van der Kolk et al, 1996, p. 49) and indeed, from 1878, became one of the celebrated earlier practitioners of hypnosis⁸, gaining him a certain amount of notoriety. Bogousslavsky, Walusinski and Veyrunes (2009) asserted that ‘Charcot and his school considered the ability to be hypnotized as a clinical feature of hysteria, and they repeatedly used this phenomenon in public demonstrations’ (p. 195).

Later, in order to describe many conditions such as multiple sclerosisis and peroneal muscular atrophy and contribute to the identification of numerous other disorders, such as Parkinson’s Disease, Charcot also identified the dissociative nature of patients’ episodes, owing to earlier traumatic experiences, and rejected the notion that ‘hystericis’ were generally females at the mercy of their hormones (a popular notion at the time, which Sigmund Freud’s early work only served to underline). For Charcot, ‘hysteria’ was originally ‘a ‘neurosis with an organic basis … permanent clinical features in patients who were also prone to paroxysmal fits
(grandes crises d’hystérie)’ but later he shifted to more ‘psychological
considerations … For him, ‘trauma’ became a critical factor which acted
both as a triggering factor and as a mental representation after an often
prolonged latency phase, a concept which was at the origin of the first
ideas developed on hysteria by Freud and Breuer in the 1890s

Indeed, the late Richard Webster (1996) credits Charcot (under whom
Sigmund Freud originally trained in hypnosis) with the invention of
psychoanalysis, rather than Freud and Josef Breuer themselves, from whom
later recidivist hypothesizations of ‘hysteric’ emerged, with the 1895
publication of Studien über Hysterie (Studies in Hysteria). Translator and
editor of the English edition of Studies in Hysteria James Strachey noted that
when Freud returned to Vienna from studying under Charcot to establish his
own practice, ‘hysteria provided a large proportion of his clientele’ (Breuer
and Freud, 2000, p. xi). Principally it was the ‘hysterical female’ who
‘epitomized the shattering effects of trauma on the mind’ (Leys, 2000, p. 4).
Freud and contemporaries considered the mind ‘… as an apparatus for
registering the blows to the psyche outside the domain of ordinary
awareness, and hypnotism was used as a psychotherapeutic method for
retrieving the forgotten, dissociated, or repressed recollections by bringing
them into consciousness and language’ (Leys, 2000, p. 4). However, Freud
was later to disengage from hypnosis as a method of treatment so favoured
by Charcot.
Other than Freud, some of Charcot’s students went on to become equally distinguished—such as Polish-French physician Joseph Babinski, Georges Gilles de la Tourette (for whom Tourette’s Syndrome is named) William James and Pierre Janet. Janet ‘was the first to recognize the connection between hysterical divisions of the personality and exposure to traumatic stress’ (van der Hart and Dorahy, 2009, p. 19) while Babinski rejected Charcot’s research in favour of a return to the original ‘hysteria’ notion with its inference of ‘simulation’, a stigma that predominated well into World War I as ‘war hysteria’ or ‘war neurosis’. Babinski’s methods were as controversial as those of Charcot; he required ‘male patients to appear completely naked and his female ones to wear only knickers’ in order to ‘examine their limbs quite freely and to devise innumerable tests for distinguishing organic from mental disorders’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 12). Having made his diagnosis, treatment included ‘faradism’ (an early version of electric shock therapy).

Neither Charcot nor Babinski’s methods found much favour over the Channel in England where ““hysteria has never been cultivated”” (Shephard, 2002, p. 9). Meanwhile, in 1869, the condition of ‘neurasthenia’ was preferred (popular among writers, poets and critics, such as Oscar Wilde, Virginia Woolf, Rupert Brooke and Ford Madox Ford). Constructed by American neurologist Charles Beard, this new ““disease of civilisation’ [was] brought about by “complex agencies of modern life”: “steam power, the periodic press, the telegraph, the sciences, and the mental activity of women”’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 10). Shephard notes, ‘Whether ‘real’ or ‘socially constructed’ by doctors and wider society, these mental disorders were felt to be on the increase in the 1900s.
“Nervous breakdown is the disease of our age,” one doctor wrote in 1909’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 10).

Contemporary conceptions of trauma also owe a significant debt to the work of John Eric Erichsen, a British surgeon who noted the phenomena in railway accident victims and published On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System (Erichsen, 1867), believing it to be the result of organic damage to the spinal cord (‘railway spine’). As Dell (in Dell and O’Neill, p. 725) notes, Jean-Martin Charcot also concurred; engaging in the railway trauma debates of the 1880s, he diagnosed railway trauma as ‘functional’ impairment due to neurosis. Charcot continued to follow the investigation of railway accidents, which later became known as “railway brain”, until the search for its aetiology was redirected elsewhere, by Charcot’s disciple Pierre Janet, and Freud (the latter being less well-known than Janet at the time, who was then considered ‘the leading scientist in the study of hysteria’ [(van der Hart and Dorahy, in Dell and O’Neill, 2009, p. 6)]. Freud was to advance his initial notion of ‘seduction theory’ in 1889 (linked to sexual trauma in infancy) and later the ‘fantasy hypothesis’. Fassin and Rechtman (2009, p. 31) note that Freud and Janet ‘moved a clear step beyond Charcot in connecting the etiology of hysteria with a psychological response to an external trauma’ but ‘did not see the anatomical link that Charcot postulated.’ Meanwhile, for Janet, external trauma plus psychological precondition ‘resulted in hysteria if the trauma occurred in childhood, or in trauma neurosis if it happened in adulthood’. Such a trauma neurosis may not be assimilated into consciousness, but rather produces an alternate split consciousness or ‘dissociation’, affecting memory (‘un altération de l’acte de mémoire’) and making the traumatic
event ‘unavailable to conscious recall’ (Robson, 2004, p. 19). This theorization of ‘dissociation’ remains current to practitioners of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, as Dell (2009, pp. 712-713) affirms. Breuer (in Breuer and Freud, 2000) concurs with Janet, maintaining that:

In normal people all ideas that can become current at all enter consciousness as well if they are sufficiently intense. In our [hysterical] patients we find a large complex of ideas that are admissible to consciousness existing side by side with a smaller complex of ideas that are not. Thus in them the field of ideational psychical activity does not coincide with potential consciousness. The latter is more restricted than the former. Their psychical ideational activity is divided into a conscious and an unconscious part, and their ideas are divided into some that are admissible and some that are inadmissible to consciousness. We cannot, therefore, speak of a splitting of consciousness, though we can of a splitting of the mind.

(Breuer and Freud, 2000, p. 225)

However, he disagrees with Janet that the 'splitting of a personality rests on an innate psychological weakness ('insuffisance psychologique') … a 'maladie par faiblesse' ['disease due to weakness'--for Janet, dissociation remained symptomatic of a prior deficit], (Breuer and Freud, 2000, pp. 230-231). Breuer adds, ‘Freud's observations and analyses show that the splitting of the mind can also be caused by “defence”, by the deliberate deflection of consciousness from distressing ideas’ (Breuer and Freud, 2000, p. 235).

Leys (2000) aligns Freudian trauma ‘both with the breaching of the protective
shield, or unbinding, and with mimetic identification, or binding’ (Leys, 2000, p. 33).

Yet it is actually the German-Jewish psychiatrist and neurologist Hermann Oppenheim who must be credited with the first fully-expounded usage of the contested signifier of trauma in his work, *Die Traumatische Neurosen* (Oppenheim, 1889). While emphasizing the role of the traumatized psyche, Oppenheim suggested ‘a third diagnostic category … (hysterical) paralysis resulted from the loss of memory pictures, i.e. ideas of the movement, in the brain’ (Holdorff and Dening, 2011, p. 466). Oppenheim clashed on this with fellow neurologists convening at the 1890 Berlin Medical Congress. In particular, Friedrich Jolly claimed that accident insurance legislation and injury pensions were to blame for the newly-minted condition (Holdorff and Dening, 2011, p. 467). Hacking (1995) also mentions that Erichsen fought for accident victims’ compensation, even if their injuries were not directly physical.
1.2 War Trauma

_Survivors_, by Siegfried Sassoon⁹

_No doubt they’ll soon get well; the shock and strain_

_Have caused their stammering, disconnected talk._

_Of course they’re ‘longing to go out again,’_

_These boys with old, scared faces, learning to walk._

_They’ll soon forget their haunted nights; their cowed_

_Subjection to the ghosts of friends who died,_

_Their dreams that drip with murder; and they’ll be proud_

_Of glorious war that shatter’d all their pride…_

_Men who went out to battle, grim and glad,_

_Children, with eyes that hate you, broken and mad._

Craiglockhart, October 1917

[Sassoon, 2007].

As certain traumatic milestones recede further from us in living memory, the interest in memorializing them has conversely expanded, together with analysis of the political discourse surrounding _lieux de mémoire_ and the manner of preservation and spaces of memory; in the UK, World War I is a particular case in point, despite the fact that “only” around 12 per cent of British servicemen died in the war’ (Edkins, 2003, p. 23) although many more returned deeply damaged.
World War I, which we now associate indelibly with war neurosis, caused a particularly reactionary backtracking on sensitivity to trauma. The Horatian sentiment of ‘dulce et decorum est pro patria mori’ ‘sweet and fitting to die for your own country’,\textsuperscript{10} recalled ironically by British war poet Wilfred Owen in his own poem, *Dulce et Decorum Est*, was used across Europe to inspire a generation of young men to enlist to the horrors of the trenches. While combat injuries were looked on as heroic, ‘combat madness’ or ‘war neurosis’ was regarded with suspicion as cowardice and treachery, and traumatized deserters were court-martialled. Fassin and Rechtman (2009) cite the coercive brutality of French war psychiatrist Dr. Clovis Vincent’s ‘famous torpille, electrotherapy’ (p. 45) to treat soldiers in order to return them to the battlefield as soon as possible; ‘faradism’ (in this case, applying an electric current to the skin of ‘malingeringers’) was used in Austria-Hungary, France and Britain (p. 48).

In Britain, the war-traumatized were said to be suffering from ‘shell shock’, believed to be consequent from proximity to an exploding shell. Dr. Charles Myers was among the first to describe shell shock in February 1915 (Shephard, 2002, p. 1) when ‘military psychology in the UK is generally regarded as having begun … and indeed, the recognition of psychiatric injury in general’ (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 1); Myers battled to allow for treatment and recognition of the soldiers’ condition ‘in specialist hospitals’ but ‘came to realize that there were other elements in the equation that were out of his control’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 27). Grudgingly, the British Army in France gave out the directive:
Shell-shock and shell concussion cases should have the letter W prefixed to the reports of the casualty, if it was due to the enemy; in that case the patient would be entitled to rank as ‘wounded’ and to wear on his arm a ‘wound stripe’

If, however, the man’s breakdown did not follow a shell explosion, it was not thought to be ‘due to the enemy’; and was to be labeled ‘Shell-shock, S’ (for sickness) and was not entitled to a wound stripe or a pension. (Shephard, 2002, p. 29) (researcher’s italics)

As the war wore on, the number of shell-shocked grew exponentially; Shephard (2002, p. 110) records that ‘By 1918 there were no less than 20 shell-shock hospitals in Britain, six for officers, fourteen for men, with over 6,000 beds, and numerous “Homes for Recovery”’. Yet still there was no accord on shell shock itself, nor on therapeutic treatment for it, within the medical profession. Moreover, Britain’s ‘winning of the war naturally led to a wish to close ranks … to move on and leave the past behind. … the fact that the Army had won somehow legitimized most of its activities’ (Shephard 2002, p. 138). An official inquest into shell shock under Lord Southborough eventually killed off the term as an accepted notion; the Army simply could not cope with the idea that its raison d’être, the waging of war, could result in deep damage to its (male) soldiers and to society at large; families and relationships suffered incalculably as loved ones returned, silent and alienated, prone to irrational fits of rage and sleep disorders. Thus:
… henceforth the term disappeared from official medical and military vocabularies. This represented a remarkable paradox. Just at the time when the cultural significance of shell shock was beginning to gain ground … it fell from use in psychiatric and medical texts until revived in the 1970s as an historical introduction to posttraumatic stress disorder …

Reflected through the Report was the fundamental ambivalence felt by the military to psychiatry, an unease that remains to this day. (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 54)

Nevertheless, as Jones and Wessely note (2005, p. 54), the Southborough Report “marks a new era in military medicine in that it points out in modern war the mental and nervous stability of the soldier is as important as physical fitness” (Anon, 1922a, p. 458, in Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 57). Yet at the same time, the Report ‘left the core dilemma unsolved: How to compensate the deserving (courageous men traumatized by combat) without rewarding those for whom psychological injury merely offered an escape from military duty’ (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 54).

Even though shell shock might have fallen from medical prominence, it ‘passed into common usage and became a synonym for the suffering of soldiers during World War One, note Jones and Wessely (2005, p. 60). Familiar to us now from poetry, novels, plays, theatre, films and television, ‘Shell shock was hijacked by the literary fraternity …
transformed from a diagnosis into a metaphor, moving from the medical to the metaphysical’ (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 60).

In Germany, Oppenheim, who defended his war-damaged patients against charges of ‘malingering’, ‘immorality’ and Willenskrankheit (disease of the failed will, also variously referred to as Willenversagung, Willenshemmung, Willensperrung, Wille zur Krankheit), also lost much status in the debate. Leading German psychiatrist Bonhoeffer and contemporaries maintained that such conditions were either due to hereditary weakness or a Rentenneurose (compensation neurosis). Germany’s 1926 National Health Insurance Act (Reichversicherungs Ordnung or RVO) decreed that the long-term war shocked could not receive compensation, since persistence pointed to ‘predisposition, constitution, “degenerative inclination”’ (van der Kolk, Weisaeth and van der Hart, in van der Kolk et al, 1996, p. 51).

Schäffner (2001), discussing both German war-damaged and accident victims’ claims, notes that popular conception considered that:

… it was not the accident, but actually the insurance itself that caused psychic injuries. The accident, which appears as psychic trauma, is a discursive bundle in which issues of medicine, jurisprudence, and insurance are intertwined … Thus the insurance-technical approach to trauma and accidents is part of a nonrepressive exercise of power, namely, through stimulation and regulation (Schäffner, 2001. p. 82).
It is noteworthy that the RVO endured until minor modifications in 1959 and again in 1975, but was basically maintained in its restrictive spirit until 1992. For the German welfare state, the issue with trauma was that ‘causes and symptoms that are so difficult to verify lead to the suspicion that the victims are presenting fictive injuries’ (Schäffner, 2001, p. 84). A compassionate society may well be generally receptive towards the notion of trauma, but at root, particularly because of the possibility of legal compensation, there remains a lingering whiff of simulation, an historical throwback from the debate of war neurosis, as Schäffner reminds us (2001, p. 84).

Leys asserts that nevertheless, ‘a small and increasingly influential minority recognized the psychogenic nature of the war neuroses’ (2000, p. 4), seeking solutions in Sigmund Freud’s hypotheses on dissociation and the unconscious. Indeed, in Vienna, 1920, Freud himself testified—albeit to little effect—on the psychological origins of shell shock in the government inquiry on the brutal electrotherapy treatment of war-shocked soldiers by the reputable Viennese physician Julius von Wagner-Jauregg, (Scott, 1990, p. 296). On Freud’s principled objection to Wagner-Jauregg and other Austrian military psychiatrists, Danto (2016) comments:

Freud's interpretation of war neurosis was both psychological and sociological. Psychologically, when the human mind is pressed to an extreme, it reacts to suffering whether or not the sufferer is consciously aware of its source in the present. In that sense, the psychological difference between war neurosis and malingering is one of motivation: neurotics are not conscious of their motivation but malingerers are.
Sociologically, citizens had tired of the endless fighting. "We had a people's army," Freud testified. "Men were forced into military service, [and] they were not asked whether they liked to go to war; that is why one has to understand that people wanted to flee." Freud also indicted the abuse of power in the military hospital. "Some physicians forgot their humanitarian duties… [and] allowed their sense of power to make an appearance in a brutal fashion" (Danto, 2016, p. 52).

However, at the time, the ‘theoretical lineage of war neurosis—which passed through the great work of Oppenheim, Charcot, Freud and Janet—in no way accounts for the therapeutic methods established from the very beginning of the war to treat traumatized soldiers … the war resulted in a detour in the history of traumatic neurosis' (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, p. 44). It stained psychiatry’s name, as many of the early treatments basically amounted to forms of torture. Meanwhile in the U.S., ‘Public opinion saw psychiatry as an instrument of social control, which wrongly classed all of the undesirables that U.S. society did not know how to deal with as insane’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, p. 85). Some interpretations, however, maintain that at least as far as British physicians were concerned, they:

… received their first practical introductions to the new medical psychology while working in army hospitals … They subsequently gained a considerable expertise in handling and treating nervous disorder and were responsible for a prodigious volume of books and articles on psychotherapy and psychopathology during the early 1920s. (Stone, 1985, p. 243, cited in Jones and Wessely, 2009, p. 55.)
This did not offset criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis in the UK; Jones and Wessely (2009, p. 56) describe the emerging discipline as somewhat ‘beleaguered’ in the interwar years, as by and large, interest in trauma waned after the Great War. However, the Great War set the stage for the later development of the category of combat stress reactions (CSR) such as ‘gross stress reaction’ in the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA)’s first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I). In addition, the interwar work of Abram Kardiner (discussed in section 3.1 below) paved the way for introduction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). PTSD was introduced as a diagnostic category in DSM-III in 1980, receiving accreditation in the wake of the Vietnam War.

1.3 Growth of Medical Models: Empirical evidence for trauma

[And] a dream full of horror has still not ceased to visit me, at sometimes frequent, sometimes longer, intervals. … as the dream proceeds, slowly and brutally, each time in a different way, everything collapses, and disintegrates around me, the scenery, the walls, the people, while the anguish becomes more intense and more precise. … a well-known voice resounds: a single word, not imperious, but brief and subdued. It is the dawn command, of Auschwitz, a foreign word, feared and expected: get up, "Wstawàch." (Levi, 1995, p. 207)
His father died in the concentration camps. 'The people who came back from the camps were never able to talk about it,' Marceau later said. 'My name is Mangel. I am Jewish. Perhaps that, unconsciously, contributed towards my choice of silence.' (Schubert, 2012, loc. 12)

As the condition of trauma gradually began to be recognized as a form of damage, rather than a spiritual or supernatural aberration, it became possible to speak of an empirical ‘turn’ towards its study, more or less mirroring the developments of psychiatry and psychology that were enabled by the development of the rationalist and materialist movements. In the medical models that were to emerge, the ‘subjects’ are patients.

The work of Abram Kardiner (1891-1981) marks the emergence of empirical studies of trauma. Kardiner—who had been a student-patient under Freud during 1921-1922—treated over a thousand patients at the U.S. Veterans Hospital in the Bronx between 1923-1925. He related that patients would often experience attacks (symptoms would include palpitations, dizziness, vertigo, vomiting, loss of consciousness, seizures, numbness, paralysis and war nightmares) some years after their war experiences; certain smells, for example, might set off the patient’s attack, and if not tackled, led to the onset of phobias or failures of adaptation. When he was able to show patients how their episodes could be invoked, Kardiner occasionally managed to bring relief; but his observation that the reactions were a ‘typical conditioned reflex’ (Kardiner, 1941, p. 43) brought him further away from Freud and closer to Pavlovian behavioral psychology.
In 1941, just after the outbreak of World War II, Kardiner published *The Traumatic Neuroses of War* (Kardiner, 1941). He highlighted the plethora of patients’ previous misdiagnoses of malingering and hysteria, and was the first to describe in detail the typical symptoms of the traumatically damaged: extreme explosive reactions to touch, temperature, sudden sounds, becoming fixated on trauma; having flashbacks and panic attacks; becoming angry, withdrawn and declining into depression. Above all, Kardiner maintained that:

… the doctor’s task was to intervene before the “defensive reaction” had become consolidated and “a new adaptation was established on the ruins of what remains of the inhibited personality”. There was “reason for haste in diagnosis and treatment. It is a race against time.” (Shephard, 2002, p. 156)

Kardiner’s was ‘by far the most sophisticated interpretation of the war neuroses yet,’ asserts Shephard (2002, p. 156), in that he succeeded ‘to integrate the physiological side with the psychological … for which he coined the term a “physio-neurosis”’. Moreover, Kardiner’s work was ‘rooted in hard clinical reality over a long period of time in a way that few previous studies had been … His message was grim, almost determinist – that war inevitably damaged men’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 156).

Meanwhile, although Kardiner’s theories would pave the way for the introduction of the concept of PTSD in the DSM-III, one year into the Second World War, interest in trauma remained low, perhaps because of his bleak prognosis. This situation continued despite post-war empirical research into
‘the long-term effects of trauma on survivors of the Holocaust—studies from the 1950s onwards that identified the existence of a chronic “concentration-camp syndrome” or “survivor syndrome”’ (Leys, 2000, p. 5; Eitinger, Krell and Rieck, 1985). Danieli (2009) recounts how in the late 1960s, she interviewed survivors:

Astonishingly, all of those interviewed asserted that no-one, including mental health professionals, listened to them or believed them when they attempted to share their Holocaust experiences and their continuing suffering. They, and later their children, concluded that people who had not gone through the same experiences could not understand and/or did not care.

With bitterness, many thus opted for silence about the Holocaust and its aftermath in their interactions with non-survivors. The resulting conspiracy of silence between Holocaust survivors and society … including mental health, justice, and other professionals … has proven detrimental to the survivors’ familial and sociocultural reintegration by intensifying their already profound sense of isolation, loneliness, and mistrust of society. … The conspiracy of silence is the most prevalent and effective mechanism for the transmission of trauma on all dimensions (Danieli, 1998, pp. 351-352).

In her books on trauma, Trauma: A Genealogy (2000) and From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After (2009) Ruth Leys discusses the delayed discovery of ‘survivor guilt’, partly as a result of interviews with
psychiatrists who were sympathetic to victims’ distress and did their best to allow survivors to claim compensation through West German Wiedergutmachung (‘making good’) reparation laws (from 1953 onwards).\textsuperscript{11}

Yet studies on the long-term effects Holocaust trauma and survivors’ guilt syndrome ‘remained somewhat isolated from the literature on combat neuroses, and to some extent also from the literature on civilian trauma’ (Leys, 2000, p. 15).\textsuperscript{12} (‘Survivor guilt’ was later dropped as a sub-category of PTSD, in DSM-IV.) Retroactively, notes Leys, ‘the Holocaust now appears … to have been the crucial trauma of the [20\textsuperscript{th}] century, but also the one that can be fully understood in the light of our knowledge of PTSD’. It also points to ‘two distinct paths—initially social, then clinical—taken by the notion of trauma, and they prefigure the uses of this notion that would become widespread throughout the Western world thirty years later’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, p. 72).

It is worth pointing out a recent challenge to the theorists of the ‘conspiracy of silence’ regarding empirical evidence of traumatized Holocaust survivors (leaving aside the proponents of the political instrumentalisation ‘turn’, such as the late Peter Novick [2000] and Norman [Finkelstein, 2000]). Cesarani (in Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012) profoundly disagrees with the ‘myth of silence’, describing it as a ‘set of beliefs almost immune to contrary data’ (Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, Loc.221). He provides a comprehensive overview of interviews, archives, and memoirs in many languages and asserts that they were in fact overwhelming in quantity, even
if the onset of the Cold War hampered their further flow. ‘Contrary to the notion that individual survivors were silent or too traumatized to act, they had mounted a frenetic, global effort to transmit information about the Jewish catastrophe. If anything, they succeeded too well, too soon,’ maintains Cesarani (Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, Loc. 1021). Cohen (in Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012) describes the ‘silence’ of traumatised survivors who resettled in the US as the mixture of the results of self-censorship in the face of incomprehension; silencing by others because the horrific details made squeamish American Jews uncomfortable; and psychiatrists and relief workers who:

... in their rush to get the refugees off relief ... ignored, minimized or even mocked the newcomers’ references to the war, believing that the newcomers wanted special treatment because of their experiences. At time the case workers suggested that the refugees were weak and dependent, or that they were better off because of their experiences, and urged their clients to move ahead as quickly as possible and leave the past firmly behind. (Cohen, in Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, Loc. 5668)

For Hasia Diner, the origins of the myth of silence lay perhaps in 1960s radical youth counterculture, which in general turned on the earlier generation, determined to ‘speak truth to power’, berating the establishment for its ‘accommodationist, conciliatory and assimilationist’ appeasing behaviour (Diner, in Cesarani and Sundquist, 2012, Loc. 6003). Thus the ‘veterans, figurative and literal, of the late 1960s ... want to be able to claim that they themselves undid the evils of the pernicious post-war period when
the Holocaust constituted a taboo topic, an uninvited guest to the community table, a reflection of a widespread, self-imposed collective amnesia’ (Loc. 6160). Historiographers who ‘produced a flawed history and perpetrated an injustice to the past’ receive scathing criticism from Diner (Loc. 6174).

What seems clear from all this debate is that for the emergent medical (psychiatric) and psychological models of trauma, there was no lack of empirical evidence to be found; what was less clear was how to narrate or interpret the evidence—and above all, which discipline could claim therapeutic ownership.

1.4 Trauma and war: Further psychological manifestations

The Cry of My Lai / It Makes No Difference

Ivan Lee

There in a ditch, a small baby cried, any man that would do this
Is bound to be possessed by the devil himself in disguise,
They may set him free, but he will still hear that small baby cry
Hey lieutenant, you're not god, you're just a lieutenant
And the devil possesses your soul

The term ‘Battle Shock’ or Combat Stress Reaction—CSR—was coined by Mullins and Glass for World War II victims (Mullins and Glass, 1973). Yet it was the disastrous U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War (1956-1975), rather than the mounting empirical evidence emerging from the World Wars or Holocaust survivors, which placed trauma most prominently on the
psychological map. With the benefit of a certain amount of historical hindsight, Fassin and Rechtman (2009, p. 89) comment on how:

The brutality of the battles, the mounting casualty numbers, the anxiety of soldiers’ families—all these factors, highlighted by intense media coverage, made this war more and more a presence in the everyday life of the United States. It seemed to be happening under the very eyes of the people, on their doorstep, within their own being. Trauma—which everyone understood, and, at least to some extent, shared—was no longer a mark of cowardice or malingering.

Familiar to us from a multitude of films, documentaries and contemporary accounts, the war ‘more than any other war in the twentieth century … redefined the social role of psychiatry and society’s perception of mental health,’ according to Shephard (2002, p. 355). The Vietnam war, with its one-year tour of intense combat duty, was regarded as unique by many Americans. In a chilling, hyperbolic essay entitled ‘Stress Disorders Among Vietnam Veterans: The Emotional Content of Combat Continues’ psychiatrist Chaim Shatan described the experience as ‘terror so total and the dehumanization of Orientals so pervasive … that mass slaughter became almost as automatic as it was in Nazi death camps’ (Shatan, 1978, p. 43). Referring to Stanley Milgram’s infamous studies in the 1960s and early 1970s on obedience, Shatan painted a vivid portrait of soldiers’ transformation into killing machines that enforced ‘a type of sensory dislocation’ (Shatan, 1978, p. 45) but left them profoundly disturbed and unable to cope thereafter, ‘The paranoid hyperalertness and autonomic arousal of the combat stance emerge as manifestations of disturbed functioning. While obviously adaptational in the
combat zone, they are maladaptive elsewhere’ (Shatan, 1978, p. 46). As combatants returned home exhibiting signs of wounded psyches, Horowitz and Solomon (1975) predicted delayed stress response to their experiences. Thereafter, many studies (too many and too conflictive to report on within the confines of this project) ‘were published that identified growing numbers of servicemen who blamed their symptoms or social maladjustment on their war service’ (Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 129). Shephard (2002, p. 340) inverts the chronology of data collection to underline the latency of emergence of symptoms that became PTSD: in 1990, a hugely expensive ($9 million) Congress-authorised report attests that ‘no less than 480,000 out of the 3.15 million Americans (15%) who had served in Vietnam were still, fifteen years after the end of the war, suffering from war-related psychological problems’ and that ‘between a quarter and a third of all who served in Vietnam, had at one time or another had the full-blown [PTSD] disorder’. Yet back in 1967, U.S. army psychiatrists had been rather more optimistic about the mental health of their servicemen and women.¹⁴ Post-World War II and Korea, more experienced U.S. military psychiatrists believed that “Psychiatric casualties need never again become a major cause of attrition in the United States military in a combat zone” (Bourne, 1970, p. 487, cited in Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 129).

Yet the truth was that military psychiatrists fared no better in coping in this particular war, due to a number of factors. For one thing, as Shephard (2002, p. 344) notes, Vietnam was a “class war”: the burden of the fighting was unfairly borne by ethnic minorities and the poor’ while psychiatrists were, for the most part, white, and later on in the war, when knowledge of atrocities
such as My Lai came to be more widely known, themselves took part in the anti-war rebellion against returning mentally unfit soldiers back to the front line as soon as possible. The prescription for troops of tranquillisers such as Thorazine became widespread; marijuana use was commonplace, and heroin addiction became endemic, in keeping with the counterculture spirit from the mid-1960s on; the numbing effect of the drug usage may well have accounted for the latent stress symptoms that emerged after the war, which was at first termed ‘post-Vietnam syndrome’ (Shephard, 2002, pp. 347-353; Jones and Wessely, 2005, p. 130).

In a sense, the cultural climate—in particular the revolution of social values that took place across the U.S. and Europe in the 1960s—was ripe for the diagnosis and acceptance of this new trauma. Shephard credits the consequent post-World War II boom in available psychiatric counselling to the ‘new “consciousness of trauma” in Western society’ (Shephard, 2002, p. 355). The roots of the acceptance of the new category grew very slowly from post-World War II empathetic reactions to victims of the Nazi Holocaust, but flourished rather more in the ambience of the 1960s and early 1970s with their rights-based social revolutions—civil, gay and women's rights (Ann Burgess and Linda Holstrom in 1974 identified ‘rape trauma’ syndrome). Specifically influential were the activities of anti-war pressure groups, such as the Vietnam Veterans Against War veterans group. The latter publicized the massacre carried out by American soldiers in the village of My Lai in 1969 and held ‘rap groups’ for members to talk openly about their experiences; their activities came to involve anti-war psychiatrists such as
Mardi Horowitz, Chaim Shatan and Robert Lifton (author of the controversial Home From the War [Lifton, 1973]), as did the more widely-based National Veterans Resource Project. Finally, APA psychiatrist Robert Spitzer appointed a formal Committee on Reactive Disorders that produced the PTSD category for DSM-III (APA, 1980).

Reception of the new category was highly controversial. Scott (1990, p. 308) points cynically not only to the production of a new ‘regime of truth’ in the widening acceptance of the new diagnostic category of PTSD, but that in turn, it was used to ‘create other objective realities; such as ‘acknowledgements of war’s horrors, populations of treatable clinical cases of PTSD, patients entitled to insurance coverage’ so that eventually, ‘each new clinical diagnosis of PTSD, each new warrantable medical insurance claim, each new narrative about the disorder reaffirms its reality, its objectivity, its “just thereness”’. Jones and Wessely (2009), critiquing the conflictive epidemiological evidence for post-Vietnam PTSD, note that while the ‘powerful and charismatic [anti-war] campaigners believed with conviction that the Vietnam War was immoral … Others reacted equally vehemently against the perceived politicization of psychiatry’ (p. 135). It does not sit well with them that ‘nearly all of the studies on the aetiology, nosology and epidemiology of PTSD did not precede its introduction in DSM, as one might expect, but followed it’ (Jones and Wessely, 2009, p. 135), a case of the tail wagging the dog.

Many trauma victims, not only Vietnam veterans but also rape victims, battered women and abused children, were lumped together in the new
‘regime of truth’, until a more scientific process reconsidered the categories with the publication of the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). U.S. researchers Horowitz (1978), Terr (1979, 1983) and Krystal (1978) all contributed to the expansion of the understanding of PTSD, including not only war but also reactions to a whole range of other traumatic life events: sexual violence in war and (negative) ‘peace’; familial abuse patterns; accidents, natural disasters (such as tsunami, earthquake, hurricane) and man-made disasters; victims of terrorism and genocides; refugees and migrants fleeing political violence, who face a complex range of additional psychological stressors in unfamiliar new cultures.

Later, multinational military involvement in the Gulf War produced a further combat-related trauma variant, ‘Gulf War Syndrome’ (Kilshaw, 2004; Iversen, Chalder and Wessely, 2007; Cohn, Dyson and Wessely, 2008), while PTSD has more recently been diagnosed in Iraq and Afghanistan war military (Marx, Brailey, Proctor, MacDonald, Graefe, Amoroso, Heeren and Vasterling, 2009; Schnurr, Lunney, Bovin, and Marx, 2009; Tuerk, Grubaugh, Hamner, and Foa, 2009; Thomas, Wilk, Rivière, McGurk, Castro and Hoge, 2010, Warner, Appenzeller, Grieger, Belenkiy, Breitbach, Parker, Warner and Hoge, 2011; Tuerk, Yoder, Grubaugh, Myrick, Hamner and Acierno, 2011). Combat stress trauma research has increased exponentially, and with it, the implications for and controversial research into PTSD-based compensation claims, as Marx and Holowka (2011, p. 1) observe:
From 1999 to 2010, the number of Veterans of the United States military receiving compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for service-connected PTSD increased 222% to 386,882. This dramatic and rapid increase in the rate of diagnosed service-connected PTSD has intensified longstanding concerns that the VA’s disability policies, procedures, and treatment programs promote compensation-seeking and illness behavior, while diminishing engagement in treatment because Veterans fear loss of compensation.

In a wide-ranging review of research on compensation issues and PTSD from the 1990s on, Marx and Holowka conclude that the evidence is ‘mixed’; many studies are currently limited by non-standardized ‘psychometrically sound’ instruments and methodology; but it seems that ‘direct evidence regarding the prevalence of malingering or exaggeration among Veterans who are applying for or who have received service connection for PTSD does not exist. Prior estimates have only been based on conjecture, case examples or small scale convenience samples’ (Marx and Holowka, 2011, p. 2). Citing a 2005 study of 2,100 cases by the VA Office of the Inspector General, Marx and Holowka note that just ‘13 (2.5% of those not adequately verified and 0.6% of the total sample) were considered “potentially fraudulent” by investigators’. However, they add a caveat that ‘additional research with larger representative samples is needed’ to clarify this thorny issue. Above all, ‘future research has enormous potential to shape policy … as well as to affect the lives of countless Veterans’.
1.5 Further psychological battlegrounds

Conceptualisations of combat stress disorder emanated not only from U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Independently, empirical evidence for war trauma was being collected among a contained and exhaustively-documented population required to serve in the Israel Defence Forces in the first Lebanon War that began in 1982, considered to be ‘Israel’s Vietnam’ (the repressed memories of conscripts’ traumatic experiences was rendered memorably by Israeli film director Ari Folman, in his nightmarish 2008 autobiographical documentary-animation, *Waltz with Bashir*).

A newly-formed military research unit on ‘combat reaction’ hand-collected and filed soldiers’ data in a pre-computer age for a longitudinal study in order to assess factors in CSR risk, effective treatment and recovery. ‘To the best of my knowledge,’ writes lead researcher Zehava Solomon, ‘this was the first time in military history that a data base of this sort had been established’ (Solomon, 1993, p. 13). Questionnaires based on the new DSM-III diagnostic criteria and clinical interviews were conducted with CSR subjects and control groups in 1982, 1983 and 1984; among the long-term goals were the IDF’s need to know what happens:

… in Israel’s unique circumstances, which require many men to participate in war a number of times. What happens to soldiers who are exposed to war more than once? Do they become stronger and more resistant to battle stress, or does the recurrent expose to combat make the more vulnerable in the future? (Solomon, 1993, p. 25)
In particular, the objective was to clarify ‘how long and profound are the wounds of war’ – i.e., to investigate the respective validities of the ‘stress evaporation hypothesis’ or the ‘residual stress hypothesis’ (short or long-term damage caused by CSR, and the nature of the post-CSR sequelae, i.e. the extent of PTSD).

The clinicians experienced the usual significant challenges in arriving at a taxonomy of CSR, since sufferers exhibited ‘a very wide range of symptoms and behaviors’ in various unpredictable combinations, including anxiety, depression, apathy, lack of responsiveness, phobias. This confirms past findings of the ‘labile, polymorphic’ character of CSR. There were ‘a range of cognitive disturbances, including lack of concentration, the inability to understand or communicate … becoming scattered or forgetful’ in addition to a variety of ‘somatic symptoms—ranging from heavy perspiration, vomiting, nausea, diarrhea, and loss of appetite to rapid pulse rate and heart palpitations, headaches and dizziness, and tics and tremors’ (Solomon, 1993, p. 31). Some subjects also showed ‘a loss of functioning in some part of the body without any organic impairment … paralysis of the limbs and mutism. There were many cases, too, of partial amnesia,’ reports Solomon (1993, p. 31). Additionally:

There were casualties who became listless and passive, who withdrew into themselves, sitting off to the side, gazing into space, not talking to anyone, not fighting. There were casualties who became very restless and irritable … Some exhibited strong startle reactions. Some burst into rage out of all proportion to the supposed provocation … Others worried
unduly about their equipment. Rumor mongering and generally looking for every and any excuse to panic were also observed…. (Solomon, 1993, p. 31).

The findings—that ‘nearly half of the soldiers who sustained a CSR on the battlefield were still suffering from pervasive diagnosable disturbances 3 years after’ (Solomon, 1993, pp. 57-58) despite intensive therapy—gave the researchers pause; even the control group exhibited a degree of PTSD, despite having been selected as healthy participants (which says something about the masculine ‘Sabra’ ethos of the time, in which Israelis did not easily seek therapy). Nor did veterans of multiple wars necessarily exhibit greater psychological strength; in many cases, past CSRs were re-activated or amplified. The implications remain significant for a ‘small, closely-knit’ and highly militarized society such as Israel (in which almost all Jewish citizens are obliged to take part in military service and reserve service thereafter). ‘There are relatively few Israelis who are not associated, with a greater or lesser degree of intimacy, with someone who has been in combat,’ notes Solomon. ‘Thus, even if only a very small number of soldiers sustain CSRs, any aftereffects affect the lives of a relatively large circle of people’ (Solomon, 1993, p. 54). Emphasizing the critical societal ‘ripple effect’ of CSR, Solomon asserts:

The distressed combatant is not an isolated individual, but part of a larger community of immediate and more distant family members; of friends, acquaintances, and colleagues; and of the nation in whose army he served and in which he was traumatized. The personal consequences of his breakdown
inevitably touch the lives of many other people, who are affected by his distress and who also have a moral responsibility to try to repair whatever damage he may have incurred on their behalf. (Solomon, 1993, p. 54).

It is not recorded what Solomon’s employers made of the researchers’ ultimate conclusions that ‘the best way to prevent combat-induced psycho-pathology is to stop making war’ (Solomon, 1993, p. 256) but clearly, since just over 20 years have passed since this particular collection of empirical evidence for war trauma, the message remained unheard.

1.6 Quantitative measures

This section will discuss controversial attempts to impose a more quantitative approach towards the assessment of psychological trauma, beginning with the formal classification of symptomology by the APA in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental Disorders and its relationship to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD, adopted by the World Health Organization from 1948 on, and now moving towards its 11th edition). In tracing this process, the preoccupation with the identification of symptom clusters for formulating diagnoses—in the absence of a deeper understanding of causality—becomes apparent, as Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz noted back in 1999, ‘Because the etiology of most mental disorders is largely unknown, psychiatric research remains particularly dependent on the principles and process of syndrome identification’ (Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz, 1999, p. 1677). Fifteen years later, we are much more advanced in the breadth of trauma research—an extensive and burgeoning field—but perhaps rather less so in depth. It is perhaps a reflection of the fact that our knowledge of
neuroscience is still relatively in its infancy in comparison to other branches of medicine.

1.7 The APA and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental Disorders

Originally formed in 1844 in Philadelphia due to the need to collect census information on mental illness (APA, 2014), the APA’s ancestor, the Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, became the American Medico-Psychological Association in 1892. It finally acquired its present name, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1921. With each new manifestation, the demand grew to produce a more ‘scientific’ taxonomy of mental illnesses; modernity seemed to prove especially stressful on the American mind.

The Statistical Manual for the Use of Institutions for the Insane, issued in 1918, was the first such attempt to publish ‘neat categories of mental illness’ that had little to do with Freudian accounts of the psyche (Greenberg, 2013, p. 30). The Statistical Manual was updated ten times from then until 1942, but since its original impetus was the harvesting of epidemiological data about institutionalised mental patients, it could not speak to the growing numbers of psychiatrists dealing with war-shocked servicemen. Greenberg (p. 31, 2013) describes the growing chaos in psychiatric clinics:

… they began to improvise, stretching diagnostic categories to fit their patients, inventing labels when that didn’t work, and borrowing disease names from other medical specialities wherever they could. The armed forces developed their own
nosology, as did the Veterans Administration, and these began to compete for primacy with the edition of the Statistical Manual that had been issued in 1942.

Greenberg cites the APA’s George Raines’ complaint that by 1948 ‘at least three nomenclatures were in general use, and none of them fell into line with the International Statistical Classification’ (Greenberg, p. 31, 2013).

Meanwhile, in 1949 the WHO had published its sixth edition of the ICD, which ‘for the first time, included a section for mental disorders. ICD-6 was heavily influenced by the Veterans Administration nomenclature and included 10 categories for psychoses and psychoneuroses and seven categories for disorders of character, behavior, and intelligence’ (APA, 2014).

By 1950, Raines and his committee had also produced a radical revision, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental Disorders (APA, 1952), geared towards psychiatrists in search of diagnoses (and as a by-product, medical insurance companies in search of clarity) rather than data collection, now the task of the newly-formed National Institute of Mental Health. The new DSM contained 106 disorders (‘reactions’\textsuperscript{16}) that were grouped either by ‘impairment of brain tissue function’ or ‘psychogenic origin or without clearly defined physical cause or structural change in the brain’ (Sanders, 2011, p. 397). Being more Freudian and psychoanalytical in character, the less pathological, less empirically-based approach did not suit all members.\textsuperscript{17} The manual was expanded in 1968 to 182 ‘disorders’ with the publication of the DSM-II (APA, 1968); ‘reactions’ had fallen from favour ‘because [they] implied causality and referred to psychoanalysis (terms like “neuroses” and “psychophysiologic disorders” remained, though’) (Tartakovsky, 2011).
Over the years, a cloud has hovered over the APA and its association with the pharmaceuticals industry (Cosgrove, Krimsky, Vijayaraghavan and Schneider, 2006; Healy, 2006; Greenberg, 2013; Kirk, 2013; Whitaker, 2010) and in particular, over its inclusion of homosexuality in the DSM as a disorder. Bayer (1987, p. 3) recorded disapprovingly how:

In 1973, after several years of bitter dispute, the Board of Trustees of the American Psychiatric Association decided to remove homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual … Infuriated by that action, dissident psychiatrists charged the leadership of their association with an unseemly capitulation to the threats and pressures of Gay Liberation Groups, and forced the board to submit its decision to a referendum of the full APA membership. And so America’s psychiatrists were called upon to vote upon the question of whether homosexuality ought to be considered a mental disease. The entire process, from the first confrontations organized by gay demonstrators … seemed to violate the most basic expectations about how questions of science should be resolved. … psychiatric experts [were compelled] to negotiate the pathological status of homosexuals with homosexuals themselves.

The compromise drawn up by psychiatrist Robert Spitzer de-listed homosexuality but allowed for the curious diagnosis of ‘Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality’, which was explained as a condition of ‘people who were gay and didn’t want to be … the result, at least in part, of “negative social attitudes [that] have been internalized”’ (Greenberg, 2013, p. 35). Although Sanders
(2011, p. 395) warns us against ‘Presentism’ and ‘Whiggism’ in applying contemporary attitudes towards historical social issues, there is no doubt that the dispute did much to discredit psychiatry. Meanwhile the DSM’s ‘Freudian turn’ was, according to Spitzer, drawing the profession into further turmoil; the notion that:

… same-sex love was the result of damage inflicted in childhood by absent fathers and overbearing mothers, and that, in general, mental suffering was the result of the eternal war among ego, id, and superego … [was leading] psychiatry to near shipwreck. … Freud’s theory of mind was a poor substitute for pathological anatomy, and the complexes and resistances and defense mechanisms … were far too ungrounded in any kind of empirical reality to be useful. Proving the existence of ego, id, and superego was like proving the existence of the Holy Trinity. (Greenberg, 2013, p. 37)

Consequently, by 1978, Spitzer, Endicott and Robins produced the more ‘reliable’ Research Diagnostic Criteria: Rationale and Reliability (RDC) based on the ‘Feighner criteria’, ‘specific diagnostic criteria for 15 mental disorders that they [the researchers] had been validated by research’ (Spitzer, 1989, p. 21). Commented Spitzer:

These criteria filled a void, since the American Psychiatric Association’s official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (at that time, the second edition, DSM-II) only contained general and often vague descriptions of the clinical features of the various disorders. In contrast, the Feighner criteria explicitly indicated which symptoms needed to be
present to make the diagnosis, and, in many cases, which
symptoms, if present, precluded making the diagnosis. (Spitzer,
1989, p. 21)

The *RDC* were very different from the *DSM II*, which ‘listed illnesses like
Depressive Neurosis … a “disorder manifested by an excessive reaction of
depression due to an internal conflict” (Greenberg, 2013, p. 38). Instead, the
*RDC* contained disorders such as Major Depressive Disorder ‘defined not in a
paragraph full of Freudian jargon, but as a list of symptoms’ (Greenberg,
2013, p. 38).

Expanding the research criteria of the *RDC* led to the publication of the *DSM-
III* in 1980 (APA, 1980), which was updated seven years later as the *DSM-III-R*
(APA, 1987), taking psychiatry back to its neo-Kraepelinian22 roots.) The
500-page *DSM-III* used an evaluation of five ‘axes’ addressing ‘mental
disorder, personality, medical causes, environmental factors, and general
functioning in diagnoses’ that was ‘viewed as advantageous’ (Sanders, 2011,
p. 398) and ‘not only restored both internal and external confidence in
psychiatry; it was also an international bestseller’ (Greenberg, 2013, p. 41).
Sanders (2011, p. 398) records that clinicians and researchers alike preferred
the new manual’s ‘atheoretical stance’ and the ‘more comprehensive and
systematic, and discrete categories’.

Yet the manual also had its critics. Allan Young (1995, p. 100), commenting
on the *DSM-III’s* ‘revolutionary turn in American psychiatry’, noted that
proponents of the previous psychodynamic approach (of psychiatry and
psychoanalysis) absolutely ‘rejected the notion that any diagnostic language
could be atheoretical’ and criticized its ‘lack of nuance’. Furthermore, writing about the *DSM-III* and its successor, the *DSM-IV* (APA, 1994), which was later updated as the *DSM-IV-TR* (APA, 2000) Kirk and Kutchins complained that the manual’s problem still remained:

The process of revising *DSM* is increasingly shrouded in the rhetoric of science. But if one looks intensively at what was identified as the core scientific problem of diagnosis in the 1970s, unreliability, one discovers that the scientific data used to claim success and great improvement simply do not support the claim. In fact, it appears that the reliability problem is much the same as it was 30 years ago. Only now, the current developers of *DSM-IV* have de-emphasised the reliability problem and claim to be scientifically solving other problems. … There are important methodological problems that limit the generalisability of most reliability studies. (Kirk and Kutchins, 1994)

Additionally, the artificial multiaxial system also gave rise to problems of co-morbidity (increased likelihood that patients would tick psychiatrists’ boxes for more than one categorization of mental illness) literally ‘trapping diagnosticians in a tautological loop’ (Greenberg, 2013, p. 54).

With each new version of the *DSM* the process expanded exponentially. In addition to two methods conferences, thirteen work groups reported to the *DSM-IV* taskforce, which in turn liaised with ‘more than 60 organizations and associations’ (APA, 1994, p. xxiv), carried out 12 field trials in ‘more than 70 sites and evaluated more than 6,000 subjects’ (APA, 1994, p. xxviii) in an
effort to improve reliability and validity; in addition, with an eye on the
competition, the *DSM-IV* Task Force worked with the parties responsible for
reformulating the *ICD-10* (WHO, 1992); according to the APA, the "codes and
terms provided in *DSM-IV* are fully compatible with both ICD-9-CM and ICD-
10" (p. xxix).24

The latest manual, *DSM-V*, was published in 2013 to much fanfare and an
equal amount of controversy. From its pre-publication days on, Chair of the
Task Force for *DSM-IV* Allen Frances and *DSM-III* Task Force Chair Robert
Spitzer and others engaged in vigorous criticism of *DSM-V* in a series of
colourful articles in the *Psychiatric Times* (Berkson, 2009; Frances, 2009a,
2009b, 2009c, 2009d; Spitzer, 2009) accusing the current Task Force of lack
of transparency, inflation of diagnoses and sloppy methodology; the current
Task Force and its defenders responded (Schatzberg, Scully, Kupfer and
Reglar, 2009, Carpenter, 2009). Frances also blogged his concerns in *The
Huffington Post* and *Psychology Today* (Frances, 2013a, 2013b) and in his
latest book (Frances, 2013c). The new manual’s ‘goal to effect a “paradigm
shift” in psychiatric diagnosis is absurdly premature,’ Frances asserted,
continuing, ‘… descriptive psychiatric diagnosis does not now need and
cannot support a paradigm shift. There can be no dramatic improvements in
psychiatric diagnosis until we make a fundamental leap in our understanding
of what causes mental disorders’.

Despite the APA’s controversial history and the history of the *DSM* itself, the
‘Book of Woe’ (Greenberg, 2013) remains still an international standard as far
as diagnostic criteria are concerned. For better or worse, it influenced the
passage of the U.S. of the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) in 1996 and the subsequently revised Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA) in 2008 that allowed patients suffering from mental illness to claim for treatment through their insurers. The MHPAEA was, however, rather like Obamacare, not quite there. As former senators Pete Domenici (a sponsor of the bill) and Gordon Smith note in an Op Ed in The Washington Post, ‘Waiting for mental health parity’:

When any law is passed, the federal government must implement and enforce it to make its benefits and provisions a reality. … Yet regulatory action has stalled since 2010. The final rule that would provide clarity to the millions who have a mental illness or substance-use disorder, and to their employers, has not been issued. This has created uncertainty and confusion for employers over what they must cover and when parity applies. For example, many health insurance plans still refuse to cover lifesaving treatment for eating disorders. Others create discriminatory barriers to care, such as imposing stricter prior-authorization requirements for mental health and addiction treatment than for medical benefits. (Domenici and Smith, 2012)

Meanwhile, the DSM is constantly playing catchup with the International Classification of Diseases. Writing in the Introduction to the DSM-III-R, Robert Spitzer and Janet Williams commented on the intersection of the DSM with the International Classification of Diseases:
Also in 1983, the American Psychiatric Association was asked to contribute to the development of the mental disorders chapter of the tenth revision of the *International Classification of Diseases* (*ICD*-10), which is expected to go into effect around 1992. In order for the American Psychiatric Association to provide its best recommendations, it was necessary to assemble committees of experts to review *DSM-III* and to make suggestions for updating it.

The publication of *DSM-III* coincided with that of *ICD-9*; the publication of *DSM-IV* was planned to coincide with that of *ICD-10*. Although by 1983 there had been only a few years of experience with *DSM-III*, it was clear that, with the burgeoning literature in the field, revisions would be needed long before the anticipated publication of *DSM-IV* in the 1990s. (Spitzer and Williams, 1987, p. xvii)

Having given a brief history and contextualization of the somewhat chaotic and highly controversial movement towards quantitative assessment of mental health symptoms in the 20th century, we turn our attention specifically to the issue of trauma itself as it was presented in the *DSM*.

1.8 The *DSM, ICD* and traumatic stress diagnosis

The diagnosis of Gross Stress Reaction (326.3) in the *DSM-I* (APA, 1952, p. 40) marks the first attempt to categorize traumatic stress in the APA’s *Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals*, and the impact of encroaching modernity
and the two World Wars are in evidence in the particular phrasing of the
diagnosis. Human beings are normally resilient, according to these criteria,
and if treated ‘promptly and adequately’ after exposure to extreme stress, they
will recover. Furthermore, if a patient’s condition ‘progress[es] to one of the
neurotic reactions’, this, too, is likely to be transient. Nevertheless:

If the reaction persists, this term is to be regarded as a
temporary diagnosis to be used only until a more definitive
diagnosis is established. … In many instances this diagnosis
applies to previously more or less "normal" persons who have
experienced intolerable stress. The particular stress involved will
be specified as (1) combat or (2) civilian catastrophe. (APA,
1952, p. 40)

Wilson (1994, p. 682) argued that it was Sigmund Freud’s highly influential
‘conceptualization of traumatic neurosis [that] was basically rewritten into the
DSM-I’. Freud’s paradigmatic shift from the controversial ‘Seduction Theory’
(which formed the conceptual basis of what would later become known as
PTSD)28 to ‘an oedipal model replete with “phantasies of a psychical vs. a
material reality”’ inferred an ‘examination of pre-morbid psychic functioning as
a determinant of mental disturbances, especially anxiety states and neuroses’
(Wilson, 1994, p. 684). This, in turn, produced Freud’s conclusion that
‘traumatic impacts to the self-structure were acute and transient in nature.
Thus, if there were prolonged reactions to trauma, they were not caused
directly by the “material reality” of stressor events but by the pre-morbid traits
and psychodynamics of the individual’ (Wilson, 1994, p. 684). In other words,
it was not the stressor itself, but the patient’s predisposition, that produced
latent post-traumatic stress (a notion that was to strike home with
diagnosticians where compensation was at issue). This more ‘regressive’
approach towards traumatic illness persisted in the *DSM-II*, noted Wilson, and
‘reflect[ed] the paucity of hard-headed thinking and empirical inquiry about the
human consequences of victimization and traumatization’ (Wilson, 1994, p.
682). The *DSM-II* shifted Gross Stress Reaction into category 307, where it
was re-termed ‘Transient Situational Disturbances’:

This major category is reserved for more or less transient
disorders … that occur in individuals without any apparent
underlying mental disorders and that represent an acute
reaction to overwhelming environmental stress. … If the patient
has good adaptive capacity his symptoms usually recede as the
stress diminishes. If, however, the symptoms persist after the
stress is removed, the diagnosis of another mental disorder is
indicated. (APA, 1968, p. 48)

Five sub-categories of ‘Transient Situational Disturbances’ are described—
‘Adjustment reactions’ of ‘infancy’ ‘childhood’ ‘adolescence’ ‘adult life’ ‘late life’
(APA, 1968, pp. 48-49), with a note that these terms ‘differ from Category 307
of the *ICD*’ since the latter ‘includes only adolescence, adult life and late life’.
The *ICD*’s category 308, ‘Behavioral disorders of children’ ‘contains the
reactions of infancy and childhood’ (APA, 1968, p. 48).

Indeed, Morton Kramer’s introduction to the *DSM-II* makes much of the
inadequacy of the *ICD-6* (APA, 1968, pp. xi-xv), which was ‘quite unsatisfying
for classifying many of the diagnostic terms that were introduced in the first
edition of this manual … nor did it provide for the transient situational
personality disorders … The exceptions were … gross stress reaction among
the transient disorders’ (p. xi). According to Kramer, a working party attempted in 1951 to develop *ICD-6* further (and the equally ‘unsuitable’ *ICD-7*, introduced in 1955) so that it could be adapted for American use; meanwhile the Viennese-British WHO psychiatrist Erwin Stengel ‘published a study revealing general dissatisfaction in all WHO member countries’ (p. xii). The International Revision Conference that ensued in July 1965 eventually produced *ICD-8*, providing the basis for *DSM-II*, but was ‘manifestly, a compromise which will fully satisfy psychiatrists neither in the U.S. nor in any other country’ states Kramer. Nevertheless, the huge multi-state cooperative project, ‘an achievement of the first order in international professional collaboration … augurs well for *ICD-9*’ (APA, 1968, p. xv).

Although from the outset the *DSM* set out to clarify the differences in nosology employed by the U.S. Armed Forces, the Veterans’ Association and other bodies, it was not until the publication of the *DSM-III* that the after-effects of trauma—in the shape of PTSD—made its highly controversial entry. Whether it was an idea whose time had come, or an overdue acknowledgement of the suffering in the wake of ‘etiological events’ such as conflict, rape, abuse, disasters or accidents, defining and assessing the new disorder gave rise to a burgeoning body of research and argument. ‘This monothetic classification is the *product or achievement* of psychiatric discourse, rather than its discovery,’ asserts Allan Young (1995, p. 121). Yet it was necessary, for at that time, ‘There was no place in the existing diagnostic system for either a chronic stress syndrome or a delayed one’ comments McNally (2003, p. 230), recalling that ‘psychiatrists [such as Robert Lifton] lobbied for inclusion of “post-Vietnam syndrome” in the forthcoming third edition’. In the face of
considerable opposition, the psychiatrists maintained that the Vietnam War’s unique characteristics ‘such as difficulty telling friend from foe, atrocities, and unclear military goals’ would contribute to a lengthy epidemic of stress-related mental disorders (McNally, 2003, p. 230). Noted McNally, ‘one prominent sociologist, a former member of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, has argued that advocates for the PTSD diagnosis inappropriately medicalized political dissent when they conceptualized the problems of veterans as a form of mental illness’.

Summing up the importance of the PTSD’s official recognition, Wilson (1994, p. 690) emphasized that the ‘post-ness’ of ‘the nomenclature’ was critical, and its inclusion was equally vital for future research and ‘new questions and refinements in understanding the complexity of stress response syndromes’. Its authentication would ‘promote clarification in terms of differential diagnosis and the understanding co-morbid conditions … [and help ] to avoid misdiagnosis and by implication, possible mistreatment’ for sufferers. Above all, acknowledging the existence of PTSD ‘helped to validate and legitimate the suffering of those victimized by stressful life-events’. Achieving legitimacy was the key to ‘disability payments, pensions, compensation for injury or as a form of legal defense in criminal litigation’.

Categorised among the anxiety disorders, ‘309.81 Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, Chronic or Delayed’ uniquely focuses on an extraordinary stressor (the so-called ‘Criterion A stressor’) a ‘traumatic event’ that can cause the sufferer to relive the event, either through ‘painful, intrusive recollections … recurrent dreams or nightmares’ or ‘dissociative like states’ causing numbing
and detachment (APA, 1980, p. 236). This focus differs from earlier DSMs that sought to emphasize patients’ underlying psychopathology and the transient nature of trauma.

Other symptoms listed the DSM-III are ‘hyperalertness, exaggerated startle response’; insomnia; ‘impaired memory or difficulty in concentrating or completing tasks’; and survivor guilt. The traumatized may avoid anything that will invoke the original trauma—cross-listed under phobias in DSM-III-R as ‘phobic avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma’ (APA, 1987, p. 244) —and conversely, certain conditions may also be highly evocative. Further ‘Associated Features’ are depression, anxiety and ‘increased irritability … sporadic and unpredictable explosions of aggressive behavior’ coupled with erratic or ‘impulsive’ behavior (p. 237). The DSM-III also acknowledges that symptoms may not necessarily show immediately after trauma’s impact; there may be a ‘latency period’ of months or years before onset of the ‘chronic or delayed subtype’.

Seven years later, as the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) was being updated, much debate ensued ‘regarding the possible reclassification of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder from the Anxiety Disorders to the Dissociative Disorder section in DSM-III-R’ since the latter included many PTSD symptoms, namely “‘a disturbance or alteration in the normally integrative functions of identity, memory, or consciousness,’” that prevented remembering or even caused amnesia (Kluft, Steinberg and Spitzer, 1988, pp. 44-45). A quasi-chicken-and-egg dilemma—which disorder was a subset of the other—meant that no agreement could be found; besides, research on dissociation was still
relatively in its infancy, and the committee members elected to table the
discussion until DSM-IV.\textsuperscript{29} Meanwhile, the narrative description for disorder
309.89 (PTSD) was considerably expanded (APA, 1987, pp. 247-249) with
added definitions of what might constitute a ‘criterion A stressor’;\textsuperscript{30} more
complex clarifications in the diagnostic table meant that the 18 criteria
extended to two pages (APA, 1987, pp. 250-251). In place of ‘C. Numbing
phenomena’ and the rather vague ‘D. Miscellaneous symptoms’ were ‘C.
Attempts to avoid situations that might trigger re-experiences or
traumatogenic distress, or a generalized numbing of responses’ and ‘D.
Forms of arousal’. In order to qualify for a diagnosis, the patient was required
exhibit six symptoms from these, including re-experiencing the trauma; phobic
avoidance; dissociation and unusual hyper-arousal for the duration of at least
a month, with no previous underlying pathology.

Accordingly, the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) and its textual revision, the DSM-IV-TR
(APA, 2000)\textsuperscript{31} continued to extend the definitions of PTSD. In the DSM-IV, the
narrative description for ‘309.81 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’ extends to
four pages, including detailed discussions of diagnostic features; ‘specifiers’
distinguishing between ‘acute’, ‘chronic’ or ‘delayed onset’ PTSD; a detailed
description of ‘associated features and mental disorders’ ‘specific culture and
age features’ and ‘differential diagnosis’ (the latter differentiates the stressor
in PTSD as ‘extreme (i.e. life-threatening)’ as opposed to ‘of any severity’ for
Adjustment Disorder, and reminds the diagnostician that certain characteristic
symptoms, if they manifest themselves ‘before exposure to the stressor’ do
not constitute PTSD. There are three equally detailed pages for the diagnostic
criteria.
Meanwhile an additional trauma syndrome, acute stress disorder (ASD), was recognized in the *DSM-I*, and also features in *ICD-10*. The new syndrome was included ‘to describe responses to trauma occurring within the first 30 days of the event … since the definition of [acute] PTSD did not allow the diagnosis to be made until the symptoms had been present for at least 30 days’, explain Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz (1999, p. 1678). (The diagnosis was described as ‘chronic PTSD’ if symptoms persisted beyond three months.)

Essentially, the new syndrome was designed to catch and treat sufferers before they proceeded to full-blown PTSD, suggesting a continuum of traumatic experience. Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz (1999, p. 1678) found this defining of ‘boundaries’ problematic, but acknowledged that it addressed the issue of patients who were previously only able to receive a diagnosis of ‘adjustment disorder’ whatever the severity of the trauma experienced.

Although generally similar to PTSD, the new syndrome differed in that it did not require a particular number of symptoms from the ‘avoidance’ and ‘increased arousal’ clusters. Instead, *DSM-IV* specified the experiencing of at least three out of five dissociative symptoms ‘during or after the traumatic event: numbing, detachment, or absence of emotional responsiveness; a reduction in awareness of surroundings; derealization; depersonalization; or dissociative amnesia’ (Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz, 1999, p. 1678).

Marshall, Spitzer and Liebowitz (1999) also disputed these particular requirements as unsupported by data available at that time (p. 1683). Twenty years and many longitudinal studies later, ASD still figures in the manual (in *DSM-V*) as research into the syndrome has expanded (Bryant *et al.*, 2010;
Data is conflicted as to whether the diagnosis is an accurate predictor of PTSD (Bryant, 2013).

However, the most controversial issue for the *DSM-IV* was the inclusion of secondary trauma, ‘learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close associate’ (APA, 1994, p. 424). For McNally (2003, p. 231) this qualified as a kind of ‘conceptual bracket creep’:

> No longer must one be the direct (or even vicarious) recipient of trauma; merely being horrified by what has happened to others now counts as a PTSD-qualifying event. Such secondhand exposure seems qualitatively distinct from being subjected to artillery bombardment for days on end while huddled in a muddy trench.

Discussing ‘conceptual bracket creep’ regarding research on Americans’ post-9/11 trauma, McNally cites the Wakefield and Spitzer (2002) argument that ‘such surveys medicalize expectable human reactions by failing to discriminate between genuine symptoms of disorder and normal distress reaction’ (2003, p. 231). Perhaps this, then, marks the difference between ‘medical’ PTSD and the (still) broader sociological conception?

Whatever the answer to this interesting question, the highly controversial ‘secondary trauma’ diagnosis remains in the current, yet more extensive and extensively-researched* DSM-V* (APA, 2013). PTSD remains a ‘disorder’, although ‘certain military leaders’ have requested that the stigmatizing nomenclature become ‘posttraumatic stress injury’ in order not to put off
soldiers who need assistance, in part because ‘others believe it is the military environment that needs to change’.\textsuperscript{33}

In this latest DSM, PTSD is re-categorized from among the ‘Anxiety Disorders’ (in previous DSMs) and located in a new cluster, ‘Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders’,\textsuperscript{34} occupying 19 pages of the cluster—perhaps a sign of the post-9/11, post-Atocha and post-Fukushima era. The remarkably similar pre-condition, ‘Acute Stress Disorder’ (introduced in DSM-IV), follows PTSD in the manual. Although the symptomology does not differ greatly from the DSM-IV, there is a greater focus is on ‘the behavioral symptoms that accompany PTSD’ and the APA proclaims that there are ‘four distinct diagnostic clusters instead of three … re-experiencing, avoidance, negative cognitions and mood, and arousal’.\textsuperscript{35} The ‘Criterion A’ stressor is now far more explicit, and includes ‘sexual violence’, while dropping former language describing the patient’s response, such as ‘intense fear, helplessness, or horror’ (APA, 2000, p. 467) as this ‘proved to have no utility in predicting the onset of PTSD’\textsuperscript{36}. Criterion C in the DSM-IV (avoidance and numbing) is listed now as two separate criteria: ‘avoidance’ (Criterion C) and ‘negative alterations in cognitions and mood’ (Criterion D)\textsuperscript{37}. Moreover, children ‘six years and younger’ are now included as possible PTSD sufferers, as are those with ‘PTSD dissociative subtype’ symptoms (experiencing detachment from reality). For better or worse, DSM-V continues to widen the net for trauma in our age of anxiety.
1.9 Conclusion

I have noted at the outset the tremendous impact psychological discourses have had latterly on the field of international relations, and the highly interdisciplinary trends of analysis that have consequently emerged. In keeping with this trend, my goal is also to investigate ‘some of the theoretical approaches essential for elucidating and interrogating the multifarious roles played by the “memory” of traumatic events … in shaping the contours of contemporary global politics’ (Bell, 2010, pp. 1-2). In this chapter, I have endeavoured to provide historical context of how the concept of psychological trauma evolved, by engaging in a detailed account of trauma’s nascence from its medical and psychiatric origins; and to give a sense of the feedback loop that was produced when further attempts were made to medicalize trauma (particularly war trauma) by through psychiatric assessment.

The inclusion of PTSD in the APA’s DSM manuals (from DSM-III on), described above, symbolizes the viewpoint that war (or another overwhelming disaster) is what marks the cut-off point between what we can cope with as ‘normal’ existential stress, and what some (or many) of us cannot tolerate. For those whose resilience is damaged, symptoms present as an ‘abnormal’ response. Linear time breaks down as the traumatic event returns cyclically to distress the sufferer. Moving forward, restoring linear time—and thereby, mental health—then becomes a matter for professional diagnosis and treatment, in itself a subject of great controversy. Nevertheless, it would be cynical not to acknowledge that:

The inclusion of PTSD as a formal psychiatric diagnosis has had substantial social impact. It has provided psychiatrically...
distressed patients a means for naming and conceptualizing how their lives have been altered by traumatic life events, thereby providing reassurance they are not “going crazy”.

(Mletzko and Dunlop, 2011, p. 152)

In contrast, other viewpoints take exception to this notion of a one-size-fits-all disorder; it masks the fact that stress reactions are normal (rather than dysfunctional) responses to an abnormal situation. After all, there is not even a clear consensus on what constitutes mental disorders or whether, ontologically, they exist at all (Phillips et al, 2012.) Under such circumstances, individual therapy is not necessarily a solution (or only part of the solution) since whole societies may be regarded as ‘under trauma’; a political and/or social ‘response’ is required in this case (Wessely, 2003). A third approach attempts to reconcile the psychological with the political and the social. Such positions will be discussed further in the forthcoming chapter.
Chapter Two – The concept of experiential collectivities

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 considered the emergence of the conception of psychological trauma as damage arising from ‘extraordinary experiences in the personal lives of individuals’ (Neal, p. 3), in particular as a result of conflicts and political violence. The Great War, World War II and the Vietnam War produced widespread diagnostic debate over the validation and treatment of symptoms of war-related trauma. Together with controversies over compensation and pensions for the war-damaged, the debate spilled over from the medical fields of neurology, psychiatry and the nascent field of psychology into the political, economic and sociological spheres of the old and new worlds.

The medical literatures of trauma are helpful for understanding its conceptual evolution, but do not explain the overwhelming extent of the theoretical bracket-creep, nor clarify the sociological meaning.¹ As is indicated in Chapter 1, trauma is embedded in multiple discourses and multiple fields to the extent that we could say it is never static—indeed, that it is contested in all forms of its modes of expression, in how it is experienced, manifested, transmitted and asserted.

Before arriving at a rubric for the sociological concept of collective trauma, it is necessary to frame the conversation in terms of epistemological trends for experiential ‘collectivities’. Since our focus is largely on the nature of the ‘wounded’ memory that has been traumatized through catastrophic blows to
the ‘body collective’ through abnormal phenomena such as war and political violence, it is particularly incumbent to consider ‘wounded memory’ in the context of the interdisciplinary collective memory theory field on which the concept draws heavily.

I will not be referring below to the more transcendental expressions of collective memory—what James Wertsch (2002, p. 21) terms ‘the strong version of collective memory [that] assumes some sort of collective mind or consciousness [which] exists above and beyond the minds of the individuals in a collective’. Some of these approaches belong to the realm of the phenomenological, or, for example, to Jungian psychology that maintains a belief in the non-explicable inherited collective consciousness, ‘a collective, universal, and impersonal nature which is identical in all individuals. … It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents’ (Jung, 1980, p. 43) Other approaches belong to a separate, parallel discussion on forms of collective identification (such as ethnies, or ‘imagined’ constructs such as ‘the nation’), which will be included, where relevant, later. However, my purpose below is to give a critical account of the lineage of memory studies that gave birth to the field of collective trauma.
2.2 Forms of identity and allegiance as collective experience: Social frameworks of memory

The collective memory field, ‘a memory boom of unprecedented proportions’ as Huyssen (1995, p. 5) and others noted, is considered to have mushroomed during the 1980s, although scholars differ as to whether this is a first-, second- or perennial-wave phenomenon (Russell, 2006; Blight, 2009; Kastner, Najafi and Connerton, 2011). As Paul Connerton explains, ‘In some sense, memory studies is really a phenomenon of the last quarter century. One hundred years ago, there would have, of course, been studies of memory—by Freud, by Bergson, by Proust—but they would have been primarily interested in individual memory. What’s happened in the last quarter century has been a turn toward cultural memory. And because of this turn, the term memory studies has acquired currency’ (Kastner, Najafi and Connerton, 2011).

The field ascribes its origins largely to the work of Bergson disciple and Durkheim contemporary, Maurice Halbwachs, who died in Buchenwald in 1945; but David W. Blight, who claims ‘at least two major memory booms’—the first one taking place ‘during 1890-1920, leading up to and transformed by World War I and its staggering losses’—locates Halbwachs in the first rather than the second ‘boom’, along with other ‘major intellectuals who probed memory in their work … including Henry Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Marcel Proust, Virginia Woolf, … and others’ (Blight, 2009. p. 243). Chronologically, this is of course an accurate observation, yet as we shall see, Halbwachs’ understanding of memory was rather different from the ‘major intellectuals’ who dealt in individual memory, the province of the

The timing of the publication of these two translations may go some way to explaining the emergence of the theoretical boom, but other forces, too, were at work. For Andreas Huyssen, the turn towards memory is to be contrasted against ‘an age of emerging supranational structures’ when ‘the problem of national identity is increasingly discussed in terms of cultural or collective memory rather than in terms of the assumed identity of nation and state’ (Huyssen, 1995, p. 5). Yet the growth of globalization, global governance and of cultural identity politics (actually an expansion of the rights movements of the late 1960s and 1970s) also took place in a climate of frenetic national memorializing:

France designated the year 1980 as ‘*l’année du patrimoine*’ (heritage year) and England, independently, celebrated its national heritage that very same year. Even Israel, where the memory of the Shoah has always played a crucial political role
for state and nation, has witnessed a marked intensification of its memorial culture, and Germany (then West Germany) gritting teeth and dutifully contrite, went through a never-ending sequence of Nazi related 40th and 50th anniversaries in the 1980s that produced a number of fascinating debates about German identity as well as the embarrassment of Bitburg and the Historikerstreit (historians’ debate). All that time, both the United States and Europe kept building museums and memorials as if haunted by the fear of some imminent traumatic loss. (Huyssen, 1995, p. 5)

Huyssen’s theory is that ‘the current obsession with memory’ is not merely a form of millenarian neurosis, but rather ‘a sign of the crisis of that structure of temporality that marked the age of modernity with its celebration of the new as utopian, as radically and irreducibly other’ (Huyssen, 1995, p. 6). We are, quite simply, alienated by high-tech modernity, made anxious by the future, by the apparently speeded-up linear propulsion towards futuristic technologies that may lead to unknown outcomes; with this comes the anxiety of losing the familiar past, and the fear of memory’s opposite, forgetting. Connerton—who found certain aspects of forgetting not only malign but also benign4—does not attribute the memory ‘boom’ to ‘any single factor’ but rather to a ‘confluence of three powerful forces coming together’:

The first could be described as the long shadow of World War II, which continued to exert its impact even as late as the 1990s. … Another factor in the emergence of memory studies has been what I would call “transitional justice.” And by that I
mean to say that in the 1980s and 1990s there were transformations in various countries—in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, South Africa, in the states of central eastern Europe—that had had a very difficult past, on the whole a totalitarian or authoritarian past, and had moved toward a more democratic form of government. Precisely because they had had a difficult past, they had to take up a position about it, they had to examine their memories. They had to think about what attitude they should take toward the previous perpetrators and victims of injustice. And the final significant factor has been the process of decolonization, which had very significant repercussions—not only for the previous colonizing powers, in particular Britain and France—but also for the previously colonized powers, in particular Africa and India, who have sought, so to speak, to re-appropriate their own memories, whereas for the previous colonizing powers, what has emerged is what might be described as a politics of nostalgia. (Connerton, in Kastner, Najafi and Connerton, 2011)

Maier, meanwhile, considers that our ‘surfeit of memory’ is due to the fact that ‘at the end of the twentieth century Western societies have come to the end of a massive collective project. … the end, or at least the interruption, of the capacity to found collective institutions that rest on aspirations for the future’ (Maier, 1993, p. 147). Discussing the rise of ethnicity and identity claims, he believes that ethnicity has ‘trumped’ all other visions for the future, leaving nothing to us except to remember:
... as we extend recognition to more and more ethnic fragments - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Moldova, etc., etc. - we are confused by their claims. Nations in the modern era were more than gene pools; they were layered communities - often hierarchical, to be sure, with subject and ruling ethnic groups. ... they encompassed larger aspirations than ethnicity. ... The modern nation-state grew out of ethnicity, not toward ethnicity. ... In the twilight of Enlightenment aspirations to collective institutions, we build museums to memory, our memory. (Maier, 1993, pp. 147-149).

For this reason, surmises Maier, we (by this presumably he means long-established nation-states) have become so 'preoccupied' with lieux de mémoire, 'landscape and place ...sometimes monuments'. In an era of globalization and 'permeable' frontiers, when 'concept of spatial coherence ... has faded as a property of nations', do these lieux de mémoire act as a form of surrogate for 'self-definition'? Perhaps; but many inter- and intra-group claims are still founded on territoriality as spaces of memory. Observe Luminet et al (on the political crisis between Walloons and Flemings in Belgium, to whom an entire issue of the journal Memory Studies is devoted), 'political conflicts surrounding the integrity of nation states systematically involve conflict of memories (e.g. Licata et al., 2007; Rosoux, 2004). ... these conflicts most often include the ignorance – or the rejection – of the other group’s memory' (Luminet, Licata, Klein, Rousoux, Wolff, van Ypersele and Stone, 2012, p. 4). The Israel-Palestine conflict—the case study at the heart of this project—is another example out of many; almost all post-colonial states also preoccupy themselves with the legacies of such memory conflicts.
Not only political developments but also epistemological trends play a part in explaining the turn to memory. Pennebaker and Banasik (1997) attribute the construction of the collective memory field to the theoretical possibilities opened up by Kenneth Gergen’s 1973 social deconstructionist movement, and his consideration that ‘social psychology was a form of history … history itself was an impartial truth with social psychological findings serving as archival reminders of the ways people thought and behaved at the time the studies were conducted’ (Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997, p. 3). Although they rightly point out that ‘history itself is highly contextual’ (one might add, relational) they concur that ‘social psychological processes help to define history … Just as the key to the future is the past, the key to the past is the present’ (Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997, p. 3). While psychological research into memory concentrates on the individual, ‘history is constructed through the shared memories of multiple people’ (Pennebaker and Gonzales, 2009, p. 171), a claim strongly influenced by the ideas of Halbwachs and echoed by the Vygotskian, James Wertsch (Wertsch, 2002; Wertsch, 2009).

Whatever the factors contributory to the timing of the theoretical boom—political or epistemic—none of them would have been possible without Halbwachs’ particular contribution to the polysemous issue of memory: the sociological anchoring of individual memory within the memory of groups, for ‘it is in society,’ wrote Halbwachs, ‘that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society than people recall, recognize, and localize their memories. … It is also in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory’ (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 32). This is not only a universal property, but it is also specific to each social group, since ‘the
particular nature of the group and its collective experience … shapes its collective memory … [and] creates a shared memory and identity’ (Russell, 2006, p. 796). Consequently, ‘every group has its own collective memory and that collective memory differs from the collective memory of other groups’ (Russell, 2006, p. 796). Halbwachs allows that individuals will have their own ‘take’ on their group’s collective narrative, but since individuals are raised in that group’s society, their memory will be framed by everything they absorb from peers and other elements of that social setting (Halbwachs, 1980). Memory—and hence, identity—becomes ‘distributed’ or ‘multivoiced’ (Wertsch, 1991, 2007) or ‘multidirectional’ (Rothberg, 2009) relying not only on individuals in the collective, but on different members of the collective retaining or sharing different segments of a narrative, mediated by ‘cultural tools’ such as ‘narrative texts’ (Wertsch, 2007, p. 8) maps, history textbooks, media or other tools that are available in the sociocultural setting of the group (Anderson’s ‘print capitalism’ develops this notion with regard to the rise of national groups [1983, p. 52]). A group’s memories are thus rarely ‘the product of an isolated speaker or cognitive agent’ (Wertsch, 1991, p. 6), and while individual memories are thus ‘socially framed’, ‘the groups themselves also share publicly articulated images of collective pasts’ (Olick, 2008, p. 156) i.e. representation in all its various forms. ‘For this reason,’ explains Olick, ‘Halbwachs distinguished between “autobiographical memory” and “historical memory.”’ The former concerns the events of one’s own life that one remembers because they were experienced directly. The latter refers to residues of events by virtue of which groups claim a continuous identity through time’ (Olick, 2008, p. 156).
The implication, however, is that a group’s collective memory reconstruction is mostly a memory of a *lived experience*,7 as distinct from a historian’s scholarly analysis, although the latter account is equally likely to be subjectively shaped by moral interpretation and the exigencies of coherent narration, as Hayden White and others note in the ongoing debate over historiography (Domsanska, 1998; Sutermeister, 2005/2008; White, 1973, 1987, 1999). (This point will be discussed in further detail in 2:3 Conceptual challenges to tropes of collective memory.)

The ‘lived experience’ does not necessarily have to be consecutive,8 according to Kansteiner (2002, p. 190):

> Physical and social proximity to past events and their subsequent rationalization and memorialization does not have to coincide. There is no natural, direct connection between the real and the remembered. On the one hand, collective memories might exclude events that played an important role in the lives of members of the community (for instance, the memory of WWII in Japan). On the other hand, socially and geographically distant events might be adopted for identity purposes by groups that had no involvement in their unfolding (as in the case of Holocaust memory).

Such memories are, in any case, ‘mediated phenomena’ and what is of interest is the ‘means of representation’ (monuments, architecture and other sites of memory, cultural artefacts, other visual, aural or discursive means)
that tells us much about how such collective memories evolve (Kansteiner, 1990, p. 190).

Certain aspects of collective memory (here scholars do not precisely agree on which aspects, or cannot determine which aspects Halbwachs intended) are not static phenomena, frozen in time, but they aggregate to a certain ‘concretion’⁹ that marks a group’s identity or claim to exceptionality (although this too, can be contested: *Nous sommes tous Charlie* / *We are not all Charlie*). Nevertheless, ‘the creation and maintenance of a collective or historical memory is a dynamic and psychological process’, argue Pennebaker and Banasik (1997, p. 4). The more historical significance that an event has to a community, they argue, the more it will be remembered collectively; but such collective remembering will nevertheless still greatly depend on the more transient issue of our current circumstances and needs. Citing the ‘critical period hypothesis’ (events that take place during the ages 12-25 are most remembered, according the psychological research of Rubin in the 1980s)¹⁰ they also surmise that that there is a ‘generational effect’ regarding which events are most collectively recollected in recent history (such as the Kennedy assassination, the Apollo moon landings, the Vietnam War; one might add the collective of memory of 911 events, which are gradually beginning to subside in reference, and to be more localized to New York City). This concurs with Halbwachs’ notion that when a generational group that preserves a memory disbands or passes away, that collective memory (or site of memory) will also diminish and fade away.
2.3 Conceptual challenges to tropes of collective memory:

Individual versus collective memory

One of the key conceptual challenges to collective memory theories has been the perennial debate over individual versus collective memory. Klein (2000, pp. 130-135) takes issue with what she terms the hypostatization of ‘the New Structural Memory’. Citing Michael Schudson, (Schudson, 1992), she retorts

… the public has gotten memory wrong, and the “social-scientific tribe” has gotten it right, says Schudson. Not only is memory “essentially social,” it is located in “rules, laws, standardized procedures, and records … books, holidays, statues, souvenirs.” Memory may also “characterize groups” by revealing a “debt to the past” and expressing “moral continuity.”… Memory is not a property of individual minds, but a diverse and shifting collection of material artifacts and social practices … Memory here becomes “structural,” provided we use that word with sufficient flexibility to invoke both the notion of “social structure” typical of recent social history and the notion of systems of difference common in the high structuralism descended from Saussurean linguistics.

Take away the individual from memory, asserts Klein, and what remains is objectivized culture:
The most common strategy for justifying the analogical leap from individual memories to Memory social, cultural, collective, public, or whatever is to identify memory as a collection of practices or material artifacts. This is the new structural memory, a memory that threatens to become Memory with a capital M. ... The items adduced as memory are potentially endless, but certain tropes appear time and again. The most obvious are archives and public monuments from statues to museums, but another, more picturesque body of objects qualifies as well, and any cultural practice or artifact that Hegel might have excluded from History seems to qualify as Memory. Ideally, the memory will be a dramatically imperfect piece of material culture, and such fragments are best if imbued with pathos. (Klein, 2000, p. 135)

A further perspective on the individual versus collective memory debate is colourfully encapsulated in Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam’s discussion, ‘Collective memory – what is it?’ (Gedi and Elam, 1996, pp. 30-50). In a willful misreading of Halbwachs—who did not get to finish or refine his theories—they characterize collective memory as ‘a fabricated version of that same personal memory adjusted to what the individual mind considers, rightly or not, as suitable in a social environment’. For Gedi and Elam:

There is no mystery here; the mechanism of collective memory and the mechanism of personal memory are one and the same and located in the same individual mind. “Collective memory” is but a misleading new term for the old familiar “myth” which can
be identified, in its turn, with “collective” and “social” stereotypes. Indeed, collective memory is but a myth. (p. 47, 1996)

These kinds of pronouncements ignore the interplay of the social and personal, and best illustrates the ‘danger in drawing stark distinctions between individual and collective processes … [and] ’ can encourage the tendency to isolate the work of one discipline from that of another’, notes Wertsch (Wertsch, 2002, p. 35) namely, psychology, versus other social sciences such as sociology and anthropology.11 ‘The distinction between individual and collective memory may not be as ironclad as current disciplinary divisions would suggest,’ observes Wertsch (2002, p. 37).12

Jan Assmann (1995; 2008, p. 109) finds a median way between the dualism of the individual-social collective memory standoff by characterizing memory as a phenomenon composed of three levels (see Table 1, below).13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Memory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inner</td>
<td>inner, subjective time</td>
<td>Inner self</td>
<td>Individual memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(neuromental)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Social time</td>
<td>social self, person as carrier of social roles</td>
<td>communicative memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural</td>
<td>historical, mythical, cultural time</td>
<td>Cultural identity</td>
<td>Cultural memory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: The three levels of memory (after Assman, 1995).
‘On the inner level,’ explains Assmann, ‘memory is a matter of our neuro-mental system. This is our personal memory, the only form of memory that had been recognized as such until the 1920s’. However, ‘On the social level, memory is a matter of communication and social interaction. It was the great achievement of the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs to show that our memory depends, like consciousness in general, on socialization and communication, and that memory can be analyzed as a function of our social life (Les cadres sociaux; La mémoire collective). It is also memory that ‘enables us to live in groups and communities, and living in groups and communities enables us to build a memory’ (Assmann, 2008, p. 109).

Because of these social and linguistic features of Halbwachsian memory, Assmann prefers to call it ‘communicative memory’ and introduces another clarificatory term, ‘cultural memory’:

Halbwachs … was careful to keep his concept of collective memory apart from the realm of traditions, transmissions, and transferences which we propose to subsume under the term “cultural memory.” …we insist on including the cultural sphere, which he excluded, in the study of memory. We are, therefore, not arguing for replacing his idea of “collective memory” with “cultural memory”; rather, we distinguish between both forms as two different modi memorandi, ways of remembering.

(Assmann, 2008, p. 110)

Assmann’s ‘cultural memory’ is ‘a kind of institution’ available in symbolized form – from the temporal (rituals and commemorative days) to the spatial (sites of memory); in this he also included objectivized cultural objects,
noting, ‘Things do not “have” a memory of their own’ but they act as a ‘trigger’. ‘They carry memories which we have invested into them … dishes, feasts, rites, images, stories and other texts, landscapes, and other “lieux de mémoire” … ’ (Assmann, 2008, pp. 110-111). ‘On the social level,’ he adds, ‘with respect to groups and societies, the role of external symbols becomes even more important’:

… because groups which, of course, do not “have” a memory tend to “make” themselves one by means of things meant as reminders such as monuments, museums, libraries, archives, and other mnemonic institutions. … In order to be able to be reembodied in the sequence of generations, cultural memory, unlike communicative memory, exists also in disembodied form and requires institutions of preservation and reembodiment. (Assmann, 2008, pp. 110-111).

2.4 Collective memory versus history

The dialogic relation of collective memory to written history provides a further major theoretical challenge to memory scholars (see Table 3, below, for a summary of various distinctions). Halbwachs and many other theorists of collective memory are clear on the ‘distinct boundaries’ of ‘history and memory’ (Blight, 2009, p. 241):

History and memory have distinct boundaries, and we should maintain them as best we can. … History is what trained historians do, a reasoned reconstruction of the past rooted in research; it tends to be skeptical of human motive and action, and therefore more secular than what we commonly call
memory. … Memory is often owned, history interpreted.

[Researcher’s italics] Memory is passed down through generations; history is revised generation after generation. Memory often coalesces in objects, sites, monuments; history seeks to understand contexts in all their complexity. History asserts the authority of academic training and rules of evidence; memory carries the more immediate authority of community membership or family experience. (Blight, 2009, p. 241).

History functions as abstract ‘semantic memory’, rather like earlier forms of prehalbwachsian collective memory, asserts Russell (2006), while Halbwachs’ version of collective memory more closely resembles personal and subjective ‘episodic memory’, except that it is shared within groups, ‘It belongs to particular groups, takes lived experience as its object, is part of that group’s identity, and cannot be transferred from one group to another’ (Russell, 2006, p. 798). Moreover, while memory is very much about the past, it only exists in the present, if it is ‘alive’ and lived by ‘re-presentation’ in the community (or by the individual), as Huysseen (1995, p. 3) explains:

The temporal status of any act of memory is always the present and not, as some naïve epistemology might have it, the past itself, even though all memory in some ineradicable sense is dependent on some past event or experience. It is this tenuous fissure between past and present that constitutes memory, making it powerfully alive and distinct from the archive or any other mere system of storage and retrieval.
Rothberg (2009, p. 3) concurs with this, reiterating Richard Terdiman’s definition that ‘memory is the past made present … a contemporary phenomenon, something that, while concerned with the past, happens in the present’. He emphasizes the non-static, active nature of memory; it is ‘a form of work, working through, labor, or action’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective memory</th>
<th>History</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Subjective”</strong></td>
<td><strong>“Objective”</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Single committed perspective</td>
<td>• Distanced from any particular perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reflects a particular group’s social framework</td>
<td>• Reflects no particular social framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unselfconscious</td>
<td>• Critical, reflective stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impatient with ambiguity and motives and the interpretation of events</td>
<td>• Recognizes ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on stable, unchanging group essence</td>
<td>• Focus on transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denial of “pastness” about events</strong></td>
<td><strong>Focus on historicity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Links the past with the present</td>
<td>• Differentiates the past from the present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ahistorical, antihistorical</td>
<td>• Views past events as taking place ‘then and not now’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commemorative voice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Historical voice</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Museum as a temple</td>
<td>• Museum as a forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unquestionable heroic narratives</td>
<td>• Disagreement, change and controversy as part of ongoing historical interpretation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Collective history and memory (after Wertsch, 2002, p. 45)
What Halbwachs intended by collective memory, writes Peter Novick, author of the influential *The Holocaust in American Life*, ‘is in crucial senses ahistorical, even antihistorical’ (Novick, 2000, p. 3):

> To understand something historically is to be aware of its complexity, to have sufficient detachment to see it from multiple perspectives, to accept the ambiguities, including moral ambiguities, of protagonists’ motives and behavior. Collective memory simplifies; sees events from a single, committed perspective; is impatient with ambiguities of any kind; reduces events to mythic archetypes. (Novick, 2000, p. 4)

Some historians, however, uphold that such dichotomizing is profoundly problematic. Winter (2009, p. 254) dislikes the ‘stylized and unpersuasive analytical distinction between history on one side as documented narratives and memory on the other as free-floating tales that may not be true’. In fact, says Winter, ‘Historians think otherwise and work to bring the two closer together’ because ‘increasingly, over the twentieth century and beyond, the space between history and memory has been reconfigured’ (2009, p. 254). There is a middle ground, a ‘varied set of cultural practices that may be described as forms of “historical remembrance”’ says Winter, (2009, p. 254).14

Nevertheless, the most controversial challenge to the hierarchical domination of ‘intellectual and secular’ history over ‘magical’ memory was issued by French-Jewish historian Pierre Nora, who asserted that ‘history is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it’ (Nora, 1989, p. 9). For Nora, ‘Memory and history, far from being
synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition,’ (Nora, 1989, p. 9). Continuing in elegiac vein, Nora discusses the shortfalls of both memory and history, maintaining that:

Memory is life, borne by living societies found in its name. It remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present. …Memory is absolute, while history can only conceive the relative. (Nora, 1989, p. 9)

Mourning the rupture of modernity and the disappearance of ‘the remnants of experience still lived in the warmth of tradition … [that] have been displaced under the pressure of a fundamentally historical sensibility’ Nora famously averred that ‘We speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left’ (Nora, 1989, p. 7). In similar vein, writing of the current ongoing preoccupation with memory, Huyssten (1995) describes it almost as a form of collective grief or anxiety; are we losing our memories? Are we losing our minds? Are we raging ‘against the dying of the light’?

The twilight of memory … is not just the result of a somehow natural generational forgetting that could be counteracted through some form of a more reliable representation. Rather, it
is given in the very structures of representation itself, The
obsessions with memory in contemporary culture must be read
in terms of this double problematic. Twilight memories are both:
generational memories on the wane due to the passing of time
and the continuing speed of technological modernization, and
memories that reflect the twilight status of memory itself.

Twilight is that moment of the day that foreshadows the night of
forgetting, but that seems to slow time itself, an in-between
state in which the last light of the day may still play out its
ultimate marvels. It is memory’s privileged time. (Huyssen,
1995, p. 3)

The ‘irrevocable break marked by the disappearance of [French] peasant
culture, that quintessential repository of collective memory’ constituted one
such living loss for Nora, together with the erosion of ‘societies that had long
assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered
values’ and minority groups who ‘have possessed reserves of memory but
little or no historical capital’ (Nora, 1989, p. 7). Under Nora’s aegis the multi-
volume work of essays, Les Lieux de Mémoire\textsuperscript{16} was published from 1981
onwards (in English, The Realms of Memory).\textsuperscript{17} As ‘milieux de mémoire, real
environments of memory’ no longer exist (Nora, 1989, p. 7), the project
constituted a unique attempt\textsuperscript{18} to focus on:

… specific objects that codify, condense, anchor France’s
national memory. These can be monuments (the château of
Versailles or the cathedral of Strasbourg); emblems,
commendations, and symbols (the tricolor of the French flag,
the Fourteenth of July, the *Marseillaise*); rituals (the coronation of the kings at Reims) ... manuals (a textbook used by all French children, a dictionary); basic texts (the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the *Code Civil*); or mottos (for example, “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité”). (Nora, 1989, p. 25).

Kerwin Lee Klein suggests that memory has emerged ‘in an age of historiographic crisis precisely because it figures as a therapeutic alternative to historical discourse’ (Klein, 2000, p. 145) but not all critics were in favour of Nora’s attempt to restore collective memory to historical consciousness and the practice of historiography, as Rothberg (2010) notes; accusations of the ‘polarization of history and memory’ provided ‘a central irony ... a project that has helped to stimulate a boom in the study of memory is premised on the demise of memory’ (Rothberg, 2010, p. 4). Rothberg prefers ‘a synthesis that also gives weight to the individual experience’. ‘Not strictly separable from either history or representation,’ suggests Rothberg, ‘memory nonetheless captures simultaneously the individual, embodied, and lived side and the collective, social, and constructed side of our relations to the past’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 4).

Others, including Tony Judt, Perry Anderson and Hue-Tam Ho-Tai (2001) took political issue with the design of Nora’s project, which ‘purged’ France of ‘many of its imperial adventures and minoritarian inflections ... phenomena that trouble the linear narrative of historical progress and the stark opposition between history and memory’ (Rothberg, 2010, p. 4).20 Connerton found ‘a very powerful undercurrent of nostalgia’ in Nora’s enterprise; France as a
previously colonizing power in the grip of ‘a politics of nostalgia’ (Connerton, in Kastner, Najafi and Connerton, 2011).

In the course of attempting to reconstitute memory and displace national history, the wheel had come full circle for memory boomers, as Zwigenberg (2014, pp. 4-5) notes:

While many historians seek to displace the dominance of the “nation” in their work, studiers of the history of memory tend to cling to the nation with peculiar stubbornness. The familiar effort to interpret the past as part of a national culture has led to what Sebastian Conrad aptly named “a tunnel vision of the past,” which marginalizes entanglement with other national memories as well as the influence of the counter-memories of minorities and others.

Wertsch (2002) also concludes that ‘it is often quite difficult to categorize an account of the past unequivocally as either memory or history’ citing as his example ‘official histories produced by the state and unofficial histories produced outside of its purview’ that ‘both include elements of collective remembering as well as history’ (p. 20). This is well illustrated in the ongoing ‘memory politics’ controversies over the content of contested school history texts in Japan as well as Palestine and Israel, where ministries of education mine history in search of what Wertsch (2002) refers to as a ‘usable past’ to shore up allegiance to a collective identity.

Nora’s huge undertaking was not the only work that is considered to have been a landmark in the 1980s ‘memory boom’ that has continued until now;
nor was it the only work to have ‘rework[ed] history’s boundaries’ (Klein, 2000, p. 128).21 Hue-Tam Ho Tai notes:

The importance of scholarship on the Holocaust in American studies of memory has been profound. As Michael Schudson observed: “There are two kinds of studies of collective memory-those that examine the Holocaust, and all the others. Even people whose own work lies in that second group find Holocaust studies inescapably important, capable of illuminating every corner of the general topic with intellectual clarity and urgency.” By its very nature, Holocaust scholarship focuses on memory that is not linked to national identity or imagination. (Hue-Tam Ho Tai, 2001, p. 916).

Indeed, scholarship on the Holocaust provides the overarching link between collective memory and trauma scholarship, as the work of Ruth Leys, Dominic LaCapra, Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, Arthur Kleinmann, and Veena Das and many others testify. Widely considered to be the critical founding trope of the social construction and formalisation of trauma, the relevance of the Holocaust to the case studies at the heart of this inquiry is paramount. It has become at once a transcendental symbol of the greatest evil and also of its infamous, mundane ‘banality’ (Arendt, 1964), an aggregated suffering fused into a collective experiential gasp of horror. Tragically since then, and before then, there have been other genocides, but this is the one that caught the theoretical imagination. This will be expanded on further in Chapter Three.
2.5 Ethical challenges for history and memory: counter-memories

Some scholars are uncomfortable with the polarized memory debates coming from the last decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (history versus memory; the individual versus the group). Such polarities, they infer, cast a questionable light on the grave business of accounting for the past and commemorating it; they miss the ethical ‘concern with memory and the obligations—if there are any—to remember; or, for that matter, to forget and forgive’ (Margalit, 2000, p. ix).

Susan Crane questions who has the right to represent history and memory, to ‘speak for others’? Such questions offer ‘a rich discussion of the responsibility for and participation in collective memory, in which historians will still play a part,’ she asserts (Crane, 1997, p. 1374). ‘I am trying to imagine a new form of historical consciousness,’ explains Crane, which will ‘avoid the pitfalls that the concept of collective memory suggests to those who fear its nationalist, revisionist temptations, as exemplified recently in the American controversy over the Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian in 1994-1995’ (Crane, 1997, p. 1375).

If history’s challenge is how to effect the inclusive representation of the widest range of voices, a new form of historical consciousness might give greater weight to the restorative and reconciliatory role of acts of collective remembering, memory work and witnessing in restorative justice acts, such as the truth commissions of Latin America and South Africa (see, for example, the extensive body of work of Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson...
on South Africa, such as Hamber and Wilson, 2002; Hamber has also written on Northern Ireland and Latin America). These kinds of memory projects:

… have been called on in transitional justice and historical memory interventions as a one of the key mechanisms that can help societies and groups come to terms with a past of war or mass violence and move societies towards non-violence and no repetition. … many such groups have activated plural, autonomous, long term, and participatory processes to recover, reclaim and/or find evidence of past violations and their impacts, while placing those who have been traditionally silenced and their knowledge at the center of memory work.

… Building memory is a political act and a social practice. Memory is a field in tension, which can either build and strengthen or challenge and transform hierarchies, inequalities and social exclusions. It is also a field where political and social legitimacies, friendships and enmities are woven … If war polarizes memories, a historical memory project that seeks to be inclusive of plural voices goes in the opposite direction. But to do so requires asking why certain stories are excluded from national history, and why that history reinforces social and political inequalities and historical injustices. (Historical Memory Commission of the Center of Memory of Colombia and the University of British Columbia, 2010, pp. 4-11)
The proliferation of ‘peoples’ tribunals’ equally engages in memory work and witnessing equally. Taking their cue from the International War Crimes Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a number of Asian women’s NGOs convened in Tokyo in December 2000 for the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery to hear accounts of women forced to work in comfort stations.22

In the early 1990s women broke almost five decades of painful silence to demand apology and compensation for the atrocities they and others suffered under Japanese military sexual slavery during the war in the 1930s and 1940s in the Asia-Pacific region. The victimized survivors, euphemistically called “comfort women” came forward to recount how they were conscripted and trafficked through force, coercion, and deception and confined to “comfort stations” or, more accurately, sexual slavery facilities, wherever Japanese troops were situated, including on the front lines. (Tokyo Tribunal, 2001)

With reference to the case study of Israel-Palestine at the heart of this project, the Russell Tribune on Palestine, an ‘International People’s Tribunal’ which was ‘created following the international community’s inaction regarding Israel’s recognized violations of international law’ (http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/about-rtop) convened sessions in London, Barcelona, Cape Town, New York and Brussels from 2010-2014 to hear witnesses and to engage in transitional justice memory work, while the Israeli NGO Zochrot (http://zochrot.org/) actively researches collective
memory of the Palestinian Nakba and carries out acts of remembrance in order to:

… challenge the Israeli Jewish public’s preconceptions and promote awareness, political and cultural change within it to create the conditions for the Return of Palestinian Refugees and a shared life in this country. To do so, Zochrot will generate processes in which Israeli Jews will reflect on and review their identity, history, future and the resulting discourse through which they conceive of their lives in this country. Our focus on the Jewish target audience derives from its practical and moral responsibility for Palestinian refugeehood, as well as from its privileged power position under the present regime. (http://zochrot.org/en/content/17)

In a similar vein, the World Tribunal on Iraq (WTI), an informal global civil society ‘reclaimative justice’ project, met from 2003-2005 in various European locations, in New York City, in a number of cities in Japan including Hiroshima; Jakarta, Mumbai and a culminating session in Istanbul:

This counterhegemonic tribunal model challenged the dominate discourse on the war in Iraq, thereby attempting to influence who could write the history of the war, whose voices would be heard, what account of the events and processes would prevail, and, from this discursive struggle, what understandings of justice would contest or support conduct in the global community. (Gerson, 2013, p. 88)
Allowing for marginalized voices to be heard is one part of the memory work equation, yet at present this frequently takes place in settings that have no official jurisdiction; how then does such public remembering relate to forgetting, and finally, to healing, if this is the sole recourse to justice that is available? ‘Since forgetting is not voluntary, neither is forgiveness’, observes Avishai Margalit (Margalit, 2002, p. 203). The latter, he says, ‘is a change in the mental state of one who was wronged’ (Margalit, *ibid.*). It is more beneficial for the psychological health and social wellbeing of the victim (or victims) than the carrying of ‘poisonous’ resentment and ‘vengefulness’ toward the offender; it is not a forgetting, but rather, a ‘covering-up model’. Since memory cannot (and ought not) to be voluntarily blotted out, ‘What ought to be blotted out is the memory of the emotion in the sense of [not] reliving it’, writes Margalit (2002, p. 208) describing forgiveness almost in terms of working through the effects of PTSD. This, finally, is memory’s ‘ethical challenge’.

2.6 Methodological challenges for collective memory

Many of the methodological challenges for collective identity continue to relate to taxonomy and description (what to call collective memory, how to define it, whether it is truly collective or not, and how to interpret it). Empirical field studies have abounded, but many theoretical and methodological concerns rumble on unabated. The interdisciplinarity (or multidisciplinarity) of the field of memory studies gives Brown, Gutman, Freeman, Sodaro and Coman (2009, p. 188) concern; is it helpful? Does knowledge transfer really take place, given the different disciplinary approaches? Can a common language be found? They note ‘our respective
disciplines [psychiatry, sociology and psychology] are limited in addressing this complex nexus of questions due to methodological or theoretical constraints’ although this ‘at first glance, has endless potential for interesting interactions and collaborations that reveal a larger piece of the puzzle’ (Brown et al, 2009, p. 188).

For Jeffrey Olick, the issue is that “‘Collective memory’ in Halbwachs indicates at least two distinct, and not obviously complementary, sorts of phenomena: socially framed individual memories and collective commemorative representations and mnemonic traces’ (Olick, 1999, p. 336) and Halbwachs failed to offer ‘an integrated paradigm that identifies the unique structures involved in each of these’ (Olick, 1999, ibid). These two phenomena, complains Olick, ‘seem to be of radically distinct ontological orders and to require different epistemological and methodological strategies’ (1999, p. 336). Olick misses ‘precisely this kind of clarity’ in the ‘rather indiscriminate (in the true sense of the word) usage of collective memory’ (Olick, 1999, p. 336).24 Almost anything seems to be ‘collective memory’, comments Olick; historian Alon Confino (1997) agrees.25 Pierre Nora’s gargantuan multi-volume project to identify lieux de mémoire in France makes us wonder ‘what is not a lieu de mémoire’, says Olick. Apropos of which, he adds, ‘The same may be said of collective memory: since social action and social production take place with capacities and materials handed down from the past, collective memory becomes synonymous with pattern-maintenance per se’ (Olick, 1999, p. 336). Even if we isolate for examination collective memory acts such as commemorations, we encounter the dilemma of individual reception versus collectivistic signs:
This is because two radically different concepts of culture are involved here, one that sees culture as a subjective category of meanings contained in people's minds versus one that sees culture as patterns of publicly available symbols objectified in society. Each of these culture concepts entails different methodological strategies and produces different kinds of knowledge. (Olick, 1999, p. 336)

One prospective solution is to include collective memory in ‘the field of political culture research [i.e. political psychology] insofar as it is concerned with the cultural constitution of political identities and activities’ and to follow appropriate analytical methods such as surveys (‘collected memory’ leading to the ‘aggregated memory’ of individuals), treating ‘the black box of human minds as the source of institutional outcomes’ (Olick, 1999, p. 336) a method also recommended, among others, by Kansteiner (2002, p. 194); such studies ‘open the possibility of dialogue among the physical, behavioral, and social sciences’ for ‘an individualist approach to memory thus has a great deal of potential for producing insights about social memory outcomes’ (Olick, 1999, pp. 340-341). Further approaches from interpretive social sciences might focus on symbolism and more discursive aspects of identity claims. Yet finally, without taking into account the ‘collective perspective, we are both unable to provide good explanations of mythology, tradition, heritage, and the like either as forms or in particular’ (Olick, 1999, p. 341).

Kansteiner himself appears to find that collective memory studies have transformed scholars from academics into ‘concerned citizens’
(2002, p. 179). We ‘have not yet paid enough attention to the problem of reception both in methods and sources’ and need to notice ‘the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artifacts according to their own interests’ (Kansteiner, 2002, pp. 179-180).

In short, Kansteiner finds collective memory tricky, or ‘slippery’. ‘It can take hold of historically and socially remote events but it often privileges the interests of the contemporary,’ observes Kansteiner (and here we might think of current events and discourse in Ukraine) adding, ‘It is as much a result of conscious manipulation as unconscious absorption and it is always mediated … it can only be observed in roundabout ways, more through its effects than its characteristics’ (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 180). Attempting to investigate memory may cause ‘an unself-conscious return to the central role of human agency in history (now as the maker of representations)’ and it may cause confusion, or lead to false conclusions, over reception: how to identify someone who ‘actually shares or identifies with these representations’ (Kansteiner, 2002, p. 192) and how to assess a collective memory’s significance, given its apparent contemporaneity in terms of usage. There are, for instance, forgotten collective memories that do not stay the course; Kansteiner gives the example of the Korean War, which ‘failed’ to stake its claim strongly in American collective memory representations (aside from the long-running television series *Mash*, and many consumers did not accurately remember the historical context of that show in any case).
At the time of writing, what seems apparent is that there is no particular agreement on methodology, particularly since memory studies have only increased in inter/multi-disciplinarity, and the largest developments in memory studies are taking place in German, French and other European languages; many of these texts have not yet reached the English-speaking market. The field then, is in a state of contestation and evolution, open to further developments, a mirror to epistemology itself. Jan Assmann perhaps best indicates the essence of the dilemma when he writes, ‘Whereas knowledge has a universalist perspective, a tendency towards generalization and standardization, memory, even cultural memory, is local, egocentric, and specific to a group and its values’ (Assmann, 2008, p. 113).

2.7 Contemporary challenges for collective memory: Temporal, spatial and cultural dimensions of memorialization

In Section 1, we noted how the expansion of the contemporary collective memory field was sparked largely by translations into English of the work of Maurice Halbwachs, published some 40 years after his death. Yet Pierre Nora’s controversial multi-volume series on French national memory (discussed earlier), through the perspective of lieux de mémoire, is far more widely known; as Gérôme Truc comments, many theorists in English offer ‘a few obligatory quotations … and seem unaware of Halbwachs’ modifications to his theses on memory’ (Truc, 2011, p. 147). For Francophones, Halbwachs is continually being reevaluated, a “rediscovered sociologist” (Jaisson and Baudelot 2007) whose works are constantly republished and
subject to stimulating new interpretations’ (Truc, 2012, p. 147). Most notable is the republication of Halbwachs’ final work before his death, *La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective* (The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land: A study in collective memory; only its Conclusion is translated in the Lewis Coser edition of Halbwachs’ works). Halbwachs made two trips to Palestine (in 1927 and 1939) to carry out field work for *La Topographie légendaire* in preparation for the realization of the fullest expression of his own sociology of memory, putting into practice a methodology that offered prospects of transference and generalizability for other studies of the temporal, cultural and spatial dimensions of memorialization. In *La Topographie légendaire* Halbwachs articulated how symbolic representations of space arise from social frameworks of memory and the mental images of groups; how commemorative sites in the Old City of Jerusalem attributed to the Passion became agreed upon and were sacralized through a combination of the construction of Christian doctrine and the claims of pilgrimage. In this, he was something of a pioneer; it is regrettable that his methodology and conclusions cannot be resourced to in order to illuminate present territorial contestations in Israel/Palestine. However, the critical work of Eyal Weizman (2012), Jeff Halper (2009) and the Foundation for Middle East Peace (http://fmepp.org) with its former (until 2014) bimonthly *Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories* represents ongoing topographical contested memory work in the region.

Halbwachs’ notion of a topography of memory has been adapted in different forms through memory work in states recovering from political violence in
Latin America. Conte (2015) gives an account of the work of the ‘Topography of Memory’ section of NGO Memoria Abierta (Open Memory) that ‘systematises and produces documentation about sites, buildings [‘architectonic memory’] and spaces that were used as spaces of temporary detention and clandestine detention centres, as well as spaces of recognition and remembrance’ (2014, p. 86). Aguilera (2015) discusses the growing number of private and semi-private memory initiatives to those who suffered from political violence as a result of ‘Chile’s 9/11’ (General Pinochet’s 1973 coup) in the form of ‘memorials, memory sites in ex-detention centers, and the Museum of Memory and Human Rights’; in both Argentina and Chile, these sites that mark what Derek Gregory calls ‘a geography of violence’ are deeply contested.

While Halbwachs’ study traced sacralization of space through social frameworks, the ways in which ‘the sacred has moved outside the churches and into secular space’ is equally a feature of contemporary life, according to historian Jay Winter (2009, p. 252). ‘Commemorative sites, alongside museums and exhibitions, are now repositories of the sacred; they are the churches and cathedrals of modernity’ writes Winter (2009, p. 252). Dates for commemoration ceremonies at commemorative sites may also overlap with the sacred calendar, as Winter notes; it chimes with the collective ‘conviction … that the moment recalled is both significant and informed by a moral message’ (p. 253).
Yet these new sacred arenas and practices of memory may also be sources or sites of contestation, often by who or what is omitted or included in the representation. As Ross (2008) notes:

Symbolic landscapes communicate inclusion and exclusion, hierarchy, and portray dominant and subordinate groups in particular ways. The meanings a symbolic landscape conveys invites us to ask: Who is present and who is absent in public representations? What the qualities of those people and objects portrayed in it? Who controls the representations and to what extent are they contested? How is hierarchy portrayed and what qualities are associated with particular positions within a society’s hierarchy? (Ross, 2008, p. 8)

Such symbolic landscapes become most controversial particularly when they appear to ‘sacralize war and the political order that governs it’ (Winter, 2009, p. 255, citing Klein, 2000) or when ‘moral doubts persist about a war or public policy’ (Winter, 2009, p. 253). Paul Cummins and Tom Piper’s striking 2014 Remembrance Day poppy art installation ‘Blood Swept Lands and Seas of Red’ in London, wherein 888,246 ceramic poppies (symbolizing fallen soldiers) filled the moat of the Tower of London, was not without deep controversy (Jones, 2014; O’Callaghan, 2014). Volunteer poppy planters stressed the personal, pacific remembrance qualities of the memorial in response to criticism, ‘going to view the poppies does not stop anyone from remembering those who lost their lives during this war regardless of where they came from. Any life lost to war is one life too many’ (Fishwick, 2014). Meanwhile, every time a Japanese prime minister visits Yasukuni Jinja, the Tokyo shrine to Japan’s World War II dead that enshrines Class A war
criminals, there are vigorous (sometimes violent) protests in neighbouring Asian nations that suffered from Japanese imperialism, particularly China and South Korea. Ran Zwigenberg’s study (Zwigenberg, 2014) of how the Hiroshima Peace Park Memorial and the August 6th commemorative practices were established as a ‘bright flash of peace’ gives an account of how these sites performed multiple purposes of censorship against war crime, propaganda (for both the Allied Forces and the defeated Japanese) in the name of world peace, and disaster tourism as recovery from war. ‘Pacifists have used sites of memory for precisely the opposite purpose,’ comments Winter (2009, p. 255) and the Hiroshima Peace Park site also serves political opponents of Prime Minister Abe’s revision of the ‘no-war’ Article 9 in Japan’s American-imposed constitution and the Global Article 9 anti-war movement (http://www.article-9.org/en/).

Finally, symbolic landscapes are generally represented as timeless, particularly in their ‘never again’ injunction when they commemorate traumatic loss. They challenge time; but ‘one of the few genuinely constant attributes to collective memory is that it is likely to undergo change’ (Wertsch, 2002, p. 46). Likewise sites of memory, as Winter, echoing Halbwachs, remarks; they only serve to remind us of their impermanence (and ours), and the ‘presentism’ with which we approach them:

These very sites are as transitory as are the groups of people who create and sustain them. … These associations are bound to dissolve, to be replaced by other forms, with other needs, and other histories. At that point, the characteristic trajectory of
sites of memory, bounded by their creation, institutionalization, and decomposition, comes to an end. (Winter, 2009, p. 267).

2.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to set the scene for collective remembering, tracing its lineage and development into a major theoretical field. Empirical studies in the sociology of memory press on creatively despite (or because of) the lack of resolution to methodological and theoretical challenges, and because there is no end to memory or the equally critical question of forgetting. Not all memory is traumatic, but the notion of collective trauma, in which a painful event is still more historically present, is deeply embedded in the landscape of collective remembering and represents a further theoretical expansion of the field. Chapter 1 examined the development of the concept of psychological trauma, but in Chapter 3, I will investigate how (or whether) this psychological phenomenon came to be ‘re-experienced’ sociologically.
Chapter Three: Clarifying the concept of collective trauma

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter we seek to develop the case for collective trauma further, advancing beyond the genesis of the documentation and medicalization of psychological trauma, whose effects were exacerbated by the employment of increasingly sophisticated war machinery. In order to site these inquiries within a wider framework, in Chapter Two we investigated epistemological trends for experiential ‘collectivities’, in particular the turn towards memory, or the recent memory ‘boom’, with the marked increase in sites of collective memory and consciously collective acts of memorialization. The latter sets the scene for the methodological basis of our inquiry in Chapter 4, for ‘examining how commemorative practices shape and are shaped by memory of difficult pasts reveals a great deal about why and how cultural trauma is continually sustained in national consciousness’ (Hashimoto, 2013, p. 30).

It follows that if we accept Hallbwachs’ and Wertsch’s stance in Chapter Two, namely, that all (or very nearly all) memories can be said to be socially mediated and (at least potentially) transmissible by the collectivity, then there is also a strong case for examining the phenomenon of collective trauma, building on collective memory for its pathways of transmission, wherein ‘all “facts” [about trauma] are mediated, emotionally, cognitively, and morally’, resulting in an imposed “an interpretative grid”’ (Alexander, 2004, p. 201). Such mediated interpretation is critical to the construction of the collective trauma, to its sustenance, its amplification and lasting power through extensive sharing over generations; this, too, is a natural outgrowth of...
collective memory theorization. Marianne Hirsch sees this as a highly creative connection, terming the phenomenon ‘Postmemory’, wherein:

… descendants of survivors (of victims as well as of perpetrators) of massive traumatic events connect so deeply to the previous generation’s remembrances of the past that they need to call that connection *memory* and thus that, in certain extreme circumstances, memory *can* be transmitted to those who were not actually there to live an event’ (Hirsch, 2008, pp. 105-106).

Postmemory is a ‘received memory [that] is distinct from the recall of contemporary witnesses and participants’, a critical term for ‘the many qualifying adjectives that try to define both a specifically inter- and trans-generational act of transfer and the resonant after-effects of trauma’ (Hirsch, 2008, pp. 105-106). This may sound like a psychological formulation, but it is sociological in its relational impact and its imaginative construction, focusing on:

… the relationship that the generation after those who witnessed cultural or collective trauma bears to the experiences of those who came before, experiences that they “remember” only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up’. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right. Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus *not actually mediated by recall but by imaginative investment, projection, and creation* [researcher’s italics]. To
grow up with such overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that preceded one’s birth or one’s consciousness, is to risk having one’s own stories and experiences displaced, even evacuated, by those of a previous generation. It is to be shaped, however indirectly, by traumatic events that still defy narrative reconstruction and exceed comprehension. These events happened in the past, but their effects continue into the present. This is, I believe, the experience of postmemory and the process of its generation.

(Hirsch, 2008, p. 106-107)

Whether one uses Hirsch’s term ‘postmemory’ or the more common ‘transgenerational transmission’, this is clearly a vivid characterisation of the collective trauma dynamic.

3.2 Acknowledging controversies

It would be remiss at this point not to acknowledge that many of the theories regarding the transmission of trauma in societies attempt to drive a wedge between ‘psychological’ and ‘cultural’ or ‘sociological’ trauma. An examination of Kira’s taxonomy of psychological traumas (see Figures 1 and 2, below) demonstrates, for instance, that individual psychological traumas do, in fact, have wider impact; in this sense they can be said to have sociological effects, not least because the traumatized transport their trauma back to their families and communities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trauma</th>
<th>Etiology</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attachment trauma</td>
<td>Disruption of bond of warmth and security between child and adult (Bowlby) e.g. through abandonment, death, kidnapping, divorce, loss, incest</td>
<td>Avoidant or disordered attachment, relationship/personality disorders; impact on emotional/cognitive processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy/identity/individuation (personal or collective) trauma</td>
<td>Sexual/physical abuse, DV, rape, slavery, torture, imprisonment, genocide</td>
<td>Shattering of behavioural &amp; emotional independence of individual/group; loss of identity, feelings of inadequacy, loss of control, helplessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interdependence/Disconnectedness trauma</td>
<td>Events that threaten social embeddedness &amp; support systems e.g. a child moving from school to school, state to state, involuntary uprootedness e.g. refugee experience</td>
<td>Traumatizing; loss of sense of belonging, security and meaning in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement/self-actualization trauma</td>
<td>Failure to achieve a target that is perceived as essential to survival or progression / goals, e.g. becoming unemployed, demotion, substantial loss of money/health/valuables, failure to achieve life goals.</td>
<td>Traumatic, may lead to depression, stress-related disorders, suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival trauma</td>
<td>Direct/indirect threat to self/significant others’ lives e.g. war, attempted suicide, homicide, killing, violent crime, natural or man-made disaster</td>
<td>Multiple effects. A strong belief system may help to manage terror; or to cause the traumatized individual to commit terror. More than one value processing subsystem may be affected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig 1. A clinical taxonomy of psychological traumas, Type 1, after Kira (2001)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trauma</th>
<th>Etiology</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factitious trauma or trauma-like events</td>
<td>Cascade/accumulation of stressors/ordeals creates trauma-like experience</td>
<td>PTSD-like symptoms; negative and non-supportive attitudes toward the traumatized individual can create secondary traumatization (factitious trauma).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect/vicarious trauma</td>
<td>Transmitted between persons/generations</td>
<td>An extreme effect might be shared psychotic disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. One-step transmission of trauma</td>
<td>a. Transmission from one person to another, or individuals in connected group e.g. parent discovering sexual abuse of child; Other examples: clinicians, firefighters, emergency and relief workers, police personnel</td>
<td>a. For relief workers etc., burnout, compassion fatigue; over-empathetic enmeshment or empathetic withdrawal, full or partial PTSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple-step indirect traumas transmitted across generations</td>
<td>b. Generational family trauma transmission e.g. abuse, incest, DV</td>
<td>b. Repeating cycle of violence, anxiety, disorganization, reexperiencing PTSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Collective cross-generational trauma transmission</td>
<td>c. Historical trauma (HT) e.g. slavery of African Americans, Armenian genocide, Jewish experience of Holocaust</td>
<td>c. Can predispose individual to lifetime traumas or higher incidence of PTSD (e.g. in combat veterans who are second generation Holocaust survivors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Multigenerational transmission of structural violence</td>
<td>d. Extreme social disparities, deprived social structures e.g. poverty, malnutrition</td>
<td>d. Multiple effects on achievement, functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct trauma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Single unexpected trauma (type 1)</td>
<td>a. A single sudden blow or event</td>
<td>a. Type 1 trauma can cause PTSD symptoms and/or impaired functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Complex trauma</td>
<td>b. Type II - a related series of blows e.g. combat (survival), ongoing physical/sexual abuse; ongoing chronic poverty, disease, terminal illness; extended traumatic experiences that cease</td>
<td>b. Past extended trauma can create massive defensive mechanisms e.g. denial, repression, dissociation, somatization, self-anaesthesia, identification with aggressor, aggression against self; impaired emotional processing e.g. absence of feelings, rage, sadness &amp; fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Type III – cascade of traumatic events, direct or indirect I or II e.g. refugee experience; may be longitudinal.</td>
<td>c. Different kinds of effects—can focus on one area of human functioning or affect different or all areas of functioning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig 2. A clinical taxonomy of psychological traumas, Type 2, after Kira (2001)
Furthermore, certain questions present themselves when we move from the individual to the wider distribution of psychological trauma (typically arising from the result of war or a major catastrophe, whether natural or man-made). Is collective trauma an extension or ‘scaling up’ of psychological trauma, mimicking certain diagnostic features of psychological trauma as they have been documented so far, or is it a slightly different animal? If so, in which ways?

Abstracting sociological trauma from its psychological substrate misses the whole picture of the developmental pathways of collective trauma and their cyclical, mutually reactive nature (see Figure 3). Recognition of this point is critical, as many sociologists (notably Jeffrey Alexander) make a deliberate decision not to pay attention to the conceptual heritage; but without such recognition, the phenomenon is no more than an empty vessel, a hauntology that cannot be taken seriously. Alexander et al’s approach effectively downsizes the role of psychological trauma (‘ naïve’ or ‘lay’) in stressing its cultural emanation, implying that the former is a-scientific and non-empiricist, an intriguing reduction in view of strenuous positivist approaches to validate psychological trauma through extensive research projects) (Alexander, 2004b, p. 3).
The argument becomes still more complicated by the fact that the status of psychological trauma itself is still contested, as Alexander notes dryly: ‘Every argument about trauma claims ontological reality’ (Alexander, 2004b, p. 9). Even when examinations of the ‘naturalization’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009) of the trauma concept attempt a critical approach, they tend to meander untidily between discussions of the psychologically traumatized individual and the traumatized mass or group (therefore having a sociological component) and are unable to escape an implicit acceptance of psychological trauma’s unclear ‘ontological reality’. Can one build a theory of collective trauma apart from, or on top of the supposedly as-yet undetermined foundation of individual psychological and psychiatric trauma theory?

Arising from the seemingly inescapable elision of psychological and sociological trauma, does the acute psychological trauma of a massive
number of individuals then become a ‘collective trauma’? Or to put it another way, is collective trauma more than additive, i.e. more than the sum of mass individual psychological traumas? Loss experienced on a devastating scale may not necessarily lead to collective trauma, as Heins and Langenohl (2016, p. 4) illustrate, asserting that ‘the memory of the [Allied] bombing war [on German cities during World War II] has not been turned into a national or “cultural trauma.”’ They suggest that defeat did indeed cause ‘a trauma process’ that was worked through by Germans, allowing them ‘to fundamentally redefine themselves … this process was successful precisely because Germans learned to connect their own suffering to the suffering of others’ (Heins and Langenold, 2016, p. 4). Surveying memory wars in which Germany’s left and right argue about the meaning of the Bombenkrieg, they conclude that attempts ‘to translate …[it] into a cultural trauma have failed. The psychological trauma of being bombed has not been transformed into a cultural trauma of “the” bombed’ (2016, p. 21). Overall, German consensus would not allow it.

A further argument revolves around how trauma is ‘passed on’ to succeeding generations. On the one hand, there is a huge, continually evolving body of medical literature on the psychological transmission of trauma; while it may have much to tell us, this research is currently highly controversial. There is unresolved debate among psychologists and psychiatrists about the extent and long-lasting nature of the transgenerational transmissive (‘sequential traumatization’) clinical aspect of trauma, which is considered to have played a critical role in the Israel-Palestine conflict through Holocaust survivors and their children (Auerhahn and Laub, pp. 21-42, in Danieli, 1998; Felsen, pp.
43-68 in Danieli, 1998; Solomon, pp. 69-84, in Danieli, 1998). Among the most prominent ongoing investigations is that of Rachel Yehuda and colleagues; from 1985, Yehuda et al began to examine significant findings in low cortisol levels in Holocaust survivors suffering with PTSD and later, their transmission to offspring, predisposing them to a range of PTSD symptoms such as depression and anxiety.

Dissenters largely cite human resilience and coping strategies, and find fault with research design or absence of large-scale empirical studies, ‘research methodology, sample selection and generalisability’ (Auherhahn and Laub, p. 22, in Danieli, 1998; see also Felsen, p. 43, in Danieli, 1998). Analyzing a wide range of literature, van IJzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg and Sagi-Schwartz (2003) comment that ‘studies on intergenerational transmission show inconsistent outcomes … Secondary traumatization, therefore, still is a concept in need of further empirical validation’ (p. 460). Sagi-Schwartz, van IJzendoorn, Grossmann, Joels, Scharf, Koren-Karie and Alkalay (2003), examining attachment and traumatic stress in Holocaust survivors’ daughters, concluded that Holocaust survivors did not transmit their trauma as per child abuse victims, because the traumatic events were exogenous and ‘emerged from an almost anonymous destructive force (the Nazis)’ (pp. 1090-1091) and also because they had previously enjoyed ‘several years of normal family life before the Holocaust’ (pp. 1091).

Running against conventional wisdom, Sagi-Schwartz, van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (2008) carried out a further statistical meta-analysis of literature and concluded controversially that ‘second generation
as well as third generation offspring of Holocaust survivors are, in general, well-adapted’ (p. 118) and the ‘potential “sleeper effect’” of trauma (delayed response, or skipping a generation, p. 118) does not seem to have emerged, for similar reasons surmised in the previous 2003 study. Expectations of Holocaust trauma transmission, say the researchers, ‘have become ingrained to a large extent in the belief system within the professional as well as the wider community (not necessarily with sound conceptual or theoretical basis for such a transmission)’ (p. 106). A further study conducted in 2010 (Barel, van IJzendoorn, Sagi-Schwartz and Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2010) also concluded that long-term post-genocide sequelae for Holocaust survivors themselves indicated ‘remarkable resilience’.

In time, epigenetic case studies (such as Yehuda, Halligan and Bierer, 2001; Labonté et al, 2012; Roth, 2014; Reul, 2014; Yehuda et al, 2016) may substantiate conclusively the psychological or medical basis for traumatic inheritance. On the other hand, scientific research on transmissible psychological trauma, although fascinating, is not a necessary condition for the empirical verification of the workings of collective trauma in societies; it has yet to account for the collective trauma’s continuing power to disorganise societies and social groups over the long term.

Nor does collective trauma require every single member of a collectivity to manifest psychological trauma or traumatic damage; the phenomenon is of larger dimensions. The sheer scale of the sociological and political phenomenon of memorialisation of painful events (discussed in Chapter
Two) creates a convincing ideological mechanism for the consolidation and expression of collective trauma.

Finally, Elizabeth Breese, Alexander and Eyerman’s co-author in *Narrating Trauma: On the Impact of Collective Suffering* (Eyerman, Alexander and Breese, 2013) makes an interesting distinction between the two contentious terms, ‘collective trauma’ and ‘cultural trauma’ asserting, ‘Collective trauma is primarily an emotional state, whereas cultural trauma is an emotional and cognitive process having to do with construction and contestation of meaning’ (Breese, 2013, p. 220). I contend that the former ‘state’ of ‘emotional’ and psychological stress is indeed a necessary response (not an Alexandrian ‘Enlightenment’ response) as the critical trigger before the cultural impacts may manifest themselves, with all their presumed intergenerational force.

This chapter aims not only to raise questions about the nature of collective trauma, but also to answer them, by identifying common characteristics and responses to selected major ‘traumatic’ events of the 20th century. These are events distinguished by the manner in which political violence occasioned widespread, catastrophic, long-lasting (and continuing) impact on certain collectives, entailing levels and forms of violence which, following Lemkin, was later deemed to be ‘genocidal’. Writing in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, Raphael Lemkin offered his watermark definition:

> By ‘genocide’ we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the
ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (killing)…. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.’ (Lemkin, 1944/2008, p.80)

I do not use the words ‘trauma’ and ‘genocide’ (as defined by Raphael Lemkin) interchangeably, but in the cases discussed below, the genocides that occurred are said to have produced wide-ranging trauma, since they were strategically aimed at the cultural decimation of particular collectives.

The twentieth century has endured at least four major episodes of this nature: the Armenian genocide, the World War Two Holocaust of Jews and Sinti-Roma, the Rwanda genocide and the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina that took place between 1991-2001 following the dissolution of former Yugoslavia; three of these cases have also benefited from commissions of transitional justice, with less than clear results for the healing of societal trauma; all of the examples in question remain contested or denied for political reasons by various actors, a key factor in their residual ability to be constituted as traumatic. There are, alas, many, many other episodes, hidden (Hinton *et al,* 2013) or slightly less well-
remembered, less familiar or less well-documented, such as the Herero and Namaqua Genocide in Namibia (1904-1907) and the enslavement, torture and murder of Aboriginal peoples in Latin America (Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru).

As it is necessary to limit the scope of the inquiry in order to elicit key attributions and arrive at a distinctive taxonomy, I have, therefore, deliberately selected two temporally discrete major events—the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust—which are identified by their ethnic or cultural component. In both cases, the trauma suffered by the collectives is historically verified, but critically, remain disputed for explicitly political reasons, with ongoing or recurrent issues of recognition that do not permit traumatic healing.

My intention is not to compare similarities and differences of the cases themselves as per Dadrian (2007) but to examine exogenic and/or endogenic propagation and operationalization of collective trauma: the events of the selected cases—sufficiently devastating as to be almost outside the possibility of assigned meaning—are now beyond or almost beyond the fringes of living memory. Their liminality is critical, in that it affords us the identification of the pathways and distinctive features of unresolved transmissible trauma in subsequent generations: silence or repression, and conversely, a mechanism for disorganisation and fragmentation, reemergence and retelling of narratives by heritage groups, who may include a new generation of traumatic entrants; memorialisation practices, many of which have become increasingly politicised (both in the sense of exposing
hidden politics, and of instrumentalisation) and have caused further amplification of collective trauma; linkage with other traumas or conversely, non-empathetic refusal to link to others’ collective traumas, for fear of ‘de-exceptionalisation’ or an insistence on exceptionality; unrecognised legal and political claims and compensation issues. Studying these and other cases necessarily engages interdisciplinary methods, and in the selected examples, may also take into account the field of diaspora studies.

Finally, there is a cascading connection between these cases and the Israel-Palestine conflict (this project’s main case study, in which accusations of ‘genocide’ and ‘massacre’ also abound, the latter most recently in regard to the three recent Gaza wars in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014). The Holocaust stands in contrapuntal relation to the Armenian Genocide, from which Hitler’s inspiration for cultural genocide was reportedly derived, noted by Dadrian (2003), Jones (2011), Kuper (1983), Landau (2006) and Travis (2013b). Dadrian (2003) in particular analyzed this issue with rigour (pp. 401-410), verifying the authenticity of Hitler’s many statements in his search to create a territory and a new world order for a purely Aryan Third Reich, including the infamous ‘Wer redet heute noch von der Vernichtung der Armenier?’ (‘Who after all today is speaking of the destruction of the Armenians?’) (p. 403).

Dadrian asserts:

A number of utterances Hitler made in the 1920s and 30s indicate that he was knowledgeable … about the historical record of the persecution of the Armenians, and their demise in Turkey through ‘annihilation’. In one of the earliest surviving
written documents containing statements or speeches by Hitler and covering the period up to 1924, the future Nazi leader made an allusion to the Armenians as victims of their lack of courage for combativeness. The ‘solution of the Jewish question’, he added, requires, therefore, ‘a bloody clash’. Otherwise, Hitler noted, ‘the German people will end up becoming just like the Armenians’ (… das deutsche Volk wird ein Volk wie die Armenier …) Hitler made an analogous remark some two decades later … (Dadrian, 2003, p. 402.)

Hitler reportedly admired both Genghis Khan and Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the former because of his attempt at empire creation despite sending ‘millions of women and children into death knowingly and cheerfully (fröhlichen Herzens). Yet, history sees in him only the great founder of States’ (Dadrian, 2003, p. 404). The latter reportedly greatly esteemend Genghis Khan too: ‘For one thing, Atatürk himself exalted the historical figure of Genghis in a November 1, 1922, speech in the Grand National Assembly, describing him as a source of pride for the Turkish nation’ (Dadrian, 2003, p. 404). Hitler envisioned emulating Kemal’s triumph in founding the new Turkish regime ‘and the world not only consigned the annihilation of the Armenians to oblivion but has accepted the new order of the things because “The world believes only in success” (Die Welt glaubt nur an den Erfolg.)’ (Dadrian, 2003, p. 404). Lemkin furthermore remarked on how the Armenian Genocide had served as an example of cultural destruction for Hitler.⁹

Thus these two cases have particular historical linkages and can be said to form counterpoints of collective trauma, even if mutual empathy is far from
consistent and at times produces truly contradictory denial (Finkelstein, 2003, pp. 68-70).

3.3 The Armenian genocide (1895-1923)

‘… the rumour in the market-place here is that every Christian at Van has been killed, and that the Government have turned the cannon on the towns of Erzeroum and Bitlis and levelled them with the ground….’ (Harris, H.B., 1896, p. 113)

‘… at Eghin the scene was terrible. Most of the Christian houses were burnt, many of the best and most respected townsmen are killed; a father and his three sons, for example, who have all left widows except the youngest. Some of the women and girls, to escape dishonour, flung themselves into the river.’ (Harris, H.B., 1896, p. 206)

Fig 4. Map of the Armenian Genocide.
Known as either the *Meds Yeghern* (meaning ‘great crime’) or by the more literary term, *Aghēt* (‘catastrophe’) the Armenian linguistic parallels of the Palestinian Nakba or the Shoah refer to the deportations, death marches, torture, mass killings, rapes and upheaval of an estimated one and a half million Armenians that took place during the dying years of the Ottoman empire and its transformation into the new Kemalist republic. One of the tragic effects is the long geopolitical shadow these events continues to cast, over a hundred years later.¹¹ As with the Jewish Holocaust and the Palestinian Nakba, it is important to note that the events did not succeed in extinguishing the Armenian community altogether, as Figure 6 (below) indicates; if that were the case, we would today be discussing only the trauma of perpetrators. Survivors of the Armenian Genocide scattered and rebuilt their lives not only in former Soviet Armenia and other states of the
FSU, but also in the Middle East, Western Europe, Australia and North America; in 2015, around 8-10 million ethnic Armenians currently live outside the Republic of Armenia:

The sun never sets on the Armenian diaspora. Its constituent communities include, in a descending order that reflects population and not cultural, political, or economic importance, communities in Russia (nearly 2 million), the United States (800,000), Georgia (400,000), France (250,000), the Ukraine (150,000), Lebanon (105,000), Iran (ca. 100,000), Syria (70,000), Argentina (60,000), Turkey (60,000), Canada (40,000), and Australia (30,000). There are some twenty other communities with smaller populations, ranging from 25,000 down to 3,000, in Britain, Greece, Germany, Brazil, Sweden, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, the Gulf Emirates, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Venezuela, Hungary, Uzbekistan, and Ethiopia. (Tölölyan, 2000, p. 107)
The most distinctive feature of the Armenian *Aghét*\(^\text{12}\) or *Meds Yeghern* is the international community’s general inability to recognize or agree on the ‘genocidal’ nature of the event (although it was the fate of the Armenians that inspired Holocaust survivor Raphael Lemkin to push for the creation of the term genocide, together with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, discussed above). Acknowledgement has remained contested, leaving the open wound to fester and for traumatic construction to grow.\(^\text{13}\) Thus it appears that although there are historical ‘end dates’ during which the various traumatic events occurred in different locations, in fact the Armenian Genocide as a phenomenon remains without
resolution, apparently endless in its painful impact (Göçek, 2014) and subject to the relentless vagaries of power politics.\textsuperscript{14}

3.4 Refusing recognition

In the operationalizing of collective trauma, the twin prongs of denial and commemoration are paramount. Discourse regarding recognition becomes particularly acute on April 24\textsuperscript{th}, the traditional day for memorial ceremonies and statements about the Armenian Genocide, commemorated across the Armenian diaspora worldwide and particularly in Yerevan, the capital of the Armenian republic (former Soviet Armenia).\textsuperscript{15} There are memorial sites and museums in 34 countries,\textsuperscript{16} and discourse in English often centres on whether or not the Armenian Genocide is completely recognized by the world’s superpower, the U.S., at a federal level (although individual American states have recognized the Genocide)\textsuperscript{17} despite the guarantees of clarification given by Samantha Power, author of the Pulitzer prizewinning \textit{Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide} (Power, 2002). (Power’s book devotes Chapter 1 to the Armenian Genocide.) Power was one of Barack Obama’s senior foreign policy advisors in his campaign for the presidency in 2008, and campaigned for Armenian Americans to vote for Obama, promising them that Obama would be the first U.S. president to recognize the Armenian Genocide.\textsuperscript{18}\textsuperscript{19} On 24th April 2015, the centennial memorial day of the largest massacres in 1915, it was widely noted that President Obama still avoided the English use of ‘the G-word’,\textsuperscript{20} possibly in order to avoid offending a vital NATO ally and ensure Turkish President Erdoğan’s continued cooperation in operations to combat Daesh. However,
President Obama had used one of the Armenian terms for the catastrophe, Meds Yeghern on Armenian Memorial Day in 2009.\textsuperscript{21} 

Despite this, a photographic museum dedicated to the Armenian genocide exists in the Armenian quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, which the researcher has visited. Prior to the 100\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, American Armenian poet and scholar Peter Balakian reminded Tablet readers of ‘distinguished Holocaust scholar Deborah Lipstadt’ and her ‘statement [that] reminds us what a morally important issue denialism is for both Jews and Armenians: ‘Denial of genocide whether that of the Turks against the Armenians, or the Nazis against the Jews is not an act of historical reinterpretation … but an insidious form of intellectual and moral degradation’ (Balakian, 2015a; 2015b).

The continuing international disagreement over whether genocidal events actually occurred is even more remarkable in view of the extensive news reports (Kloain, 2005) and eye witness accounts compiled by then-diplomats, consuls and British and American missionaries in the region, and the American Red Cross, many of them collected in Bryce and Toynbee’s British Parliamentary Blue Book, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16 (Bryce and Toynbee, 2000) and other independent publications (see, for example, the many books digitalized at ArmenianHouse.org or published by the Gomidas Institute in London) and memoirs such as Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s Story: Formerly American Ambassador to Turkey (1919).\textsuperscript{22} Kateb (2003) offers an account of
how the massacres were extensively covered in the Australian media; and there are many works of history, as well as personal memoirs (Akçam, 2007; Alayarian, 2008; Balakian, 2008; Dadrian, 2003; Dadrian and Akçam, 2011; De Waal, 2015; Hovannisian, 1999, 2007a, 2007b; Kevorkian, 2011; Naimark, Suny and Gocek, 2011, Schrodte, 2014; Suny, 2015, Winter, 2004).

T.S. Kahvé (2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015) provide a cumulative and updated extensive bibliography of publications that detail the different phases of documentation of data. Attempts to rebut data regularly rebound; for example, the Gomidas Institute’s Ara Sarafian, responding to further Turkish government denials, felt compelled to publish a stout defense of Bryce and Toynbee’s 1916 British Parliamentary Blue Book (Sarafian, 2005).

As for ‘most Turks,’ explains Hürriyet Daily News columnist Mustafa Akyol, they ‘… only use the much more innocent term “tehcir,” or deportation’ about the fate of the Armenians (Akyol, 2015). Disputing the ‘Muslims versus ancient Christian people’ version of the events, Akyol cites denialist historian Justin McCarthy (McCarthy, 1995) placing the Armenians in the wider political context of the winds of nationalism blowing through post-French Revolutionary Europe, in which many Ottoman Christian peoples, ‘such as Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians’ sought their own states, in the process often engaging in ‘ethnic cleansing, whose victims were often Muslims. A similar tragedy hit the Muslims of Crimea and Caucasus as well, who were persecuted by the Russian advance. … some 5 million Ottoman Muslims have perished during the decline and shrinking of the empire over two centuries — all due to various waves of ethnic cleansing’ (Akyol, 2015).

(Bjørnlund [2008] refers to this historical process as ‘violent Turkification’,
focusing on the ethnic cleansing of Aegean Greeks as part of the process. This is a consensus also reflected in the 2007 Resolution by the International Association of Genocide Scholars, and in Genocide Prevention Now’s special web magazine issue, *Armenian Genocide and Co-Victims: Assyrians, Yezidis, Greeks.)*

Alleging that the Armenian nationalist support of the Russians led to their expulsion to Syria by the ‘Young Turks’ (the Committee of Union and Progress who overthrew the last Ottoman Sultan, Abdul-Hamid II), Akyol echoes McCarthy’s analysis that it was ‘out of the fear that the Balkan nightmares would be repeated this time in Anatolia, the last stronghold of the Turks.’

It is certainly true that friction did exist between the various populations, including friction between different Christian populations.

Finally, Akyol concludes, ‘the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Armenians’ (his preferred term) ‘took place not because of the Ottoman system. Rather, it occurred because of the fall of the Ottoman system. Christian Armenians, who lived with Muslim Turks for centuries, were driven out not because of religion, but a modern ideology: nationalism’ (Akyol, 2015).

Armenian-French historian Raymond Kévorkian similarly places the Armenian Genocide in its historical context, but there is an implication that contextualisation and understanding do not necessarily excuse:

> The destruction of historical groups by states is always the culmination of complex processes that unfold in particular political and social environments – most notably, in multiethnic contexts. The translation of genocidal intentions into action is
systematically preceded by periods of maturation rooted in diverse experiences, collective failures, frustrations, and virulent antagonisms. It is justified by an ideological construction that envisages the elimination of “internal enemies” from the social body. Each instance of genocidal violence, however, obeys an internal logic that lends it its singularity. The physical destruction of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire has, in its turn, a singular feature: it was conceived as a necessary condition for the construction of a Turkish nation state — the supreme objective of the Young Turks. The two phenomena, in other words, are indissolubly linked: we cannot understand the one if we ignore the other. (Kévorkian, 2011, p. 1)

On this dialectic, Ronald Grigor Suny comments that ‘Revision of history is constant, even necessary’ (Suny, 2015). Yet as far as the interpretation of Lemkin’s original inspiration for the genocide convention goes, ‘it has led to the creation of two separate, contradictory narratives’. Pro-Armenian and pro-Turkish historical analyses concur ‘on many of the basic facts’ but the latter, the denialists, ‘have argued that the tragedy was the result of a reasonable and understandable response of a government to a rebellious and seditious population in time of war and mortal danger to the state’s survival. Raison d’état justified the suppression of rebellion, and mass killing was explained as the unfortunate residue (“collateral damage” in the now fashionable vocabulary) of legitimate efforts to establish order behind the lines’ (Suny, 2015). 26
Yet despite all this, as Noradounkian (2015) notes, ‘the classification of this crime as genocide has consistently been denied by the successive Turkish governments and a number of Turkish and non-Turkish scholars alike’\textsuperscript{27} Scholar Richard Falk, former UNHCR special rapporteur for the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, and personal friend of Turkish PM Ahmed Davutoğlu, carefully explains with reference to the Turkish government that Pope Francis’s 2015 recognition of the Armenian Genocide especially rankled, just after Turkish President Erdoğan had softened his position the year before: ‘In an apologetic and conciliatory speech addressed directly to the Armenian community Erdoğan in 2014 said: “May Armenians who lost their lives in the early twentieth century rest in peace, we convey our condolences to their grandchildren.”’ (Falk, 2015). However, in 2015, Falk asserts that President Erdoğan

… revert[s] to a much harsher tone, in a pushback to Francis declaring that religious leaders make a ‘mistake’ when they try to resolve historical controversies. In an effort to be constructive, Erdoğan restates the long standing Turkish proposal to open the Ottoman archives and allow a joint international commission of historians to settle the issue as to how the events of 1915 should most accurately be described, and specifically whether the term genocide is appropriate. …The Turkish position is that there were terrible killings of the Armenians, but at a level far below the 1.5 million claimed by Armenian and most international sources, and mainly as an incident of ongoing warfare and civil strife in which many Turks
also lost their lives, and hence it was an experience of mutual loss, and not ‘genocide.’ (Falk, 2015)

Falk shows understanding of the Turkish position, explaining their ‘credible anxiety’ regarding a ‘furious right-wing backlash’ that might endanger the state’s stability (although currently it seems that the Turkish state has greater problems from other sources) and further complains of the construction of an ‘almost uncontested international narrative’ and the ‘international consensus’ regarding the ‘ambiguous’ Armenian genocide, ‘the position endorsed and supported by Pope Francis, the European Parliament, and about 20 countries, including France and Russia’. He resorts to the legal defence: the term did not even exist ‘until 1944 by Rafael Lemkin in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, written in reaction to the crimes of the Nazis …’ and, sensing a circular argument, allows that:

Lemkin’s text does indirectly lend support to the Armenian insistence that only by acknowledging these events as genocide is their true reality comprehended. Consider this often quoted passage from Lemkin’s book: “I became interested in genocide because it happened so many times in history. It happened to the Armenians, then after the Armenians, Hitler took action.” (Falk, 2015)

Yet, according to Falk, even ‘the Nuremberg Judgment assessing Nazi criminality avoids characterizing the Holocaust as genocide, limiting itself to crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.’ Moreover, ‘If in 1945 there was no legal foundation for charging surviving Nazi leaders with
genocide, how can the crime be attributed to the Ottoman Turks, and how can the Turkish government be reasonably expected to acknowledge it?"

Finally, the Nuremberg Judgment provides that 'criminal law can never be validly applied retroactively (nulla poena sine lege)' a ‘principle [which] is also embedded in contemporary international criminal law.’ Thus, ‘if genocide was not a crime in 1915, it cannot be treated as a crime in 2015,’ (Falk, 2015).

This may be the case legally, but as Falk acknowledges, the preamble of Lemkin’s Genocide Convention does leave room for wider historical interpretation; it “Recognized in all periods of history that genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity.” Moreover:

… even the premise of prior criminality is reinforced by Article 1: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace, or time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.” By using the word ‘confirm’ it would appear that the crime of genocide preexisted the use of the word ‘genocide’ invented to describe the phenomenon, and thus no persuasive jurisprudential reason is present to oppose redescribing the events of 1915 as an instance of genocide. (Falk, 2015)

Finally, Falk gives up on a legal interpretation and concludes that we had better take the pressure to acknowledge Armenian Genocide ‘as a *psycho-political [sic]* campaign’. The Armenians wish ‘to achieve an acknowledgement and apology … and possibly to set the stage for a subsequent demand of reparations’.

The Armenian ‘insistence on the label “genocide” seeks to capture total control of the moral high ground’ and to
piggyback by association on ‘the most horrendous events experienced by others, and most particularly by the Jewish victims of Nazism’ (Falk, 2015) a stance that gave Bernard Lewis particular pause. The association with the Holocaust adds a further ‘element in the unfolding story,’ notes Falk, for ‘there appears to be an Israeli role in deflecting Turkish harsh criticism of its behavior in Gaza by a show of strong support for the Armenian campaign’ (Falk, 2015). Yet after the huge falling-out between Israel and Turkey over the 2010 killing of nine Turkish activists (the death count rose to 10 on 25 May, 2014) on the Gaza-bound aid ship *Mavi Marmara*, it is likely that Israel is keen to avoid further Turkish alienation, amid talk of a settlement having been reached.

3.5 Enduring impact

Finally, how does the *Meds Yeghern* continue to affect subsequent generations of Armenians and the Armenian diaspora? While it remains active as collective cultural traumatic memory, evoked and preserved through highly-politicized annual memorialization ceremonies, and yearly rounds of denial or recognition, with the passage of time and the deaths of survivors, there are relatively few living witnesses; and in comparison to Holocaust literature, fewer extensive studies of its transgenerational psychological impact on remaining Armenian populations exist (Kalayjian and Weisberg, 2002). Many sites of memory have been all but erased within former Armenian areas of Turkey (Üngör, 2014, p. 151; pp. 165-166; Banco, 2015) as the new state constructed its national memory through revised historical accounts and textbooks (Üngör, 2014, p. 156), and converted domestic issues inherited from its ‘traditionally multilayered cultural
composition’ to ‘foreign ones, such as Ermeni meselesi (the Armenian question) or Kürt meselesi (the Kurdish question)’ (Anahit, 2014, p. 206).

Nevertheless, at present, sufficient social memories of mass violence remain preserved and transmitted among families, as various documentaries attest and promote (Üngör, 2014, p. 157; Eric Friedler’s documentary, Aghét – Ein Völkermord (Friedler, 2010) and many other documentaries are readily available on YouTube). Indeed, between 2002-2007, Üngör (2014) conducted ‘up to 200 interviews with the (grand)children of contemporaries of those events … elderly Turks and Kurds often remembered vivid stories from family members or villagers who had witnessed or participated in the massacres’ (pp. 158-159). Anahit (2014, p. 212) interviews on video ‘over 250 Turkish Armenians’ between 2006-2010, in order to illustrate how ‘For many Armenians, their identity is principally associated with being violated as their unresolved traumas get transmitted to future generations’; she supports her project further by citing Slavoj Žižek’s contention that ‘Inherited memory of atrocity can indeed dominate a people’s heritage. Sometimes to the extent that it can be almost a defining factor of identity and cohesion, often for many centuries’ (Anahit, p. 212).

3.6 New entrants to trauma

As these generations pass away, it is inevitable that social transmission will degrade; but in a contemporary climate that emphasizes identity politics, a different kind of cultural trauma will evolve, not only among diasporic Armenians but also among the ‘hidden Armenians’ in Turkey, numbering ‘from [the late Armenian-Turkish human rights journalist] Hrant Dink’s
300,000 to the Turkish Historical Society’s 500,000 to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutuyn’s figure of two million’ (Üngör, 2014, p. 163).

Dink, assassinated on January 19th, 2007, in Istanbul, was one of the co-founders and editor of the Turkish-Armenian weekly Agos, and sought to build empathy between Turks and Armenians, as well as greater integration for Armenians and others into Turkish society (Oran, 2006). He decried the state’s attempt to repress difference and divide its minorities in general, claiming ‘we can be a better unity with the multiplicity of our different identities’ (Anahit, 2014, pp. 206-207). While frequently challenging the Turkish State’s denial of genocide, Dink despised the political manipulation of the genocide by diaspora Armenians and the Republic of Armenia. Reportedly ‘tens of thousands’ (or ‘hundreds of thousands’, ‘up to 100,000’) attended Dink’s funeral, bearing signs that read ‘We are all Hrant Dink’ or ‘We are all Armenian’ (Hürriyet, 2007; Today’s Zaman, 2007; Krajeski, 2012). As Turkey has moved further and further to the right and its crackdown on the freedom of the press has become more severe, particularly newspapers and media organizations associated with Fetullah Gülen’s Hizmet (‘service’) movement, such as the Feza Gazatcelik Media group, Dink’s death represents a new phrase in the evolution of this collective trauma within Turkey, with additional entrants choosing to identify:

In the years since Dink’s murder, the movement has grown and become more complex, bringing together Turkish liberals, Armenians, and journalists, and also Kurds and Alevi, and women and members of the L.G.B.T. community—basically all
marginalized minorities in Turkey. That round placard ["We are all Hrant. We are all Armenian."] took on a neon hue at last year’s gay-pride parade. (Krajeski, 2012)

In an era of identity politics that emerged largely from the U.S., Khachig Töölöyan (Stockholm University, Department of Social Anthropology 2012; Töölöyan and Papazian, 2014) alleges that the continuance of Armenian trauma in the U.S. is more a result of **ethnic identification**, rather than purely diasporic identification (making a distinction between diaspora and transnationalism, diaspora and ethnicity). Many of those who identify as Armenian may be Armenian American, but also mixed with other identities; however on April 24th, they may choose to identify with the Armenian Genocide. Only a small minority of the community are dedicated ‘diasporic’ committed activists – but as Töölöyan notes, catastrophes can mobilize both kinds of community, for example for fundraising in times of disaster, such as the 1988 Armenian earthquake, and during the period of the Armenian war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, which ended in 1994. Meanwhile, the worldwide community of diaspora Armenians is extraordinarily diverse and difficult to generalize about; the one thing that connects all these communities is the memorialized trauma of the dispersal.

For an explanation of this phenomenon of transgenerational identification that is connected by the *Meds Yeghern*, Töölöyan suggests we have to resort to the concept of ‘postmemory’ as adumbrated by Marianne Hirsch (2012). Remembering the Genocide in an organized, constructed fashion is the ‘postmemory’ work of ‘communal elites … in the name of the nation-in-exile’ (Töölöyan, 2000, p. 107).
Yet the diaspora is no longer wholly the community of tragic victims presented in, for example, Henri Verneuil’s classic films *Mayrig* and *588 Rue Paradis* or Atom Egoyan’s *Ararat*. It is a dynamic community ‘undergoing an accelerating transition from exilic nationalism to diasporic transnationalism. … this transition is challenging the agendas, discourses, and resources of existing institutions, causing changes and occasionally leading to the creation of new organizations’ (Tölölyan, 2000, p. 107). Nonetheless, the unrecognized Armenian Genocide remains a central unifying frame for its construction of identity, constituting an extensive and extended ‘symbolic boundary… in which members of the collective, which treats a certain event as a cultural trauma, categorize the modes of relating to others, within and outside the collective, to that cultural trauma’ (Lazar and Litvak-Hirsch, 2009, p. 189). Thus the unanswerable question remains: despite the tremendous resilience shown by Armenians, will the Genocide continue to be the ultimate traumatic organizing factor for the collective’s cultural memory, even beyond such time as resolution and restitution take place?

### 3.7 The Holocaust

Developmentally, the Holocaust or *Shoah* is generally considered to be ‘the starting point for the contemporary manifestation of collective trauma in the public arena’ (Fassin and Rechtman, 2009, p. 17). Have and Boender (2012, p. 7) emphasize the Holocaust’s centrality as a ‘a paradigm’, noting that:

Research into other cases of genocide uses the Holocaust as a benchmark, whether consciously or subconsciously. This becomes evident in the methodology and the use of related
terms such as ‘victims’, ‘perpetrators’ and ‘bystanders’. When cases of mass violence and genocide are analysed or discussed, the Holocaust is often used as an example. As the ‘paradigm’, interdisciplinary examinations of the Holocaust arc between political, juridical, philosophical and psychological disciplines; as the Ur-trauma, it has also been notably co-opted by cultural studies through the work of Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, Arthur Kleinman, and Veena Das. In particular, the Shoah also the avowed political ‘never again’ raison d’être and rationale for establishment of the State of Israel, enshrined into its Proclamation of Independence:

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations.

Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland. (Provisional Government of Israel, 1948)
The traumatic underpinnings of the Israel-Palestine conflict—producing a further set of victims, the Palestinians—undoubtedly emanate from the Shoah, layered on top of earlier historical persecutions throughout the centuries.

3.8 Avoiding recognition
Paradoxically, there was a somewhat tardy growth of the notion (or construction) of ‘the Holocaust’ itself. In Europe, assert Levy and Sznaider (2006, p. 5) ‘initially … revulsion about the Holocaust was prominent’. Alexander concurs, commenting that at war’s end in 1945:

… the Holocaust was not the “Holocaust” but rather ‘atrocities’; in fact the first American media reports of atrocities were not of the Nazi genocide of Jews but of the Japanese army’s brutal treatment of American and Filippino war prisoners after the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. News of the Nazi concentration camps filtered out slowly, as ‘from the late thirties on, reports about them had been greeted with widespread public doubt about their authenticity … they were dismissed as a kind of Jewish moral panic’ (Alexander in Alexander et al, 2004a, pp. 197-198).

In the U.S., for example, ‘in the first postwar years, the Holocaust was viewed, by Jews, as well as Americans in general, as part of history. It was an event that had taken place there and not here; it was an aspect of a period—the era of fascism—that was now ended’ comments Peter Novick (Novick, 2000, p. 177). Fassin and Rechtman also reinforce this picture by
describing the meaning-making of the Holocaust as both piecemeal and cumulative:

As we know, the emergence and unfurling of this memory did not follow immediately after World War II and the discovery of the extermination camps. Collective remembering was a gradual process, coming through the first books by survivors (primarily those of Primo Levi) and collections of testimonies... through historiographic studies, some of which were strongly contested... and occasionally through controversial screen works (such as the TV series *Holocaust* or the film *Schindler's List*) and finally through a belated commemoration procedure... (Fassin and Rechtman, 2007, pp. 17-18)

Indeed, the term Holocaust itself was not employed in those early years:... those Jews who suffered in the ghettos and camps of Nazi-occupied Europe did not think of themselves as victims of a “Holocaust.” Nor did most of them employ such Hebrew terms as *churban* or *shoah*, which today sometimes alternate with “Holocaust” in popular usage. Rather, in referring to their fate in the immediate postwar years, they typically spoke about the “catastrophe,” or the “recent Jewish catastrophe,” or the “disaster.” These more or less general terms remained dominant through the latter 1940s and into the early 1950s, when “Holocaust” or “the Holocaust” gained currency and took on the connotations it has largely retained until today.

(Rosenfeld, 2011, pp. 57-58)
While the Holocaust may well not have symbolized the ultimate expression of evil until it was interpreted in this way in subsequent years, in contrast, there was little contemporary doubt regarding the Armenian Genocide, as it initially occurred. There was a wealth of horrified contemporaneous reporting (mentioned above). Moreover, Grand Vizier Damad Ferit Pasha convened a military tribunal in Istanbul between 1918-1920 to prosecute the government of the Committee of Union and Progress and the military for their atrocities; leading members were sentenced to death in absentia, leaving little doubt that a systematic decimation of the Armenians had been attempted. (The sentences were never carried out for a multitude of reasons, the most pressing of which was the nationalist revolution of Kemal Pasha.) This makes the later denials and concealment even more acutely tragic; but what is common to both the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust is the lacuna of time before a definitive traumatic narrative picked up pace, together with a widening of cultural memorialisation practices and dedicated sites of memory.

The Catholic Church and the Allied Powers are often accused of knowing about the horror of the Nazi plans for Europe’s Jews all along, and having failed to prevent it, even before the events of Kristallnacht (9th-10th November, 1938). It is a point frequently made in the labelling of exhibits in Israel’s Holocaust museum, Yad Vashem. Tom Lawson (2010, p. 88) offers a note of caution, pointing out multiple problematic issues of contemporary ‘bystander historiography’, which seeks ‘to impose a fixed moral code on the past …[and] judge the past anachronistically using the standards of the present … it is replete with suggestions that the
“international community failed” ... the Church “should” have shown more concern for the Jews ... the pope “should” have issued a protest against the deportation of Roman Jews ... the “American response to the European Jewish catastrophe was a dismal failure”. Nevertheless he agrees that ‘what the documents that have been progressively released since the end of the war have provided is a basis for a narrative of the Allied response to the Nazi persecution and murder of Europe’s Jews over which, just like the scholarship on the Church as bystander, there is widespread agreement’ (Lawson, 2010, pp. 104-105).

Although inaction or partial ‘bystanding’ does not precisely constitute denial as per the Armenian case (Britain did, after all, take in 10,000 ‘assimilable’ Kindertransport children, including this researcher’s late father) there remains heated argument about the extent to which the knowledge of the atrocities was suppressed in Europe and the U.S., even among existing Jewish communities, for fear of exacerbating the situation and worsening their own, thereby contributing to an ‘unresolved’ aspect of the collective trauma. 42 Louise London notes that for the British government, the ‘problem of what to do with the Jews’, if they could be saved, ‘took precedence over saving them ... Humanitarian aid to the Jews was assigned much lower priority than, for instance, the maintenance of severe restrictions on alien immigration to the United Kingdom’ (London, 2000, pp. 1-2). One thinks today of Europe's disarray and moral panic at the Syrian refugee crisis, unlikely solutions for which involve a dubious deal with an increasingly repressive Turkish regime.
This failure to cope with the details of the Holocaust is supported by Shephard (2005, 2010) who offers another revisionist take on history in his description of the British liberation of typhoid-stricken Belsen concentration camp:

For half a century the British regarded their conduct at Belsen as one of the great epics of medical history; ‘perhaps never in the history of medicine has a more gallant action been fought against disease’, a doctor wrote in 1947. … But when historians looked at this episode again in the 1990s, they noticed several disturbing elements. Why were the British not prepared for what they found at Belsen? Why did it take so long (almost two weeks) to organize a proper medical response? Why were the medical teams sent to the camp so poorly equipped, with only aspirin and opium, and no surgical instruments and anaesthetics? Why, when specialists did arrive, did they get so much of the medicine wrong? Above all, was it inevitable that nearly 14,000 people should die at Belsen after it was liberated? … The ‘mishandling’ of the medicine of liberating the camps, argued Rabbi Irving Greenberg, ‘reflected Allied ignorance and failure to plan, which in turn mirrored the democracies’ lack of concern for the fate of the Jews’. ‘The organized mass killing stopped,’ he said, ‘but the dying went on’. (Shephard, 2005, p. 4)

The delayed revelation of the Holocaust and the situation of the victims has political meaning for the social construction of trauma. For people to feel
disturbed by such events, ‘symbolic extension and psychological identification are required’ but the ‘starving, depleted, often-weird-looking and sometimes weird-acting Jewish camp survivors seemed like a foreign race … a mass… a petrified, degrading, and smelly one ’ (Alexander in Alexander et al, 2004a, p. 199). Moreover, the ‘evil’ of Nazism, alleges Alexander, was only coded and appropriately weighted retroactively, despite the judgment of ‘crimes against humanity’ through the Nuremberg Trials from 1945-1949 (in which the mention of the Jewish Holocaust was minor) and the 1948 UN Convention Against Genocide.

3.9 Turning points
Principally, as Michael Rothberg notes, ‘The year 1961 is generally considered a turning point in the history of Holocaust memory’ (Rothberg, 2004) with the media coverage of the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem that year, and Hannah Arendt’s 1963 serialization of it in The New Yorker (later to become Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil), and the 1963 Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt. As for the ‘belated commemoration procedure’ noted above by Fassin and Rechtman, (2007, pp. 17-18), this took rather longer; it can be said to include the foundation in 1998 of the intergovernmental organization, the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, renamed in 2013 the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA, https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/). The ‘31 member countries, ten observer countries and seven permanent international partners’ of IHRA (IHRA, n.d.) cooperate with the United Nations Outreach Programme on Holocaust education programmes in a pedagogical enterprise to instruct on
the critical global meaning of the Holocaust

Among the outcome of such activities was the 2000 Stockholm International
Forum on the Holocaust, ‘when representatives from 46 governments
around the world met in Stockholm … all attendees signed a declaration
committing to preserving the memory of those who have been murdered in
the Holocaust’ (Holocaust Day Memorial Trust, 2005). In Article 1, the
declaration underlined the overarching, global message that ‘the Holocaust
(Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The
unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal
meaning.’ Its conclusion (Article 8) is a clarion call for transnational
solidarity, ‘We empathize with the victims’ suffering and draw inspiration
from their struggle. Our commitment must be to remember the victims who
perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity’s
common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice’. (Holocaust
Memorial Day Trust, 2005).

The Forum also instituted an annual International Holocaust Memorial Day,
27th January, marking the anniversary of Auschwitz’s liberation by the
Soviet army. In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted
the International Holocaust Memorial Day formally (UNGA, 2005).44 A
‘corresponding willingness to let a set of transnational ideas and
institutions take over certain aspects that had been under the firm
sovereignty of the nation-state’ (Levy and Sznaider, 2006, p. 5) informed
such decisions, especially as ‘by the 1990s the Holocaust had been reconfigured as a decontextualized event oriented toward nation-transcending symbols and meaning systems such as the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Memories of the Holocaust helped shape the articulation of a new rights culture’ (ibid.).

3.10 The banality of evil
By the late 1990s, discourse in Western countries about the Holocaust had moved on from reticence to a veritable flood of official memorialization. In contrast to Theodor Adorno and George Steiner’s famous injunctions about the imperative for silence in the face of unrepresentable evil, the Holocaust had become firmly established in Western contemporary awareness through its cultural performance—via the literary work of survivors such as Primo Levi (referred to above) and Eli Wiesel, accounts such as Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl (adapted for both stage and screen), best-selling historical works such as Hitler’s Willing Executioners (Goldenhagen, 1996) and above all, through popular culture, such as the graphic novel (Art Spiegelman’s Maus) and television (the series Holocaust, 1978, mentioned above) to ‘blockbuster’ movies (The Odessa File, 1974; Marathon Man, 1976; Sophie’s Choice, 1982; Enemies, A Love Story, 1989; Schindler’s List, 1993, mentioned above; Jakob the Liar, 1999; The Pianist, 2002) through to European movies (The Night Porter, 1974; Les Uns et les Autres, 1981; Au Revoir Les Enfants, 1987; La Vita è Bella, 1997)45 and the 1985 documentary, Claude Lanzmann’s nine-hour-plus opus, Shoah.46
Despite the European origin of the Holocaust, the fact that the majority of these works of broadest popular culture emanate from the U.S. is largely a reflection on demography and circumstances: the U.S. contains the largest surviving population of Jews outside of Israel, and historically, Jews have been active in Hollywood, originally finding fewer prejudicial bars in the entertainment industry than elsewhere in the U.S. Yet the banal performance of Holocaust trauma, the widening of consciousness through its ‘Americanization’, comes at a certain price: Rosenfeld (2011, p. 54) laments its degradation, but there is little escape from the process whereby ‘historical memory in a popular culture is determined chiefly by popular forms of representation’.

Yet this outpouring of memorialization and popular culture can be said to have produced both a partially globalizing and a particularizing consciousness regarding the event in North America, adding new entrants to carry forward traumatic transmission. ‘By and large, the story of how the Holocaust was first marginalized, then came to be centered in American life,’ according to Novick (2000, p. 6) was also a conscious choice of American Jewish organizations to reinforce collective identity through Hallbwachian collective memory of European roots; this phenomenon of memorializing trauma as a reinforcement of collective identity can be found in contemporary Armenian identification with the Meds Yeghern. Not only direct descendants of victims, but also those included in the wider process of diasporic identification may be drawn in, often strategically. Novick, for example, comments how:
The Holocaust, as virtually the only common denominator of American Jewish identity in the late twentieth century, has filled a need for a consensual symbol … well designed to confront increasing communal anxiety about “Jewish continuity” in the face of declining religiosity, together with increasing assimilation and a sharp rise in intermarriage, all of which threatened a demographic catastrophe. (Novick, 2000, pp. 6-7)

Novick’s contention finds support in Pew Research’s 2013 report, which claims that ‘Roughly seven-in-ten say remembering the Holocaust and leading an ethical life are essential to what it means to them to be Jewish, while far fewer say observing Jewish law is a central component of their Jewish identity’ (Pew Research Center, 2013).

Meanwhile, alongside popular cultural dissemination of the Holocaust, collective memorialisation, institutionalisation of social memory and traumatic reinforcement developed in parallel through the burgeoning growth of Holocaust museums, memorial sites, educational and academic research centres. The international roster of Holocaust museums and memorial sites is too extensive to detail; outside of Israel—whose major Holocaust museum, Yad Vashem, was established in Jerusalem in 1953 and renewed in 2005 as an extensive (and explicitly political) site of memory, mourning and study and the U.S., which hosts (among its 50 Holocaust museums) the comprehensively-endowed and much-visited United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington D.C. (opened in 1993)—the greatest concentration of museums and
memorial sites are of course in Europe;⁴⁹ Auschwitz concentration camp itself became a museum in 1947, and a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1979, a site of pilgrimage and tourism. Yet it must be noted that in its early years, when Poland remained part of a Soviet Union that preferred a Judenrein interpretation of the Holocaust, ‘it was projected as a crucial memory site of the martyrdom of the Polish nation, and only in more recent years has it also been shown to be a place where over a million European Jews were destroyed’ (Rosenfeld, 2011, p. 55). Sixty years after the war’s end, Eisenman’s Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (https://www.stiftung-denkmal.de/en/home.html) was inaugurated in Berlin in 2005, and from 2009, included memorials to the Sinti-Roma and homosexuals murdered by the Nazis.

Fig. 7 Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin (Beate Müller, 2012; reproduced with her permission)
Fig. 8 Yad Vashem interior, Jerusalem (Esta Tina Ottman, 2011)

Fig. 8 Children’s Memorial at Yad Vashem, Jerusalem (Esta Tina Ottman, 2011)
How the Holocaust has been remembered and represented in Europe (especially Germany and France), the U.S. and Israel since 1945 continues to change. In an era of intersectionality, one trend of Holocaust representation has been to universalise (and thereby, according to some arguments, to de-exceptionalise) its traumatic message: the Holocaust as a signifier for all genocides and atrocities, widening the traumatic inclusion of victims; lack of recognition of Armenian Genocide prevents it becoming a similar signifier. ‘Discussion of Holocaust memory within the realm of juridical, political, and ethical thought,’ observes Goldberg ‘… inevitably involves questions of universal moral laws and the relations of inclusion and exclusion that necessarily arise’ (Goldberg, 2015, p. 10). Despite its being the primary traumatic event of the first half of the twentieth century, the Holocaust now serves a wider, more symbolic function; its ‘shared memories … [will] provide the foundations for a new cosmopolitan memory, a memory transcending ethnic and national boundaries … In an age of ideological uncertainty these memories have become a measure for humanist and universalist identifications’ (Levi and Sznaider, 2006, p. 4).

Not all scholars are comfortable with this universalising trend. Alvin Rosenfeld (2011) notes dubiously that:
… there is ongoing argument today over whether the Holocaust is to be understood as but one example of a larger phenomenon—genocide—and, consequently, seen within the wider framework of state-sponsored mass violence, or whether its distinctive features make it a singular crime best comprehended in its own terms. Similarly, the once widely shared view that the Holocaust was “unique” has eroded in scholarly circles, although it generally persists among people outside of the academy, at least in North America. (Rosenfeld, 2011, p. 55)

This erosion concerns Rosenfeld; the Holocaust’s memory is ‘beset by an array of cultural pressures that challenge its place as a pivotal event in modern European and Jewish history’ (p. 239). Among the pressures he lists are Holocaust denial, a phenomenon of both the far right and the far left; downgrading of the Holocaust’s ‘magnitude and consequences’; distortion, trivialisation and universalisation; ‘Holocaust fatigue and Holocaust resentment’; finally, he refers to the misappropriation of the Holocaust in the political struggle to delegitimise or defend the State of Israel (Rosenfeld, 2011, p. 239).

Norman Finkelstein, a child of concentration camp survivors, controversially declared much of the outpouring of Holocaust studies to be ‘shelves upon shelves of shlock that now line libraries and bookstores’ (Finkelstein, 2003, p. 7). Enough is enough, he exclaims:

The time is long past to open our hearts to the rest of humanity’s sufferings. This was the main lesson my mother imparted. I never
once heard her say: Do not compare. My mother always compared. No doubt historical distinctions must be made. But to make out moral distinctions between "our" suffering and "theirs" is itself a moral travesty. "You can't compare any two miserable people," Plato humanely observed, "and say that one is happier than the other." In the face of the sufferings of African-Americans, Vietnamese and Palestinians, my mother's credo always was: We are all holocaust victims. (Finkelstein, 2003, p. 8)

The trend towards treating 'the Holocaust and other genocides' as moral learning material (although apparently as humans, we still have not learned the lesson adequately) is reflected in a 2010 Education Working Group Paper on the Holocaust and Other Genocides (Task Force paper), which offers eight reasons to 'relate or compare the Holocaust to other genocides, crimes against humanity and mass atrocities' (United Nations, 2010). In a similar vein, one may note from the official website http://hmd.org.uk/genocides for the UK's Holocaust(s) Day (commemorated on January 27th since 2001) that other victims of Nazi persecution and other genocides are also remembered (Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur). Yet there was sufficient remembrance of Jewish deaths at the core of Holocaust Day to invoke political controversy, in the shape of a boycott by the Muslim Council of Great Britain; the boycott ended in 2007 (Dodd, 2007), only to resume in 2009 in protest at Israel's Gaza attack; the Jewish Chronicle notes that finally 'a junior representative' was designated to attend in 2010 (Bright, 2010).
Weighing in on the relativistic turn, Michael Rothberg (2009) considers the undignified jostling competition for victimhood (the Holocaust and other atrocities) and asks whether ‘collective memory really works like real-estate development’ (p. 2). He suggests that rather than ‘competitive memory … a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources’ memory should be reconceptualised as ‘multidirectional … subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, borrowing; as productive and not privative’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 2).

Yet it is both real estate and collective memory that is very much at stake in the by-product of the Holocaust, the Israel-Palestine conflict; and there are currently very few possibilities for ongoing negotiations. The Jewish state is very territorial in its insistence on the Holocaust as its national trauma sine qua non. Nevertheless, Rothberg’s claim that it is ‘crucial for scholars of the Holocaust to acknowledge the ways that their topic intersects with another ongoing conflict’ is critical, as is his acknowledgement of the problematic issue that ‘Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land has produced some of the most obvious—and often invidious—analogizing of the Nazi genocide in relation to political struggle’ (Rothberg, 2009, p. 311).

Intentionalist Holocaust historian Saul Friedländer, whose parents died at Auschwitz, concurs, commenting that ‘learning about the Holocaust may lead some to right-wing conclusions but it can be the other way around and lead you to emphasize more the moral imperative in accepting “the other”’ (Pfeffer, 2014). He found it possible both to insist on ‘the peculiar evil of National Socialism’ (Friedländer, 2001, p. 25) and the wider meaning of the
Holocaust. A member of Peace Now, Friedländer has also spoken consistently against Israel's post-1967 continued occupation of the West Bank, and decries the ‘invidious analogizing’ referred to by Rothberg (above), ‘Since the 1970s when Menachem Begin described Yasser Arafat as a ‘second Hitler,’ we have seen how the political right in Israel has been using the Holocaust and its memory to justify more and more radical positions. It caused the left to refrain from even mentioning the Shoah. Personally, it caused me a dilemma when I saw how the subject which I devoted my life to has been used to prop up the most repulsive political attitudes’ (Pfeffer, 2014).

At a time of perceived rising antisemitism in Europe and the U.S, more conservative scholars, diasporic Jewish communal institutions and Jewish media see the de-exceptionalism of the Holocaust as perilous. Indeed, for many, the process of de-exceptionalism itself constitutes a form of antisemitism, particularly when bitter arguments over the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign and antisemitism intersect, particularly on university campuses in the West, and in the British Labour Party. The late Robert Wistrich, a prolific scholar of antisemitism, characterizes this position, asserting that ‘distortions of Holocaust memory have considerably diluted whatever remaining effectiveness this cataclysmic event may still have as an antidote to present-day anti-Semitism. If anything, it seems more plausible to assume that contemporary Judeophobia derives at least, in part, from a feeling of resentment that Jews have “monopolized” the martyr’s crown of pain and persecution’ (Wistrich,
Wistrich’s traumatic background no doubt informed his worldview; born in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic to leftist Polish parents who were repatriated to post-war antisemitic Poland, fleeing to post-Vichy Paris and finally to the U.K., he viewed ‘the longest hatred’ as present throughout the continuum of history and foremost in its expression in contemporary times among the revolutionary left, the anti-Zionist left and Islamism, particularly the Holocaust-denying Islamism of former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Wistrich, 2010, 2012). The State of Israel provides post-war Europe’s conscience with a get-out clause for the atrocities of the Holocaust and for its Judeophobia, since in a neat inversion, the victim becomes the perpetrator:

In fact, by branding Israel as a Nazi State, one is killing two birds with one stone. One may point the finger at the erstwhile victims who are no better than “we, Europeans” (in fact they are worse, since they did not try to learn from their history); and one is free to express in a “politically correct” anti-Zionist language those sentiments which are no longer respectable among educated people—namely dislike of Jews. … Jews (or others) who defend the Nazi State of Israel can expect to be vilified as “racists” “fascists” and “ethnic cleansers”. Indeed, in many European countries it is becoming increasingly difficult to discuss the Shoah without balancing it by appropriate references to Palestine, intending to offset the horrors of Nazi Germany with those of the Palestinian naqba … (Wistrich, 2012b, pp. 257-258).
Alain Goldschläger (2012) amplifies this view. Discussing the 1980s Canadian trials of the German neo-Nazi publisher Ernst Zündel, he fears that ‘assaults against the memory of the Holocaust are no longer taboo’. The Holocaust cannot simply be ‘reduced to just another “detail” of history (to quote Jean-Marie Le Pen … )’. He insists on its exceptional nature as ‘a unique event that has marked not only Jewish consciousness, but also world history; it is the symbol for cruelty toward Jews.’ Universalisation (‘To equate other acts of genocide to it and to reduce it to the scope of a “normal” massacre’) would ‘denigrate its particularities and atrocities’; it is preferable to consider ‘each act of genocide … in its historical, social, and human context. Amalgamating all massacres into one category only denies the particular lessons in each of these events’ (Goldschläger, 2012, pp. 109-110). However, the conclusion that Goldschläger draws from ‘open denial of the Holocaust by neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and Arab governments’ is similarly problematic; it fuses anti-Semitism indivisibly with ‘an attempt to delegitimize the State of Israel’ (Goldschläger, 2012, p. 110).

Clearly these conflicting accounts of the meaning and ways of memorialisation of the Holocaust point to an unresolved and uneasy narrative, through which fear of re-enactment bubbles up repeatedly, exacerbated by political manipulation and the insecurity of the contemporary political climate. Resistance to symbolic universalisation of the trauma story indicates that those who are in positions of cultural or political power to frame the consensus still perceive that either the social collective’s existence or its identity remain under threat, leaving little space for solidarity with victims of other traumas.
It is a puzzling conundrum; the Holocaust has been comprehensively (but clearly not exhaustively) studied and analysed; witness testimonies continue to be collected and preserved, and witness journals continue to be discovered and translated into English, adding to the archives of irrefutable evidence; Holocaust denial has been legislated against in various forms in many Western countries, although the internet and social media still remains a vibrant space to nourish this particular pathology. Yet if the collective were a traumatised patient on the analyst’s couch, the impression is that the patient’s account has not yet been sufficiently heard or talked through. Certainly resolution or ‘closure’ has not been adequately reached, in large part because the topic of the Holocaust is intimately connected with the political future of the State of Israel. Perhaps, as Alexander observes, the ‘spiral of signification’ is indeed ‘not rational’; perhaps it is ‘intentional’; or perhaps it is both irrational and intentional (Alexander, 2016, p. xxii). Finally, maybe it is still ‘too soon’, although as the persistence of collective trauma in the case of the more distant Armenian Genocide indicates, time is not necessarily a healer.

3.12 Conclusion

In the above discussion I have endeavoured to clarify and identify the markers for the sociological phenomenon of collective trauma, through the examination of two historically-connected instances of catastrophic mass violence. Both cases involve vast suffering and unbearable loss of life, and have a genocidal component, in that the major intent was to extinguish entirely an ethnic collectivity or group, according to Lemkin’s original definition of the term.
Neither the Ottoman Turks nor the Nazis were able to complete their attempt at wholesale destruction. The survival of a sufficient number of victims among the Armenian people and the Jews of Europe has ensured a haunted remembrance, divided between communities of diaspora and their respective newly-constituted states, where commemoration is most highly politicised, and attracting other entrants to traumatised memory in the process. As Hutchison and Bleiker observe, ‘A particular emotional politics—centred on loss, humiliation, anger and even guilt … triggers forms of remembering that preclude the possibility of working through the legacies of war’ (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2015, p. 210). The unresolved post-genocide trauma of these collectives has ‘come to inscribe and perpetuate exclusive and often violent ways of configuring community. … ensuring political attitudes generate new antagonisms that increase rather than reduce the propensity for violence’ (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2015, p. 210).

In both cases, the early feature of ‘silence’ has been frequently remarked on; this refers both to the delayed revelation of genocides and an inability on the part of the perpetrators, collaborators or international community to acknowledge the immensity of losses, causing further suffering. It is also refers to victim silence, although there is not unequivocal agreement on this point; in many cases the disempowered victims’ testimonies only came to light or were translated later; some accounts may remain unrecovered. Above all, it refers to the necessary hiatus before cultural carriers were able to shape coherently and disseminate the narrative of social suffering.

The juridical and political aspects of silencing—in the shape of refusing recognition or incomplete recognition and reparations—remain common to
the lack of resolution in both cases and contribute to ongoing trauma. The Armenian Genocide remains bitterly contested to this day, as discussed at length above, and survivors and descendants have never received any reparations. In contrast, legislation by individual states worldwide for Holocaust recognition and anti-semitic hate speech is widespread, although Holocaust negationists and deniers show remarkable persistence, contributing both to unremitting diasporic communal apprehensions and extreme paranoia regarding Iran (and other Islamist deniers) among Jewish Israelis. Moreover, there are progressive attempts at restitution to Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and other victims of Nazi slave labour. Both the State of Israel and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (http://www.claimscon.org/) have negotiated since 1952 with the German and Austrian governments for Wiedergutmachung reparations, despite the vociferous ‘blood money’ objections and demonstrations from both left and right in Israel; the much-criticised Claims Conference continues to distribute compensation to individual Holocaust survivors and attempts to recover assets and property; however, many claims remain open or have been judged inadmissible although between 2012-2017 the German government has agreed to pay further monies to elderly survivors, including those who lived in ‘open ghettos’. France has also agreed to compensate elderly deportee or internee survivors.

Finally, while the psychological suffering of survivors and their heirs represents a different aspect of trauma investigation, what is inescapable is that such groups are generally marked by accents of distress that go beyond simulcra of individual suffering. These communal accents are most
pronounced when that account of suffering is challenged or dismissed, and on days of commemoration and in sites of memory; they are also highly subject to manipulation by elites and interest groups. Narrativised and ritualised remembrance of a particular traumatic history has been viewed as promoting a tendency towards insularity or parochialism, and frequently combined with an unethical refusal to extend empathy to other groups, as if the core identity of the group is rooted in suffering and thereby threatened by such empathy. We all wish for mourners to move on from the stage of grief; it is partly for our own ease and convenience, and partly for their own healthy functioning. Yet if an adequate resolution is not secured, that stage may become a fixed position or complex fixation—destabilising, irrational and ultimately perilous.
Chapter Four: The politics of collective trauma: Israel

4.1: Methodological approaches to collective memory and trauma: the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The researcher has thus far essayed a critical analysis of the origins and development of the notion of collective trauma as a sociological phenomenon in Chapters One through Three, clarifying the key features that underpin unresolved historical and cultural conflicts. For this, two key historical incidences of resonating violence were examined: the Armenian Genocide and the World War II Holocaust of Jews (excluding the genocide of Sinti-Roma owing to limitations necessary for this thesis). As has been noted earlier, these episodes represent a cascading connection to the further case of the Israel-Palestine conflict that has been selected to form the empirical nexus of this study. The conflict is composed of two mutually dependent traumas that are highly interactive and reactive, which will be dealt with both separately (in order to avoid competing claims of a hierarchy of suffering) and together, at the points where the traumas intertwine and impact on each other. As Thomas (2015, pp. 194-195) notes, although both ‘cultures of victimhood’:

… share similar features … the positioning of the Holocaust and the Nakba are distinct and not completely comparable … Jews suffered at the hands of Nazi Germany, a third party not represented in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, whereas the Palestinian trauma was directly the result of the creation of the state of Israel. … Israel approaches this conflict as an
established state with a strong economy and developed military, while the Palestinians act from a relative position of disempowerment, statelessness, and occupation … a factor in explaining the tactics, motivations, and perspectives of the conflict actors in a chain of victimhood. (Thomas, 2014, pp. 194-195)

Generally speaking, in considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conventionally the focus has largely remained on key issues such as ‘borders, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the rights of Palestinian refugees’ (Rogers, 2013); water is frequently appended to these. Attempts at resolution to date have focused mainly on ‘process’: interstate-style peacemaking, despite the ‘state versus occupied entity’ asymmetry. Meanwhile, the conflict ethos and flare-ups of deadly violence—such as the current Gaza conflict—regularly render bottom-up civil society intergroup peacebuilding projects unfeasible and unreal; this is exacerbated by the lack of official Israeli government and Palestinian Authority support for such projects.

The starting point of this research is the epistemic shift that has taken place in recent years towards examining the conflict from a somewhat different perspective: that of psychological trauma, largely through the extensive work of Daniel Bar-Tal and Rafi Nets-Zehngut, among others. Extrapolating from this, it can be seen that it is fundamentally the force of traumatic narratives that perpetuates the conflict, on the (macro) collective sociological level, resulting in further damage on the (micro) psychosocial level.
Although certain kinds and degrees of progress have been made at different points in the history of the conflict, leading to adjustments in attitudes suggestive of the notion that the conflict is open to a more dynamic interpretation (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2014) it is the frequent backsliding into episodes of violence that have led many to characterize the conflict as one of apparent ‘frozenness’, suggesting an underlying morbid pathology at work, to borrow a medical diagnostic term. Without addressing the powerful traumatic undercurrent that underpins a chronic conflict, no amount of top-down formal peacemaking is likely to be sustainable.

Peace theory recommends that peacemaking processes must be situated within a continuum of peacebuilding; transitional justice practices, which discharge trauma, generally take place only in post-conflict scenarios. In the absence of such a continuum or post-conflict scenario, what questions can be asked about dealing with intractability? Are there societies that are so addicted to destructive, trauma-fixated narratives (including narratives that are held to be sacred), that a therapeutic approach on the level of national/group discourse is called for? If so, how can this be effected? Does the concept of ‘collective trauma’ have explanatory power with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and if so, does it offer new approaches for peacebuilding? Within that traumatic concept, what is the under-explored role of collective emotion for the research case? Finally, what are the possibilities for the transformation of resilient traumatic discourse in the Israel-Palestinian conflict?

In order to explore this, the researcher returns the discussion to the pungent role of collective memory, adapting from the widely-accepted and much-cited
Hirschian ‘postmemory’ or heritage memory. In Hirsch’s case, as the Romanian-born daughter of Holocaust survivors, she used it largely:

… to describe the relationship of survivors of cultural or collective trauma to the experiences of their parents, experiences that they “remember” only as the stories and images with which they grew up, but that are so powerful, so monumental, as to constitute memories in their own right. The term is meant to convey its temporal and qualitative difference from survivor memory, its secondary or second-generation memory quality, its basis in displacement, its belatedness.

(Hirsch, 1999, p. 8)

For our purposes, the second part of Hirsch’s observation is more germane, as she observes that:

Postmemory is a powerful form of memory precisely because its connection to its object or source is mediated not through recollection but through projection, investment, and creation. That is not to say that survivor memory itself is unmediated, but that it is more directly connected to the past. Postmemory characterizes the experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are displaced by the stories of the previous generation, shaped by traumatic events that they can neither understand nor re-create. … Postmemory in my terms is a form of heteropathic memory in which the self and the other are more
closely interconnected through familial or group relation …

(Hirsch, 1999, pp. 8-9)

In the selected example of Israelis and Palestinians, some Israelis (a more heterogeneous group) but not all are direct descendants of survivors of trauma; almost all Palestinians have had their lives impacted by the foundation of the state of Israel. Despite this disparity of directly inherited trauma—or perhaps because of this—both groups are subject to a synchronous traumatic discourse of official or canonical memory.

In concert with a range of mnemonic practices, what can be observed is the harnessing of powerful emotions to ensure the evocation and continuance of traumatic responses, ‘lest we forget’ and collective loyalties become degraded, less accessible to mobilization. Great anxiety is attached to forgetting, as Sa’di and Abu-Lughod observe, ‘Forgetfulness and the passage of time, as various analysts of collective memory have argued, are the enemies of causes, meaningful events, and their commemorative symbols’ (Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 18).

Remembering and the evocation of powerful emotions are most clearly seen on memorial days, and it is these that the researcher will focus on in order to gain insight. ‘How many people in the West,’ ask Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, ‘know why Palestinians feel such different emotions from Israelis on their “Independence Day” on May 15?’ (Sa’di and Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 9.) More pertinently, aside from the minority of Israel’s left, how many Israelis care to dwell on this during their Independence Day parades and barbecue parties?
Punctuating the rhythm of the year in the region, days of memory (and protest), such as Palestinian *Yawm an-Nakba* (Nakba Day), Naksa and Land Day, Israel’s *Yom ha’Shoah ve HaGevurah* (Holocaust and Heroes’ Day), the solemn *Yom ha Zikaron* (Day of Remembrance for Fallen Soldiers) that precedes *Yom Ha’Atzma’ut* (Independence Day) range in emotions including anger, loss and triumphalism; they are tasked with maintaining and mobilizing an uptick in collective trauma. Discourse surrounding the commemoration of such days, including controversies emanating from commemorative speeches, provide the core data for this study.

Naturally, such days of remembrance are part of a supporting complex mnemonic web that features foundational documents (Hamas, 1988; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1948; Palestinian Liberation Organization, 1964, 1968; 1988), controversial educational artefacts that mediate the presentation of the official past, such as history textbooks (Adwan, Bar-on and Naveh, 2012; Akram and Rudoren, 2013; IMPACT-Se studies on PA textbooks and curricula, such as those of 2009, 2011; Pardo, 2016; Pardo, 2017a; Pardo, Agassi and Sheff, 2017b; IMPACT-Se studies on Israeli curricula and textbooks (2000a, 2002; Teff-Seker, 2009; Teff-Seker, 2012; Teff-Seker, 2016); Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information investigations on Palestinian curricula, 2003, 2004 and 2006; Nets-Zehngut, 2013; Peled-Elhanan, 2012), cultural-historical artefacts of popular memory, such as numerous collected oral histories of the Nakba and the Shoah, together with films and documentaries; literary construction includes both popular memory and cultural artefacts, from the village books of former Palestinian villages (Davis, 2011), to the immense proliferation of works of
literature, literary autobiographies and poetry dedicated to remembrance; finally both official and individual sites and spaces of memory are represented by museums with richly-endowed websites (largely in well-resourced Israel, such as the Holocaust museum of Yad Va’Shem, Beit Lohamei Haghetatot-the Ghetto Fighters’ House Museum, the Israel Museum, Eretz Israel Museum) and memorials, abandoned and displaced villages, and lastly, in cyberspace, numerous internet websites dedicated to remembrance, such as http://www.palestineremembered.com/, http://nakba-archive.org/ and http://www.webgaza.net/background/Palestine1948/index.htm. Yet it is necessary to restrict the focus to that which is feasible for the purposes of a single study; and it is the days of remembrance that act regularly as a mediating force to bring to the fore the strong emotions of collective trauma that continue to fuel this conflict, and on these we shall concentrate.

4.2 Israel – A history of collective traumas

Israel, from its foundation onwards, presents no lack of tragic histories on which to build an empirical account of sociological trauma; as has been observed earlier, the former has a way of infiltrating into the latter. Both Palestinian and Jewish paradigmatic narratives are steeped in culturally traumatic memories, connected by the foundational narrative at Israel’s nascence, the ‘ur-trauma’ of the Jewish Holocaust (the Shoah) that in turn, is often considered to have contributed in some way to the Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe).
4.3 Immigration as trauma

For Palestinians, these memories flow into present day ongoing trauma of loss and occupation; the impact is not only cultural but psychosocial and clinical; as trauma sufferers, they are positioned as both ‘subjects’ and patients. For Israeli Jews, symptoms of trauma present over a more diffuse period of time, and differ according to each immigrant group that arrived during the rapid massive waves of immigration (aliyah) that succeeded the declaration of the state, as will be summarised below.

While Israel has long and variously been characterized as an opportunistic settler colonial society (Degani, 2016; Kimmerling, 1983; Robinson, 2013; Shafir, 1996; Veracini, 2013, 2016), many of its immigrant groups arrived as refugees fleeing from immediate—and also endemic or historic—situations of traumatic persecution, danger and loss of life. Immigration and forced relocation, moreover, carries its own wellspring of deep traumatic intergenerational memories. In the case of Israel’s Middle Eastern, North African, African and Asian Jews, many were placed in grim transit camps (ma’abarot) on arrival, and confronted with not only sudden loss of property and status, but also significant discrimination from the already-settled predominantly Eastern European or European-origin Ashkenazi Jews in Yishuv Palestine (pre-state Israel) and early state Israel (Lev-Wiesel, 2007) who subjected them to ‘Zionist normalization’ and a hegemonic secular Hebrew culture complete with a revived language (Ottman, 2001). Many continued to struggle for generations with discrimination and displacement from their (mal)absorption into the young state, which did not treat (nor have the resources to treat) the newcomers with any especial sensitivity.
Later waves of Jewish immigrants (*olim*), from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union similarly faced many traumatic acculturation challenges, including significant absorption struggles, ongoing discrimination and the humiliation (in the case of the Ethiopians) of having to validate their ‘Jewish identity’. Regular protests by Ethiopian Israelis against their treatment, particularly with regard to harassment by Israeli police, parallel to some degree the situation for African Americans in the U.S. (Kubovich, 2016; Pulwer, 2016; Yaron, 2016). These narratives of suffering, struggle and loss provide the sociopsychological ‘infrastructure’ (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1431) to nourish the roots of trauma.

4.4 Holocaust survivors’ trauma

Not only did the Jews of the Middle East and Asia suffer during the process of absorption; those earlier arrivals, survivors and refugees from Nazi Europe, fared little better, despite providing the rationale for the foundation of the state. The work of the Israeli revisionist historians reveals that early attitudes in pre-state Mandate Palestine towards the ongoing atrocities against Europe’s Jews was as ambivalent as that of the Allies. Historian and journalist Segev (2000, p. 73) discussing how the Hebrew press chose to downplay the genocide, notes that ‘The news came not in a flood but in a trickle, and it did not immediately arouse all who heard it’. Reliable information was hard to come by and in their zeal not to frighten their readers, ‘the newspapers missed one of the biggest stories of the century’, often relegating seemingly unsubstantiated reports of massacres to less prominent pages (Segev, 2000, p. 73).
By late 1942, the stories were becoming harder to avoid; officially, the hands of the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine) were tied partly by the British, who limited immigration and permitted the establishment of a Jewish Brigade only towards the end of World War Two, and partly by less than empathetic attitudes towards Holocaust victims from the Yishuv’s Zionist leadership. Zertal (2011) records that Labour Zionist leader Berl Katznelson ‘admitted that there was an unbridgeable mental and emotional abyss between the people of Eretz Israel and the dying Diaspora’ (p. 26).

Elsewhere Zertal cites Zionist rescue operatives telling David Ben Gurion, “It will be hell if all the [DP] camps come [to Palestine]’ and asking ‘All this filth, just as it is, you [the Jewish Agency/Ben Gurion] plan to move to Palestine?” (Zertal, 1998, p. 216). Certainly they did not fit the masculinist profile of early Zionist leader Max Nordau’s *Muskeljudentum* (*Muscle Jewry*, based on the Bismarckian German Turner movement); Zionism’s ‘new Jew’, according to the political movement’s founder Theodor Herzl, must not be one of those ‘Ghetto creatures, quiet, decent, timorous’ and ‘must answer the call to freedom and manliness’ (Hertzl, 1956, p. 39, in Mayer, 2000, p. 285).

The rugged *Sabra* (‘native born’ Israeli, named after the prickly pear cactus fruit of Palestine) stood in sharp contrast to the ‘emasculated’ victims of the Holocaust, who were considered to have gone meekly to their deaths in the gas chambers ‘like sheep to the slaughter’ (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 74, citing Zionist Socialist poet Abba Kovner’s resistance call to Vilna Jews in 1942). It was the ‘ideal New Jew—the youth movement graduate turned pioneer settler (*chalutz*), colonizer and defender—[who] became the emblem of Zionism’ (Mayer, 2000, p. 289).
Zertal (1998, p. 218) commenting on the strategic operationalization of the Holocaust trauma, notes that it ‘provided [future Prime Minister David] Ben-Gurion with the object he needed for the complete realization of his concept of “exploiting the Jewish tragedy in the establishment of a Zionist Jewish state”’ (1998, p. 218). She adds, ‘Talks about transforming Jewish suffering into Zionist redemption reverberate in Ben-Gurion’s statements throughout the 1930s and 1940s … In the Mapai [Labour Party] Council on 25 October 1942, Ben-Gurion explained his entire “Zionist view”: “to forge Jewish catastrophe into redemption matrix … We have power … and there is a great disaster—this is power” (1998, p. 316).

Ben-Gurion’s ‘selective appropriation’ (Zertal, 2005, p. 5) of the Holocaust also led at times to his abandonment of its victims, in order to further his aims; particularly egregious was ‘his functional and expedient attitude towards the Exodus refugees’ (Zertal, 2005, p. 46). Indeed, Ben-Gurion ‘intervened’ in Haim Weizmann and Léon Blum’s promotion of their cause in order to ensure their return to Germany:

The Holocaust survivors aboard the Exodus, who for over two years, since the war ended, had been wandering from camp to camp, passed from hand to hand, and “unloaded on some quay or other,” as Léon Blum had phrased it, were now Zionism’s trump card, and the greater their suffering, the greater their political and media effectiveness. Not only did the Zionist leadership make no effort to spare the refugees the appalling return to Germany; it actually took distinct steps
towards preventing any solution other than Germany. (Zertal, 2005, p. 48)

At other times the resistance of the dying Diaspora—in particular the battle of the Warsaw Ghetto—was freely promoted into the pantheon of Zionist superhero exploits. ‘The [Warsaw] ghetto fighters were retrospectively “conscripted” into the Haganah’s fighting unit, the Palmach, set apart from their brethren in the Diaspora and described as true sons of combatant Zionism,’ notes Zertal (2005, p. 26). Yet the truth was that the Warsaw ghetto uprising ‘was not a major operation. It made no contribution towards shortening the war or vanquishing Nazism. It did not save Jewish lives and made no real difference to the process of systematic murder of the Jews of Europe’ (Zertal, 2005, p. 27). Moreover, the Warsaw rebels were not necessarily all members of Zionist youth movements, but included Communists and anti-Zionist Bundists, such as Marek Edelman (Greenstein, 2009, Barnett, 2017) and were also supported by the American non-Zionist ‘Joint’ (Joint Distribution Committee). These points will be taken up again later in this chapter.

Thus while the state of Israel cherry-picked which parts of the traumatic memory of the murder of Europe’s Jews it wished to adopt, in its early years it may have further exacerbated the suffering of survivors who reached its shores. Danieli (1998, pp. 70-71) notes that part of this was related to the fact that many survivors arrived at a time when national resources were scarce, and in the midst of the bloody 1948 war; the state could neither provide adequate treatment nor facilitate an easy absorption; ‘they were
generally left alone in their struggle,' commented Danieli (1998, pp. 70-71). A survivor, David Leitner, ‘reflects ruefully how the attitude has changed in Israel since he first arrived in 1949' and recalls:

They mocked survivors then. When I told some of my new friends in the army that a Gypsy boy had tried to steal my shoes in Auschwitz, they said “Why did you let him? You soap (a derisory nickname in use at the time for Holocaust survivors).” I don't want to blame people from back then, people just couldn't believe this had happened, even we who had been there had trouble believing it happened. (Pfeffer, 2015).

Leitner asserts that ‘for years [he] didn't tell his own family of his time in Auschwitz’ (ibid). Mordechai Ronen, another survivor, also recalls how:

It was a massive blow, to come like this to Israel and feel totally rejected. People were afraid of the survivors, many didn't want us in their homes, they couldn't understand what we had been through and didn't want to try. So we quickly understood that we should remain silent. … I never spoke about my past in all the years in the army. It was very different to the way it is today when the army sends officers together with survivors to Poland to see the camps. (Pfeffer, 2015, ibid.)

Former Speaker of the Knesset and former chairman of the Jewish Agency Avram Burg also noted how Israelis ‘despised weakness and frailty and
lacked empathy for the arriving Jews. As the Israelis absorbed the Jews, they fused into one silent, insensitive society’ (Burg, 2008, Loc.1295). Burg published a book in 2008 that was explosive and detailed in its criticism of the abuse of the ‘Shoah industry’—to paraphrase the title of Norman Finkelstein’s work (Finkelstein, 2003)—in Israeli life: the English title, The Holocaust is Over, We Must Rise from its Ashes, is rather more prescriptive than the Hebrew title, Lenatsech et Hitler (‘Vanquishing Hitler’). We shall be referring to his observations again in this chapter.

Nevertheless, the official ceremonies of Holocaust Remembrance Day, Yom HaShoah, routinely represent and honour the experiences of those remaining survivors of the Holocaust. At the same time, many media reports also focus on survivors’ poverty, isolation and difficulties in receiving necessary benefits in Israel.² Ariel David (2015) relays that

On the eve of Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel on Thursday, and 70 years after the end of World War II, survivors and groups that represent them say the complexities of Israeli law have created inequalities in the benefits given to Holocaust victims.

Despite a new law passed last year that increased the funds and services granted to Holocaust survivors, they say that 1 in 4 survivors in Israel live in poverty, and some 20,000 are unrecognized or only partially supported by the state.
The 2014 report of the Foundation for the Benefit of Holocaust Victims in Israel (http://www.k-shoa.org/eng/) counts ‘193,000 Holocaust Survivors … living in Israel. Two thirds of the survivors are women and 50,000 of them are living below the poverty line’ (Foundation for the Benefit of Holocaust Victims in Israel, 2014, p. 2). The survivors, whose average age is in the late 80s, are passing away at the rate of about 13,000 people per year, despite the slight increment of newly-recognized survivors to their numbers; the report considers that there is thus ‘a time window of five years, in which “a national last chance effort” to assist the population of Holocaust survivors in Israel will ensue’ (Foundation, 2014, p. 3) with about ‘14,200 [dying] each year – nearly 40 per day’ (David, 2015). While the generation of survivors is fast disappearing, some allege that the state is actually waiting for this (Rubin, 2013). As the report notes, with age comes an increase in survivors’ ‘medical and general needs’ (Foundation, 2014, p. 3). Most shocking of all is the fact that:

... Until recently, only survivors who had immigrated to Israel before 1953 automatically received a monthly pension, regardless of their individual experiences during the Holocaust. Those who arrived later were not entitled to benefits.

This situation was partially amended last year, when a law spearheaded by then-Finance Minister Yair Lapid allocated an additional one billion shekels ($254 million) per year to survivors and granted them other benefits, including a total
exemption on all medical costs and subsidized psychological treatment.

The law also granted equal treatment to survivors who had immigrated to Israel after 1953—but only if they had been in concentration camps or ghettos. (David, 2015)

Amos Rubin, a survivor hidden during the war by non-Jews in Munkács, Hungary (now Mukachevo, Ukraine) meanwhile condemns ‘several Israeli banks’ who ‘hold the property of Jews murdered in the Holocaust' for preventing Holocaust heirs from receiving their inheritances. The banks:

... shamelessly benefit from the funds of the dead, those without heirs and even those with them. ... It is saddening to see how the Jews who determine government priorities in our country, which was founded on the ruins of the Holocaust and thanks to the tremendous Zionist endeavor, are in practice waiting for Holocaust survivors to die.’ (Rubin, 2013)

All in all, this adds up to a picture of a fledgling society whose various groups are riven by the stresses and strains of emergence from the series of knock-on tragedies caused by the impact of European anti-Semitism, stressors that are carried forward through a form of memorial institutionalization that permeates sociocultural frameworks widely, as will be discussed in the section below.
4.5 Trauma as historical narrative and constant condition – days of remembrance in Israel

As Leeat Granek notes, ‘Grief is one of the most powerful affects in our lives … more powerful than love, anger, and desire’ (Granek, 2014, p. 67). Hence it is profoundly vulnerable to manipulation and excessive forms of control, ‘policing’ or ritualized observance; it can be easily mobilized or operationalized for political ends. Such control is especially necessary since:

Open grieving is bound up with outrage, and outrage in the face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss has enormous political potential … whether we are speaking about open grief or outrage, we talking about affective responses that are highly regulated by regimes of power and sometimes subject to explicit censorship. (Butler, 2009, p. 39)

As is known, the lunisolar Hebrew calendar is punctuated with sacred festival days of celebration, poignant remembrance and ‘awe’; yet to these must be added those secular-yet-sacralized days of remembrance in which recollection of trauma is paramount and highly politicized. These days are, namely, Holocaust and Heroism Memorial Day (Yom HaZikaron la'Shoah ve la'G'vurah), the 27th of Nisan (henceforth referred to as Yom HaShoah, falling around April or May, dependent on its proximity to the Jewish Sabbath, and different in date from the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, which is observed on 27th January by UN decree since 2005, as discussed in Chapter Three); and Memorial Day for the Fallen (in full, Yom Hazikaron l'Chalalei Ma'arachot Yisrael ul'Nifge'eI
Pe'ulot Ha'ei, or ‘Memorial Day for the Fallen Soldiers of Israel and Those Injured by Hostile Actions’, i.e. victims of terror and conflict, henceforth referred to as Yom HaZikaron) celebrated by Knesset decree since 1951 and falling on 4th Iyar, the day before the dramatic turn to exuberant celebrations on Yom Ha'atzamut or Independence Day.5 (Again, the coincidence of this date is adjusted depending on the proximity to the Jewish Sabbath, when the dates might be moved, for example, to the 2nd and 3rd of the lunar month of Iyar.) Yom HaShoah and Yom HaZikaron provide an exemplary illustration of what Granek refers to as ‘Mourning Sickness Type II’ wherein ‘the politicization of grief is about consciously manipulating individual and collective grief in the service of nationalism and military power’ and providing ‘justification for further war, aggression and violence’ (Granek, 2014, p. 67). The discussion will focus on the changing ways in which the former of the two days has been publicly remembered in recent years to promote emotive, traumatic triggers toward maintaining the political ethos. The analysis reveals the pervasiveness throughout sociocultural institutions, as well as discourse centering on reactions to utterances of key political actors during those days.

In procedural aspects, both memorial days have certain notable similarities: both commence at sunset of the previous day (deliberately following the pattern of all sacred days in the Jewish calendar), and both feature prayers, speeches and a siren at 10:00 a.m. (disconcertingly, the same siren used to warn Israelis of impending missile attacks) in which all traffic stops and Israelis pause in respect. For Holocaust Memorial Day itself, the official opening ceremony is broadcast live on television and
radio and takes place at Warsaw Ghetto Square in the Yad Vashem Museum, Jerusalem, with speeches by the president and prime minister of Israel, and words from Holocaust survivors; also featured is the lighting of the Memorial torch by the Chairman of Yad Vashem Council, Rabbi Israel Meir Lau, and six symbolic memorial torches are lit by Holocaust survivors, to remember the six million souls lost during the Holocaust. Psalms, Kaddish (the Jewish prayer of mourning) and prayers for the souls of the dead are recited by Israel’s Chief Rabbi, the IDF cantor, and actors are at hand to read prose or poetry or accounts of survival and heroism; generally there is chamber music as an accompaniment, and television and radio preserve 24 hours of solemnity in their programming (as they do on Yom HaZikaron). Observes Yitzhak Laor:

It is hard to find your own space in the totality of the Israeli culture of mourning. From the outset, this culture was intended to create subjects of its realm, harness immigrants and reproduce offspring into nationalism, dependent on death and its imagery. It is customary to measure our lives with the help of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. So let’s do that, by checking television broadcasts. There is no other country within the OECD that shuts down its programming on a day resembling Yom Kippur or Holocaust Remembrance Day. (Laor, 2014)

Laor argues against these:
modern patterns of controlling consciousness from which there is no escape. The ideological mechanisms of the state—army, education, media—are recruited, and recruit their subjects to jointly shrink before the uniform story, which is gradually taking over our lives. Even the lives of kindergarten children. And so, from all the windows we hear fragments of bereaving phrases, edited into television programs made to order by journalists who grew up into this uniform culture. … Television is a key instrument in this totality. (Laor, 2014)

There is no critical voice in the media representation of Yom HaShoah or Yom HaZikaron, argues Laor; the media does not:

... interview parents who curse the day their son joined a combat unit. On Holocaust Remembrance Day, they do not interview survivors who demanded, and who still demand, to cease this cheap preoccupation with the horrors. Of course, they do not interview the people whom the Holocaust taught a “lesson” different from the “national lesson” (Laor, 2014).

The dark goal, according to Laor, in the ‘culture of commemoration’ is to preserve Israelis’ self-image as ‘victim’. The state, claims Laor, ‘remains in control of consciousness’ with the insidious objective of ‘permit[ting] and conceal[ing] the apartheid and colonization of the Palestinians’ (Laor, 2014).

After the solemnity of the 10:00 a.m. siren on Yom HaShoah, a ceremony takes place at Yad Vashem in which wreaths are placed by survivor groups’ representatives at the torches; as with the Memorial Day for the
Fallen, there are other ceremonies at other locations throughout the country, such as schools, colleges and army bases. Sites of particular relevance also hold their own ceremonies, such as Kibbutz Lochamei Haghetto’ot (the Ghetto Fighters’ Kibbutz, which hosts a museum, the Ghetto Fighters’ House, http://www.gfh.org.il/Eng/) and Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, which contains the Mi’Shoa li’Tkuma Museum (From the Holocaust to the Revival, http://eng.shimur.org/yadmor/ ). The latter kibbutz celebrates the commander of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, Mordechai Anielewicz, and features a model of the Warsaw Ghetto’s 18 Mila Street bunker and of the Ghetto itself.

It should be acknowledged that approaches toward the Warsaw Ghetto uprising have been subjected to much controversial historical revisionism in recent years, along with various other aspects of Israel’s Shoah memorialization; some of these contentions are a critical attempt to ‘de-Masadafy’ or de-mythologize the uprising (Jungwirth, 2016); other rebuttals, such as that of Robert Faurisson, represent a form of Holocaust denial (Faurisson, 1994; Rehmat’s World, 2013). Notably, Eli Gat, Holocaust survivor and author of the memoir Not Just Another Holocaust Book, engaged in a public spat in the media with historians regarding the Warsaw Ghetto uprising when he contended, most controversially, that:

… the very name is deceptive … The Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto never revolted. … These people never thought about revolt, they thought about survival. Only a small group of young people revolted, whose size and efforts were inflated to mythic
proportions in Israel after the state was established in 1948. More importantly, the uprising, which started on April 19, 1943, contradicted the survival strategy of the masses of Jews who remained in the ghetto.

…. It was exaggerated by the activist part of the Labor movement – the Ahдут Ha'avoda party and its affiliated kibbutz movement – which also laid claim to the uprising while repressing the memory of other movements that took part, like the Bundists, Communists and right-wing Revisionists. (Gat, 2013)

Gat asserts that the uprising caused the Germans to extract a terrible revenge on the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto. He also takes issue with Israel's Labour movement, claiming that it was due to their ‘spin’ that Yom HaShoah received its official name of ‘Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day, as if there was any proportionality between the two parts of the phrase’ (Gat, 2013). Furthermore, Gat maintains that the Warsaw Ghetto uprising was ‘inflated by a blurring of the numbers: the number of German casualties, the number of ghetto fighters and the length of the uprising’ and accuses various leaders by name of exaggeration regarding the numbers of fighters. Although two uprising participants, Marek Edelman (a non-Zionist Bundist who controversially remained in Poland after the war) and Prof. Israel Gutman estimated respectively that only 220 and 350 fighters participated, others pushed the participation figures still higher: Jewish Combat Organization leader Yitzhak Zuckerman claimed 500
fighters, participant Stefan Grayek 700 fighters, Prof. Yehuda Bauer of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem estimated up to 1000 fighters.

The length of the fighting was also inflated, says Gat, and in another article (Gat, 2013), in response to historian’s Dr. Havi Dreifuss’s vociferous objections (Dreifuss, 2013) to Gat’s assertions, he continues to maintain:

> The myth was created in Israel after the Holocaust by scholars who came from a very specific political camp. It came to have a decisive influence on the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial and museum, and on shaping the memory of the Holocaust. It still dominates to a great extent in the awareness of their students and disciples – and is sometimes expressed in genuine historical naïveté. (Gat, 2013)

Gat goes into great detail to explain that the usage of the word ‘bunker’ to refer to the places of concealment for Jews in the ghetto should also be demystified, for these were simply ‘hiding places’ rather than military outposts or ‘entrenchments’, as Dreifuss imagines; nevertheless it is the military image of the bunker that is celebrated in the museum at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai.

Finally, however, we must leave the last words to Dreifuss; it may well seem that the Jews of the Warsaw Ghetto paid the ultimate price in reaction to the uprising, but what is also sure is that they ‘were murdered in the Holocaust … rather as a result of German policy, and those who survived did so thanks to luck and resourcefulness’. Dreifuss finds that the ‘uniqueness of the Warsaw Ghetto Revolt lies in its popular nature, its combination of armed
resistance and mass defiance’. She may overstate the ‘mass defiance’ but is correct in noting its ‘desperate’ symbolic power (Dreifuss, 2013).

4.6 Educating towards remembrance

Much of the enduring and recurring emotional potency of Yom HaShoah is derived from careful and intensive priming. Although, as Porat notes (2008, p. 345) the Holocaust was not taught or discussed in Israeli schools and universities directly from the inception of the state, all began to change in the 1980s-1990s, after a long process in which understanding became more sophisticated and nuanced, and public attitudes shifted from ‘contempt and criticism to empathy and identification’ (Porat, 2008, p. 389). The right-wing Likud party, elected in 1977, was the first to mandate the teaching of the Holocaust at high school levels; Likud’s leader, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, was utterly shaped by and a quintessential product of the Holocaust generation—having lost his parents and brother in the Holocaust—and referred to it constantly. Since then, national education programmes on the Holocaust have commenced at increasingly youthful ages in Israel—latterly, from kindergarten upwards, in programmes promoted by the Israel Ministry of Education (Lanir, 2013; Aderet, 2014; Landsmann, 2014; Kordova, 2014; Skop, 2014; Skop, 2015). Israeli teens take their own version of the unashamedly Zionist ‘March of the Living’ (https://motl.org/) -style school trips or youth movement trips to Poland, and young army conscripts take part in the ‘Witness in Uniform’ tours to the concentration camps; soldiers visit Holocaust survivors in Israel, present them with flowers, and take photos with them. New schemes for youth volunteering with elderly Holocaust survivors in Israel are regularly set up (Eisenbud, 2017).
Not all of this passes without mishap. The IDF campaign Hashtag #WeAreHere, which encouraged young national service conscripts to upload ‘selfie’ photos of themselves with Holocaust survivors to social media, was the butt of a great deal of criticism and parody throughout the internet (Ben Zion, 2014; Grossman, 2014; IDF, 2014; Schechter, 2015), causing pro-Palestinian supporters to also upload images to remind the public of their forgotten reality. Moreover, in recent years some high schools have withdrawn from programmes to visit the concentration camps in Poland, citing expense and fearing that such programmes supported the rise in flag-waving right-wing nationalism (Avivi, 2016; Skop, 2016; Maltz, 2016).

Starkman and Dattel (2016) report the comments of anthropologist Dr. Idan Yaron, co-author of a three-year study on racism in Israeli schools (Yaron and Harpaz, 2015) who has travelled on five such trips and studied their impact on schoolchildren:

“The main problem is the values promoted on them … In their present format, the trips are driven by an agenda and miss the educational goals. The story is, ‘We have overcome the Holocaust, and we are here to stay. And we – my words – showed them.’ It’s the narrative on a national and systematic level. And when we harness the trip to Poland in order to advance an agenda of strengthening nationalism, that’s a problem. We’re missing the other goals, and the overall, human message of the Holocaust is blurred. … The trips are usually built around the Jewish-Zionist and Jewish-nationalist story, and much less on a universal message and the significance of
the Holocaust. This is so targeted, timed and managed in a manipulative fashion by a very well-oiled educational system, until there is almost no space for the students to say ‘Let’s look at the suffering of other peoples, too.’ If someone tries to say something like that, there’s a feeling that it is grating, it is almost taboo.” (Starkman and Dattel, 2016)

Or Kashti finds the ‘cynical’ exploitation of emotions of fear aroused by Yom HaShoah and school trips to the death camps echoed throughout the education system in Israel; Kashti condemns the acute rise in intolerance produced by their ‘otherization’ effect, accompanied by unhealthy sensations of victimhood:

Instilling fear is one of the few tasks in which the Education Ministry actually succeeds. It begins with pre-school, when Pharaoh, Hitler and the Arab countries that rose up to destroy us in 1948 become one big, confusing mess and continue to be so for the 12 years of studies. One can see its traces in, among other areas, history instruction, from which any hint of complexity or dissent is removed – absent are any ideas that would deviate even slightly from narrative of self-reliance. The result is the memorization of a chain of tragedies with very little context. This is no mistake. …

Fear is a necessary ingredient in justifying the status quo in the story that the Jewish majority tells itself about itself. The ideas projected towards those outside – the Arab minority, the
Palestinians in the territories who simply follow in the path of the Nazis, and all the other anti-Semites in the world - are an illusion. A student educated to interpret the reality around him using a victimized world view will ultimately decide to withdraw behind large gates and high walls and live surrounded only by those who are like him. That life is much simpler. The tolerance for those who are different – with respect to class, ethnic origin, culture and the like - is gradually eroded …The education system has fostered a fear of catastrophe, suspicion of raising historical questions and apprehension of those who are considered outsiders. (Kashti, 2013)

From this one can see that the debate over how the Holocaust is taught and recalled produces an echo chamber effect that goes to the debate over the symbolic essence of the state of Israel itself, its ambivalent yet critical relationship with the Jewish Diaspora from which it emerged, and asks anxious questions about the effects on Israelis of their 50-year occupation of the Palestinians in the wake of the 1967 victory, while reminding Israelis of a time of existential doubt, when many believed that, like Europe’s Jews, their survival hung in the balance.
4.7 The IDF and Yom HaShoah

‘Israel today is becoming Yad Vashem with an air force. … The Holocaust is well on its way to becoming the defining feature of Israeli society. Even Sephardic and Oriental Jews who came to Israel from Muslim countries now treat it as part of their personal family memories. “The Holocaust is now no longer a trauma that affected certain families in Israel,” said Sidra Ezrahi, an Israeli expert on Holocaust literature, “it has become a collective pathology affecting the entire nation.”’

(Friedman, 1991/2012, p. 281)

One might reasonably expect the presence of Israel’s Defense Forces to be felt powerfully in shaping the rituals of Yom HaZikaron, but the same is also true of Yom HaShoah, where the army provides the honour guard at many Yom HaShoah ceremonies, in particular those which take place at Yad Vashem. Remembrance of the Holocaust, in particular the concentration camps, also provides a substantial platform for the promotion of a securitization discourse, especially within the army and also throughout the nation at large, which serves as the military’s recruiting ground. The participation of army recruits in visits to survivors and to the camps has been alluded to above. The IDF’s Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi has addressed participants wrapped in blue and white Israeli flags at the March of the Living (Ha’aretz, 2008), while the army’s ‘Witnesses in Uniform’ (Edim Be’Madim) programme continues to take soldiers on missions to Poland and Germany that include tours of the camps:
Unique delegations of IDF officers, dubbed “Witnesses in Uniforms,” continue to fly to Europe. These delegations consist of some 180 IDF officers from various units, including reservists. The delegations visit the concentration and death camps, the ghettos and the old communities of the destroyed European Jewry.

These trips are preceded by extensive studying and preparation that the delegation members undergo, including a tour of Yad Vashem. They study Jewish history in general and specifically that of the Holocaust. Each delegation is accompanied by a Holocaust survivor who adds their personal story and contributes their perspective on the Holocaust. (Savir, 2013)

The profound effect of these experiences has been blogged by IDF members (https://www.idfblog.com/tag/witnesses-in-uniform/). Even those serving soldiers from the country’s Muslim minorities deeply feel the impact of witnessing the places where the Holocaust took place and extract from it a military message, according to a Bedouin officer, Lieutenant Colonel Falach Hayib:

Lt. Col. Hayib firmly believes not only the Jews have a duty to remember and a responsibility to never forget: “Unfortunately, we still hear about a lot of people who deny the Holocaust and threaten to destroy the state of Israel,” he said. “As a country, we need to be united and strong to guard the land against all
enemies, far and near. This is our job – to defend the country.”

(IDF blog, 2013)

For Jewish members of the Witnesses in Uniform programme, participation is reportedly a profoundly unsettling experience, yet one which drives home a triumphal message, as Lieutenant Colonel Avital Leibovich affirms, ‘Our presence there alone was proof that the Nazis failed in their mission to destroy the Jewish people’ (Leibovich, 2013). The various tragic sites of memory visited by the IDF’s spokesperson Major Peter Lerner during the tour produce an even more vivid triumphalist cry:

I have visited the death ditches in the Lopuchowo forest where nameless mass graves lie in the midst of the tress. I have visited the memorial sites of Treblinka death camp and its rocks that remind us of the communities erased from the face of Poland. I have breathed in the air of the Majdanek camp in its shocking gas chambers where the Nazis watched as they murdered Jews and wheelbarrowed them through the camp to the crematorium and I have walked from the gates of Birkenau to the steps where 2000 Jews at a time disappeared down in to the belly of the Nazi death machine. In all these places I have stood head held high in my military dress uniform bearing the blue Star of David and the Israeli flag. When, in the not so far away future, the survivors are no more, the responsibility to remind the world of the atrocities will be ours. I, Major Peter Lerner, am the Israel Defense Forces Spokesman in the
Central Command and now I am a Witness in Uniform. (Lerner, 2011)

The involvement of the army in Shoah ceremonials for Europe’s Jewry is an historic one, marked by episodes such as the 30-second IAF flyover of three F-15 fighter jets over Auschwitz on the 85th anniversary of the Polish Air Force on September 4th, 2003. During the flyover, one of the participants, Major-General Amir Eshel, whose parents were Holocaust survivors, controversially broadcast the army’s pledge to defend all Jews, saying, “We pilots of the Air Force, flying in the skies above the camp of horrors, arose from the ashes of the millions of victims and shoulder their silent cries, salute their courage and promise to be the shield of the Jewish people and its nation Israel” (Jewish Virtual Library, 2003). Intones Israeli-American philanthropist Adam Milstein, reminiscing on the momentous event:

… in today’s tumultuous world, the sole guarantor of Jewish safety is a strong Israeli military. Jews facing mortal danger in any corner of the globe can count on Israel to protect them. … Before Israel’s founding in 1948, Jews were easy prey. They could run but they were not safe. Not anymore, never again! Thanks to its strength, the Israel Defense Force is fulfilling its true purpose – to serve as the ultimate insurance policy for the Jewish people against our enemies. … While Jews are often the first to be targeted by tyrants and bigots, it almost never ends with the Jews.
Remember that the next time you hear the news about an IDF operation. When Israel goes to war, it is not doing so just for its citizens or Jews around world.

When Israel fights, it does so on behalf of Western civilization as a whole. Israel is the floodgate – it sits on a strategic fault line between enlightenment and tyranny. (Milstein, 2016)

In fact, the flyover went ahead while ‘Ignoring protests by the National Museum of Auschwitz-Birkenau and a heavy cloud cover’, and the museum’s spokesman, Jaroslaw Mensflet, protested that Auschwitz-Birkenau is “a cemetery, a place of silence and concentration … Flying the [F-15s] is a demonstration of military might which is an entirely inappropriate way to commemorate the victims” (Barkat, 2003). Israeli historian of the Holocaust Yehuda Bauer concurs in criticizing the gesture:

Auschwitz is the largest Jewish cemetery in our entire history.

You do not fly over a cemetery as a gesture of mourning, and not even fury. Certainly not in a foreign, rather friendly, country, against its will. If foreign military planes were to fly over Israel for any reason whatsoever, in defiance of our demands, would Maj. Gen. Eshel not scramble the whole air force to intercept the alien planes?

… There is a peculiar argument that says the “lesson” of Auschwitz is that there should be a strong Israel. Well, had it not been for Auschwitz, would Israel have had to be weak? And if we’d had a choice between nearly six million living Jews and
establishing a state, which would we have chosen? I do not know what Mr. Shavit [journalist Ari Shavit] and Maj. Gen. Eshel would choose, but I would have opted for millions of Jews.

Columnist Tom Friedman of *The New York Times* was quoted as writing that Israel is Yad Vashem with an air force. It is very good that we have the air force we have. But there is no connection between that and the Holocaust of the Jewish people. (Bauer, 2013)

Former PM and then-defence minister, Ehud Barak, added his own touch of controversy to the linkage between the victims of the Holocaust and the military might of the Israeli army during one of his various visits to the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in 2009 by writing in the visitors’ book, ‘Remember and don’t forget. Preserve our strength and know to depend only on ourselves. A strong Israel is both consolation and revenge for all those who died. Auschwitz - never again’ (Arutz Sheva, 2009). (On an early visit in 1992, Barak is reported to have said ‘Maybe Israeli soldiers have come to Auschwitz 50 years too late’ [JTA News, 1992], although in general his speech at Auschwitz offered the revolutionary perspective that the victims of the Holocaust were not to be disparaged in the face of the overwhelmingly brutal forces of history, ‘We who did not stand in your place, know that we are, therefore, unable to criticize you’ [cited in Porat, 2008, p. 390]). In a similar vein, IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz also wrote in the same visitors’ book in 2013, ‘The state of Israel is the security that an atrocity like this will not happen again. The IDF is the shield for the national home — the safe
haven for the Jewish people,' (Winer, 2013). Thus the message is clear: there is no way to unlink the destruction of Europe’s Jews from the rise and necessity of Israel’s military might. In reflecting upon the one, one cannot help but remember that the other invokes the complications of a threat of a different order.

4.8 Yom HaShoah and some further political uses of collective trauma

The opening and closing ceremonies of Yom HaShoah, together with the period leading up to the day of remembrance, are generally a signal for Israel’s politicians to make their mark in the local and international media, beyond the general saturation of the Holocaust in Israeli public life and culture. Frequently, the message is directed not only towards local consumption but outwards, to the international community; there is generally an urgent contemporaneity to the themes of such messages, beyond eternal remembrance, reflective of current international events.

Of course, not only on Yom HaShoah is the Holocaust referenced as an ever-present entity in Israeli public life; in recent years, two such notable eruptions emanated from Prime Minister Netanyahu. The first, widely dubbed ‘Irangate’ represents a frequent coruscation of the international community for not taking a stronger line with Teheran and its alleged nuclear bomb programme, climaxing in an address to the 70th General Assembly of the United Nations on October 2015 in which Netanyahu threatens an impending Holocaust, warning that ‘Seventy years after the murder of six million Jews, Iran’s rulers promised to destroy my country, murder my
people,’ (The Jerusalem Post, 2015). The second and more controversial eruption, ‘Muftigate’ widely parodied across social media networks (Kaplan Sommer, 2015) and hugely analyzed by the Israeli and Diaspora Jewish media (Avnery, 2015; Ilany, 2015; Sokol, 2015; Zalman, 2015), refers to an episode of a peculiar speech to the 37th Zionist Congress in 2015 in which Netanyahu recounts ‘ten big lies’ and concocts an imaginary dialogue between Haj Al-Amin Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and German Chancellor Adolf Hitler (but not an imaginary meeting; their encounter in Berlin in 1941 is a matter of documentary record, whereupon the Mufti can be witnessed proffering a Heil Hitler salute to his host). While it was undoubtedly correct to vilify the Mufti for pro-Nazi sympathies, Netanyahu’s claim (which he was later encouraged to retract, at the insistence of the German government [Barkin, 2015; Beaumont, 2015]) that the Mufti was responsible for inspiring Hitler with the notion of the Final Solution is a flight of sheer historical revisionist fancy. As the son of a historian, the prime minister ought to have been cognizant that the destruction of Europe’s Jews had begun well and in earnest with the activities of the Einsatzgruppen before their meeting in 1941; the massacre of Babi Yar, for example, in which 34,000 Jews were shot, had already taken place, together with many other atrocities, such as the mass shooting of the Jews of Pinsk, Belarus, including my father-in-law’s entire family. (Netanyahu’s flight of rhetoric points, moreover, to an implication that Palestinians also harbour similar Nazi sympathies, and largely draws on what historiographer Michael Sells refers to as the ‘Perish-Judea literature’ that relies on three frequently recycled, problematic and biased sources [Sells, 2015]). Referring to the uprisings against the pre-state Yishuv (Jewish community) in the 1920s,
Netanyahu stitches together local Palestinian resistance, his own grandfather's immigration to Palestine and the Nazis' Final Solution in one breathless sweep, together with the old-new ‘big lie’ that Israel is attempting to change the status quo on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem and destroy al-Aqsa mosque:

And this attack and other attacks on the Jewish community in 1920, 1921, 1929, were instigated by a call of the Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, who was later sought for war crimes in the Nuremberg trials because he had a central role in fomenting the final solution. He flew to Berlin. Hitler didn’t want to exterminate the Jews at the time, he wanted to expel the Jews. And Haj Amin al-Husseini went to Hitler and said, ‘If you expel them, they'll all come here.’ ‘So what should I do with them?’ he asked. He said, ‘Burn them.’ And he was sought in, during the Nuremberg trials for prosecution. He escaped it and later died of cancer, after the war, died of cancer in Cairo. But this is what Haj Amin al-Husseini said. He said, ‘The Jews seek to destroy the Temple Mount.’ My grandfather in 1920 seeks to destroy…? Sorry, the al-Aqsa Mosque. So this lie is about a hundred years old. It fomented many, many attacks. The Temple Mount stands. The al-Aqsa Mosque stands. But the lie stands too, persists. (Netanyahu, 2015)

Commenting on Netanyahu’s particular obsessions—the Holocaust, Iran and the purported anti-Semitism of the Palestinian leadership, in particular PM Mahmoud Abbas, whose doctoral thesis investigated the alleged
collaboration between Zionist leaders and the Nazi regime during the Holocaust (Rosenberg, 2014)—political analyst Chemi Shalev opines that:

The Nazis may move from Tehran to Ramallah and back, Barack Obama will remain Neville Chamberlain only for the remainder of his term in office, but Netanyahu plods on, at least in his own mind, as Winston Churchill. The only thing he promises the Israelis is a future of blood, sweat and tears: many tears, and very little hope. (Shalev, 2015)

Netanyahu returned to his familiar ‘blood, sweat and tears’ theme on the occasion of the Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes’ Remembrance Day Ceremony at Yad Vashem on April 23rd, 2017. On this occasion, he referred to the publication of a study based on UN archival material and alleged that ‘the Allies knew about the mass murder of the Jews as early as 1942’ yet did ‘nothing’ (Netanyahu, 2017). This, he explained darkly, was due to the age-old ‘unfathomable hatred of Jews … it would be naïve to think that it is going to disappear in the foreseeable future’. Turning towards more contemporary trends, Netanyahu sees the ‘resurgence’ of ‘new-old’ Jew-hatred ‘in the West’ and (a side-swipe at the UN here) ‘it is also common in UN institutions. The hypocrisy is so blatant’. In addition, notes Netanyahu, there is ‘a fierce hatred bursting forth from the east: the anti-Semitism of both streams of radical Islam, headed by Iran and ISIS, which openly work for our destruction’. This enmity is not only directed against Jews, but additionally, ‘against the nation-state of the Jews’ (Netanyahu, 2017). The world stands by in indifference, not only at resurfacing anti-Semitism, but also in the case
of other genocides ‘in Biafra, in Cambodia, in Rwanda, in Sudan and indeed, also in Syria’.

Israel, however, has not been indifferent to Syrian suffering, and ‘has treated thousands of wounded Syrians’ at a border field-station hospital; but by and large, the message to be taken from all of this is that only, ‘The strong survive. The weak are wiped out. Our people experienced this personally in the Holocaust and we have kept that lesson at the forefront at all times’ (Netanyahu, 2017). The message segues into a reiteration for the supreme necessity of a militarily powerful Israeli state; in contrast to the powerlessness of Holocaust victims, Israel ‘traded weakness for strength’. A paean to Israeli militarism ensues:

From a helpless people, we have become a strong nation.
From a defenseless people we have become a nation with a defensive force that is among the strongest in the world. We nurture our military, intelligence and technological strength and propel them forward. … Together we will defend our home and together we will guarantee the eternity of Israel. (Netanyahu, 2017)

The more global tide of rising nationalism, anti-Semitism and populism in 2016-2017 was also evoked in more measured terms by Israel’s president, Reuven Rivlin, in his Yom HaShoah address for the closing ceremony at the Ghetto Fighters’ House Museum, in the presence of Former President of Germany Joachim Gauck. Criticizing the turn to the right in Europe and North America, President Rivlin found that:
... the prevalent message arising from recent political statements is uniquely disturbing. And in every place that message is the same: we are not responsible for the Holocaust.

We are not responsible for the extermination of the Jewish people which occurred within our borders. (Israel MFA, 2017).

Referring indirectly to French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, and further east to Poland and Ukraine, he continued:

So denied for example a French presidential candidate, France’s responsibility for the deportation of its Jewish citizens to the Nazi concentration and death camps. (A member of her party denied not only French involvement in the deportation of the Jews to destruction, but their very murder). In Poland, the debate surrounding the involvement of the local population in the persecution and murder of Jews has become a political issue of the first order. In the Ukraine, elected officials were enraged by my speech before the Ukrainian Parliament, when I recalled that many of those who collaborated with the Nazis were Ukrainian, and among them those who betrayed, and slaughtered Jews, and in many cases turned them over the Germans.

President Rivlin acknowledged that the ultimate responsibility for the ‘systematic planning and the implementation of the Final Solution’ lay with Germany, but those nations who cooperated should also face some serious ‘moral internal reflection’. Their refutation represents ‘Holocaust denial of a
new, more destructive and dangerous kind from that we have known till now … a denial of the distinction between a victim and a criminal’ (Israel MFA, 2017). Without a shred of irony, Rivlin adds, ‘Victimization is the most comprehensive and effective note of exemption from responsibility. …We must resist the renunciation of national responsibility in the name of alleged victimhood. As a society and as a state, we must resist unholy alliances with extreme right-wing elements.’ (This last comment being, no doubt, an indirect dig at the Israeli right’s exuberance on the election of American President Donald Trump, considered to be more pro-Israel in inclination than his predecessor, Barak Obama.)

At another ceremony at Yad Vashem earlier, President Rivlin also courted controversy, firstly by indirectly taking aim at President Trump’s following of an international trend in his neglect or refusal to recollect or specify the Jewish victims of the Holocaust in his earlier International Holocaust Remembrance Day comments. Those who adopt a ‘universalist’ perspective on the Holocaust, missing out the singular experience of the Jews as the target victims of the Nazi extermination programme, are making ‘a historical, national, and educational error’ (Rivlin, 2017). The ‘universal approach’, states Rivlin:

…. negates the uniqueness of the Holocaust as a historical event that has no parallel, that happened to us, the members of the Jewish People. According to this approach, the Shoah is just one specific occurrence of genocide, of racism, and such events have happened in the past and may happen again in the history of humankind. In the case of the Shoah, they would say,
this terrible genocide attacked the Jewish People. This is a dangerous approach. It downplays the Shoah. It distorts history. It denies the program of systematic extermination that was aimed specifically at the Jewish People. It denies anti-Semitism, a malignant disease that is two thousand years old. It denies the right and the obligation of the Jewish People to a history of its own, and to a state of its own. The Shoah has always been, and will always be a program of annihilation that was planned and implemented against the Jewish People. The gas chambers were not built ‘as a crime against humanity’, they were built for the purpose of annihilating the Jewish People, and specifically that nation. (Rivlin, 2017)

The message is not only to refocus on the particular nature of the Final Solution, but to reemphasize the particular identity of the ethnic group singled out for annihilation; and the solution Rivlin draws from this is not the toleration of diversity in societies, but rather the traditional Zionist solution, a solution to which Theodor Herzl arrived in the wake of the 1894 Dreyfus Affair: a Jewish national state is necessary to bulwark against anti-Semitism.

Once again, the lurking danger of anti-Semitism even in the most advanced and cultured of societies is reemphasized. The Shoah, Rivlin points out, did not happen in a vacuum of moral decay, it ‘happened in the heart of Europe of enlightenment. In the heart of the Germany of Kant - the father of modern ethics. In the heart of the France of the declaration of the rights of man, the rights of the citizen’ (Rivlin, 2017). That said, the spectre of the Shoah should not become ‘the lens through which we view the world’ notes Rivlin, in an
oblique reference to the ‘approach’ of the current Prime Minister Netanyahu, whereby, ‘the Shoah, and preventing it ever happening again, are all that is important’ (Rivlin, 2017). Recalling Netanyahu’s Likud predecessor, Menachim Begin, whose tendency to justify all Israeli actions and reactions as prevention of further Holocaus ts, Rivlin reminisced how:

On the eve of the IDF’s entry into Lebanon in June 1982, Begin said to me, and I quote, “The alternative to the IDF’s entry into Lebanon, is Treblinka, and we decided that there would never be another Treblinka”. According to this approach, the justification for the existence of the State of Israel is the prevention of the next Holocaust. Every threat is a threat to survival, every Israel-hating leader is Hitler. (Rivlin, 2017)

This kind of approach, born in fear and paranoia, suggests that Holocaust is the only Israeli Jewish reality, but ‘the Jewish People was not born in Auschwitz,’ affirms Rivlin, ‘…the Shoah is not the lens through which we should examine our past and our future’:

It was not fear that kept us going through two thousand years of exile, it was our spiritual assets, our shared creativity.

Externally, this approach damages our ability to develop relations with the nations of the world and with our critics from a safe place, appropriate for dialogue. (Rivlin, 2017)

There must be another, less bipolar approach, a ‘third way’ in which the international community is neither identified with “‘Righteous among the Nations” on the one hand, and anti-Semitic Nazis on the other’ so that any
Censure of Israel’s behaviour does not automatically amount to anti-Semitism (Rivlin, 2017). Rivlin’s third way consists of three ‘pillars’. The first pillar reaffirms the traditional Zionist perspective that ‘We shall always undertake our own defense’:

… the State of Israel is not compensation for the Holocaust, but the Holocaust teaches us that we must take our fate in our own hands. The Jewish People has the right and the duty for a defensive force, for national independence, for sovereignty, here in our historic homeland. (Rivlin, 2017)

For the second pillar, Rivlin reaffirms the connection to the Jewish Diaspora, ‘and our obligation to their safety and welfare’ (as the state of the Jewish people) especially in the light of the current wave of anti-Semitism; the third pillar is a universal message of concern for all humanity, for ‘this is the immense courage bequeathed to us by the victims … in actions for the sake of others’ (Rivlin, 2017). Yet nevertheless, the message reiterated is ultimately a traditional Zionist one; and concludes with a parable about a Holocaust survivor and witness to the ceremony, Peter Josef Grünfeld Kleinmann, who has emigrated to Israel. Like Grünfeld Kleinmann, the Jews ‘have returned to our land, and from here we shall never get lost’ (Rivlin, 2017).

Contrasting the personalities of the two Likud rivals, President Rivlin and his prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu political commentator Chemi Shalev concludes with a commentary on Netanyahu’s bleakness and paranoia that ultimately prevails among Israelis:
Where Rivlin sees a glass half full, Netanyahu sees a glass half full of poison. Like his predecessor Shimon Peres, Rivlin is an optimist; Netanyahu, on the other hand, sees enemies and misfortunes everywhere. It is one of the common traits he shares with Donald Trump. … it is Netanyahu’s dark view of the world that gets [Israelis’] vote time and time again. His fatalism is a natural fit for Israeli Jews haunted by memories of the Holocaust and concerned about the real enemies that surround them. Netanyahu’s hopelessness, his insularity …[feeds] the natural pessimism of Israelis, they … perpetuate it and ensure that Netanyahu’s despondency will return him to power time and time again. (Shalev, 2017)

Finally, in Netanyahu’s defence, he has partaken in the trend in recent years for a growth in compassion towards Holocaust victims as individuals, rather than solely as a carrier of a larger message in service of the survival of the Jewish state. The 2017 Yom HaShoah ceremony at Israel’s Knesset was entitled ‘Unto every person a name’ (Knesset, 2017) and during it, PM Netanyahu eulogized his own father-in-law, the writer, educator and Holocaust survivor, Shmuel Ben-Artzi, whose entire family perished during World War II; family members too were named and eulogized at length. Even in the darker speech discussed earlier, Netanyahu did not omit to retell the stories of two survivors present at the ceremony, Max Privler and Moshe Porat, both of whom lived on to contribute to the growth of the state by (of course) serving in the IDF and producing children, grandchildren and great grandchildren.
4.9 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to portray how the ‘re-traumatising’ commemoration of the Holocaust in Israel remains both a sacred and strategic issue, since its 1951 adoption of the observance of *Yom HaShoah ve-Hagevurah* (Holocaust Day and Heroism) on the 27th of the lunar Hebrew month of Nisan; the day memorialises the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and falls eight days before *Yom HaZikaron* (the Day of Remembrance, commemorating Israel’s war dead) and the subsequent *Yom Ha’Atzmut* (Independence Day, which follows directly after the Day of Remembrance). While Israel did not necessarily treat its Holocaust refugees particularly well, these cascading rites of memory are central to the routine instrumentalisation of Israeli collective trauma. It is noted that the date of Yom HaShoah is different from International Holocaust Memorial Day, and puts the emphasis on those who resisted the genocide:

Ultimately, in 1951, Israel’s Yom HaShoah (literally, Holocaust Day) was scheduled close to the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. The choice of date was an attempt to focus on those who fought against the Nazis, rather than on those who never had that chance. Those who “went like sheep to the slaughter,” as it was phrased in those days, were an embarrassment to the so-called “new Jews” of Israel. The official name of the new memorial day—Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Day—reflected this mindset: It was, in large part, a
commemoration of the lucky few who had been able to fight, rather than the unfortunate majority. In effect, Israel's version of Holocaust memorial day was not a commemoration, but a denial of memory. (Shahar, 2015)

Levy and Sznaider concur, finding that Holocaust memorializing in the Zionist state ‘fulfilled two mutually exclusive functions’. On one hand, they ‘represent the victims as typical examples of Jewish passivity as a consequence of the lack of sovereignty’ while ‘on the other, they commemorated those Zionist martyrs who actively resisted the Nazis’ (Levi and Sznaider, 2002).

The Holocaust, notes Avram Burg, is ‘woven into almost all of Israel’s political arguments … a past that is present, maintained, monitored, heard, and represented’ (Burg, 2008, Loc. 436 of 4852). Over 50 years have passed since the end of the 1967 or Six-Day War, but even the relatively dovish late foreign minister Abba Eban described the 1949 Armistice borders erased by the new occupation as ‘Auschwitz borders’ to which Israel should never return. ‘He coined a term that is still used today … [rendering] legitimacy to the worst argument of the right, as empty rhetoric sometimes carries nations to unwanted destinations’ (Burg, 2008, Loc. 448 of 4852).

Discourse in Israel about the Holocaust continues to be highly political and traumatically charged in a way that is utterly different from debates elsewhere in Europe and the U.S. Bound up with the state’s image of itself as under constant existential threat, inextricably linked in the contemporary imagination of the Left with the fate of the Palestinians
whom the Jewish state displaced and continue to displace, despite robust arguments for unlinking (Bauer, 2017),\(^8\) the atrocities of the Holocaust continue to be used and abused instrumentally, a collective trauma that operates as a substantial barrier to peace.

A further feature also emerges from the unending streams of analyses on Israeli leaders’ latest pronouncements on the Holocaust: despite its enduring sacred status, remarkable in a 24-hour news society in which so much is rapidly forgotten, Holocaust memorialization is a subject on which there is far from complete consensus within Israeli society. At first glance the topic appears sacrosanct, but it is nevertheless much deliberated upon, as:

> Statements on that subject are rigorously scrutinized by historians, journalists, organizations and the public at large. Every inaccuracy summons forth a demand for correction and a reprimand, as though merely to speak the words is damaging. Talk about the Holocaust carries a status similar to that possessed by pledges of faith in medieval Europe: Anyone who deviated from the doctrine about the holy trinity or about Jesus’ divine nature was considered a heretic and risked denunciation and severe punishment. (Ilany, 2015, ibid.)

Yet deviation does occur. There are ‘group narratives, which constitute an alternative to the dominant narrative’ to be found on the internet, on social media in Hebrew and in English that may suggest that the ‘“official
version” of the Holocaust is unraveling at the edges’ (Ilany, 2015). This diversification of discourse, will, however, remain on the fringes for the foreseeable future. Orthodoxy is likely to prevail for quite some time to come until the generations of survivors disappear or become less connected with the official state narrative; whether Middle East peace can wait that long is another question.
Chapter Five: Palestine and the politics of collective trauma

I have learned and dismantled all the words in order to draw from them a single word: *Home*. (Darwish, 2003, p. 8.)

I will tell the world, I will tell…
About a house whose lantern was broken,
About a hoe that cut down an iris
And a fire that destroyed a braid of hair.
I will tell stories about a goat that was not milked,
About a morning cup of coffee never drunk
About a mother’s bread that was not baked,
About a mud roof sprouting grass.
I will tell the world, I will tell…
(Al-Qasim, 1993)

5.1 Palestine: empirical evidence of historical trauma

Chapter Four examined the *problématique* of collective or cultural trauma as it is manifested in Israeli society, particularly through its formative traumatic history, which remains so focused on the Holocaust, the ‘central axis of [Israel’s] national experience’ (Elkana, 1988). A key event that is enduringly present in contemporary discourse, the Holocaust is recalled cyclically and instrumentally through mnemonic triggers (days and sites of memory). As Chapter Four argues, the State of Israel extensively operationalized the Holocaust, and still continues to do so, but it is the State that bears extensive (but not exclusive) ongoing responsibility for Palestinian suffering and the fractured nature of Palestinian society, wherein indubitable empirical evidence of collective trauma is to be found.
Chapter Five will similarly analyze the construction and operationalization of the Palestinian traumatic narrative, but does not intend to attribute direct causality to the Jewish Holocaust, even if the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel has often inspired the conflation:

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people—the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe—was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the community of nations. (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013 [1948])

As the historian and Holocaust survivor Professor Yehuda Elkana observed, ‘There is not now, and never has been any historical process that necessarily leads to genocide,’ (Elkana, 1998) (my italics); nor, conversely, is there any genocidal episode that necessarily leads to another. This linkage is the realm of the post hoc fallacy. Thus, historian Yehuda Bauer takes distinguished actor and director Mohamed Bakri to task in an open letter for allegedly making just such an assertion ['Dear Mr. Bakri, I write to you because of something you said at the Nakba Day ceremony held at Tel Aviv University: that the Holocaust caused the Nakba [the “disaster”] because it caused the State of Israel to be established'] (Bauer, 2012). Bauer’s claim (the supporting details of which otherwise evince a troubling denial of responsibility for the Palestinians’ tragedy) is reiterated elsewhere in another open missive, directed at the conductor Daniel Barenboim (Bauer, 2017,
mentioned in Chapter Four), in response to the latter's assertion, 'Without the Holocaust there never would have been a partition of Palestine, there would have been no al-Nakba, 1967 war, and occupation' (Barenboim, 2017). What can be said is that there are certain ineluctable 'symmetries', as Gilbert Achcar acknowledges, particularly with regard to nomenclature, 'that should give us pause, even if the situations are not perfectly symmetrical' (Achcar, 2009, p. 23). The major point of similarity, of course, is that both events represent sacred foundational narratives (Litvak and Webman, 2009, p. 35) and both events constitute the defining or 'chosen trauma' of Palestinians and Israeli Jews, to adopt the terminology of Turkish Cypriot psychiatrist Vamık Volkan, whose theories of 'large group' and transgenerational trauma, evinced throughout the body of his work (see, for example, Volkan, 1996; 2001; 2004, 2018) serve to bridge the interdisciplinary gap between individual psychological suffering and propel us toward a sociological or anthropological approach:

> I call the shared trauma a 'chosen trauma' … Since a group does not choose to be victimized, some of my colleagues take exception to my term 'chosen trauma'. But I hold that the word 'chosen' fittingly reflects a large group's unconscious choice to have their group identity be defined by the transgenerational transmission of the shared trauma. (Volkan, 1996, p. 110)

Resembling Benedict Anderson's 'imagined communities', large-group identities, claims Volkan, ‘are the end-result of myths and realities of common beginnings, historical continuities, geographic realities, and other shared linguistic, societal, religious, cultural and ideological factors’ (2018,
Palestinians define themselves by the very real rupture of their existence caused by the Nakba; Israeli Jews refer frequently to Jewish persecution throughout history, and the State of Israel as a whole continuously operationalizes the trauma of the Shoah or Jewish Holocaust when it wishes to mobilize its Jewish citizens into support for its policies. It seems, at times, as if both groups would be adrift without this unwelcome yet resounding self-image; but any discussion of this point strays into the controversial area of ‘victim blaming’.

5.2 A human geography of trauma

The societal, cultural, political and historical losses of Palestinians literally represent a human geography of trauma, punctuated by the absence of the ‘present absentees’ in the towns and countryside of contemporary Israel. This was the official terminology of the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property, who in 1950 compiled lists of their ‘some 94,000 residential rooms, 9,700 shops and 1,200 offices, worth in total some 11,800,000 pounds sterling’ and in villages, ‘tens of thousands of buildings … real estate assets belonging to refugees amounted to nearly a quarter of all buildings in the country at the time’, not to mention personal and livelihood possessions, livestock and vehicles, valued at ‘twenty million pounds sterling’ by the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Kadman, 2015, loc. 473/5416). ‘The geography is such that without knowledge of the Palestinian villages’ existence in the past, it would be impossible to know that they were once there,’ writes Rochelle Davis (Davis, 2011, p. 1) of two such villages, Suba and Bayt Mahsir, today subsumed inside Kibbutz Tzova and Beit Meir in the Ya’ar HaK’doshim (the Forest of the Martyrs, established in the Jerusalem...
hills in 1951 by the Jewish National Fund in memory of the Holocaust’s six million perished European Jews). In one of those cruel juxtapositions of history, \(^2\) Yad Vashem also outlooks onto this scenic forest, whose less than picturesque symbolism includes the site of the former village of Deir Yassin (Dayr Yasin), infamous as the scene of one of the worst atrocities on April 9\(^{th}\) of the 1948 war, in which an estimated and highly contested number of villagers (between 94 to 254) were massacred (Brooks, 2008, p. 297; Morris, 2006; PalestineRemembered.com; Sharvit, 2004). Israelis are encouraged to go hiking the forest trails, which constitute ‘the green lung of the residents of Israel’s capital. The forest has a variety of trees, flowers and wildlife, remains of ancient farming implements and burial caves’ (Jewish National Fund, n.d.).

As Ronit Lentin observes, ‘The link between remembering and forgetting in constructing collective memories … entails a memory boom, as each generation invests lieux de mémoire with different interpretations so they become their own referent’ (Lentin, p. 209).

As with those who survived the Jewish Holocaust, those who have suffered through the Palestinian Nakba (and the later Naksa of 1967) perceive their experience to be without parallel:

The Palestinian Nakba is unsurpassed in history. For a country to be occupied by a foreign minority, emptied almost entirely of its people, its physical and cultural landmarks obliterated, its destruction hailed as a miraculous act of God and a victory for freedom and civilised values, all done according to a premeditated plan, meticulously executed, financially and
politically supported from abroad, and still maintained today, is no doubt unique. (Abu-Sitta, 2000, p. 5)

Likewise, as with the Jewish Holocaust, the broad strokes of the Nakba are familiar to us now, and equally contested: the details of the 1948 war (for Israelis, Milchemet Ha’atzma’ut, the War of Independence) that pre-empted the flights, expulsions and atrocities (Morris, 2007, loc. 729/4448; Abd al-Jawad, 2007) remains the subject of intense historiographical controversy, about which many others have written in the past, including this researcher (Ottman, 2008). As Picaudou (2008) has observed, ‘The historiography of the 1948 events in Palestine remains a work in progress and a true battlefield, for in this case, writing history is one of the issues at stake in the conflict itself – to the point that claiming to review the facts only, dissociated from their interpretation, appears to be a huge challenge’.

In the ‘traumatic rupture’ of 1948 (Masalha, 2012, p. 13), approximately three quarters of a million of Palestinians (the exact number is contested, but the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS] suggests ‘more than 800,000’ [PCBS, 2017]) became internally displaced or exiled abroad from their towns and villages in 1948 (and more again in 1967). PCBS President Ola Awad tells us that:

According to documentary evidence, the Israelis controlled 774 towns and villages and destroyed 531 Palestinian towns and villages during the Nakba. The atrocities of Zionist forces also included more than 70 massacres in which more than 15 thousand Palestinians were killed. (PCBS, 2017)
Studies such as Sami Hadawi’s monumental *Palestinian Rights & Losses in 1948* (Hadawi, 1988), Michael Fischbach’s *Records of Dispossession* (2003), the critical mapping work of Salman Abu-Sitta (Abu-Sitta, 2000; Abu-Sitta, 2007; Abu-Sitta, 2010) the photographic records of pre-Nakba Palestine published by the co-founder of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Walid Khalidi (1984, 2006), Rochelle Davis’s examination of Palestinian village books that emerged from the 1980s on, *Palestinian Village Histories* (2011) and Noga Kadman’s account of the Palestinian strata upon which Israel has been established (Kadman, 2015) provide comprehensive evidence of the fabric of the world that was lost.

As with the past century’s major unresolved historical traumas, such as the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust of World War II, the further that event recedes in terms of the lived memory of survivors, the more its living memorialization grows. This is heightened by the phenomenon identified by Marianne Hirsch as ‘post-memory’ (discussed in Chapter Three) whereby ‘descendants … connect so deeply… that they need to call that connection *memory* and … memory can be transmitted to those who were not actually there to live an event’ (Hirsch, 2008, pp. 105-106). Thus although 2018 marks 70 years since the Nakba, and 2017 marked 50 years since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, these events are entirely present in Palestinians’ lives, a ‘society crystallized as a “community of memory”’ whose narrative spans the ‘continuum between past and present’ (Milshtein, 2009, pp. 48-49). This feature is particularly acute for those enduring ongoing repression and loss, as regular reports from regional NGOs and NPOs such as Adalah (https://www.adalah.org/), Addameer (http://www.addameer.org/),
Precise demographics of the Palestinian population within Israel and the Occupied Territories and in the diaspora from 1948 until now are difficult to obtain; since 2005 on there has been a debate about numbers, in particular about the looming projection for Palestinians to outnumber Israeli Jews in Israel and the Occupied Territories; COGAT (Coordination of Government Activity in the Territories, http://www.cogat.mod.gov.il/en/Pages/default.aspx) reported to the Knesset in April 2018 that the number of Palestinian Arabs and Jews throughout the region has now reached equilibrium, at 6.5 million in each case (Brown, Abunimah and Parry, 2005; DPA, 2013; Hasson, 2013; Lazaroff, 2016; Abu Toameh, 2018; Beilin, 2018; Harkov, 2018; Cook, 2018a; PCBS, 2018; WAFA, 2018). The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (Lindsay, 2009) records 5,266,603 refugees registered for its assistance in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (UNRWA, n.d.) but its data is problematic, according to its original narrow then expanded definition of Palestinian refugee identity (‘persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict … The descendants of Palestine refugee males, including adopted children, are also eligible for registration. When the Agency began
operations in 1950, it was responding to the needs of about 750,000 Palestine refugees. Today, some 5 million Palestine refugees are eligible for UNRWA services.’) (UNRWA, n.d.). Who may be counted among descendants of those who fled or left or became refugees once again after the 1967 war or, for example, due to the destruction of refugee camps in the current war in Syria is deeply relevant when it comes to the question of the ‘right of return’ for refugees. Nevertheless, Al-Awda tells us that ‘One in three refugees worldwide is Palestinian. There are about 7.2 million Palestinian refugees worldwide’ (Al-Awda, n.d.) On the 69th anniversary of the Nakba, its president, Ola Awad declares:

The estimated Palestinian world population totaled 12.70 million by the end of 2016. This indicates that the number of Palestinians worldwide has multiplied more than 9.1 fold since the Nakba. According to statistics, the total number of Palestinians living in historical Palestine (between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean) by the end of 2016 was 6.41 million and this number is expected to rise to 7.12 million by the end of 2020 based on current growth rates.

Statistical data also show that refugees constitute 42% of the total Palestinian population in Palestine. … Around 29% of Palestinian registered refugees live in 58 refugee camps, of which 10 are in Jordan, 9 in Syria, 12 in Lebanon, 19 in the West Bank, and 8 in Gaza Strip. These estimates represent the minimum number of Palestinian refugees, given the
presence of non-registered refugees. These estimates also do not include Palestinians who were displaced between 1949 and the 1967 war, according to the UNRWA definition, and do not include the non-refugees who left or were forced to leave as a result of the 1967 war.

The number of Palestinians who remained in their homeland in the 1948 territory after the Nakba was estimated at 154 thousand persons, but 2016 estimations show that it has grown to 1.53 million on the 69th annual commemoration of the Nakba. (PCBS, 2017)

5.3 The naming of suffering

Palestinians are also commonly referred to as victims of ethnic cleansing (Abunimah, 2009; Cook, 2010, p. 1; Hamzeh and May, 2003, pp. 154-166; Masalha, 2012, p. 161-162; Pappé, 2006; Pappé, 2014; White, 2012, p. 6), apartheid (Abdelnour, 2013; Bargouthi, 2011, p. 63; Cook, 2018c; Falk, 2017; White, 2014, 2016; Yiftachel, 2006, p. 80) and ongoing genocide (Boyle, 2013, 2014; Lendman, 2010, pp. 29-38; Polya, 2008, pp. 39-42) or ‘sociocide’ Russell Tribunal on Palestine, 2014) not only by Palestinian intellectuals themselves but also by engaged academics and journalists and legal experts (Center for Constitutional Rights, n.d.; Falk, 2014). Whether or not Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, intended to ‘transfer’ the entire Palestinian population beyond Palestine’s borders is part of the historiographical dispute that hinges on whether there has been selective translation or mistranslation of his diaries; and whether Plan Dalet contained
an organized and uniform intention to expel the indigenous population, or whether the expulsions were ad hoc and piecemeal according to individual commanders (Hazkani, 2013). In contradiction to Palestinian historian Adel Manna (2017; Golani and Manna, 2011) Israeli revisionist historian Morris claims it did not (Morris, 2017).

The accusation of genocide regularly levelled at the State of Israel (especially after the Gaza wars) is perhaps the most highly contested point. Significantly, the CCR reiterates Raphael Lemkin’s explanation that genocide ‘does not necessarily signify mass killings’:

More often [genocide] refers to a coordinated plan aimed at destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups so that these groups wither and die like plants that have suffered a blight. The end may be accomplished by the forced disintegration of political and social institutions, of the culture of the people, of their language, their national feelings and their religion. It may be accomplished by wiping out all basis of personal security, liberty, health and dignity. When these means fail the machine gun can always be utilized as a last resort. Genocide is directed against a national group as an entity and the attack on individuals is only secondary to the annihilation of the national group to which they belong. (Lemkin, cited in Center for Constitutional Rights, n.d.)
5.4 The correspondence with cultural trauma

The particular interpretation of ‘sociicide’ or ‘genocide’ discussed above corresponds closely to Kai Erikson’s original conception of cultural trauma (Erikson, 1976) portrayed in his groundbreaking study of the destruction of the Appalachian community of Buffalo Creek. (The community was decimated as a result of a catastrophic flood that was largely a consequence of criminal human neglect rather than a natural disaster, as discussed in Chapter 1.)⁶ It has been theorized that in the case of the former kind of traumatic event—largely or wholly intentional, either as the result of human inaction or action—then the acute sense of betrayal is far greater (Zinner and Williams, 1999; Edkins, 2003, p. 4), exacerbating the struggle to deal with the consequences. The many pages of interviews with survivors of the Buffalo Creek flood reiterate the profundity of their shock and distress.

Like the Nakba, the disaster at Buffalo Creek caused people to be ‘wrenched out of their communities, torn from the human surroundings in which they had been so deeply enmeshed’ (Erikson, 1976, p. 186). Compare this with Edward Said’s description of the Nakba as the very definition of ‘the wrenching, cataclysmic quality of the collective experience’ (Said, 2007, Loc. 3914/4438) and:

’a human tragedy so profound, so extraordinary in saturating both the formal as well as the informal life of its people down to the smallest detail … For Palestinians, a vast collective feeling of injustice continues to hang over our lives with undiminished weight’ (Said, 2007, Loc. 3929/4438)
The loss of what Erikson calls a supportive ‘communality … the network of human relationships that make up their general human surround’ (Erikson, 1976, p. 187) caused the Appalachians great disorientation, accompanied by a ‘sense of constant apprehension’ that expresses itself either as a ‘raw sense of fear’ or ‘fear … more generalized and diffuse’ (Erikson, 1976, pp. 234-235) which he details through inclusion of their accounts (Erikson, 1976, pp. 186-245), citing the disintegration of families, children’s extreme distress at any loud noises, insomnia, erratic hostility, and survivors’ descriptions of their abandoned environment as ‘frozen’ ‘dreary’ ‘like a graveyard’ ‘deserted, forsaken’ ‘people are depressed, unhappy, mournful, sick’ (Erikson, 1976, p. 195), “‘Our lifestyle has been disrupted, our home destroyed. We lost many things we loved, and we think about those things. We think about our neighbors and friends we lost. Our neighborhood was completely destroyed…’” (Erikson, 1976, p. 196). Likewise, Abu-Lughod and Sa’di describe their own Palestinian ‘catastrophe’ as that of ‘a society disintegrated, a people dispersed … taken for granted communal life was ended violently. … After 1948, the lives of the Palestinians at the individual, community, and national level were dramatically and irreversibly changed’ (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 3).

Erikson is at pains to stress the critical nature of communality: ‘It is the community that cushions pain, the community that provides a context for intimacy; the community that represents morality and serves as the repository for old traditions,’ he notes (Erikson, 1976, pp. 193-194), suggesting that ‘most of the traumatic symptoms experienced are a reaction to the loss of communality as well as a reaction to the disaster itself, that the
fear and apathy and demoralization one encounters ... are derived from the shock of being ripped out of a meaningful community setting' (Erikson, 1976, p. 194). Among those reactions detailed by Erikson are 'anxiety, depression, apathy, insomnia, phobic reactions, and a pervasive feeling of depletion and loneliness' (p. 198); granted, these are psychological responses suffered by individuals, but there is a Halbwachsian dialectic in the interaction between individual and group or society; thus, en masse, this suffering translates to the pervasive symptomology of an entire society that has been damaged by a sudden catastrophe, and is exhibiting 'the classic symptoms of mourning and bereavement' (Erikson, 1976, p. 200). These symptoms were also to be found in abundance in the early years after the Palestinian Nakba, which were 'mostly about fear, helplessness, violent uprooting, and humiliation ... a new era dominated by estrangement, and often poverty' (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 9). Moreover, the ongoing occupation and lack of resolution or acknowledgement of the Palestinian catastrophe has not permitted any meaningful healing to take place, as the 'sociocide' continues. This point is emphasized in Mahmoud Darwish’s letter published on the 53rd occasion of the Nakba, ‘Our catastrophe was the creation of Israel’:

We do not need to be reminded of an ongoing human tragedy which has haunted us for the past 53 years. We are still cut by the elements of that tragedy here and now. We are still resisting the expression of its effects, here and now, on the soil of our homeland, our only homeland. How can we forget what happened on this motherland of ours, a motherland which is still losing children to this catastrophe?
We cannot forget because our collective and individual memories remain fertile and capable of recalling our sad past, the chronology of which is the chronology of a land and a people, the chronology of tragedy and heroism, the chronology of a tale related in drops of blood, in open conflict between what we are told to be, and what we aspire to be. (Darwish, 2001.)

Like the Appalachians in Erikson’s account, there is a tendency towards ‘geographic nostalgia’, (Davis, 2007, p. 54) an idealization of all that went before, particularly amongst those who ‘generations later, still live in refugee camps that have become unsettlingly permanent. For them, memories of home were frozen,’ (Abu-Lughod, 2007, p. 78.) Poet Mourid Barghouti reminisces on this as he makes the long-awaited journey home in the lyrical 2004 memoir, *I Saw Ramallah*:

I used to tell my Egyptian friends at university that Palestine was green and covered with trees and shrubs and wild flowers. What are these hills? Bare and chalky. Had I been lying to people, then? Or has Israel changed the route to the bridge and exchanged it for this dull road that I do not remember ever seeing in my childhood?

Did I paint for strangers an ideal picture of Palestine because I had lost it? I said to myself … I had a lump in my throat and a feeling of being let down.
Had I been describing Deir Ghassanah [his home village] with its surrounding olive groves, and convincing myself I was describing the whole country? (Barghouti, 2004, pp. 28-29)

…The closer we drew to the village square the clearer I saw the traces of departure, of desertion. … The deserted houses tell their stories in eloquent silence. (Barghouti, 2004, p. 67)

Those who recall at first hand their villages and towns often exhibit what Ben-Ze’ev refers to as a kind of “Proustian” type of recall, namely the overwhelmingly sensual and emotional effect’ (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004, p. 142). This form of sensual nostalgia should be contrasted with ‘secondary sources, such as the Internet and the novels [that] reflect and circulate the imagery that is taking root in collective commemorations’ (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004, p. 142). As the generation of the Nakba passes away, it is this form of nostalgic recollection that predominates.

Another characteristic that Erikson notes is in accord with survivors’ initial silence or ‘conspiracy of silence’, a feature often attributed to the Jewish Holocaust (previously mentioned in this study) and, as we shall see, the Nakba:

Virtually every study of a disaster in the social science literature reports that the first reaction is one of dazed shock and numbness, and one of the reasons for that stunned reaction … is a feeling on the part of survivors that the larger community has been demolished. Even when the individual has not suffered any serious personal loss and has not been exposed
to any immediate danger, he is shocked by the “cultural damage” and is likely to drift around in a state of “stunned disbelief”. (Erikson, 1973, p. 199)

The ‘stunned silence’ not necessarily the polar opposite of speech, nor is it necessarily concomitant with forgetfulness, as Winter (2010, p. 4) observes:

We cannot accept the commonplace view that silence is the space of forgetting and speech the realm of remembrance … it is a socially constructed space in which and about which subjects and words normally used in everyday life are not spoken. … people … at one point in time deem it appropriate that there is a difference between the sayable and the unsayable, or the spoken and the unspoken, and that such a distinction can and should be maintained and observed over time.⁷

A similar phenomenon of silence was noted in the case of the Nakba, for a variety of factors including shock, depression, humiliation, apprehension and disempowerment. On the initial silence surrounding the catastrophe, Webman (2007) cites Palestinian writer Ghassan Kanafani, who ‘claimed in the first years after the Nakba, “there was a muteness, as a result of the bewilderment and confusion”’ (p. 30). Ronit Lentin affirms that:

… the [Nakba] story is still full of silences regarding the experiences of different Palestinian communities, some living in the western diaspora, others living in refugee camps; it is also marked by the erasure of the struggle of internal refugees who
remained in Israel after 1948. … There was also a degree of self-silencing of Nakba memories, due some argue, to shame at not having fought … but also to fear, particularly during the military government which ended only in 1966. (Lentin, 2009, p. 211)

The ‘shame at not having fought’ is, of course, reminiscent of one of the accusations levelled at Jewish Holocaust victims, who kept their own silence. Lila Abu-Lughod and Ahmad Sa’di also comment that ‘Some might fault the Palestinians for somehow having remained silent, for not having told enough of their story’, (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 9). Recounting the interview of a Nakba victim who was asked about her silence, ‘particularly since so little was known to the world about what had happened in that period’ they report her disempowered response, “How can those without lips whistle?” (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 10). This comment is both a reflection on the status of the victims, and also on the traditional patriarchal nature of Palestinian society, in which women’s voices were seldom heard; and it furthermore hints at the phenomenon of delayed trauma that was identified by Erikson and others. Ben-Ze’ev additionally points to the passage of time as a critical component before interviewees were able to unburden themselves, ‘Many of the interviewees I met were old people, and by telling their stories they reconsidered the trajectory of their lives. … Secrets escaped … gray took the place of black and white. Very often it was the interviewees who wished to be freed from the moment,’ (Ben-Ze’ev, p. 190, 2011). Time is required before memory work can begin, together with the conditions that enable the permission to narrate. Some of the conditions are
social, but others are political: Ahmad Sa’di notes that despite the enormity of the ‘rupture in history’ (Sa’di, 2007, p. 287), the narrative ‘failure’ corresponded not only to the ‘victims’ silences … but also … a general lack of desire by those responsible to deal with the moral weight of the Palestinian catastrophe’ (Sa’di, 2007, p. 297), pointing the finger at the West in general, and Israeli Jews. ‘The debilitating factor … is that powerful nations have not wanted to listen,’ say Abu-Lughod and Sa’di (Abu-Lughod and Sa’di, 2007, p. 11). Others also point the finger at the Arab world, whose shame over its ability to prevent the events of 1948 was substantial (Bresheeth, 2006, p. 500).

Meanwhile, other historiographical reasons for silence on and the lack of exposure of the Palestinian narrative are well known: Benny Morris discusses them at length in his introduction to *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*:

> Perhaps curiously, little serious historiography has been produced, both in the four decades before the publication of the original version of this book [*The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*] or since … Soon after 1948, several chronicles were published by Palestinian exiles, including ‘Arif al ‘Arif’s *Al-Nakba, 1947-1952* … and Haj Muhammad Nimr al Khatib’s *Min Athar al Nakba* (following the catastrophe). About a decade after the event, Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian scholar, published two academic essays … All had suffered from the relative paucity of archival materials. … Historians … need luck. 1982 proved to be a pivotal year in the Israeli archives.
The government began opening large amounts of documentation on 1948 at the Israel State Archive (ISA).

Simultaneously, local and party political archives began organizing and releasing materials … But a major problem remained: Arab documentation. Unfortunately, the Palestinians failed to produce and preserve ‘state papers’ from 1947-1949 and the Arab states – dictatorships of one sort or another … refused and continue to refuse access to their papers from the 1948 war, which they regarded and still regard as a humiliating catastrophe. (Morris, 2004, pp. 1-3.)

Morris’s is a ‘positivist’ approach that relies extensively on the victor’s sources—those who were privileged enough to preserve documentation, and furthermore, those who are able to access it. As Kraft (2018) notes, many Palestinian historians cannot even acquire the necessary permits to enter Israel in order to examine archival material; those who succeed may also be informed that they need further security clearance to view the materials. (A further obstacle is presented by the fact that many materials may be non-digitized or gradually undergoing digitization, and not easily searchable due to transliteration issues). Even for Israeli historians, access to materials is not a given, and much documentation is in the Israel Defense Forces and Defense Establishment Archives (http://www.archives.mod.gov.il/Pages/default.aspx), the Central Zionist Archive (http://www.zionistarchives.org.il/Pages/Default.aspx) and the State Archives (http://www.archives.gov.il/) that was serendipitously de-classified in the 1980s and 1990s—permitting the wave of Israeli ‘new historians’ such as...
Morris, Shlaim and Pappé to produce their work—has since been reclassified or redacted (Goldman, 2016; Gratien and Hazkani, 2014 [Ottoman History Podcast]).

As censorship and restrictions of access to documents provided a particular historiographical challenge to breaking the silence on the story of the Nakba, Palestinian historiography has relied heavily on the utilization of oral history accounts, both through choice and also absence of alternatives. For the evidence-bound Morris, this is problematic, owing to the greater fallibility of memory:

I believe in the value of documents. While contemporary documents may misinform, distort, omit or lie, they do so, in my experience, far less than interviewees recalling highly controversial events some 40-50 years ago. My limited experience with such interviews revealed enormous gaps of memory and terrible distortion and selectivity born of ‘adopted; and ‘rediscovered’ memories, ideological certainties and commitments and political agendas … The value of oral testimony about 1948, if anything, has diminished with the passage of the 20 years since I first researched the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem. Memories have further faded and acquired memories, ideological precepts, and political agendas have grown if anything more intractable; intifadas and counter-intifadas have done nothing for the cause of salvaging historical truth. (Morris, 2004, p. 4.)
Morris may have a point about the fallibility and subjectivity of memory; but that is hardly the issue.\textsuperscript{8} The ‘value of oral testimony’, together with the ‘entitlement to speak’, is somewhat a cultural construction, and as such, ‘is in no sense universal. Some have the right [to speak]; others do not. The difference between the two categories is a matter of social and cultural codes, which can and do change over time’ (Winter, 2010, p. 8). Such memories have tremendous representational and traumatic power and gain conviction when retold and passed on to subsequent generations, and are preserved in the former of digital archives. Moreover, in combination with conventional primary documented sources, they provide a critical source that offers us a deeper and richer perspective into historical experience, and can hardly be ignored. Furthermore, such a position is tantamount to ‘memoricide’ as far as historians Nur Masalha and Ilan Pappé are concerned. ‘The Palestinians share common experiences with other indigenous peoples who have had their narrative denied, their material culture destroyed and their histories erased or reinvented by European white settlers and colonisers,’ Masalha retorts (Masalha, 2012, p. 88), noting at length the ‘asymmetrical power relationship between Israel and the Palestinians and the reinforcement of this asymmetry by … repeated cycles of Israeli looting of Palestinian historical documents, archives and library collections in and since 1948’ (Masalha, 2012, p. 137). Masalha repeatedly accuses Israel of the ‘appropriation of the Palestinian heritage and its voices … In 1948 the Israeli state appropriated immovable Palestinian assets and personal possessions, including schools, libraries, books, pictures, private papers, historical documents and manuscripts …’ (Masalha, 2012, p. 135). The attacks on Palestinian centres of research and documentation continue, alleges

Nevertheless, despite its catastrophe, contemporary Palestinian society in the MENA region largely characterizes itself as highly resilient (it has, after all, expanded hugely in numbers despite its territorial losses), practising sumud (forbearance and staying put or endurance in the face of adversity) together with various degrees of resistance (muqawama) that included a revolutionary approach,\(^9\) as ‘the nationalist awakening of youth marked a transition from a resigned jīl al-nakba (Ar. generation of disaster) to the activist jīl al-thawra (Ar. generation of revolution),’ (Pearlman, 2011, p. 64) to popular resistance including nonviolence strategies such as direct action and civil disobedience (Awad, 1983, pp. 22-26; Amnesty International, 2018; Darweish and Rigby, 2015; Qumsiyeh, 2011; Rigby, 1991; Rigby 1999; Rigby, 2010). Memory work projects have contributed to this resistance in the determination to not to be forgotten (Davis, 2007; 2011; ‘Issa, 2013, Loc. 3516-3856/7585; Sleiman and Chebaro, 2018) resulting in a substantial body of ‘subaltern’ oral history ‘from below’ as ‘in this existence of dispossession, dispersion, and statelessness, collections of personal stories and memories are what Palestinians have in comparative abundance’ (Davis, 2011, pp. 122-123). These accounts are most particularly celebrated through the work of anthropologists Rosemary Sayigh (Sayigh, 2007)\(^10\) and Julie Peteet (Peteet, 2009; Peteet, 2017). There are two further oral history projects
based in Beirut, the Arab Resource Center for Popular Arts (AL-JANA, http://al-jana.org/) and the Nakba Archive (http://nakba-archive.org/), now combined into the Palestinian Oral History Archive (https://website.aub.edu.lb/ifi/programs/poha/Pages/index.aspx), at the American University of Beirut. The Birzeit University Digital Palestinian Archive, which started in 2011, also collects documentation and audio-visual materials, accessible online (http://awraq.birzeit.edu/ar); indeed, the internet has enabled many other projects such as Palestine Remembered http://www.palestineremembered.com/. Together they present a formidable resource, in addition to numerous personal and literary accounts that mourn the loss of Palestine inconsolably (Al-Qattan, 2007, pp. 191-206; Karmi, 2004; Tamari and Hammami, 1998). At the heart of these is the work of the national poet, Mahmoud Darwish, and his contemporaries, Samih al-Qasim, Tawfiq Zayyad and Rashed Hussein.

As we shall see in the next section, the Nakba itself constitutes a unifying if painful site of Palestinian collective memory, in which remembering is far from bringing the redemptive power of healing. Palestinian society coalesces around days of memory such as Nakba Day together with the increasingly politicized March of Return (in which historical Palestine itself, and the depopulated villages are literally the site of memory). Other days of memory also form part of the contemporary canonical calendar, such as the commemoration of the 1956 massacre of villagers from Kafr Qasem, the 1976 Land Day strikes and killings (recognized as an official holiday by the PNA in 1994, and marked on March 30th) and Al Aqsa Day (commemorating the martyrs of the 2000 Al Aqsa Intifada, although the Northern Branch of the
Islamic Movement, outlawed since 2015, interprets this more literally as a day of dedication to the monument itself, which is perceived as always under threat). The evolution of these further days of memory is thoroughly discussed in Tamir Sorek’s *Palestinian Commemoration in Israel: Calendars, Monuments, and Martyrs* (Sorek, 2015) and the limitations of chapter length do not permit a reinvestigation here. Yet like the core Nakba Day and March of Return on which this chapter focuses, all of these have a nation-(re)building aspect, as Masalha affirms: ‘Narratives of memory and commemoration have also been part of grassroots initiatives to bring to life marginalized and counter-narratives that have been suppressed, either by hegemonic discourses or by unwillingness on the part of repressive regimes to acknowledge the past’ (Masalha, 2012, pp. 205-206).

5.5 Palestine – trauma as historical narrative and lived condition: the construction of memorial days

The 1948 catastrophe did not immediately become ‘the Nakba’, just as the Jewish Holocaust required a period of time until it acquired its sacrosanct and tragic stature and nomenclature through a process of iconic construction, as Jeffrey Alexander has commented (Alexander, 2004a, p. 197). To reiterate, I have referred (with reservations) elsewhere to Jeffrey Alexander’s two classifications of ‘lay trauma theory’, the second of which, the ‘psychoanalytic version’ relates to above-discussed period of delayed reaction of ‘silence and bewilderment’ (Alexander, 2004a, p. 201). Like Erikson, Alexander posits that ‘only after two or even three decades of repression and denial were people finally able to begin talking about what happened and to take actions in response to the knowledge’ (Alexander,
The long lens or ‘grid’ through which we view events such as the Nakba, ‘has a supra-individual, cultural status; it is symbolically structured and sociologically determined’ as we come to interpret the trauma (Alexander, 2004a, p. 201).

How, then, was the Nakba ‘symbolically structured and sociologically determined’? How did its status and commemorative practices come into being? The first usage of the term ‘Nakba’ is generally attributed to Syrian philosopher Constantin(e) Zurayk (his name is also transliterated as Zureiq, or Qustantin Zurayq), whose *Ma’na al-Nakba* (sources date this to 1948 or 1949) was published in English in 1956 as *The Meaning of the Disaster* (Webman, 2009, p. 28; Masalha, 2012, p. 213; Picaudou, 2008). Webman (2009, p. 28) contends, however, that ‘perusing Egyptian papers from 1945 reveals that Egyptian intellectuals were already using the term to describe the evolving political situation in Palestine’. In any case, the term stuck, and was used from then on in later accounts of the Palestinian catastrophe, pregnant as it was with powerful symbolism:

Traditionally, Arabs used the word “Nakba” in reference “to strong misfortunes caused by external forces they could not confront,” explains the Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. The connotative significance of the term … adds the Palestinian columnist Hassan Khadr, is “firstly, a deference to nature, with all its latent violence and its impetuosity; secondly, resignation to the vicissitudes of fate; and thirdly, relinquishment of responsibility for the catastrophe.” (Webman, 2009, p. 29.)
If the Palestinians initially felt that they lacked agency to repel the seemingly overwhelming and unstoppable force of the catastrophe, they compensated for it in ensuing years; the response to the tragedy became the making of the Palestinian political consciousness as it gave definition and framing to all that went afterwards. The construction of Nakba memory, and of ways of remembering and days of memory ‘provides a cyclical structure for political mobilization and a distinct pantheon of martyrs that fuels political protest’ suggests Tamir Sorek. Not only a funnel for pain and loss, it has ‘played a central role in the gradual process of post-1948 recovery and empowerment’, (Sorek, 2015, loc. 189/7631). Furthermore:

The memory of the Nakba evolved as a central national myth that elucidated three issues: the way in which their past evolved, the course in which their present is conducted, and the goals they must strive for in the future. It has become a powerful tool, shaping and disseminating Palestinian national consciousness and mobilizing the community. Hence the memory of the Nakba was never merely the object of grief and longing, nor an idea encouraging passivity, but a means of stimulating Palestinian activism, inter alia, by enhancing the yearning for return (al-‘awda). The Palestinians never really portrayed the Nakba as a story of the distant past, but as a living, continuous event, integrated into the present and spanning several generations, different sectors of the population, and geographic locations.’ (Milshtein, p. 48)
Yet despite the profound shaping force of the catastrophe, which replaced older, more local or regional loyalties as a thread of commonality, serving to piece together the fractured Palestinian psyche, no uniform or coordinated commemoration of ‘Nakba Day’ as a day of memory was possible until 50 years later in 1998, after the advent of the 1993 Oslo Peace Process and the institutional recognition of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA); nor would such a commemoration have been deemed progressive by the PLO during the ‘revolutionary’ period in the 1960s and 1970s, when struggle was preferred as a dynamic form of memory. As for the perpetrators who had caused the Nakba, until then, not so many Israelis were even familiar with the term itself, much less the notion that the Palestinians had their own right to a day of memory that encroached chronologically upon Yom Ha’atzmut (their Day of Independence—in 2005 both events even took place within the same week). This was partly due to the fact that 18 years after the establishment of the State of Israel, until November 1966, those Palestinians who were living within the new State of Israel (with the exception of inhabitants of Jewish-Arab cities) had been constrained by military emergency regulations from movement that might permit political activity; considerable self-censorship remained in marking the day officially.\(^\text{13}\) This tight control of more Palestinian lives was to re-emerge a year later after the 1967 war, when citizens of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli occupation. As for Palestinians living in \textit{al-kharij}, the wider regional diaspora:

> The experience of collective dislocation and uncertain exile and the desire to return to a specific territory made patriotism (\textit{wataniyya}), the sentimental attachment to homeland or even a
more localized birthplace, a common denominator among Palestinians. But the rise of a distinctly Palestinian nationalism (or its precursors, nationalist patriotism or proto-nationalism) was not inevitable, given the absence of the common political and institutional framework of the state. (Sayigh, 1999, p. 36.)

Amal Jamal also affirms that ‘Any form of coherent self-image was challenged by the differing existential conditions in which the various Palestinian communities lived after their expulsion and dispersal from Palestine’ (Jamal, 2003, p. 2). Their widely diverse circumstances ‘led to a growing discrepancy in Palestinian practices of subjective self-constitution’. This produced ‘multiple and diversified self-images that did not cohere and/or even contend with the official national discourse … intensified by the internal differences regarding the future political vision that Palestinians foresaw for themselves,’ (Jamal, 2003, p. 2). What draws these diverse identifications together is the unifying traumatic force of the Nakba experience, ‘a bipolar symbol of concurrent destruction and building’ (Milshtein, 2009, p. 47, my emphasis); the usage of an adjective that has both psychological and political force here is striking.

Thus it was that in 1998, despite considerable opposition to the Oslo Process, the time had come to come to terms with the collective trauma in a less diffuse fashion, in the form of a PNA-sanctioned Nakba Day on May 15th, 1998, when a Supreme National Commission for Commemorating the Nakba guided the outpouring of events that were to counter Israel’s 50th anniversary of independence. The official entry of May 15th into the canonical calendar connects the ‘forgotten Palestinians’ living within Israel
with those outside of it and marks a growing similarity in their commemorative practices (Sorek, 2015, loc. 1437). In the Gaza Strip, meanwhile, a less secular cultivation of Nakba memory, focusing on the restoration of mosques, shrines and cemeteries, has been preferred since the 2006 election of Hamas [Harakat al-Maqawama al-Islamiya], and other movements in the Islamist camp, such as Islamic Jihad.

The PNA commemorations were marked by the ‘million people’ masirat al-milyun rallies in the Occupied Territories, processions of young people holding signs of destroyed villages and keys to houses, speeches, art and photography exhibitions and performances of traditional arts that have characterized Nakba Day commemorations ever since then, together with outbreaks of violence against participants whenever Israeli troops attempt to disperse crowds. At the inception, there was also, says Masalha:

… a remarkable proliferation of Palestinian films, memoirs and archival websites—all created around the 50th anniversary of the Nakba. In conjunction with this 50th anniversary, several films were released, including Edward Said’s In Search of Palestine, Muhammad Bakri’s 1948, Simone Bitton’s film about the poet Mahmoud Darwish Et la terre comme la langue. More Nakba films have recently been released in conjunction with the 60th anniversary, including Maryse Gargour’s La Terre Parle Arabe, with which I have been personally involved. Also since 1998 several “online archives” have been created on oral history and refugee experiences and recollections of the Nakba. (Masalha, 2009, p. 42)
Mahmoud Darwish’s ‘Palestinian People’s Appeal on the 50th Anniversary of the Nakba’ (Darwish, 1998) marks the occasion in tones of triumph over trauma (‘we have vanquished all attempts at our obliteration and denial and at the eradication of the name of Palestine from the map of Palestine’), connecting the people of Palestine to their land since time immemorial in a ‘commemorative narrative’ which ‘creates its own version of historical time as it elaborates, condenses, omits, or conflates historical events’ (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 9). Delivered at the end of the Nakba Day March, Darwish’s address on behalf of ‘the victims of half a century of perpetual night of occupation and dispersion’ reminds the listener of the eternal connectedness of the Palestinian people to its ‘sacred land’ through their ‘resounding presence in time and place’. There is a nod to the diverse ancient cultures of the region, but no mention of the Hebrews (although later ‘compassionate recognition of the unspeakable Jewish suffering during the horror of the holocaust’ is made, only to be swiftly followed by the rebuke that ‘we find it unconscionable that the suffering of our people be denied or even rationalized’).

The speech pays homage to those who have sacrificed so much; Palestine’s martyrs, its prisoners, its bereaved mothers and its refugees who have ‘carried Palestine in their hearts along with their land deeds and the keys to their homes. Both the topography and demography of our reality remain alive in our collective memory and continuity.’ Palestinians remain steadfast as ‘advocates and witnesses of the authentic narrative of Palestinian endurance and the will to live’. Rather than mourning victimhood, ‘we stand in awe at the heroism of the ordinary individual and the collective will to endure … Slated
for national obliteration and severance from the land, we have affirmed our identity and ties to our homeland, snatching our reality from the jaws of oblivion’. A sweep of recent history reminds us of how, ‘From revolution, to Intifada, to nation building’ the Palestinians ‘have extracted recognition from the world. The dual injustice of exile and occupation could not break the will of a people bent on achieving freedom, dignity and the redemption of history’. Triumphalism aside, Darwish reminds the listener that the traumatic struggle remains ongoing:

Fifty years since the Nakba were not spent in grief over a painful memory. The past has not entirely departed, nor has the future entirely arrived yet. The present is an open potential to struggle. For 50 years, Palestinian history has stood witness to epics of perseverance and resistance, to confronting the implications, consequences and injustices of the Nakba. For half a century Palestinian history became a living pledge to future generations for their right to a life of freedom and dignity on their own land. We have begun painstakingly the nation-building process, to ensure a free homeland for a free people. (Darwish, 1998.)

In the climax of the address, Darwish calls on the international community to take Israel to task for reneging on the peace process. Zionist ‘racist exclusivity’ will not permit the democratic one-state solution to the present predicament, therefore ‘we formulated the alternative of sharing the land on the basis of the two state solution’ with Jerusalem as the eternal Palestinian capital. The two-state solution represents a ‘conciliatory compromise of
historical magnitude’ but ‘must not be misconstrued as self-negation or weakness’ (Darwish, 1998).

Other formative cultivations of the Nakba as a site of memory prior to and concurrent with the inception of Nakba Day in 1998 have included the Palestinian Ministry of Education’s educational textbooks, in which the history, geography and literature of the catastrophe feature prominently; it would require a separate study beyond the bounds of this one to engage with this extensive material in sufficient depth. The textbooks have already attracted considerable attention, and many reports have already been written by Israelis themselves on what they perceive as ‘inflammatory’ curricula. The summer youth camps constitute a further wing of PNA mobilization of Nakba memory (Sorek, 2015, Loc. 3670-4009). Then there are the daily mnemonic practices that are common to Palestinians, regardless of geographic location (whether in al-karij, the diaspora, or al-dakhil, the Occupied Territories and the Gaza Strip) or political control (PNA, Hamas, or neither), such as retaining property deeds from Ottoman times, keys to former homes, and naming streets, businesses and public and educational institutions after former villages, cities and towns; maintaining associations that preserve the memory of lost homes (including the publication of village books, and narration of personal and familial stories). In refugee camps, Ben-Ze’ev reminds us:

… the Palestinian landscape is recreated by a residency pattern that imitates that of the place of origin and by naming of quarters after demolished villages … Second and third generations of refugees are encouraged to marry into families
from the same ex-village or ex-locality … people tend to use
the services of those from the ex-village or ex-locality, such as
a grocery store, a garage, or a restaurant (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004, p.
143).

There are also poignant accounts of personal visits, made wherever and
whenever possible, to the sites of former homes (see, for example, Abu-
Palestinians possessing passports of other countries and IDPs residing
within Israel wishing to visit their (often nearby) former villages and towns,
this is less challenging than for Palestinians of the Occupied Territories (and
those in Gaza rarely gain permission from the Israeli authorities to enter
Israel). Those who can visit engage in a variety of practices such as prayer,
tending to family graves and picking local herbs, fruit and vegetables (Ben-

While the commemoration of Nakba Day is necessarily proximate to Israeli
Independence Day, many of its features are constructed to contain traumatic
triggers patterned on those of Yom Ha’Shoah and Yom HaZikaron, as have
been picked up by the Israeli media: a 68-second siren, for instance, is
sounded in the towns of the Occupied Territories, and the ‘Right to Return’
marches that precede Nakba Day recall the annual March of the Living
(https://motl.org/) through the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camps.
There is even black-painted train in Bethlehem for Nakba victims that
recollects the cattle cars taking Holocaust victims to the concentration camps
(Levy, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2013; Times of Israel Staff and AP, 2013; Groisman,
2016).
The commemoration of Nakba Day within Israel itself has suffered from the state's further rightward turn: in March 2011, a bill was passed in the Israeli Knesset 'prohibiting any activity “which would entail undermining the foundations of the state and contradict its values”' (Ma'an News, 2011) and seeking to impose fines on any organizations or institutions (particularly state-funded ones, such as foundations, schools or universities) that participate in Nakba commemoration (Adalah, 2012a; Kestler-D'Amours, 2011; Kremnitzer and Fuchs, 2011; Sofer, 2011; Stoil, 2011. The human rights organization Adalah (the ‘legal center for Arab minority rights in Israel’) and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) campaigned vigorously (Adalah, 2012b) against the intervention:

Palestinians traditionally mark Israel’s official Independence Day as a national day of mourning and organize commemorative events. The law violates their rights, and restricts their freedom to express their opinion, and will cause substantial harm to cultural and educational institutions and further entrench discrimination. The law causes major harm to the principle of equality and the rights of Arab citizens to preserve their history and culture. The law deprives Arab citizens of their right to commemorate the Nabka [sic], an integral part of their history.(Adalah, 2012)

Despite a 2012 petition (Adalah 2012c, Adalah 2012d) to the Supreme Court in Israel brought by Adalah and ACRI, together with representatives of two schools that practice Nakba Day commemoration (the Alumni Association of the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa and parents of students at the Arab-
Jewish school ‘Galilee’ in Misgav) the law was upheld (HCJ 3429/11, January 5th, 2012), prompting an angry response from Adalah and ACRI that ‘The High Court ignored the chilling effect of this law’. Adalah’s lawyer, Sawsan Zaher, reiterated the organization’s disquiet:

There is a concern that the legitimation of this law by the court could encourage the Knesset to introduce additional racist legislation against Arab citizens. This law seeks to present the identity and the narrative of Arab citizens in the lowest possible way and it legitimizes the continuation of deep discrimination against them. (Adalah 2012e)

The legislation aimed at reining in those publicly-funded institutions and preventing Nakba commemoration has discouraged Arab mayors and Arab municipal representatives from participating in the March of Return (Sorek 2015, Loc. 3300) but in general, it has had precisely the opposite effect on the numbers of people attending these rallies. Furthermore, the ‘Nakba Law’ has had the function of arousing the ire of the Israeli Jewish public in furiously partisan discussions through the media. One such foundation touched by the law, the New Israel Fund, which ‘… invest[s] in hundreds of Israeli organizations whose work changes the equation on civil rights, on religious freedom, and on social justice. … building a community committed to a vision of a democratic, just, and equal Israel’ (New Israel Fund, 2018) has come under fire regularly for its financial support of progressive civil society groups that recognize the Nakba, such as ACRI (https://www.acri.org.il/) Adalah, Breaking the Silence (former IDF soldiers who discuss atrocities carried out during military service in the oPTs,
http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/), B’tselem, Machsom Watch (https://machsomwatch.org/, Israeli feminist peace activists who monitor IDF checkpoints between Israel and the oPTs), Mossawa Center (Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel, http://www.mossawa.org/), Sikkuy (The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality, ‘a shared organization of Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel who have dedicated themselves to advancing equality and partnership, in all spheres and at all levels, between Palestinian Arab citizens and Jewish citizens of Israel’, http://www.sikkuy.org.il/en/about/) and Yesh Din (https://www.yesh-din.org/, an NGO that reports on human rights violations in the oPTs). The NIF is regularly accused by Israeli politicians such as PM Netanyahu of constituting a ‘fifth-column’ supported by external funding (the fund is American in origin, but with offices in Jerusalem) and aimed at destroying the state of Israel (Harel, 2018; Netzer, 2017; New Israel Fund, 2017; Sokol, 2014). Meanwhile Zochrot (http://zochrot.org/), an Israeli NGO that works with Palestinian citizens to conscientize Israeli Jews through an annual transitional justice programme of Nakba commemoration and March of Return ‘tours’ to depopulated villages, receives no government funding and therefore is not subject to the ‘Nakba Law’. Journalist Jonathan Cook correctly sums up the ‘effect’ of the Nakba Law as a ‘backfire’, claiming that there is ‘greater attention on the Nakba than ever before. Recent [return] marches have been among the largest in the event’s history, and have increasingly attracted a younger generation of Israel's Palestinian citizens’ (Cook, 2018b). Zochrot, meanwhile, attracts the Israeli Jewish public in growing numbers to its own Nakba commemoration activities and is largely responsible for introducing the term ‘Nakba’ to Jewish Israelis, but by and large, like the majority of
Israeli ‘radical’ NGOs, remains a marginal element in Israeli society, even if the issue of the Nakba itself has become absolutely impossible to ignore. Israeli Jewish society’s attempt at the ‘act of erasure’ of the Palestinian past has prompted an opposite tendency among Palestinians, in ‘an ever-growing effort to document, map, revive, and glorify the memory of the pre-1948 Palestinian society’ (Kadman, 2015, p. xi). With increasing amounts of racism, oppression and hopelessness following the failure of the Oslo Peace Process and the drift towards the right in Israeli Jewish society, the extent of collective trauma for Palestinians living both within Israel and the oPTs is mirrored by the expansion and intensity of commemorative practices; for Palestinians, the past is definitely not a ‘foreign country’ and all attempts to extinguish the names and locations of their pre-1948 world (vividly documented by Meron Benvenisti in Sacred Landscapes) are to be resisted (Benvenisti, 2002). To paraphrase Pierre Nora, Palestinians speak so much of memory because there is so little of theirs left—and so few Nakba survivors remaining to carry the struggle forward (Nora, 1989).

5.6 Encroaching upon memory: Collective trauma and the politics of return

‘There is no question that our relationship to memory is treacherous. … Sometimes it seems to me that we become prisoners of an angry, stubborn and bitter tenacity to return—to the past, to the land that has been taken away, to a sort of national childhood from which none of us wishes to awaken.’ (Al-Qattan, 2007, pp. 200-201)
As Ben-Ze’ev and others have observed (Ben-Ze’ev, 2004; Sorek, 2015), the pilgrimage to former sites of abode for Palestinians was formerly a private and ad-hoc event, depending on possibility of access and taking place at a variety of dates, sometimes congruent with Israel’s Yom Ha’atzmut, sometimes on Land Day, sometimes on Nakba Day, sometimes as part of young people’s summer camps. During the period of the Emergency Regulations, in the 1950s and 1960s, for Palestinians living in Israel, memorialization was of necessity private by nature; Sorek notes that some of these control tactics (including pre-emptive arrests of activists prior to Land Day) continued throughout the 1980s (Sorek, 2015, Loc. 2926).

Nevertheless, the ‘48 IDPs’ within Israel (the largest group of whom are those descended from refugees expelled from the village of Saffuriya in northern Israel) have maintained a tradition of the March of Return to depopulated villages on Israel’s Independence Day for the past three decades, representing a critical infusion of ‘post-memory’, a handing-on of collective trauma to young Palestinians as part of their cultural education (Social TV, 2018). Jonathan Cook reports:

Abu Arab, one of the founders of ‘Adrid’ – the Association for the Rights of the Internally Displaced, the main body representing the internal refugees – said the March of Return had played a vital role in raising awareness among the younger generations of what had taken place during the Nakba.

Ziad Awaisi, a 43-year-old physiotherapist whose grandparents were expelled from Saffuriya and who was raised in Nazareth, is one of the organisers …. ‘The annual march is
now by far the largest event in the calendar of Palestinians inside Israel. …Our march to the destroyed villages is closely followed by all Palestinians but especially by the refugees in the camps,’ said Awaisi. ‘It shows them that they are not forgotten and that we continue to stand with them.

Organisers seek out refugees from the destroyed village at the centre of each march – often those in camps in the region – to relay a video message to the marchers.

‘It is a heavy responsibility for those of us inside '48,” added Awaisi. … ‘We march on behalf of all the refugees, to represent them because they are denied the right to attend.’

(Cook, 2018b)

In 2008 (on the 60th anniversary of the Nakba/Israel’s Independence Day) Israeli police violently attacked the convoy of participants (Alarz TV, 2008); Cook (2018b) recounts that this ‘marked a sea-change in Israel's attitude towards the Nakba march’, which began to be regarded with great anxiety by Israeli authorities and the Jewish public; it is matched by an even greater determination on the part of Palestinians to engage in active memorial practices.

Despite the introduction of the above-discussed Nakba Law, the commemorative practice of return has nevertheless grown enormously in size, symbolic power and politicization, as the result of a combination of a range of factors: political desperation (indicated above), together with more liberal approaches to citizenship within certain sectors of Jewish Israeli and Palestinian society; the eruption of the Israeli revisionist historians into public
discourse, and critically, the development of both Arab print and online media and satellite television channels such as the highly influential Al Jazeera in the 1990s, followed by social media in the 2000s and the emergence of a new generation of citizen journalists armed with cellphones and later, drones. There can be little doubt that the internet has changed everything as far as how young Palestinians receive and disseminate cultural knowledge, and by association, how they are drawn to commemorative practices such as the March of Return and Nakba Day. Khoury (2018) notes that in northern Israel, over 20,000 people marched this year in a ‘procession of return’:

The Association for the Protection of the Rights of the Displaced organized the event for its 21 consecutive year [sic] alongside Israel's Independence Day celebrations. ... the event takes place each year on the lands of a different village that was uprooted in 1948. This year, it took place in the area of Atlit, just south of Haifa in northern Israel.

In recent years, the procession has become a large demonstration, with people participating from the entire political spectrum of Israeli Arab society. Jewish Israelis who associate themselves with the liberal-democratic camp also participated. Ultra-Orthodox Jews were seen marching in the procession as well.

Protesters held up Palestinian flags and signs bearing the names of over 530 villages they say were uprooted in 1948. This year, organizers were pleased with the increased number of young people participating in the event, saying that it sends
the message that younger generations will not forget the Nakba and the right of return.

In a highly charged speech, Chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel Mohammad Baracha declares, ‘On this day they try to distort history, but we are here to say we have not forgotten. The Nakba is a hard, painful memory for every Palestinian, especially those who were uprooted from their homes,’ (Khoury, 2018). Clearly for Palestinian participants, the March of Return is more than a ceremonial ‘re-enactment … a simulacrum of the scene or situation recaptured’ (Connerton, 1989, p. 72); it represents a very present collective action, a challenge to the status quo that has resulted in confrontations with existentially-threatened right-wing Israelis from the 2000s onwards (Sorek, 2015, Loc. 3134-3203).

5.7 The Great March of Return: Acute trauma politics

At the time of writing, the most politicized form to date of the March of Return has been adopted to protest along the borders of the heavily blockaded Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, as activists originally scheduled 45 days of non-violent demonstrations to run from Land Day on March 30th until the ‘million person’ climax on Nakba Day on May 15th, 2018 (one day after the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem) although it now appears that there is no precise end-date.18 19 The demonstrations are at their most intense on Fridays, the Muslim day of prayer; however, their larger context derives from the historic deprivation of its citizens, 70% of whom are descendants of 1948 refugees, whose freedom of movement beyond the densely-populated Strip is heavily restricted by Israel and who face

In an interview with the progressive Israeli news site, 972mag, one of the 20 organizers, Hasan al-Kurd, expressly declares that the aim of the ‘Great Return March’ is to roll back Gazans’ situation to a time of greater freedom:

‘We want to send a message that we want to live in peace — with the Israelis. We’re against stone throwing or even burning tires. We will make sure the protest doesn’t escalate to violence — at least from our end. … Our message is peaceful and we’re against violence. If you remember back in 1987, Gaza was packed with Israelis. We want the siege to be lifted and to go back to these days. … The situation in Gaza has become unbearable and we absolutely can’t live in Gaza anymore – that’s what prompted us to plan this march and that’s why we anticipate so many people to attend the protest. … The whole idea is based on UN Security Council Resolution 194 (the right of return) and the current unbearable living conditions in Gaza. It is actually a peaceful act. We want to ask the Israelis to
welcome as if we were visitors from another country, the same way they welcome refugees in certain countries in Europe — though we’re not actually visitors here.’ (Younis, 2018)

The organizers claim that they desired the protests to include cultural events and to attract families (Younis, 2018); Ahmad Abu Artema, an originator of the Great Return March, and other organizers ‘agreed they would pitch tents and have meals, traditional dabke dancing, football games and even weddings hundreds of metres from the perimeter. “We are looking for a new culture,” [Abu Artema] said, showing a video on his phone of a marriage at the protest camp last weekend’ (Holmes and Balousha, 2018). Fadi Abu Shammalah’s emotive New York Times Op-Ed, ‘Why I march in Gaza’, a cry for human dignity, also stresses the cultural nature of the event:

The resistance in the encampments has been creative and beautiful. I danced the dabke, the Palestinian national dance, with other young men. I tasted samples of the traditional culinary specialties being prepared, such as msakhan (roasted chicken with onions, sumac and pine nuts) and maftool (a couscous dish). I sang traditional songs with fellow protesters and sat with elders who were sharing anecdotes about pre-1948 life in their native villages. Some Fridays, kites flew, and on others flags were hoisted on 80-foot poles to be clearly visible on the other side of the border. (Abu Shammalah, 2018)

This is far from the portrayal of events in Israeli media, both broadcast and print, which do not examine the issues being protested, nor the troublingly
youthful age of victims and mostly focus on sensationalist description of ‘riots’. With the exception of the left-liberal newspaper Ha’aretz, they do not query the IDF’s use of lethal force against demonstrators, which may be the subject of an independent UNHRC investigation (Al Hussein, 2018; Miles, 2018, UN Watch, 2018). Reports and analysts emphasize the use of burning kites that have set fire to fields and forestry over the border (Ben Zikri, 2018; Khoury and Kubovich, 2018b; i24 News, 2018; TOI Staff and agencies, 2018a; The Tower Staff, 2018; Weber Rosen, 2018), ‘incendiary’ balloons (Tzuri and Levi, 2018), burning tyres, weaponized drones, anti-Semitic chants, slingshots, homemade firebombs and Molotov cocktails, wire-cutters and knives (MEMRI TV, 2018a, 2018b); among the goals are to ‘kidnap Israeli civilians and murder soldiers’ (Marcus and Zilberdik, 2018). Israeli media also views the protests as largely or entirely Hamas-orchestrated (Beck, 2018; Gilboa, 2018; Lenarz, 2018; Lev Ram and Okbi, 2018; Khoury and Kubovich, 2018a; Ragson, 2018, Siryoti et al, 2018; TOI Staff and agencies, 2018b; Yemini, 2018; Zitun, 2018). It has widely publicized Hamas’ official admission that 50 of its members are among those killed (MEMRI, 2018c; MEMRI 2018d). Jonathan Halevi, a retired lieutenant colonel, writing in Jerusalem Issue Brief, concurs:

‘The Great Return March’ is the Hamas codename for its campaign that is striking against Israel’s existence. … Attempts are being made to tear down the fences to enable infiltration into Israel.

Khalil al-Hayya, a senior Hamas official and member of the Hamas political bureau, defined the three main objectives of
the return marches in Gaza: inculcating the right of return among the Palestinian people and the younger generation, thereby giving a focus to the struggle against the ‘occupation’; torpedoing the ‘deal of the century’, President Trump’s diplomatic plan for resolving the Middle East conflict; and breaking the embargo on the Gaza Strip. (Halevi, 2018)

*Jerusalem Post* journalist Khaled Abu-Toameh, reporting also on the website of the right-wing Gatestone Institute, credits the demonstrations as being entirely ‘organized by Hamas and other Palestinian factions’ (no mention of non-violent origins) with an entirely different aim in mind, one that is sure to stir extreme existential fear among Israeli Jews:

The organizers of the ‘March of Return’, including several Hamas leaders, have repeatedly made it clear in the past few weeks that the real goal of the campaign is to ‘achieve the right of return’ for Palestinian refugees and their several generations of descendants to their former homes and villages inside Israel. … a demand no Israeli government could ever accept as it would means turning the Jews into a minority in their own state.

Thus, the ‘March of Return’ is hardly about a ‘humanitarian crisis’ in the Gaza Strip. Instead, it is a campaign designed to put the issue of the Palestinian refugees at center stage and let the world know that the Palestinians will not give up what they call their ‘right of return.’

The ‘March of Return’, as Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh said a few days ago, marks the beginning of a new Palestinian
intifada, or uprising, against Israel. As Haniyeh and other organizers of the campaign have clearly stated in recent weeks, the Palestinian protests are aimed at thwarting US President Donald Trump's yet-to-be-announced plan for peace in the Middle East. (Abu-Toameh, 2018)

Indeed, the Palestinian Information Center website, reporting Haniyeh’s speech, affirms that the aim of the march is not to protest against humanitarian conditions (‘a matter of bread, bread and electricity’ but rather a ‘battle for independence and confronting apartheid … a political issue for a people displaced from its land and an illegal state has been established on its land. The issue of a people who wants independence and a return to their land… no retreat, no concession and not compromise, and that Hamas and Gaza will not recognize Israel’ [researcher’s translation]) (Palestinian Information Center, 2018). Meanwhile, Anshel Pfeffer looks at the struggle between Hamas and the PA, and sees the Great March of Return as a strategic move by Hamas not merely to marshal Gazans’ frustrations at their deprivation, but also to buttress their power and appeal against the waning influence of the PA:

Hamas has recognized its limits and a historic opportunity to grasp the leadership of the Palestinian cause from its rivals in Fatah, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at 83, with his popularity plumbing new depths, may soon be leaving the scene. That’s why Hamas in the last three and a half years has stuck to the cease-fire with Israel, tried to enforce it on other
factions in Gaza, and searched for a diplomatic way out of its and Gaza’s isolation.

... The Hamas leadership will never say so publicly but it realizes it has lost every single round since the bloody coup in which it took over Gaza in 2007. With few options remaining, it has changed tactics, and its behind-the-scenes organizing of the “Great March of Return” that began Friday reflects this, more than a sudden embrace of nonviolence. Sinwar and his comrades who came of age in the early days of the first intifada are returning to that ethos of ‘popular uprising’, not because they plan on dismantling their impressive arsenal but because they understand the old ethos is more effective at present. (Pfeffer, 2018.)

Yet Abu Shammalah (cited above) disagrees that Hamas is at the heart of the Great March of Return:

Representatives of the General Union of Cultural Centers, the nongovernmental organization for which I serve as executive director, participated in planning meetings for the march, which included voices from all segments of Gaza’s civil and political society. At the border, I haven’t seen a single Hamas flag, or Fatah banner, or poster for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, for that matter — paraphernalia that have been widespread in virtually every other protest I have witnessed. Here, we have flown only one flag — the Palestinian flag.
True, Hamas members are participating, as they are part of the Palestinian community. But that participation signals, perhaps, that they may be shifting away from an insistence on liberating Palestine through military means and are beginning to embrace popular, unarmed civil protest. But the Great Return March is not Hamas’s action. It is all of ours. (Abu Shammalah, 2018)

The demonstrators, groups of whom moved increasingly closer into the ARA (access restricted areas) buffer zones along the border, and in some cases, beyond it, have inevitably been met with a sharp response from the IDF, who have inflicted a huge number of casualties (OCHA, 2018b, OCHA, 2018c; OCHA, 2018d; Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 2018). The peak day of casualties, May 14th, when 60 Palestinians were killed and at least 2,771 injured (Dabashi, 2018, citing figures from the Gaza Ministry of Health; different figures reported by the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights [PCHR, 2018]), coincided with the opening of the American Embassy in Jerusalem. At the time of writing, the numbers are of course still rising:

Since the first protest on 30 March, according to the MoH [Ministry of Health] in Gaza, Israeli forces have killed 104 Palestinians, including 14 children, during the course of the “Great March of Return” demonstrations. In addition, 12 Palestinians have been killed during the same period in other circumstances, including five reportedly shot at the fence or after crossing into Israel, whose bodies are reportedly being withheld by the Israeli authorities. The cumulative number of injuries by Israeli forces is approximately 12,600, of whom 55
per cent have been hospitalized. One Israeli soldier has been injured. The violence reached a peak on 14 May, coinciding with the official transfer of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, when Israeli forces killed approximately 60 Palestinians and injured over 2,700 in Gaza, the highest casualty toll in the Gaza Strip in a single day since the 2014 hostilities.

The large number of casualties among demonstrators, in particular the high percentage injured by live ammunition, has raised repeated concerns about excessive use of force, alongside calls for independent and transparent investigations of these incidents, including by the UN Secretary-General. Israel has stated that a large number of fatalities were Hamas members and that an investigation will review the use of force, including incidents of fatal shooting.

In the wake of this week’s events, today, the UN Human Rights Council convened a special session on the deteriorating human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). By 29 to two votes, with 14 abstentions, the Council condemned ‘the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force by the Israeli occupying forces against Palestinian civilians’ and called for the urgent establishment of an ‘independent, international commission of inquiry’ to investigate the killing of Palestinians during the protests. (OCHA, 2018c.)
The IDF also fired gas canisters at encampments far from the buffer zone, which were ‘set up specifically for the demonstrations at a distance of 400 to 600 meters from the fence’. These tents included ‘field clinics, food vendors and various activities for children and adults, such as clown shows, poetry readings, live music shows and soccer matches,’ explains B’tselem, adding, ‘Many families gathered inside tents where they ate and talked.’ (B’tselem, 2018a.)

It is not only the abnormally large quantity of persons injured, but the grave nature of the injuries caused by IDF live-fire sniper tactics that have earned international condemnation (Hass, 2018; UNHR: OCHR, 2018a, 2018b). Medècins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) reported that their clinics are ‘overwhelmed’ (Patel et al., 2018) and they have treated more patients already than during the 2014 Gaza war:

MSF medical staff report receiving patients with devastating injuries of an unusual severity, which are extremely complex to treat. The injuries sustained by patients will leave most with serious, long-term physical disabilities. … MSF surgeons in Gaza report devastating gunshot wounds among hundreds of people injured during the protests over recent weeks. The huge majority of patients – mainly young men, but also some women and children – have unusually severe wounds to the lower extremities. MSF medical teams note the injuries include an extreme level of destruction to bones and soft tissue, and large exit wounds that can be the size of a fist.’ (MSF, 2018)
This has resulted in an admonition of Israel, together with a threat of further investigation of the Israeli military from the International Criminal Court (ICC) (International Criminal Court, 2018); three NGOs (Al-Haq, Al Mezan and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights) jointly submitted further sets of complaints to the ICC (Abunimah, 2018). Meanwhile, B’tselem took the unusual tactic of openly urging IDF soldiers in Gaza to refuse orders to shoot (B’tselem, 2018b) and carried out a media campaign in which the names and ages of victims who had lost their lives were published (Fig.1). Despite a petition filed in Israel’s High Court of Justice by human rights NGOs (Yesh Din, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Gisha and Hamoked: Center for the Defense of the Individual) querying the army’s rules for live fire and requesting that it be made illegal (Kubovich, 2018a), the IDF refused to reveal its rules of engagement and the Court ruled the Gaza situation constituted a state of war and therefore, “The state opposes the applying of human rights law during an armed conflict,” (Kubovich, 2018b; Winer and TOA Staff, 2018).

What can be inferred from the protests (ongoing at the time of writing) is that they have returned the focus back to the issue of the 1948 refugees, of course central to Nakba commemoration and at the core of the collective trauma; and away from discussion of political compromise on refugees (such as ‘limited return’ or other similar conditions pertaining to the two-state solution) that has been raised as a prospect for peace negotiations by the PLO (in the Oslo peace process) and occasionally by Hamas (including recently [Harel, 2018]). Observes Rashid Khalidi (2018):
Palestinians … understand the futility of the approach of both wings of their national movement, located in Ramallah and in Gaza. Instead of futile diplomacy and pointless (and easily exploited) armed resistance, nonviolent grassroots movements are growing stronger. They range from the boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement to the kind of marches we’ve seen for the past several weeks in Gaza. …Such an approach terrifies the Israeli security establishment, which depends on demonizing any Palestinian resistance … As retired Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad said of Israel’s response to Palestinian nonviolence, “We don’t do Gandhi very well.”

Finally, not all Gazans meet the demonstrations against Strip’s collective punishment with a response that speaks only of collective distress. At the time of writing, the Gaza Peace Doves initiative (Figs. 2 - 4) focuses on the original non-violent aims of the Great March, with a symbolic peace action that attempts transcendence over collective trauma. It is documented through social media and comments under the postings subject it to accusations of ‘fake news’. However, the initiative appears as a series of posts by Israeli-American peace negotiator Dr. Gershon Baskin (co-founder of the NGO and think-tank IPCRI [Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, http://www.ipcri.org/] on his Facebook page and was broadcast on Palestinian television (see Fig. 4, AlGhad TV).
Fig. 10. Soldiers, hold your fire! Israeli media campaign by B'tselem.²⁰

[Source: B'tselem, 2018b.]
Fig. 11. FROM GAZA - LIKE AND SHARE THIS MESSAGE ALL OVER ISRAEL, PALESTINE AND THE WORLD! [Source: Gershon Baskin, Facebook, 2018a.]

Fig. 12: ‘Gaza sends messages of peace to Israelis.’ [Source: Gershon Baskin, Facebook, 2018b]
Fig 13: AlGhad TV: Gaza Peace Doves. [Source: Gershon Baskin, Facebook, 5 May] (Baskin, 2018c)

5.8 Concluding remarks

This chapter has endeavoured to show how Palestinians’ empirical experience of historic and continuing loss and violence has been encoded into cultural and contested historiographical narratives, and gradually given shape and iteration through commemorative practices, in particular through days of memory (primarily Nakba Day) and the March of Return, the corollary of which is to be observed in the current Great March of Return in Gaza, perhaps the most political attempt of all to redress the issue of the return of Palestine’s 1948 refugees and descendants.

I have discussed the manner in which Palestine’s remembrance days bear points of correspondence to Israel’s remembrance days (Yom HaShoah and Yom HaZikaron); but while there is a syncopation in both collective traumas, the unresolved and ongoing nature of Palestinians’ suffering adds the qualitative (and cumulative) intensity of immediacy. The re-traumatising re-enactments involved in annual Nakba marches and visits to abandoned
villages are reminiscent of Jenny Edkins’ non-linear ‘trauma time’, which, unlike ‘historical, narrativised time …has [no] beginnings and ends’. In such cases, ‘Events from the period of the trauma are experienced in a sense simultaneously with those of a survivor’s current existence’ (Edkins, 2003, p. 40). For Palestinians living under occupation, whether in the oPTs or as IDPs within Israel, their ‘current existence’ contains sufficient daily stress on top of the collective revisiting of historical injury.

Scholars are preoccupied with identifying what the Nakba represents to their particular disciplines: According to Volkan, it is Palestinians’ undesired ‘chosen trauma’; for the Russell Tribunal on Palestine, it is a ‘sociocide’. However, of especial interest to our analysis are the characteristics of Palestinians’ collective experience, which can be matched closely with Kai Erikson’s original notion of cultural trauma, namely the destruction of community in the wake of violence, accompanied by initial silence and mourning, together with other aspects such as confusion, disorganization and a sense of shame and disempowerment, together with a strong nostalgia for the past that is handed on to future generations. These features are all present as a result of the Palestinian Nakba, thus validating the notion that they have suffered a collective trauma, as per Erikson’s conception, which is distinct from the individual psychological experience; and yet of course, the individual experience touches on the experience of others, producing a rippling of wider impact throughout a community or society. Audergon, writing about fieldwork in post-war Croatia, affirms these reverberations: ‘Entire communities are traumatized, and the dynamics of trauma have collective dimensions that influence the course of global history. … When whole
communities suffer atrocity, the trauma stays in the fabric of family, community and society for generations’ (2004, pp. 6-20). That said, there is an overarching context beyond individual and summative suffering; and, for the purposes of this investigation, in the case of the Palestinians, it is that of political violence, which impacts on all the other levels of trauma (sociological and psychological). I concur with Fierke’s argument that:

… it is more useful to develop political trauma as a separate level of analysis in which the traumatic ‘shock’ is directed at a political and social category and where this shock has implications for the identity and agency of the group. While war involves physical, psychological and political trauma, these are all byproducts of a political context. The three experiences may intermingle as part of a ‘politics of trauma’, while remaining separate levels of experience or treatment. Political trauma is larger than the sum of traumatized individuals in a context. While the psychological and political are related, they are not equivalent (Fierke, p. 482.)

The frameworks for remembering are problematic for societies facing ongoing political violence. Shoring up (or revising) memory in the absence or inaccessibility of official documentation of a tragedy represents one aspect of this, and has been the work of memory projects, both physical and online, such as the Palestinian Oral History Archive at the American University of Beirut, and the Birzeit University Digital Palestinian Archive. Meanwhile, both the land and the loss of it combine to present a unifying site of collective
memory and commemorative practices, among which I have singled out Nakba Day and the March of Return as core elements in this chapter.

Finally, particularly in light of contemporary events occurring around Nakba Day and the March of Return, we may advance the theory that memory practices in situations of unresolved trauma do not necessarily serve to mitigate or promote healing; they may result in temporary catharsis, but can also result in a deepening of suffering and entrenched hostility that can actually contribute to further harm. Indeed, Antonius Robben (2012) who studies political violence in post-dirty war Argentina, comments that in that case, ‘memorialization and continuous narration of past massive violence … did not advance the coexistence of adversarial groups but intensified their enmity and revived certain repressive practices’ (p. 305). We can also see this, for example, in the regular standoffs between bitter rivals Fatah and Hamas (Abu Toameh, 2018; Alsaaafin and Tahhan, 2017; Ma’an News, 2017) which prevents the amelioration of the Palestinian condition. Furthermore, Fierke (2004, p. 473) argues that ‘social trauma can find expression in a political solipsism, which has dangerous consequences’, and vice versa, the experience of social trauma creates conditions for political leaders to mobilize the solipsism of the group (pp. 482-488). This point will be taken up further in the penultimate and the concluding chapter.
Chapter Six: Reconsidering collective trauma: Israel and the Palestinians.

6.1 Introduction: Factoring in collective trauma

Among the questions asked by this project was, to what extent does privileging and instrumentalising the concept of collective trauma hinder progress in the resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflict? Does one need to accept the ‘naturalized’ concept of collective trauma as a salient feature of this conflict? Is the concept helpful to sustainable peacebuilding? One might contend that noticing unhealthy behaviour patterns is as productive as validating a designation. In any case, it is the extent of certain behaviour repertoires that have been extensively observed by social and political psychologists Daniel Bar-Tal, Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Vamik Volkan (albeit almost all of their research focuses largely in the Israeli sector) that underline the value of taking such perspectives into account. These need to be factored in alongside the conventional final-status sticking points in the Israel-Palestine conflict, such as ‘borders, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the rights of Palestinian refugees’ (Rogers, 2013) and water rights (all previously mentioned as sources of conflict). Experts tend to select their focus and claim the greatest attention needs to be paid to that perspective; for example, with reference to the recent May 2018 relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem, peace negotiator Dr. Gershon Baskin and educator/activist Aziz Abu Sarah particularly privilege the city as ‘the core of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In the coming days we will be witnesses to the
centrality of Jerusalem in the conflict. Jerusalem is also the core of any future Israeli Palestinian peace’ (AlQuds Yerushalayim, 2018). Then there are overarching political claims for the significance of proxy power jockeyings in the Middle East, a feature that has been present since the Cold War; meanwhile the identities and influence of proxy powers has shifted and widened as a result of the failure of regional states consequent to the Arab prodemocracy uprisings; and beyond this, further claims for sets of persistent attitudes that view the conflict as incompatibilities due to ‘civilization clash’ (pace Samuel Huntington), religious differences, competing sets of nationalisms and most especially, rampant settler-colonialism (Busbridge, 2018). Finally, there are the conflict resolution debates post-Oslo on the claims for the one-state or two-state solution (Baskin, 2018d; Qumsiyeh, 2004) or even approaches that ponder the ‘nuclear version’ of the one state solution (Rigby, 2017) (total annexation of all territories by Israel, likely to bring about maximum opprobrium and hence, perhaps, provoking resolution through conflict).

While all of these accounts of contributing factors to the Israel-Palestine conflict are undeniably important, situating the parties’ stances according to overlapping perspectives on collective trauma sheds the most critical light on how the conflict itself is locked in perpetual stasis owing to the respective pathologies of the parties. This study’s core claim rests on the notion that the parties’ traumatic interpretation of their histories and their associated remembrance rituals and practices function as a negative source of conflict sustenance: greater attention needs to be paid to privileging and instrumentalisation of collective trauma in order for peace to take hold in any
meaningful form. Failure to take into account the significance of this undertow is likely to produce perpetual instability and most likely the forestalling of any top-down attempts at securing conflict resolution. While this chapter cannot investigate every single ill-fated peace initiative that has ever been launched in the attempt to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, particular attention will be paid to the only one that remains extant: the Arab or Saudi Peace Initiative (hereafter, API), as an example of ‘pressing for peace’ (presenting a fait-accomplis comprehensive Track-1 multilateral package). Like all the previous attempts, it too pays little attention to the traumatic underpinnings of the conflict, but does represent the Arab world’s most significant proposal since the legendary ‘three noes’ of the 1967 Khartoum Summit (‘no peace’, ‘no negotiations’ and ‘no recognition’ of Israel) and thus was hailed in 2007 by Israeli PM Ehud Olmert as ‘a revolutionary change in outlook’ (Benn, 2007).

6.2 Pressing for peace

In connection with ‘pressing for peace’, Jerusalem-based author and journalist Nathan Thrall, who heads up the International Crisis Group’s Arab-Israeli Project, makes an interesting contention (Thrall, 2017a) that the actors in this conflict can only make peace through tough external pressure—i.e. when strong international Track-1 diplomatic duress is applied. However, this approach misses the mark when one considers the fate of all the peace agreements constructed so far in this manner. Without concern for parties’ respective traumatic histories, follow-through on negotiations has been undeniably impacted. Of course one cannot over-claim: there have been many other factors that contributed to breakdown of peace initiatives, as
Thrall himself acknowledges in respect of his own contention: most significant was the murder of Israeli premier Yitzhak Rabin, signalling the failure of the Oslo Accords. However, both at the time and in the decades afterwards, Palestinian criticism of the Oslo Process has always indicated their view of it as deeply flawed, biased and doomed to failure for a wide range of reasons that included not only the superior Israeli ‘matrix of control’ but also the lack of foresight among the donor-driven Palestinian leadership (Bauck and Omer, 2016; Said, 2000; Sayigh and Ereket, 2015; Shlaim, 2016; Turner and Hussein, 2015). Other initiatives also failed largely—but not entirely—as a result of contingent factors, too numerous to unpack here, such as the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, the 2000 Camp David summit, the 2000 Clinton parameters, the 2001 Taba negotiations, the 2002 Arab peace initiative1 (reaffirmed by the Arab League in 2007, 2013 and 2017), the Quartet’s 2003 Roadmap to Peace; and unofficial initiatives such as the 2003 Geneva Accord and the 2009 Kairos Palestine document. With each failure, collective trauma intensifies as the parties respectively retreat into their familiar conflict ethos.

6.3 The implications of the Arab Peace Initiative

At the time of writing, the API remains the only initiative still in play (Baroud, 2017; Khoury, 2017; Lieber and Winer, 2017; Okbi/Ma’ariv, 2017; Savir, 2018; Terris, 2015). It was recalled by President Abbas at the UN Security Council as recently as February 2018 (WAFA, 2018) and is also projected to be the basis of US President Trump’s Middle East ‘deal of the century’ (Black, 2017).
The API is widely known as the ‘Saudi Peace Initiative’ in American and Israeli diplomacy, primarily as it was the initiative of then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. (‘Saudi Arabia is the country that in the end will determine the ability of the Arabs to reach a compromise with Israel,’ Israeli PM Olmert is quoted as saying in an interview in Ha’aretz [Benn, 2007]). The Crown Prince, moreover, reportedly took a milder and more ‘acceptable’ version of the API to U.S. President George W. Bush’s Texas ranch; even this version, which had not been endorsed by the Arab League Summit, was ‘immediately’ rejected by Israel (Podeh, 2007, citing The New York Times, 27 April 2002; Ha’aretz, 28 April 2002, and al-Watan, 28 April 2002).

The Israeli reaction to the Arab League’s wider reaffirmation of the API in 2007 fared little better, despite PM Olmert’s widely-reported enthusiastic reaction towards it (The Guardian Staff and agencies, 2007). As Aluf Benn affirms, ‘Israel's official response, released in a statement by the Foreign Ministry in coordination with the Prime Minister's Bureau, was lukewarm. It ignored the content of the Riyadh resolution and focused on the call by the moderate Arab nations to enter a dialogue with Israel’ (Benn, 2007).

Palestinian-American journalist and author Dr. Ramzy Baroud concurs that Olmert ‘stripped [the API’s] content of any practical value … what Olmert—as with current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—was keenly interested in was the idea of “unconditional normalization”’ (Baroud, 2017). Today business is much the same, according to Baroud: the conflict continues, but ‘what truly interests Israel and its American backers is breaking Israel's isolation through regional “peace” pacts and separate deals—in other words, normalization under occupation’ (Baroud, 2017).
Meanwhile, a *Jerusalem Post* article (Okbi/Ma’ariv, 2017, op. cit.) discusses an exposé from the Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese newspaper *Al-Akhbar*, reportedly detailing a ‘secret document of the Saudi Foreign Ministry’ confirming further recent secret API back-channels between the Saudis, the Israelis and U.S. President Donald Trump ‘including the rumored visit of the Saudi Crown Prince to Tel Aviv’. The alleged document features “compromises Riyadh will offer to end the Palestinian issue” and in addition, “Riyadh’s effort to gain support against Iran and Hezbollah”. While *Al-Akhbar* ‘has a history of fabrications … [it is] the Lebanese proxy of Iran’, Okbi nevertheless appears to be intrigued by the unverifiable contents, which include a demand for Israeli military denuclearization. Furthermore, in this latest alleged re-characterization of the API, Jerusalem will be subject to international sovereignty; Palestinian refugees will be resettled in the West Bank or will be able to gain ‘naturalization by other Muslim states’ and there will be a ‘major summit to launch a final peace agreement’. In return, the U.S. must ‘ratchet up U.S. and international sanctions against Iran for its ballistic missile program and its sponsorship of terrorism around the world and revisit the P5+1 nuclear agreement’. (As we now know, since 8 May, 2018, the U.S. has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between the P5+1 [+1 being Germany], Iran and the EU.) The report concludes by speculating on ‘denied’ allegations that ‘Saudi Arabia is pressuring … Abbas into accept [sic] Trump’s peace terms, most recently on an emergency visit Abbas was called to pay to the kingdom earlier this month’ but notes that the ‘leakers’ have ‘reasons to discredit Saudi Arabia by painting it as capitulating to the US and Israel’. Yet reports in *Al Jazeera*, subject to its own anti-Saudi bias (‘MBS: Palestinians should ‘accept Trump’s proposals or shut up’, Al
Jazeera, 2018) and drawn from Israel’s Channel 10 news (Ravid, 2018) perhaps suggest that there is some substance to Saudi back-channel rumours.

Whatever the truth of these fascinating speculations, the text of the official version of the API, endorsed by 22 Arab states, is the only one that remains available to us, and thus benefits from the ‘legitimacy’ of approval, backed by ‘the custodian of the Islamic holy places’; it also:

… deals with all the remaining parts of the conflict (Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians) and … given the impasse in the Palestinian track as a result of the Fateh-Hamas split, the plan can offer a multilateral track, bypassing the deadlocked bilateral track. In such a case, an Arab solution may be imposed on the recalcitrant Palestinians. (Podeh, 2007).

Yet for all this, the API constitutes a salient illustration of how a sweeping take-it-or-leave-it peace initiative arouses the greatest apprehension, at least as far as Palestinian and Israeli collective trauma is concerned; the notion of ‘imposition’ provokes tremendous anxiety, and this enforcement aspect, together with a thorough consideration of the API, forms the focus of this chapter.

In a revealing article (‘Why is Israel so afraid of the Arab peace initiative?’) Raphael Ahren (2013) cites Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon rejecting the API ‘as a “spin” and a “dictation” that would force Israel to make great concessions before being able to present its own demands.’ The familiar conflict repertoire behaviours (Bar-Tal, 1998) are in evidence as Ahren asks:
Why the objections, the reservations, the mistrust? Okay, the likelihood of peace with Iran may sound beyond improbable, but why doesn’t Israel at least ride the initiative toward normalization with ostensibly moderate Arab states, many of which appear to be interested in teaming up with Israel against their common enemies in Tehran? (Some analysts say that the Gulf states are especially willing to normalize relations with Israel, mainly because they seek allies in their struggle against the Iranian threat.)

Skeptics say the Arab Peace Initiative is unacceptable to Israel because of certain clauses that no government can ever agree to. Well, if so, why doesn’t Jerusalem at least try to engage with the Arab world by professing interest in the initiative, if only to demonstrate the will for peace and avoid being labeled as the party that prevents an agreement? There is so much to gain — politically and economically — in making peace with the entire Arab world. What is Israel afraid of? (Ahren, 2013)

The devil is in the details, as far as Israelis are concerned, ‘such as a return to the 1967 lines and the right of return’, explains Ahren; the API’s Item 2 calls for ‘full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon’ (Muasher, 2008, p. 281). It is also conceived to be an unlikely scenario by Israelis that the Jewish state will ever be accepted in an Arab Middle East.
For example, then Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon, ‘a declared opponent of a Palestinian state’, is quoted as saying, “You have to sacrifice a lot, and on the other hand you’re not really going to get peace. … Maybe if you sit in Qatar or Abu Dhabi it sounds good.” However, he infers that ‘those who know what happened in Gaza after the Hamas take-over fear that the terror group could also conquer the West Bank and rain rockets on central Israel from there,’ (Ahren, 2013). Existential security fears loom large, for ‘the ’67 lines, land swaps notwithstanding, are indefensible’ according to those on the Israeli right who are opposed to the API and Resolution 242 (the ‘land-for-peace’ resolution voted on after the 1967 war):

“I don’t foresee any Israeli government willing and/or capable of returning to the 1967 lines, with or without territorial swaps,” said Dani Dayan, a former chairman and current chief foreign envoy of the pro-settler Council of Jewish Settlements.

…”Territorial swaps do not make the 1967 borders more defensible. Territorial swaps have to do with demography, they have nothing to do with security,” Dayan said. “I do not see any territorial compromise that can reconcile Israeli and Palestinians demands. Therefore the Arab Peace Initiative, exactly like Oslo and John Kerry’s initiative, are [sic] a waste of time.” (Ahren, 2013)

Joshua Teitelbaum, writing for the right-wing think tank, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, quibbles that the API’s Item 2 demands are ‘at odds with Resolution 242, which calls for withdrawal from territories, not all the
territories’ and claims that this ‘effectively placed the Syrians on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, Israel’s main water source’ and moreover, ‘Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 was certified by the UN as a withdrawal to the international border’ (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 15).

Not only borders but the ‘right of return’ of refugees (clause 11 in UN Resolution 194)\(^2\) arouses great anxiety among Israelis, who foresee a flood of Palestinians returning to reclaim lost lands and homes as result of agreements such as the API. Furthermore, the ‘right of return’ issue is also of particular interest to countries such as Lebanon and Syria, where large numbers of not entirely welcome non-naturalized Palestinian refugees reside; the somewhat obscurely-worded Item 4 in the 2002 text ‘assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation, which conflicts with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries’).\(^3\) Ahrens flags these demands for ‘resettlement’ placation:

Another little-known clause in the Arab Peace Initiative rejects “Palestinian patriation,” which implies that refugees living in camps on Israel’s borders will not be granted citizenship of their current host countries. … critics fear it could further complicate issues.

Not only these details, but also the API itself is not particularly familiar to many Israelis. Allegedly the ‘unfamiliar’ API was aimed not at the Israeli government itself, but at more progressive Israelis, who might then pressurize their government to negotiate for peace (Podeh, 2007).\(^4\) In the
context of a publicity drive to spread awareness of the API among Israelis, Joshua Teitelbaum enlarges on the deliberate Arab lack of clarity regarding the thorny issue of the ‘right to return’:

During the months of November and December [2009], advertisements containing the text of the API were placed in … Israeli newspapers in Hebrew in a well-orchestrated publicity campaign. These ads were placed by the Negotiations Affairs Department of the PLO. Additional Hebrew ads included the endorsements of prominent Israelis calling on the government to examine the API, and explained the Initiative in a manner that would appeal to Israelis, emphasizing an end to the conflict and that a solution to the refugee problem would require Israeli agreement. The publication of the ads stimulated a debate in the Israeli press about how much progress the API represented. In the Hebrew translation of the API, the proponents translated the word tawtin (patriation, or resettlement) as izruah (naturalization), which is a considerably softer term. The impression was that they were trying to soft-peddle the API by avoiding the difficult questions. (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 27)

This is the critical issue, as far as Israel is concerned; anything resembling UN Resolution 194 ‘would undermine Israel’s Jewish identity’ (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 15); thus above all, the ‘patriation’ issue is the one that is the ‘deal-killer’; countries that refuse to accept permanently their Palestinian refugees would insist on sending them back home:
The refugees would have nowhere to go but Israel. Israel, of course, would not agree to this. …The Final Statement which accompanied the API was even stronger on the refugee issue, explicitly demanding all of the Palestinians’ rights, including “guaranteeing the right of return (ta’min haqq al-‘awda) for the Palestinian refugees on the basis of the resolutions of international legitimacy and the principles of international law including General Assembly Resolution 194,” and rejecting any solutions that involve “resettling [of the Palestinians] outside of their homes (tatwinhim kharij diyarihim).” (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 17)

Majority Israeli existential fears are presented with stark clarity: Israel will not countenance waves of returning Palestinian refugees claiming their pre-1948 villages and towns, although some might be able to return to the eventual State of Palestine:

As part of its diplomatic offensive, Israel needs to be particularly clear to the Arabs that they must disabuse themselves of the notion of Palestinian refugee settlement in Israel. On the discursive level, one has to begin talking not of return to their homes, as does Resolution 194, but of return to Palestine, as defined by the eventual Palestinian state to exist next to Israel.
As a consequence, Teitelbaum recommends that Israel reject the API: ‘because it contains seriously objectionable elements, as discussed above. Israel should also reject the “all or nothing” approach of the Saudis and the Arab League. *Peacemaking is the process of negotiation, not diktat*’ (Teitelbaum, 2009, p. 3, my italics). He concludes:

… There is only so far that repackaging, complementing, and improving atmosphere can go when the parties are so far apart. Any government elected in Israel today cannot make an offer acceptable to the Arabs and still survive. It is equally unlikely that the weak Palestinian leadership, whether it be Hamas or Fatah, would be able to make an offer acceptable to Israel and remain in power. (Teitelbaum, 2009, pp. 27-29.)

Above all, it is evident that Israelis remain unconvinced that The Other means peace (and indeed, the significant changes in the successive versions of the API regarding the wording of ‘normalization’, friendly or not, do indicate the difficulties the Arab states themselves encountered in reaching consensus). Ahrens (2013) cites Dr. Yossi Beilin (one of the architects of the Oslo Declaration of Principles), who imagines the Israeli response as, “‘No, you don’t really mean it. You can’t mean it, after all—we know you.’” Hebrew University specialist in Arab-Israeli relations Prof. Elie Podeh is also quoted as saying, “‘The Arab and Muslim world, in our minds, are generally linked to threats and danger; when they ‘launch’ a peace proposal at us, we don’t know how to react.’” An ‘anonymous’ Israeli official is given the last word: “‘Peace with Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan—very funny. Let’s be clear: We will
not get New Year’s cards from Iran, Sudan or Libya under any foreseeable circumstances. It is nothing but a lack of seriousness to rely on such promises,” (Ahren, 2013).

It is not only chronic mistrust and fear that leads Israelis to reject such peace overtures and to resort to tried-and-trusted ‘conflict management’ techniques. The costs are simply too high, as Nathan Thrall wryly observes, with a pungent prediction of Israelis’ worst security and economic nightmares:

The damages Israel would risk incurring through such an accord are massive. They include perhaps the greatest political upheaval in the country’s history; enormous demonstrations against – if not majority rejection of – Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem and over the Temple Mount/Noble Sanctuary; and violent rebellion by some Jewish settlers and their supporters.

There could also be bloodshed during forcible evacuations of West Bank settlements and rifts within the body implementing the evictions, the Israeli army, whose share of religious infantry officers now surpasses one third. Israel would lose military control over the West Bank, resulting in less intelligence-gathering, less room for manoeuvre in future wars, and less time to react to a surprise attack. It would face increased security risks from a Gaza-West Bank corridor, which would allow militants, ideology and weapons-production techniques to spread from Gaza training camps to the West Bank hills overlooking Israel’s airport. Israeli intelligence services would
no longer control which Palestinians enter and exit the occupied territories. The country would cease extraction of the West Bank’s natural resources, including water, lose profits from managing Palestinian customs and trade, and pay the large economic and social price of relocating tens of thousands of settlers. (Thrall, 2017b)

None of the suggested benefits of peace, nor ‘the moral costs of occupation for Israeli society’ or even ‘international opprobrium’ (I would dispute this last point, as it is a powerful traumatic stressor, reawakening ancient fears of anti-Semitism) are evenly faintly close to ‘outweighing the deficits’; according to Thrall, ‘no strategy can succeed if it is premised on Israel behaving irrationally … waiting would serve the country well’ (Thrall, 2017b). This is a very provocative and seductive argument, were it not for the fact that when examined closely, much of the repertoire of conflict ethos behaviours is far from rational, even when stemming from the drive for self-preservation. True, Israel can indeed continue to function profitably to a certain extent behind its many walls and barriers, shielded diplomatically and materially by the U.S. government; it is barely chastised by the U.S. for its conduct in the occupied territories, where there is the ‘illusion of U.S. castigation … in reality it insulates Israel from answering for its actions … by assuring that only settlements and not the government that creates them will suffer consequences for repeated violations of international law’ (Thrall, 2017b). Meanwhile the Palestinians can continue with their ‘quasi-state in the occupied territories, with its own parliament, courts, intelligence services and foreign ministry’. which allows for a simulacrum of post-Oslo donor-driven
functionality to be maintained, although as we know in Gaza, parts of that equation are in danger of near or imminent collapse, and this may have a domino effect.

For anything to change meaningfully, Thrall suggests, severe economic sanctions have to be brought to bear on Israel, together with strong international pressure from the U.S. and Europe; sticks have to be applied for the carrot of peace and international acceptance. Others argue that removing financial support for the PA might force a change in leadership and bring about a more unified challenge to Israel. However, both scenarios, considering the geopolitical power balance, are exceedingly unlikely; enabling of oppression is likely to continue for quite some time. Thrall concludes that ‘too many insist on sparing Israelis and Palestinians the pain of outside force, so that they may instead continue to be generous with one another in the suffering they inflict’. I do not disagree with this conclusion, but would argue for a different or a combined approach, a therapeutic outside intervention; force alone is unlikely to bring long-term peace.

6.4 Conclusion: Towards peacebuilding mechanisms and the politics of recognition

When theorizing the Israel-Palestine ‘conflicts’ ethos (since there are two Palestinian institutions of government who claim representation for Palestinian people within the region) they may be viewed either as conflicts occurring between sets of actors, who cannot make progress, indirectly or unconsciously, owing to trauma; or sets of actors, who make cynical discursive use of trauma, as a consequence itself of trauma. Whichever
combination is correct, this has a significant effect on the capability to negotiate a political peace agreement, such as the one remaining one on the table, the API. In the following sections I will discuss first of all the notion of the introduction of a therapeutic framework into conflict transformation, and then the issue of memorialization within such a framework.

6.4.1 The therapeutic framework

A therapeutic framework is an approach that specifically addresses trauma through the use of trained and trusted mediators from the fields of social and political psychology to pinpoint and unpack traumatic narratives when discussion becomes looped around these narratives. Generally speaking, such therapeutic approaches are part of graduated initiatives to ‘create preconditions’ and promote cooperation, particularly in the case of ethnic conflict, as Ross (2000) notes; some ethnic conflicts are so complex (involving a number of groups) that ‘no single leader can be said to fully represent the group’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1004) and in the case of the Palestine-Israel conflict, leaders of groups are not necessarily trusted by their own populations. Thus initiatives may be conceptualized along the lines of whether they can be projected to have ‘internal’ and ‘external criteria of success’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1005), the former relating to transformations in attitudes and practices (in everyday settings or even major political actions) and the latter to intervention-dependent particular effects on the conflict. Approaches range from ameliorating relations between communities and groups through a range of projects, some of which include utilizing intercultural communications theory; human needs workshops; ‘principled negotiations’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1011) such as the Minds of Peace project
(http://mindsofpeace.org/ ; Handelsman, 2014) which brought together Palestinians and Israelis from a diverse range of backgrounds in a series of experimental ‘popular negotiations’ or public congresses in various locations in the Israel-Palestine region and in the U.S. and Canada, to talk peace where elites (primarily political leaders) have failed. The latter project also shades into a theory of practice that Ross categorizes as ‘psychoanalytically informed identity theory’ (Ross, 2000, p. 1014) whereby groups explore their ‘targets of externalization—common enemies … High emotional salience is attached to group differences which are reinforced through symbolic and ritual behaviours binding individuals to their own groups’ (Ross, ibid). The American Psychological Association-sponsored 1980s workshops with Egyptians, Palestinians and Israelis conducted by Vamik Volkan, who formulated the concept of ‘chosen trauma’ (discussed in Chapter Five) represent the earliest example of this attempt at conflict transformation, vividly recounted in his book, Enemies on the Couch (Volkan, 2013).

Likewise social and political psychologists Herbert Kelman and Nadim Rouhana provided context towards the Oslo process with a series of more than 30 interactive problem-solving ‘unofficial intervention’ workshops for Israeli and Palestinian Track II leaders in order to change the flow of the ‘conflict ethos’ (Bar-Tal, 2007). Politically influential ‘cadres’ of Palestinians and Israelis took part in the workshops from the 1970s to the 1990s (Kelman, 2005a; Kelman, 2005b). These continued even after the Oslo Accords, until the second Intifada. The ultimate success rate of such experimental interventions is far from guaranteed, as Rouhana observed in 1998, but there remains a healthy and invested commitment to their success:
… there does seem to be sufficient interest in academia and
curiosity among diplomats to give theorists and practitioners in
this emerging field a chance to advance its theories, develop
new tools and methodologies, and demonstrate its
effectiveness in dealing with conflicts. …As with any emerging
field, there are serious challenges that theorists and
practitioners are facing. These challenges range from how to
formulate and standardize meaningful terminology to how to
define the most fruitful objectives of unofficial interventions.

According to Rouhana, although neither diplomats nor negotiation scholars
are convinced of the wisdom of such approaches, ‘the same sources of
weakness can also be seen as advantages that unofficial intervention can
use in order to make singular contributions to conflict resolution that official
diplomacy is not equipped to achieve’ (Rouhana, 1998, p. 116).
Nevertheless, more research is recommended as ‘some theoretical and
methodological advances are needed for such a contribution to take place’
(Rouhana, ibid). The approach does certainly indicate ‘potential’ as long as
practitioners are able to:

… explain how the micro processes of their unofficial activities
are related to macro processes of the conflict, to develop
methods for evaluating their interventions, define the
relationship between official and unofficial processes, and
demonstrate how ideas developed regardless of the power
balance can be accepted in conflicts defined by power
asymmetry. Methodologically, practitioners will have to deal
with issues of training and professional standards, examine tools of practice, and develop research methodologies. Finally, it is of utmost importance that the field develop ethical guidelines to guard against possible harm to participants and to societies in conflict. (Rouhana, 1998, p. 128)

While the therapeutic approach can be used in a variety of forums, primarily Track 2 negotiations, media debates, educational curricula, and in religious settings, working (not exclusively) with gatekeepers and authorities in these different settings, what has not yet been attempted is a scaling-up at the Track 1 level. In preparation, however, the multi-track aspect of the approach is critical, since it aims to represent the ‘complexity’ of a conflict, and avoid focusing merely on elites or binary portrayals of a conflict, for ‘Cycles of violence are often driven by tenacious requirements to reduce complex history into dualistic polarities that attempt to both describe and contain social reality in artificial ways’ (Lederach, 2005, p. 35). As advocated throughout the body of the work of seminal conflict resolution scholars such as Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach, a holistic view of a conflict is necessary in order to arrive at an understanding of ‘core patterns’ of dysfunction that ‘generate complexity’ (Lederach, 2005, p. 33). Lederach (Ibid.) offers a ‘working definition of complexity’ as one that involves ‘multiple actors, pursuing a multiplicity of actions and initiatives, at numerous levels of social relationships in an interdependent setting at the same time’; for Galtung this complexity requires the involvement of empathetic, respected mediators meeting parties engaged in intractable conflicts separately to ‘map’ the conflict thoroughly in order to bring in the widest possible range of goals (Galtung, 2000). In terms of the Israel-Palestine conflict, this means taking
into account not only Jewish Israelis and Palestinians living within Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza, but also non-Jewish minority groups living within Israel and Palestinians who are living in adjoining Middle Eastern countries with refugee status as a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars. As Bainbridge (2012, p. 222) observes, ‘Refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan will still remain an integral component of any process that may emerge in the future’. Evoking Lederach’s ‘three stages to achieving justice’, she suggests that Israelis and even the Arab states need to accept ‘accountability’ and differing degrees of responsibility for the refugees’ situation; agree on compensation; and treatment of the refugees should involve ‘equality and fairness’ so that they are less ‘marginalized in relation to the peace process’. Bainbridge calls for the ‘issue … [to] be addressed more by the Palestinian Authority, which is the only political representative of the Palestinian population in the peace process’. The refugees have been neglected and ‘sidelined’ owing to ‘the PA’s ‘policy of concentrating on the West Bank and Gaza that means refugees are nowhere near to achieving stage three’ (Bainbridge, 2012, p. 236).

Based on contemporary experience, political agreements between elites and/or military leaders that do not take into account a therapeutic approach merely scratch the surface of what is necessary to build sustainable peace; they ‘tend to hide the reality that the conflict has not ended. [It] has been placed within a newly defined context where it can be pursued by other … means’ (Lederach, 2005, p. 47), bringing to mind, for example, the lack of peace induced by the 1993 Oslo Accords and the ensuing Oslo Process. A
wider and deeper follow-through process is necessary for peace to take root, as Lederach notes:

Constructive social change and peacebuilding itself promote and must harness multiple processes of change, which cut across the levels and populations affected by the conflict we recognize agreements for what they are: social and political antacids, temporary acid reducers that creates an exit for symptomatic problems and an opportunity to create a way to work on repeated patterns and cycles of destructive relationships. (Lederach, 2005, p. 48)

Continued engagement is critical for a process to avoid the ‘authenticity gap’ whereby no parties believe in the ‘miraculous’ prescribed solution, as Lederach (2005, p. 49) observes: ‘Authentic engagement recognizes that conflict remains. Dialogue is permanent and requires platforms that make such engagement at multiple levels of the affected society possible and continuous’. When such conditions are not met, agreements are not taken seriously and efforts are likely to peter out. With regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as Telhami and Kull (2013) observe, there is a deep lack of faith in the ‘miraculous’ solution, with almost half of Israelis and Palestinians believing that ‘a peace agreement will never be reached’ (p. 5). Telhami and Kull’s research analyzes polling by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion and the Midgam Projects of Israeli and Palestinian attitudes towards nine months of peace talks in 2013. Yet at the end of the day, Israelis and Palestinians are choosing not to hope for peace based only on past experiences that did not contain the necessary conditions for conflict
transformation. A sustainable therapeutic framework has not, until now, been assayed.

Finally, it would be remiss to neglect the critiques of certain scholars regarding the implications of the therapeutic approach; primarily this opposition has been voiced by Michael Humphrey (2006) and most notably by Vanessa Pupavac. Pupavac (2001, 2002, 2004a, 2004b) and Hughes and Pupavac (2005) are critical of what they consider to be the 1990s soft-focus neoliberal emphasis on ‘pathologization’ of states and ‘emotionality’ or ‘emotionology’ in politics. Objecting to the individualist trend in contemporary conflict solution, Pupavac (Hughes and Pupavac, 2005, pp. 874-875) objects powerfully to the way that:

Perspectives on conflict emerging from psychosocial foundations are framed in such a way as to remove from analysis questions of political or social structure. They also downplay the significance of the state as the institutional expression of self-determination on the part of the political community. The complexity of interrelations between the state, society and international or transnational forces in a globalizing world is subordinated to the simple metric of rationality or irrationality of individual agency. Conflict is represented as a series of individual experiences of violence. States are portrayed as failed service providers run amok, separate from victimised and oppressed populations, even while preying upon them. Societies are viewed as formed of violated or violating individuals, whose actions spring from a hopeless cycle of
conflict from psychological processes rather than from political beliefs or economic needs. This excision of political processes from the depiction of conflict, oppression and poverty has opened the way for therapeutic approaches to intervention. …

The complexity of politics, social and economic imperatives that both renders conflict and violence an option for ordinary people, and determines responses to it, is ignored in favour of a view of conflict as causeless (‘the confiscation of memory’) and responses as traumatized (‘the pathologisation of populations’).

In adopting this approach, contradictions … are elegantly solved through the denial of capacities for autonomy to populations. Echoing colonialist discourses, which awarded rights only to populations deemed mature, this discursive strategy de-legitimates local politics and gives the green light for the disciplinary and rationalizing intervention of outside forces. By this means the international discourse of failed states legitimises perpetual international supervision.

While the primary frame of reference for Hughes and Pupavac in consideration of the above is the problematic ‘professionalizing’ of emotional distress in the shape of psychosocial intervention of teams of trauma specialists in Cambodia and former Yugoslavia that ‘may unintentionally weaken communal responses’ (Pupavac, 2004a) and de-emphasise resilience, Pupavac takes on a host of other issues as she tilts at ‘therapeutic governance’. There is a muddied elision of psychological and (sociological) collective trauma that fails to distinguish between the two expressions of individual and societal responses. She additionally implies that trauma
intervention in post-conflict states may necessarily lead to other colonialist-style forms of militarist intervention, such as the U.S. reaction to the 11 September 2001 attacks. There is some merit to her portrayal that under certain circumstances Western psychosocial intervention approaches represent a well-meaning form of paternalistic treatment of victims of war and political violence, but it is rather a leap to suggest that one is the logical corollary of the other: military intervention does not necessarily follow on from the compassionate therapeutic response.

Pupavac rightly appreciates the complex interplay ‘between the state, society and international or transnational forces’ in conflict yet fails to engage with the concept that collective expression of emotions also entails political implications, namely in cases of entire societies whose dominant discourse is one of overwhelming violence due to mediated perceptions of existential threat. She also suggests that states are the ultimate and preferential expression of citizens’ political and social collectivity, and that they (whether stable or ‘failed’) have the best interests of their citizens at heart. (Yet neither are necessarily the case; it is the considerations of just such notions that lie at the core of the contested ‘R2P’ doctrine.) Additionally, Pupavac’s allegations that the ‘international trauma model treats trauma as a cause of future wars’ is somewhat of an oversimplification. One thing does not necessarily lead to another, whereby ‘individual emotions … become a legitimate target of external intervention’ (Pupavac, 2004b, p. 156). Taking into account a further complex factor (such as engaging with a more collective expression of trauma) may expand our comprehension of modes of
transformation of intractable conflicts and does not invalidate other contributory factors, nor suggest total causality.

In particular Pupavac ascribes to the Clausewitzian conception of war as a continuation of politics by other means. This is perhaps the most problematic element of Pupavac’s seductive deconstruction of the therapeutic paradigm: the claim that war is a ‘rational’ response to political violence or oppression. This belief in particular is the one that is fundamentally at odds with any form of pacific progress. She does concede, nonetheless, that it is largely the political operationalization of trauma that is at issue, for ‘trauma is invoked to authenticate suffering, and validate political, social and moral claims’ (Pupavac 2004b, p. 151).

6.4.2 Transforming remembrance

As I have previously discussed, the central traumatic concept itself remains contested and is continuously evolving. However, this does not devalue the concept, but rather expands the multidimensionality and contextualisation by which a conflict may be comprehended—particularly a political conflict with two very different narrative memories. As Michael Rothberg observes, ‘understanding political conflict entails understanding the interlacing of memories in the force field of public space’ (Rothberg 2009, p. 314). Hence the exogenous centrality of the trauma of the Jewish Holocaust for Palestinians; its eternal remembrance serves as a particular foundational trope in Israeli society and politics, and indirectly has great impact on Palestinian lives. The fatal combination of the Shoah, together with the
ideologies of various streams of Zionism, arising also from the cumulative trauma of centuries of persecution in Europe, combine to produce an alternate traumatic suffering predicated on the loss of the Palestinian homeland. From this reading of this conflict, it is trauma that drives the conflict’s conduct and persistence.

The majority of analyses of this historic conflict are solutions-oriented, focusing on proposals for its resolution that are based on detailed examinations of proposed divisions of contested resources. However, if trauma can be conceived of as a wound to the memory, in which the comprehension of the past is damaged, inducing sufferers to revisit the pathological loop of distress, then above all, unacknowledged pain and fractured memories are at the root of the conflict, creating further mutually reactive episodes, from which very little is learned. ‘Remembering may serve good ends and bad ones,’ writes Tzvetan Todorov, continuing, ‘It may be used to further self-interest just as it may be used for the good of others. Memories do not always bear fruit and may even lead us astray. If we treat the past as holy, we exclude it from the world of meaning and prevent it teaching lessons that might apply to other times and places, to other agents of history’ (Todorov, 2003, p. 311).

Memory is at the root of our identity, but what and how we remember is very much the product of societal mediation. As Anthony Smith was wont to say, ‘no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation’ (Smith, 1996, p. 383). The memories of the group are especially resonant in the Israeli-Palestinian case, in particular as neither party recognizes the validity of the other’s memory. In such a case, ‘the peaceful or bellicose end to crises often depends on the
presence or absence of a conciliatory policy of recognition. Indeed, this policy takes into account others’ security fears, but it also attempts to preserve the face of the other and to take its symbolic interests into consideration,’ argues Lindemann, rightly concluding that ‘the emotional dynamics of recognition should not be underestimated, especially for the legitimacy of political decision makers with domestic opinion. (Lindemann 2011, pp. 68-70).

Since all substantial peace agreements (but not necessarily peace itself) are concluded at Track 1 level, creating an attractive framework for recognition at this level in which Israeli and Palestinian mutual acceptance of narratives can take place is critical to reducing existential de-legitimisation of peacebuilding; it is more effective as a first step rather than reverting—in the first instance—to familiar formulae such as transitional justice commissions or extra-territorial international judicial proceedings (whose authority, like the ICC, Israel may choose not to recognize). Israelis live in a permanent state of exception and emergency at the price of Palestinian lives, and attempts at judgment by the international community, although survivable (as Thrall suggests above) would surely be perceived as threatening; I concur with Lindemann’s assessment that ‘a politics of recognition can maintain peace by alleviating others’ security and identity fears through the de-legitimization of the option of war. Military threats and identity offenses are associated,’ (Lindemann, 2011, p. 72). This is illustrated not only by Israel’s refusal to recognize the ICC and to ratify many Optional Protocols in human rights conventions; panic at the widening economic and moral impact of the BDS
campaign has resulted in a variety of non-state and state pushback strategies. As Lindemann observes:

Materially dominant actors [such as Israel] do not inevitably and exclusively possess symbolic power. In an asymmetrical social conflict, the weaker party can compensate for its material inferiority through better moral standing. ... In international relations, there are strategies of victimization attempting to make the stronger actor lose face if it does not comply with the will of the weaker actor ... state leaders are not inevitably eager to maintain peace' but a 'politics of recognition can “force” peace as it increases the moral costs of armed aggression for [the] attacking state. (Lindemann, 2011, pp. 70-84).

Beyond moral re-legitimization, an accepted recognition framework is also likely to have more overarching and long-term impact than the ‘alternative’ work of numerous well-intentioned individual dialogue, encounter and reconciliation groups that are unsupported officially, and subject to powerful opposition from anti-normalization activists. Regrettably, in order for civil society capacity building for peace to be truly effective, official support is necessary. Thus far, a sincere proposition for memory work and recognition has not been attempted at Track 1 level; it is surmised that perhaps the costs of non-recognition are simply not yet high enough, but as BDS activity and ICC work become still more prominent, the Israeli government may reach a point where it will conclude that there are greater benefits in opting for such a course. It may also recall the strategic benefits of the politics of recognition, which resulted in two major ‘cold’ peace treaties beneficial to Israel (with
Egypt and Jordan); but as Thrall (2017b) has indicated, it will always carefully count the costs before embarking on such measures.

The formal management of memory work needs to be compelling and suprapolitical, in order to avoid susceptibility to subsequent manipulation. When such conditions are not met, efforts are likely to peter out; for example, social and political psychologists Herbert Kelman and Nadim Rouhana’s workshops designed around the Oslo process (as discussed earlier). Yet despite the modest co-acknowledgement of identities and humanities and the acceptance of a two-state solution, progress was not maintained, and the rest, as we say, is history.

How would the societies of Palestine and Israel mainstream the acceptance of mutual recognition? Certainly recognition would also need to be enforceable by law in order for it to be reflected in media representation and centered in political discourse, in addition to bottom-up ideological mainstreaming through education for peace. Some 14 European countries have passed legislation regarding Holocaust denial or have criminalized genocide denial in the case of critical 20th century traumas, such as the Armenian and Bosnian Genocides; while such laws remain controversial, legislation of positive import requiring mutual commitment to recognition of each other’s humanity and a shared history of trauma cannot be argued to constitute an infringement of freedom of speech. Moreover, legislating in order to reduce international opprobrium can bring a sufficient moral, economic and political payoff, as Lindemann (2011) notes. Discussing the case of the U.S. rapprochement with Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya, he reminds us that ‘All in all, joining the community of nations was the primary goal of
Libyan diplomacy. American officials had identified this need for recognition. The politics of recognition is not expensive but its benefits can be huge,’ (Lindemann, 2011, p. 84). Of course, here one must disregard the violent consequences of the Arab Spring in Libya—something that none of the parties, nor the author, could have foreseen.

Despite the emphasis on the need for official recognition and positive legislation, such a process cannot only be top-down; education for peace is critical to underwriting national curricula for coming generations, and in particular, history textbooks that form an ongoing source of contestation. An updated and mandatory-use version of the joint dynamic to create dual narrative history textbooks for Israeli and Palestinian schools, such as Adwan, Bar-On and Naveh’s Side by Side: Parallel histories of Israel-Palestine (2012) which was facilitated by PRIME, the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East, would be critical to this venture.

An open discourse that ‘speaks truth to power’ is critical to paving the way towards memory work, in order to dismantle trauma-based national myths—particularly to counteract the rhetoric of national leaders whose flagrant abuse of commemorative practices exacerbates chronic conflict.

From this, it is possible that other ameliorations will ensue. Concretely, Burg (2008) recommends ‘three areas that deserve careful attention’ in Israel’s ‘public life and jurisdiction’: its Law of Return (‘enacted as a mirror image of Nazi Germany’s Nuremberg Laws’), its Law of Punishment of the Nazis and their Collaborators, and its relationship with Germany (Burg 2008, Loc. 3964]. Such recommendations constitute a mere beginning in a judicial overhaul that needs to roll back many discriminatory and abusive practices of
governance, including emergency laws inherited from the period of the British Mandate and the Ottoman era that facilitate illegal imprisonment, use of torture and a basic racialized withholding of equal access to resources.

Finally, as Rothberg notes, a zero-sum conflict is also often a zero-sum competition of memories, primarily traumatic ones, as ‘conflicts of memory converge with contests over territory’ (Rothberg 2009, p. 309). While there are no facile answers, an inclusive recontextualisation of memories ‘can contribute especially to rethinking questions of recognition and representation ... crucial for establishing and contesting what form justice will take, who gets to count as a subject of justice, and how or under what jurisdiction justice will be adjudicated’ (Rothberg 2009, p. 309). Out of such a thicket, sustainable peacebuilding might tentatively proceed.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This study is particularly wide-ranging in scope as it has endeavoured to offer a contribution to the understanding of the emergence of the concept of experiential collectivities and, consequently, collective trauma, and apply the validity of the latter to an ongoing conflict, an approach that is especially necessary when the conflict is longstanding, intensely biased and prone to outbreaks of extreme violence.

There are various studies of the Israel-Palestine conflict that focus on either specific aspects of the parties’ collective trauma as a given and contributory factor (Thomas, 2015) or transgenerational Palestinian psychological trauma emanating from the Nakba (Peddle, 2015, a limited case study of a select population) or Israeli collective memory in relation to the conflict (Nets-Zehngut, 2016; Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2018; the latter examines popular memory through a large-scale questionnaire) but so far none that attempt to connect all of these (trauma as a wound to the memory, and memory as a generative force for further trauma, and the mutually reactive effects of both factors on conflict) and place the inquiry into a generalizable framework supported by case studies.

Tracing the construction of the notion of trauma, from its nineteenth century European roots in the new discipline of psychology, which attempted treatment of individuals suffering from psychological stress, I have plotted the widening of the understanding of traumatic stress as it manifested itself in contemporary Western society. The conception of what has constituted a traumatic event originated largely from the attempts to diagnose and care for
those suffering from psychological damage as a result of the two World Wars of the past century. While, as Marianna Torgovnick noted, ‘soldiers and civilians have always died in war’ (Torgovnick, 2005, p. xi) the new technologies of these two wars (from the First World War on) resulted an exceptionally brutal and experience of combat with devastating and widespread loss of life:

The world saw death in new and shocking forms: speeded up, multiplied, and dealt by human beings with deliberate and stunning technological speed, often under government auspices, and sometimes burning or vaporizing bodies on religious, ethnic, or racial grounds. (Torgovnick 2005, p. xi)

For Torgovnick, this produced what she calls ‘the war complex’, but for philosopher and psychoanalyst Robert D. Stolorow, it has segued into part and parcel of our fearful existence, lived in an ‘age of trauma’ whereby the ‘tranquilizing illusions of our everyday world seem in our time to be threatened with collapse from all sides—by global diminution of natural resources, by global warming, by global nuclear proliferation, and by global terrorism’ (Stolorow, 2009, p. 207). Elsewhere Stolorow describes these perpetual sensations of menace or ontological insecurity as ‘forms of collective trauma’ that ‘threaten[s] to obliterate the basic framework with which we as members of our particular society have made sense out of our existence and derived a sense of security’ (Stolorow, 2013).

Thus it can be seen that there is a clear connection between collective trauma and the degeneration of other elements that go to make up peaceful,
healthy lives and constitute human security. During the World Wars, the focus was on individual rather than collective suffering, although there was indeed immense collective suffering. It was not until Kai Erikson’s 1972 portrayal of the destruction of an Appalachian community as the result of a human-engineered disaster that we can really consider the emergence of the notion of the cultural trauma of a whole society (Erikson, 1972). He was the first to engage with social breakdown in the wake of mass trauma, and I have applied his criteria for the diagnosis of collective trauma to the Palestinian and Israeli situations.

In common with Erikson and Stolorow, Jenny Edkins observes that trauma frequently involves ‘a betrayal of our expectations of – and trust in – the family or community in which we live. And it brings to the surface existential questions which at least in the modern world we prefer to keep submerged’ (Edkins, 2002, p. 245). This crosses beyond an expression of millennial angst or personal psychological unease into overarching political concerns; it is our government and the state that is tasked with keeping us safe and has the responsibility to protect. Consequently in recent years, as I have already noted in the pages of this project, interest has arisen among IR scholars in the widening arc of trauma and comprehending how traumatic events are ‘experienced, felt, perceived, memorialized and forgotten, as well as how they influence – and are influenced by – norms, identities and interests in world politics’ (Resende and Budryte, 2014, p. 1). Questions arising from the intersection of perspectives on human security, collective trauma and memory studies have begun to preoccupy scholars, producing ‘thought-provoking insights about practices of memorialization and remembrance in
IR’ (Resende and Burdryte, 2014, p. 1). In connection with this, I have highlighted Andreas Huyssen’s observation on ‘the emergence of memory as a key concern in Western societies’ (Huyssen, 2000, p. 21). The researcher’s own project, too, locates itself at the intersection of politics, cultural/collective trauma and memory, and specifically analyzes how official collective memory practices, such as days and sites of memory, may both reflect and reinvoke collective trauma, impacting on an ongoing conflict, namely the Palestine-Israel conflict.

While we have all internalized Santayana’s injunction on the necessity of remembrance of the traumatic past in order not to repeat it, memorialisation is a present and active process, as memory (generally official and cultural memory, which in turn influence popular memory)¹ is ‘reconstructed on the basis of the present’ (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 40) or, in other words, ‘retrospectively produces a past while claiming merely to invoke it’ (Zehfuss, 2007, p. xiii) and thus is clearly open to extensive and unhealthy political manipulation that can significantly exacerbate an intractable conflict. Despite memory’s claim to represent perpetuity, one of its ‘few genuinely constant attributes … is that it is likely to undergo change’ (Wertsch, 2002, p. 46) as it provides a dressing-up chest from which items can be plucked to suit and be adapted to the wearer’s contemporary desires, whether the ‘wearer’ is a group or a political authority. It ‘functions to provide a usable past for the creation of coherent individual and group identities’ (Wertsch, 2002, p. 31) and this may not necessarily have a pacific or healthy effect.

Clearly consideration of traumatic events presents an emerging interdisciplinary turn, whose deliberations on such intersected areas will
continue to expand in coming years, and which presents a fertile field for further investigation. Experts and scholars will doubtless also continue to contend over the definition of trauma itself, and what constitutes a traumatic stressor, both in the psychological sense (with further refinements and editions of the *DSM*) and in the collective, sociological sense for many decades to come, certainly beyond the life of this project; and to question the construction of theories and explanations, as Jeffrey Alexander, Didier Fassin, Richard Rechtman and others have done (including myself). What has been agreed upon so far by the majority of scholars across disciplines is that the traumatic event is one that is intense, inassimilable and beyond the human coping capacity, both at the individual psychological and at the collective sociological level; it cannot ‘slot into the framework of normal social reality, which is why there is no language for it or any of the other tools on which one would normally rely to make sense of the world’ (Resende and Burdryte, 2014, p. 2), thus we struggle to offer a definitive interpretation, to ‘process’ it satisfactorily, at least for now. This is at once the limitation of the present project, and a topic for further investigation. To paraphrase Adorno, it constitutes a ‘barbaric’ paradox to attempt to render into words (let alone poetry) a supremely traumatic mass experience (such as Auschwitz, to which he referred). Perhaps it can only ever be expressed as series of contradictions in which ‘trauma is felt, but not understood; it is memorized and recalled, but not necessarily experienced; it defies language, but insists on being communicated; it refuses to be incorporated into normality, but goes on perpetuating itself in memory; it is triggered at a specific moment in time, but alters the linearity; it must be forgotten, but is always being recalled and relived’ (Resende and Burdryte, 2014, p. 2).
What does it mean when a longstanding trauma (or collection of traumas) caused by political violence is perpetually relived and reiterated, even when some of its participants are only the heirs to the original participants in that trauma? Gatekeepers to the trauma will on the survival of the traumatic memory, like an open wound; for bystanders, it is history’s wound and should be resolved. There is only so much invocation of past collective suffering that can be tolerated, particularly if present behavior is not deemed acceptable to the international community. I am both the daughter of a gatekeeper—in a certain sense—and a bystander, studying events from the luxury of a not-entirely-detached distance; this too is my limitation (and privilege). I experience frustration, disquiet, foreboding and perplexity. How can the instrumentalisation of memory be avoided, in the case of political violence?

‘Memory breathes revenge as often as it breathes reconciliation,’ comments Avishai Margalit (2002, p. 5). It is tempting to consider the value of forgetfulness. Indeed, some societies (such as Japan, where the researcher temporarily resides) have functioned relatively well by employing cultural amnesia—a reverse form of memory instrumentalisation—even if the diplomatic repercussions are profound.

Yet we are supposed to strive for perfect memory, as a form of perfect consciousness; this represents an ideal, if somewhat challenging, goal. The injunction not to forget is based on our notion of non-repetition; and most of all, honouring the memory of victims (‘may her/his memory be a blessing’, zichronah livracha/ zichronoh livracha, in Hebrew). Moreover, by acknowledging the past, truth-telling and reconciliation processes may take place (Zehfuss, 2007, p. 33; she recalls the Kabbalistic proverb attributed to
the Baal Shem Tov, ‘Wanting to forget prolongs the exile, and the secret of redemption is remembering’ cited by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker in his address at the 40th anniversary of the conclusion of World War II, and taken up by German discourse thereafter).

Thus far forms of remembrance have brought little relief to allaying collective trauma in the researcher’s core study, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Israel’s long occupation of Palestinian territories continues without any sign of resolution, while both societies remain critically and chronically divided, without consensus on core issues or strategies. Even attempts to tell a more complete history of the seminal period of 1948 have been stalled and censored (Gratien and Hazkani, 2014) although Nets-Zehngut (2016) notes that there has been a greater openness towards a critical inquisition of the past in Israeli society, and, to a far lesser degree, in Palestinian society. Yet the past does not necessarily hold all the keys to this conflict, or any other; and memory, as a form of knowledge, is ‘from the past’ as Avishai Margalit observes, but it is ‘not necessarily knowledge about the past’ (Margalit, 2003, p. 14). Meanwhile, it could be said that through employing claims from subjective histories, any prospect of peace is now as far away as it has ever been. This sobering fact is an indicator of the urgent need to examine more closely what is remembered, and how; this is what I have endeavoured to do in Chapters Four and Five. It is a modest beginning; much more work remains to be done in-field (in situ) than is possible for the itinerant and precariously-funded researcher. As Zehfuss notes, ‘How we should remember is a significant ethno-political question’ and what we recall faces
the challenge of acknowledgment and inclusivity, of taking into account a multitude of
‘different experiences and perspectives on these events’ (Zehfuss, 2007, p. 74). Clearly much more remains to be considered with regard to these questions if the parties to the conflict are ever to face each other in honesty, tabling damaging national myths and addictions to mutual delegitimisation and victimhood for the purposes of dialogue.

Finally, as the dominant power in the asymmetrical conflict, the greatest onus lies with the Israeli state. Treading water may seem a tempting method for managing conflicts, but it is neither an ethical nor reliable method, as the current Gaza crisis indicates. Ultimately, exhaustion sets in, and with fatal effects.
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Notes for Chapter One


3 Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus controversially researches the issue of false memories and testimony.

4 German scientist Emil Kraepegin (Neustrelitz, 15 February 1856 – 7 October 1926, Munich), considered to be an influential leader in the new fields of scientific psychiatry, psychopharmacology and psychiatric genetics.

5 Despite the reservations of José Merquior and others, it is impossible not to acknowledge the inevitable domination of theoretical approaches to the subject since the 1961 publication of Michel Foucault’s controversial Folie et Dérision: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (the title and the extent of the book would undergo various changes in various editions, emerging firstly in 1964 in an abridged English translation as Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason in English and later in 2006 as History of Madness).

7 From the Greek for womb, *hystera* - ὑστέρα.
8 Dell (2009, p.713) notes that 'The field of dissociation did not begin with trauma. It began with hypnosis. From the time of Mesmer (circa 1778) until the turn of the century in 1900, Western Europe experienced recurring waves of fascination with animal magnetism or hypnosis. Each wave of fascination was, in turn, undercut by periods during which hypnosis was widely discredited. The fact that each discrediting was supplanted by yet another surge of interest testifies to the inherently fascinating nature of hypnotic phenomena'.
9 'Survivors', by Siegfried Sassoon, can also be viewed in the *First World War Digital Poetry Archive*, University of Oxford, <http://tinyurl.com/mc3lex4> 'This poem was written while Sassoon was a patient at Craiglockhart War Hospital in October 1917. Originally published in 'Counter-Attack and Other Poems' (1918).'
10 Horace, Odes III.2.3
11 Danielli, however, remarks that the implementation of the repair law was ‘traumatic in itself’ and that psychiatrists who examined survivors were only required speak German, rather than Polish or Yiddish; and that experts and courts displayed contempt and hostility for the victims (Danielli, 2009).
12 Fassin and Rechtman (2009, p.72) disagree, claiming that ‘two important psychiatrists’ Robert Lifton and Mardi Horowitz, supported the ‘new clinical entity’ of ‘survivor syndrome’, which ‘replaced traumatic neurosis as a description of the symptomology of civilian victims’.  
13 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQbg1HcYEBs>
14 Shephard (2002, p.342) claims that the recent Korean War had significantly prepared military psychiatrists for battle readiness in the Vietnam War. ‘There was military psychiatry from the start, not from the point where things began to go wrong; it was different because this time the military saw the need for psychiatrists and psychiatrists understood their function in the military, so there didn’t have to be all that manoeuvring and neglect before the programme came into effect’.
15 According to the World Health Organization, the *International Classification of Diseases* 11th Revision is due by 2018 (see <http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/revision/en/>)
16 According to Tartakovsky (2011), ‘the term reactions originated from Adolf Meyer, who had a “psychobiological view that mental disorders represented reactions of the personality to psychological, social and biological factors” (from the DSM-IV-TR)’.
17 James Sanders comments, ‘Many users of the DSM-III or DSM-IV may be surprised to know that many of the diagnostic criteria are not based on empirical research but on expert consensus and, in some cases, political appeasement’ (Sanders, 2011, p. 394).
18 ‘Reviews of the history of the DSM and mental disorders can be subject to such misapprehensions. For example, the inclusion of homosexuality as a disorder … was consistent with general attitudes toward homosexuality at the time. It was included as a supplementary term for sexual deviation in DSM-I (1952) and as a specified type of sexual deviation in DSM-II (1968), which was later changed to sexual orientation disturbance in the same manual in 1973 under pressures from activists in the Gay Liberation movement … Ego-dystonic homosexuality, included in DSM-III (1980) but removed in DSM-III-R (1987), does not refer to homosexuality as a disorder per se but that homosexuality is for the individual unwanted and a source of distress. Social values regarding homosexuality changed over time, and the DSM evolved with those changes. Unfortunately, literature reviewing the historical inclusion of homosexuality in the DSMs has been “whiggish,” criticizing DSM classifications from decades ago’ (Sanders, 2011, p.395).
19 ‘Unfortunately, up to now, the standard glossaries, such as the first or second edition of the American Psychiatric Association's *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* have not contained explicit criteria for psychiatric diagnoses. Therefore, the clinician or research investigator has been forced to select the diagnostic category in the glossary that most closely resembled the characteristics of the patient being diagnosed. In practice, this has meant that, by and large, the diagnostician used his own concept of the disorder even though a publication referring to those diagnoses might state that the diagnoses were made “according to the DSM-II criteria.” The inadequacies of the standard glossaries have led research investigators to develop their own explicit criteria and classification schemes’ (Spitzer, Endicott and Robins, 1978, p. 773).
20 For a discussion of the Feighner criteria, see Kendler, Muñoz and Murphy, 2009: ‘In 1967, at the urging of the then-resident John Feighner, a discussion group led by Eli Robins and including Sam Guze, George Winokur, Robert Woodruff, and Rod Muñoz began meeting with the initial goal of writing a review of prior key contributions to psychiatric diagnosis. In
their meetings over the next year, the task soon shifted to the development of a set of new diagnostic criteria. For three diagnoses, major depression, antisocial personality disorder, and alcoholism, the authors could identify the original criteria from which this group worked and the rationale for many of the changes they introduced. Published in 1972, the Feighner criteria were soon widely cited and used in research, and they formed the basis for the development of the Research Diagnostic Criteria, which in turn were central to the development of DSM-III. The team that developed the Feighner criteria made three key contributions to psychiatry: the systematic use of operationalized diagnostic criteria; the reintroduction of an emphasis on illness course and outcome; and an emphasis on the need, whenever possible, to base diagnostic criteria on empirical evidence’(Kendler, Muñoz and Murphy, 2009, p.134).

Put differently, from a psychoanalytical perspective, ‘These manuals conceived of symptoms as reflections of broad underlying dynamic conditions or as reactions to difficult life problems. Dynamic explanations posited that symptoms were symbolic manifestations that only became meaningful through exploring the personal history of each individual. The focus of analytic explanations and treatment, therefore, was the total personality and life experiences of the person that provided the context for the interpretation of symptoms (Horwitz, 2002). The DSM-I and DSM-II made little effort to provide elaborate classification schemes, because overt symptoms did not reveal disease entities but disguised underlying conflicts that could not be expressed directly (Mayes and Horwitz, 2005, pp. 249-250).

According to Sanders, ‘Eli Robins, Samuel Guze, and George Winokur, who sought to return psychiatry to its medical roots, were called the neo-Kraepelinians’ (Sanders, 2011, p.398) in addition to John Feighner and his colleagues.

‘Each individual is evaluated on each of these axes:

Axis I Clinical Syndromes Conditions Not Attributable to a Mental Disorder That Are a Focus of Attention or Treatment Additional Codes

Axis II Personality Disorders Specific Developmental Disorders

Axis III Physical Disorders and Conditions Axes IV and V are available for use in special clinical and research settings and provide information supplementing the official DSM-III diagnoses (Axes I, II, and III) that may be useful for planning treatment and predicting outcome:

Axis IV Severity of Psychosocial Stressors

Axis V Highest Level of Adaptive Functioning Past Year’ (APA 1980, p. 23)

For a comparison of the ICD-10 PTSD diagnosis with the DSM-IV criteria, see U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (2016) <http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/overview/comparison-icd-dsm-iv.asp>

In 2008, Congress passed the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act taking a great step forward in the decade-plus fight to end insurance discrimination against those seeking treatment for mental health and substance use disorders. This law requires health insurance to cover both mental and physical health equally. Under this law, insurance companies can no longer arbitrarily limit the number of hospital days or outpatient treatment sessions, or assign higher co-payments or deductibles for those in need of psychological services.

The 2008 act closes several of the loopholes left by the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act and extends equal coverage to all aspects of health insurance plans, including day and visit limits, dollar limits, coinsurance, co-payments, deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums. It preserves existing state parity and consumer protection laws while extending protection of mental health services to 82 million Americans not protected by state laws. The bill also ensures mental health coverage for both in network and out-of-network services.

Research shows that physical health is directly connected to mental health and millions of Americans know that suffering from a mental health disorder can be as frightening and debilitating as any major physical health disorder. Passage of this law will lead the health care system in the United States to start treating the whole person, both mind and body’. (American Psychiatric Association, 2018a)

An example of typical sour grapes is to be found on the APA’s DSM: History of the Manual webpage, <http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual>. According to the APA (American Psychiatric Association, 2018b), there was a ‘lack of widespread
acceptance of the mental disorder taxonomy contained in ICD-6 and [its successor] ICD-7 (published in 1955) thus prompting a further review leading to ICD-8 (1965)."

27 It is beyond the scope of this account to enter into a discussion of traumatic stress screening instruments; there are simply too many and they are variously culture- and context-dependent (whether for research, or geared toward assessment for medical or other forms of compensation). For example, according to the U.S. Veterans Association, the ‘Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale, or CAPS, is the “gold standard” for PTSD assessment' and diagnosis for both military veteran and civilian trauma survivors’ (https://www ptsd va gov/professional/assessment/adult-int/caps.asp ). According to http://www ptsd va gov/professional/assessment/DSM 5Validated Measures.asp other measures include the Primary Care PTSD Screen (PC-PTSD) and the 17-item self-report PTSD Checklist (PCL); while <http://www ptsd va gov/professional/assessment/all_measures.asp> lists more than 70 other assessment measures; there are many more to be found in other clinical literature.

28 Despite flip-flopping paradigmatically, Freud had earlier recognized the power of certain events such as abuse, war and railway accidents to produce traumatic stress, and his descriptions of symptoms eerily prefigured the descriptions of post-traumatic stress. ‘A fixation to the traumatic accident lives at their root. These patients regularly repeat the traumatic situation,’ wrote Freud in in The Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis published in May 1917, adding, ‘The attack corresponds to a complete transplanting of the patient into the traumatic situation. It is as though these patients had not yet finished with the traumatic situation, as though they were still faced by it as an immediate task which has not been dealt with’ (1966, pp.274-275, cited in Wilson, 1994, p.684).

29 ‘The Dissociative Disorders are the subject of considerable contemporary clinical and research interest, but their study is a relatively new field of inquiry. The committee attempted to incorporate the most reliable and valid insights of the newer clinical and research findings and the most cogent feedback from a wide variety of sources. It is anticipated that the DSM-III-R criteria and text will require additional revision as psychiatry further explores this group of conditions’ wrote Kluft, Steinberg and Spitzer (1988, p.45).

30 ‘an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone’ (APA, 1987, p.250); for Allan Young (1995) the ‘distress’ is as much of an issue as the ‘event’; is it fear, shame, perpetrators’ guilt, survivors’ guilt? The description implicitly conflates these issues, and contributes to the moral morass surrounding trauma discussions.

31 The revised diagnostic criteria ‘include a history of exposure to a traumatic event meeting two criteria and symptoms from each of the three symptom clusters: intrusive recollections, avoidant/numbing symptoms, and hyper-arousal symptoms. A fifth criteria concerns duration of symptoms and sixth assesses functioning’, according to <https://www ptsd va gov/professional/PTSDoverview/ptsd-overview.asp>

32 For a graphic description of the process, see Allen Frances’ articles in Psychiatric Times (Frances, A., 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d).

33 According to the APA’s PTSD Fact Sheet, downloadable from <https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-factsheets> (American Psychiatric Association, 2018c)

34 ‘Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders’ include: Reactive Attachment Disorder; Disinhibited Social Engagement Disorder; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; Acute Stress Disorder; Adjustment Disorders; Other Specified Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder; Unspecified Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorder.

35 See again, the APA’s PTSD Fact Sheet at <https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-factsheets>

36 According to the APA’s PTSD Fact Sheet, at <https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-factsheets>

37 DSM-5, pp. 271-272.
Indeed, Jeffrey Alexander (2004) argues, regarding the evolution of the psychological emergence of trauma, which he terms ‘lay trauma theory’ that it is, “‘naturalistic,’” either in the naively moral or the naively psychological sense because it ‘fails to see that there is an interpretive grid through which all ‘facts’ about trauma are mediated, emotionally, cognitively, and morally’. Unobservable to those who buy into these theories, the ‘interpretive grid’ … has a supra-individual, cultural status; it is symbolically structured and sociologically determined’. The undetectable ‘interpretive grid’ is far from positivist science, for it is we who carry out the interpretation or diagnosis, since a trauma cannot independently ‘interpret itself’. We choose to overlook or are unaware of the ‘the social, structural, or individual elements of the trauma process.’ (p. 201).

Kerwin Lee Klein (2000, p. 135) warns against ‘indulging in mystical transpositions of individual psychological phenomena onto imaginary collectivities’.

Writing in 1999, Jeffrey Olick describes the wide-ranging impact and acceptance of the emergent new field: ‘Collective memory, one might plausibly argue, often plays an important role in politics and society. Such claims are by now commonplace in scholarly as well as political discourses: images of the Vietnam war limit support for American military activities; memories of the Nazi period constrain German foreign and domestic policy; recollections of dictatorship shape the activities of transitional and post-transition regimes from Eastern Europe to Latin America; and Watergate has become the perennial reference point for all subsequent scandals in Washington, to name just a few possible such hypotheses. Indeed, the term collective memory has become a powerful symbol of the many political and social transitions currently underway, though there is also something broadly epochal about our seemingly pervasive interest in memory. New regimes seek ways to ‘settle’ the residues of their predecessors, while established systems face a rise in historical consciousness and increasingly pursue a “politics of regret” (J.K. Olick, 1999, p. 333.)

Connerton’s taxonomy of ‘forgetting’ includes (politically) repressive erasure; prescriptive forgetting; the forgetting entailed in a new identity formation; John Barnes’ ‘structural amnesia’ (as in patri- or matrilinealism); ‘forgetting as annulment’ in the case of a surfeit of documentation; ‘planned obsolescence forgetting’ inbuilt into the ‘capitalist system of consumption’; and finally, forgetting as humiliated silence (for example, the shame of the war-defeated Germany).

Taking a broader view, Schwartz (1996) ‘identifies three related aspects of 1960s-1970s intellectual culture that gave rise to interest in the social construction of the past. First, multiculturalists identify historiography as a source of cultural domination and challenge dominant historical narratives in the name of repressed groups. Second, post-modernists attach the conceptual underpinnings of linear historicity, truth and identity, thereby raising interest in the relations linking history, memory, and power. Finally, hegemony theorists provide a class-based account of the politics of memory, highlighting memory contestation, popular memory, and the instrumentalization of the past’ (cited in Olick and Robbins, 1998, p. 106).

Wertsch (2002, p.23) citing Edward Hutchins 1994 theory of ‘socially distributed cognition’, terms this ‘complementary’: ‘In this case, it is assumed that different members of a group have different perspectives and remember different things, but these exist in a coordinated system of complementary pieces’.

Jan Assmann, in his article ‘Collective Memory and Cultural Identity’ (Assmann, 1995, pp. 125-133) shifts the emphasis of the ‘lived experience’ on to what he terms everyday ‘communicative memory’. However, when it comes to ‘objectivised culture … texts, images, rites, buildings, monuments, cities, or even landscapes’ a living memory becomes transformed into something more static; ‘mémoire is transformed into histoire’ says Assmann (p.128).

Assmann (1995, p. 129) describes non-proximate collective memory as ‘cultural memory … characterized by its distance from the everyday. Distance from the everyday (transcendence) marks its temporal horizon. Cultural memory has its fixed point; its horizon does not change with the passing of time. These fixed points are fateful events of the past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).’
Assman (1995) asserts that ‘cultural memory preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity. The objective manifestations of cultural memory are defined through a kind of identificatory determination in a positive (“We are this”) or in a negative (“That’s our opposite”) sense’ (p. 130).

See Jonathan Koppel and David C. Rubin (2016) for a review of ‘reminiscence bump’ research.

In more moderate terms, Fentress and Wickham (1992, p. ix) also wondered about ‘how to elaborate a conception of memory which, while doing full justice to the collective side of one’s conscious life, does not render the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorized collective will’. They settled on the term ‘social memory’ (as opposed to the more commonly-used collective memory), additionally because they feel it will ‘avoid the image of a Jungian collective unconscious’ (Fentress and Wickham, 1992, p. ix).

Amos Funkenstein (1989, pp. 6-7) also found that although ‘Remembering is a mental act, and therefore it is absolutely and completely personal. … Despite all these reservations, “collective memory” is by no means a mistaken and misleading term. … Consequently, we cannot abandon the concept of collective memory, but must reformulate the relationship between collective memory and the constant act of personal remembering’.


Winter points out that memory has its problems too, particularly forgetting. ‘Witnesses forget, or reconstruct their narratives as a kind of collage, or merge what they say with what they read. Memory alone renders history, a documented account of the past, impossible’ (Winter, 2009, p. 255).

In millennial vein, Andreas Huyssen echoes Nora, commenting that ‘there is a deepening sense of crisis often articulated in the reproach that our culture is terminally ill with amnesia’ (Huyssen, 1995, p.1).

The notion of a place or site of memory, un lieu de mémoire, was hitherto unknown in French or English; Nora references a classical memory technique ‘founded on an inventory of memory places, loci memoriae’ in which speeches were rote-learned through ‘associating each topic … with some part of a real or imagined building in which the oration was to be delivered’ to evoke the ‘profound connotations in French: historical, intellectual and emotional, often subconscious’ (Nora, 1989, p. 25).

To date, the volumes in English available are:


“it would be impossible to overstate the influence of Pierre Nora’s massive, multi-part Lieux de mémoire project, a series of volumes that conjoins rich contributions to an understanding of France and French culture with an innovative methodology for studying collective memory,’ writes Michael Rothenberg (Rothenberg, 2010). ‘In the quarter century since the first volume was published in 1984 - and in the two decades since Nora’s introduction to the project first appeared in English in 1989 - the concept of the "lieu de
mémoire” or "site of memory" has been at the center not just of considerations of French negotiations with its national past but of studies of remembrance on an international scale. Drawing our attention to the way the past finds articulation in a wide array of "sites" - considered broadly to include not only monuments and museums, but also novels, cities, personages, symbols, and more - Nora’s project has inspired reflection and scholarship on national memory in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, among other places. Although emerging from a commitment to the exceptionality of France’s relation to its national past, the approach pioneered in Les lieux de mémoire has proven highly exportable as a model for the consideration of diverse memory cultures'.

Writing as a Vietnamese, Hue-Tam Ho-Tai (2001, p. 907) found Nora’s selective ‘research agenda’ deeply problematic: ‘I write this review from the margins of both French history and of the French nation, as a historian (not of France but Vietnam) and as a postcolonial subject. Born in Saigon when it was still the capital of French Cochinchina, I began my schooling the very year the French were defeated at Dien Bien Phu [excluded from Nora’s project]. As a result, unlike my father and even my older siblings, I was spared from having to recite “Nos ancêtres sont les Gaulois.” With numerous relatives permanently settled in France, I also write with a personal appreciation of the impact of postcolonial immigration on the French social and cultural landscape and on French notions of national identity.’

Nora herself finally acknowledged that although ‘the memorial model has triumphed over the historical model ... [it has] ushered in a new, unpredictable, and capricious use of the past’ [Realms 3, 618]’ (cited in Rothberg, 2010, p. 6).

Yerushalmi’s Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (1982) is cited by Klein (2000), Funkenstein (1989), Olick and Robbins (1998) and others as one of the leading works of this period to counter the claims of history and memory.

The Charter of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery can be found at <https://droitcultures.revues.org/2189> (Annexe 2, 2009) and a transcript of the proceedings at <http://iccwomen.org/wigjdraft1/Archives/oldWCGJ/tokyo/index.html> (Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, 2001)

Almost everything is collective memory, snorts Olick, ‘Collective memory has been used to refer to aggregated individual recollections, to official commemorations, to collective representations, and to disembodied constitutive features of shared identities; it is said to be located in dreamy reminiscence, personal testimony, oral history, tradition, myth, style, language, art, popular culture, and the built world. What is to be gained, and what is to be lost, by calling all of these “collective memory”? (Olick, 1999, p.336).

However, Confino (1997) defends the usefulness of Jacques Le Goff’s notion of ‘the history of mentalités’ and ultimately finds for methodological ‘open-endedness’. ‘The beauty of memory,’ he writes, ‘is that it is imprecise enough to be appropriated by unexpected hands, to connect apparently unrelated topics, to explain anew old problems’(1997, p. 1403). Over a decade later, (Confino, 2008, p. 83) he continues in the same undecided vein, that ‘in the unbearable lightness of interpretation—lies the risk of memory and mentality as methods of inquiry, and also the promise of their relations. They call for interpretation, which can be facile and superficial.... The challenge of the historian is to resist this unbearable lightness of interpretation. It is rather to sift meaning from memory via methods and theories, via interrogations of the use of evidence, of narrative, and of sources. Here lies today the potential of memory and the history of mentalités to set our historical imagination free, as they have done for a century’.

Complained Jonathan Jones (2014), ‘the poppies are fake, trite and inward-looking – a Ukip-style memorial ... It is deeply disturbing that a hundred years on from 1914, we can only mark this terrible war as a national tragedy. Nationalism – the 19th-century invention of nations as an ideal, as romantic unions of blood and patriotism – caused the great war. What does it say about Britain in 2014 that we still narrowly remember our own dead and do not mourn the German or French or Russian victims? The crowds come to remember – but we should not be remembering only our own. It’s the inward-looking mood that lets Ukip thrive.’

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Notes for ChapterThree

1 Alexander admits ‘It is neither ontology nor morality, but epistemology, with which we are concerned’ (Alexander, in Alexander et al., 2004b, p.9)—at one hand a stroke of genius in which it is only the construction of trauma that is investigated; by confining oneself to the sociological (and sociolinguistic) perspective; but on the other hand, this leaves the excavator with an empty vessel. In Alexander’s strong interpretation, there is no such thing as trauma; nor can there be any broadening of understanding of the non-existent trope; all we can do is follow trauma’s alleged workings on social groups, as they transform their suffering into discourse, commemorative practice and political action.

2 Volker Heins and Andreas Langenohl (2016) specifically refute the conflation of perpetrator with victim, as ‘a cultural trauma “demands reparation” … Thus, if the memory of the air war ever crystallized into a cultural trauma, Britain, and to a lesser extent, the United States would have to repair the damage, starting perhaps with a formal apology. But the refusal of British officials, including Queen Elizabeth II, to apologize for any bombing raid has not caused more than a minor and passing public outcry, not even in Dresden … Leading German military historians have even argued that an “admission of guilt” on the part of Great Britain would be inappropriate … there are no indications of a memory project that is going to replace the double image of German civilians as victims/accomplices that corresponds to the perpetrator/liberator perception of the Allies, with the kind of polarizing discourse that is required to establish a cultural trauma’ (Heins and Langenohl, 2016, p. 22).


4 Conversely, perhaps not every traumatic event experienced on a large scale produces long-term collective trauma, as Yaacov Vertzberger noted in ‘The Antinomies of Collective Political Trauma: A Pre-Theory’ (Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 4, Dec. 1997, pp. 863-876). The politically traumatic assassination of Israeli PM Itzhak Rabin produced a short, sharp shock in Israeli society, rather than lasting trauma, despite the reactions of the moment. Bounce-back comes into play, as group recovery necessitates ‘self-purification’ and ‘requires a scapegoat - somebody, preferably an outsider, against which to blame and direct both individual and collective rage’ (p. 865) such as Rabin’s assassin, ‘Yigal Amir; or in the case of Israel’s traumatic near-defeat by Egypt and Syria in the October 1973 war, PM Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and the entire Labour Party cabinet. The tragic
events of 9/11 in the United States have also followed this pattern of decreasing remembrance of trauma, while the search for ‘the outsider’ for revenge has perhaps produced more long-lasting violent impact.

Finally, the need for ‘compliance with socially imposed beliefs and attitudes’ to effect group recovery may actually result in ‘reversal and/or polarization; that is, the pretrauma cognitions maybe reversed, but may also be accentuated to a higher level of extremism, and result in polarization at both the macro- and microlevels, by (1) increasing the distance between the main competing views in the affected society concerning the definition of political reality, and (2) pushing individuals’ positions toward greater extremism’ (p. 866).


Lemkin was also behind the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 (UNOCHR, 1948) x a treaty which the U.S. notably did not ratify until November 4th, 1988. Michael Ignatieff, writing in the *New Republic* (2013), notes how Lemkin’s devotion to his cause lead to his untimely demise: ‘Unfinished fragments of autobiography poignantly document his decline: ‘As I am devoting all my time to the Genocide Convention, I have no time to take a paying job, and consequently suffer fierce privations.... Poverty and starvation. My health deteriorates. Living in hotels an rooms. Destruction of my clothes. Increased number of ratifications.... The labors of Sisyphus. I work in isolation, which protects me.’ He collapsed at a bus stop on 42nd Street in New York in August 1959 and died at the age of 59, friendless, penniless, and alone, leaving behind a bare rented room, some clothes, and a chaos of unsorted papers.’ (http://tinyurl.com/z7n692c).

William Safire in ‘On Language: Ethnic Cleansing’ recounts the contemporary usage of the term:

In 1988, well before the Soviet Union came apart, clashes broke out between Armenians and Azerbaijans in the autonomous enclave of Azerbaijan known as Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Sol Steinmetz, executive editor of Random House dictionaries, who cites Serbo-Croatian sources, the attempt by one group to drive out the other was called by Soviet officials *etnicheskoye chish cheniye,* ‘ethnic cleansing.’

On July 9, 1991, a Serbian building supervisor named Zarko Cubrilo told Tim Judah, a Times of London reporter: ‘Many of us have been sacked because they want an ethnically clean Croatia.’ On July 31 of that year, as Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats began the conflict that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia, we had the first English use of the phrase in its gerund form: Croatia’s Supreme Council was quoted by Donald Forbes, a Reuters reporter in Belgrade, as charging, ‘The aim of this expulsion is obviously the ethnic cleansing of the critical areas . . . to be annexed to Serbia.’ (Safire, 1993)

A year later, journalists in the battle zone picked up the phrase: John F. Burns, in *The New York Times* on July 26, 1992, described the movement for a ‘Greater Serbia,’ observing that ‘the precondition for its creation lies in the purging—‘ethnic cleansing’ in the perpetrators’ lexicon—of wide areas of Bosnia of all but like-minded Serbs.’

same online journal for the tag ‘genocide’ https://electronicintifada.net/tags/genocide; ‘Israel’s War on Children’ (Hedges, 2015).
8 Comments Daniel Feierstein in Genocide as a Social Practice: Reorganizing society under the Nazis and Argentina’s Military Junta 'Dadrian has argued in several works that it is possible and desirable to compare the genocide of the Armenian and Jewish peoples. Even though he does not say so explicitly, his goals are as much political as academic. His work attempts to show that the genocide of the Armenian people—still denied by the Turkish state after nearly a century—was a social event comparable in its magnitude, severity, and consequences to the genocide of the Jewish people under Nazism' (Feierstein, 2014, Loc. 182/6997).
9 ‘Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew, saw the connection between the crimes committed against the Armenians and the rise of the Nazis in Germany. Lemkin was profoundly frustrated by the failure of the international community to hold leaders of the Young Turk movement accountable after the war. He worked tirelessly to have “crimes against humanity” recognized as a violation of international law. Indeed it was Lemkin who coined the term “genocide”—a concept that stands as one of the foundations of the international movement for human rights’. Facing History and Ourselves (2004, p. 148).
11 Discussing the usage of the term Aghét in a review of the documentary Aghét: Nation Murder by the German director Eric Friedler, Taline Voskeritchian (2011) comments, ‘Genocide is the legal, universal term; it connects Armenians to the world, to activism, to community efforts at justice and reparations, all of them laudable, most of them necessary. It can connect Armenians also to other peoples and groups that have been threatened by annihilation. Aghét is the Armenian term in the broken family of such words—shoah, nakba included. The biography of the word aghét itself locates its origins in literary usage, as Marc Nichanian has so thoroughly demonstrated in his Writers of Disaster (Gomidas Institute, Princeton and London: 2002). It was the Western Armenian novelist and literary critic Hagop Oshahan who first used it in 1931 specifically and consciously as the term for the extermination of the Ottoman Armenians; it was the literary answer, if you will, to the Ichart (massacre, in Armenian).
12 For a further discussion of the semantic connotations of the term see Taline Voskeritchian’s ‘Notes on Eric Friedler’s Aghét: From massacre to catastrophe to genocide’ (May 16, 2011).
13 Notes Ian Black in The Guardian, ‘The Armenian Genocide – the Guardian Briefing’ on 16th April, 2015, ‘Diaspora organisations tend to be more militant than the republic itself on this question and are suspicious of moves towards normalisation with Turkey. The two main organisations in the US have made recognition their raison d’être. This helps them preserve a collective identity and resist assimilation.
   A recent pan-Armenian declaration focusing on the genocide was criticised by Levon Ter-Petrosian, the country’s former president, reflecting the view that Armenia needs to focus on its current problems and not be obsessed by a painful past.’ (See https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/16/the-armenian-genocide-the-guardian-briefing.)
14 Not does only the Turkish government continue to dispute the facts or existence of the genocide, but it has also enlisted internationally-recognized scholars to this end, among them Bernard Lewis who actually faced lawsuits for denial (see his account in Notes on a Century: Reflections of a Middle East Historian, Chapter 11, ‘Judgment in Paris’; [Lewis, 2012, pp. 286-297]); Stanford Shaw (Shaw and Shaw, 1977); David Fromkin (1995) Guenther Lewy (2005a; 2005b); Norman Stone (2011), Michael Gunter (2013); Atatürk biographer Andrew Mango (see below for his review of Peter Balakian’s Burning Tigris); retired US Army officer and World War 1/Ottoman military historian Edward J. Erickson (2013, and other publications). Dated August 8, 2014, A Select Bibliography on Denial of the Armenian Genocide (Zoryan Institute, 2014) lists still more works discussing denial (from all perspectives).
   An official statement from the Turkish embassy in London, published on 23rd October 2007 in The New Statesman, gives a taste of the typical strategy to enlist celebrated historians. Orhan Tung writes, ‘There is a legitimate historical controversy concerning the interpretation of the events in question and most of the scholars who have propounded a contra genocide viewpoint are of the highest calibre and repute, including Bernard Lewis, Stanford Shaw, David Fromkin, Justin McCarthy, Guenther Lewy, Norman Stone, Kamuran
As Julien Zarifian (2013) affirms, ‘A few American historians and researchers, such as Bernard Lewis, Heath Lowry, Stanford Shaw, Edward Erickson, or Justin McCarthy, whose close ties with the Turkish state are often criticized, have opted, or still opt today, for revisionist and denialist positions. The best example illustrating this tendency is the case of the 69 American historians and its aftermath. In 1985, 69 American historians, led by famous British-American scholar Bernard Lewis, signed a petition opposing a congressional resolution aiming at affirming the reality of the Armenian Genocide. These 69 scholars, who, according to several sources received funding from institutions directly linked with Ankara, such as the Institute for Turkish Studies or the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, published a full-page advertisement in the New York Times and the Washington Post, sponsored by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations. This was an important victory for those who deny the Armenian Genocide in the U.S.

A further example is the war of words over the publication of Peter Balakian’s Burning Tigris collected at Arlindo Correia’s website (Correia 2003a, 2003b, 2006) and Norman Stone’s ‘A bungled case for the prosecution’ (Stone, 2004); Andrew Mango’s review of Balakian’s Burning Tigris and angry responses is collected at http://www.aga-online.org/news/attachments/PeterBalakian.pdf (Mango, 2004).

Ronald Grigor Suny, in ‘Learning about the Armenian Genocide’ on the PEN America website, names further denial patterns: ‘In the last ten years a more sophisticated “neo-denialism” has emerged, which elaborated the argument that the Armenians were involved in insurrectionary activity that necessitated a counter-insurgency response from the Young Turk government. A number of authors have worked with Professor M. Hakan Yavuz and published works with the University of Utah Press. These writers are to a large degree sympathetic to the defensive attitudes of Turkish government and military officials, favor evidence and accounts exculpatory of the Young Turk policies, and emphatically reject the notion of genocidal intention. See, for example: … Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); … and M. Hakan Yavuz, “Orientalism, the ‘Terrible Turk’ and Genocide,” (Suny, 2015).

Maria Karlsson’s paper, ‘A hoax and a sham: An argumentative analysis investigating Western denial of the Armenian Genocide’ (Karlsson, 2009) follows Richard Hovannisian in analyzing four denial strategies: ‘of four separate Western scholars … arguments of absolute denial… arguments trivializing the acts and actions of genocide … arguments aimed at “rewriting” the chronology and course of history’. Karlsson’s paper ‘re-emphasises the “classic” type of denial, noticed by several scholars of the Armenian Genocide and its denial, where absolute denial is only partly visible, having to give way to arguments of trivialization and rationalization’ and also examines ‘most extreme type[s] of denial… represented by American writer Samuel A. Weems. He openly utilizes all patterns of denial. Nothing happened, Weems claims, but what happened was the fault of the Armenian victims themselves.’ Her paper also examples Bernard Lewis, whose ‘denial to a large degree is latent, but none the less present’.

According to an article ‘At the Origins of Commemoration: The 90th Anniversary Declaring April 24 as a Day of Mourning and Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide’ on the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute’s website, <http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/31.03.2009.php> this observance of this commemorative date goes back to 1919: ‘A special committee was formed in Constantinople, in March 1919, by a group of Ottoman Armenian intellectuals who survived the Armenian Genocide. The main goal of this committee was the organization of commemoration ceremonies dedicated to the 4th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. The committee, known as “The April 11th Board of Ceremonial Mourning” consisted of 13 members including Yevphime Avetisian, Zaruhi Galamkarian, Mari Stambulian, Perchuih Parsamian, Miss Arpiar, Tigran Zaven, Merujan Parsamyan, Hakob Siruni, Gevorg Mesrop, Tagvor Suqiasian, Dr. Barsegh Tinanian, Shahan Perperian and Hovhannes Poghosian. Due to the efforts of these people the memory of the victims of Armenian Genocide was commemorated among the Armenians of Constantinople for the first time in 1919. Armenian writer, publicist and public figure Hakob Siruni wrote in his memoirs: “The mourning ceremony became a tradition. Since then, the 24th of April was adopted as a symbol of mourning.”’
that such crimes that are
opinion of the world, which has decreed that the right of small nations shall be respected and
volume is dedicated to 'Woodrow Wilson, the exponent in America of the enlightened public
opinion of the world.'

22 ‘Samantha Power on Obama and Armenian American Issues’ <https://youtu.be/8yNT7XsV-Dq> (Armenians for Obama, 2008) “I know [Obama] very well and he’s a person of incredible integrity. ... He’s a true friend of the Armenian people, an acknlowledger of the history ... he's a person who can actually be trusted.”

19 See also Barack Obama’s pre-election statement, on January 19th, 2008, ‘Barack Obama on the Importance of US-Armenia Relations’: ‘As President, I will maintain our assistance to Armenia I also share with Armenian Americans – so many of whom are descended from genocide survivors - a principled commitment to commemorating and ending genocide. That starts with acknowledging the tragic instances of genocide in world history. As a U.S. Senator, I have stood with the Armenian American community in calling for Turkey's acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide. Two years ago, I criticized the Secretary of State for the firing of U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, John Evans, after he properly used the term "genocide" to describe Turkey's slaughter of thousands of Armenians starting in 1915. I shared with Secretary Rice my firmly held conviction that the Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence. The facts are undeniable. An official policy that calls on diplomats to distort the historical facts is an untenable policy. As a senator, I strongly support passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution (H.Res.106 and S.Res.106), and as President I will recognize the Armenian Genocide:'

20 See, for example, ‘Armenian hopes crushed as Obama decides not to use the word “genocide”’ by Noah Bierman (Bierman, 2015); Jon Schwarz in The Intercept notes that President Obama’s ‘Obama’s commitment [to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide] was quietly removed from his website sometime after December 2010 and this Armenian Remembrance Day, he broke his promise for the seventh year in a row. (‘What Obama’s Refusal to Acknowledge the Armenian Genocide Tells Us About the U.S. — and the Rest of the World’ (Schwarz, 2015).

21 See the ‘Statement of the President on Armenian Remembrance Day’ in 2010
<https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/22/statement-president-armenian-remembrance-day> in which the term Meds Yeghern is used (The White House, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016). Not everyone felt compelled to rail against the president though; in a nuanced deconstruction of Obama’s statements on the Armenian genocide, historian Vartorian Matossian noted on May 15, 2013, “Even though Obama the politician did not use the term genocide, Obama the lawyer, the graduate of Columbia University and Harvard Law School, has already clearly acknowledged the events of the Armenian Genocide. On behalf of the Bar Association of the Republic of Armenia, we would like to express our gratitude to President Obama for his historic statement,” (Matossian, 2013).

22 Morgenthau was the American ambassador in Constantinople from 1913-1916; the volume is dedicated to ‘Woodrow Wilson, the exponent in America of the enlightened public opinion of the world, which has decreed that the right of small nations shall be respected and that such crimes that are described in this book shall never again darken the pages of 442
commemoration of the legendary victory against the Allied forces at the 1915 Battle of this year's centenary, Turkey's AKP government has shifted the date of its own traditional commemoration of the legendary victory against the Allied forces at the 1915 Battle of...
Gallipoli from the customary March 18 to April 24, to coincide with the Armenian remembrance. The AKP government has invited world leaders to come to Turkey for the three-day commemoration, in an attempt to steal them away from the Armenian ceremonies in Yerevan. ('Turkey Angry At European Countries' Recognition of Armenian Genocide; Turkish President Erdogan Says He Disregards It: 'It Goes In One Ear And Out The Other' at <https://www.memri.org/reports/turkey-angry-european-countries-recognition-armenian-genocide-turkish-president-erdogan-says>) (MEMRI, 2015).

26 Turkish historian and holder of the Kalosdian and Mugar Chair of Armenian Genocide Studies at Clark University, Professor Taner Akçam writes, ‘Such an admission implies an obligation for compensation. Of the nearly two million Armenians living in Ottoman territory in 1915, only 67,000 Armenian-speakers remained by 1927. Even if we accept the higher estimate of 140,000 remaining, it still represents the effective elimination of most of the country's Armenian population, along with the unrecompensed seizure of their considerable assets and properties. Any admission of responsibility for this crime must surely be followed by claims for restitution.’ (Akçam, 2015)

27 Claire Berlinski’s controversial hyperlinked diatribe in the context of the 2006 French law against Armenian genocide denial at ‘The Voltaire Project: I Deny the Armenian Genocide’ (Berlinski, 2007) <https://ricochet.com/archives/the-voltaire-project-i-deny-the-armenian-genocide/> includes a video clip of Bernard Lewis on the topic <https://youtu.be/zY27-x-UM> (video removed but can be found at <https://youtu.be/qG70UWESfu4> and <https://youtu.be/yCYz3IigNE0> ) ‘This is a question of definition … the point that was being made was that the massacre of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was the same as what happened to the Jews in Nazi Germany and that is a downright falsehood. What happened to the Armenians was the result of a massive Armenian armed rebellion against the Turks which began before war broke out and continued on a larger scale … great numbers of Armenians deserted and crossed the frontier and joined the Russian armed forces invading Turkey. Armenian rebels actually seized the city of Van and held it for a while, intending to hand it over to the invaders … This was what we now call nowadays a national liberation movement of the Armenians against Turkey. … There is clear evidence of a decision by the Turkish government to deport the Armenian population from the sensitive areas, which meant virtually the whole of Anatolia … there is no evidence of a [government] decision to massacre, on the contrary there is evidence of attempts to prevent it’.

30 Israeli support for recognition of the Armenian Genocide has waxed and wanted, according to its relations with the Turkish government, as Yair Auron’s The Banality of Denial: Israel and the Armenian Genocide (2003) acknowledges.

31 See ‘Mavi Marmara death toll rises to 10’ (Al Jazeera, 2014) and ‘Turkey orders arrests over Gaza flotilla raid’ by Hassan Ghani (2014).

32 See the Reuters report carried by Al Arabiya, ‘Turkey, Israel close to deal on compensation over Mavi Marmara’ (Al Arabiya, 2016) ; and in Ha’aretz, ‘Israel and Turkey Officially Announce Rapprochement Deal, Ending Diplomatic Crisis’ (Ravid, 2016).

33 Dr. Anie Kalayjian and Marian Weisberg’s 2002 study of transgenerational psychological trauma among second- and third-generation Armenian-Americans living on the East Coast of the U.S. aims at redressing the balance of the overwhelming quantity of literature dedicated to Holocaust survivors, but notes that its clinical sample is too small (Kalayjian and Weisberg, 2002).

34 Currently available in English on YouTube at <https://youtu.be/ybSP04ajCDg> (Friedler, 2010).

35 According to Oran in a 2006 interview with Hrant Dink, Dink told him that ‘Armenians should be able to get rid of the residues of the past and look at the problems through the eyes of the other side (the majority) as well. In other words, Armenians should be able to display empathy. This will incite the majority to act the same. This second observation, which H. Dink expressed by saying “Turkish-Armenian relations should be taken out of a 1915 meters-deep well”, is of great importance, because it is a hundred per cent against the genocide thesis of the Diaspora and the Republic of Armenia. In this context empathy has nothing to do with accepting or refusing the genocide. Second, Armenians should be able to get rid of the residues of the past and look at the problems through the eyes of the other side (the majority) as well. In other words, Armenians should be able to display empathy. This will incite the majority to act the same. This second observation, which H. Dink expressed by saying “Turkish-Armenian relations should be taken out of a 1915 meters-deep well”, is of
great importance, because it is a hundred per cent against the genocide thesis of the Diaspora and the Republic of Armenia. In this context empathy has nothing to do with accepting or refusing the genocide.' (Oran, 2006)

36 Baskin Oran writes further, ‘According to Agos, the genocide discourse is not a historical term but a political one. It is cherished by the Diaspora for two important reasons. First, it is a “national cause” that hinder its assimilation; second, it increases its political influence in the host State. But the same discourse is blocking both the Turkish-Armenian dialogue and the integration that is in the good interest of Armenians in Turkey. What’s more, this blocking is being made while the Turkish intellectuals have started questioning 1915 in every way. Everyone should abstain from blocking a dialogue that would for sure be beneficial to everyone (the Diaspora, Republic of Armenia, Turkey)’ (Oran, 2006).

37 According to Reporters Without Borders, in 2018 Turkey ranks 157 out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom index (https://rsf.org/en/turkey) (Reporters Without Borders, 2018). The Committee to Protect Journalists meanwhile commented that Despite releasing some journalists in 2017, Turkey remains the world’s worst jailer for the second consecutive year, with 73 journalists behind bars, compared with 81 last year. Dozens more still face trial, and fresh arrests take place regularly. … Every journalist CPJ found jailed for their work in Turkey is under investigation for, or charged with, anti-state crimes, as was true of last year’s census’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017).

38 See, for example, in Turkish daily Today’s Zaman, on 4th March 2016, ‘Turkish police raid Zaman HQs, fire tear gas on readers after gov’t takeover’ (original link unavailable due to closure of paper; the story can be viewed at <https://warsc rotoric.com/2016/03/05/turkish-police-raid-zaman-hq-fir e-tear-gas-on-readers-after-govt-takeover/>) and on 5th March 2016, ‘Reactions pour in against gov’t-orchestrated takeover of Zaman daily’ (original link unavailable due to closure of paper; the story can be viewed at <https://www.turkishminute.com/2016/03/05/reactions-pour-in-against-govt-orchestrated-takeover-of-zaman-daily/>) (Today’s Zaman, 2016a, 2016b); in another leading Turkish daily, the Daily Hürriyet, ‘Trustees appointed to Zaman media group’ (Daily Hürriyet, 2016); and on the BBC website, ‘Zaman newspaper: Defiant last edition as Turkey police raid’ 5th March 2016 (BBC News, 2016).

39 Kalayjian and Weisberg (2002) emphasize the constancy of the traumatic connection rather more, as they explore the ‘physical, psychosocial, and spiritual’ intergenerational impact of the Genocide on a relatively small group of Armenian Americans out of ‘approximately one million Armenians living in the United States, with the majority settled on the West Coast; 90% of those who did not migrate from previously Soviet Armenia are offspring of the Genocide survivors’. Their study attempted to redress the balance of the hundreds of articles, dissertations and books that have been written on intergenerational transmission of the Holocaust on succeeding generations, but the number of subjects (eight) and the psychodynamic process makes it impossible to make wider sociological generalizations. However, what is notable is that the Turkish lack of recognition remained a source of anger and frustration ‘an outcome of feelings of helplessness and powerlessness’ (p. 273) and that ‘an explicit expression of remorse … would have enormous healing value,’ (Kalayjian and Weisberg, 2002, p. 274).

40 Tölyöyan explains, ‘The variety of communities in the Armenian diaspora today is one of the many reasons why it is difficult to coordinate their actions, let alone “unify” them. Simply to enumerate them is complicated. For instance, there is the intrastate diasporic community of Istanbul, the majority of whose members deny that they are a diaspora; the highly territorialized diaspora of Georgia; the post-deportation diaspora formed in 1604 in Iran ...; the post-genocide (1923-on) and post-Independence (1991-on) diasporas, and the Soviet diaspora of the returnees of 1946-1948, many of whom left the homeland again in the 1974-1989 period and reside primarily in the US. The list could be extended by naming the secondary diasporas created by the dispersion of the Iranian, Lebanese, Egyptian, Iraqi and now Syrian diasporas.

Each has unique features. There are some connections among them, but not enough to coordinate them effectively. Furthermore, they differ along many registers: in terms of social behavior, language, and culture; in demography and economic prosperity; in terms of internal institutionalization and ideology; and by the level of available leadership. Some people hope that this heterogeneity may someday become a positive resource, but currently it is the reason why Armenia-Diaspora relations are hard to discuss: the Diaspora is
Theoretically or conceptually real, but in quotidian practice it consists of deeply fragmented and diverse communities linked only by a few elites – of the Churches, the political parties, the AGBU [the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), founded in 1906 in Cairo by Boghos Nubar Pasha, is philanthropic pan-Armenian association, up to this day, one of the main actors in the Diaspora and Armenia.]

The struggle for Karabagh … and the existence of post-independence Armenia have of course had a very large impact on the Armenian diaspora, but there are no reliable, conclusive studies that show just how. We do not have any pre-independence studies that reliably documented most features of various diaspora communities in a disciplined manner’ (Töloöyan and Papazian, 2014).

Details of the troubled and ultimately failed prosecution are to be found in Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam’s Judgment at Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide Trials (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011.)

In the U.S., ethnic quotas and an ambience of discrimination also prevailed in the 1940s, as portrayed in Elia Kazan’s 1947 Academy Award-winning film Gentlemen’s Agreement. A similar discreet and casual anti-Semitism prevailed in the UK (and other European countries) until at least the late 1970s (and has latterly returned, albeit for somewhat differing reasons).

This repulsion is often connected to the so-called ‘myth of silence’ of the international community (on the part of perpetrators and bystanders) and by turn, with Yael Danieli’s ‘conspiracy of silence’ of survivors (victims) discussed in Chapter 1 and refuted in Cesarani and Sundquist’s After the Holocaust: Challenging the myths of silence (2012). The reaction of the American community, according to Hasia Diner in her 2009 work, We Remember with Reverence and Love: American Jews and the Myth of Silence after the Holocaust, 1945-1962, was also far from silent; she fervently disagrees with the late Peter Novick, whose controversial thesis in his book The Holocaust in American Life (Novick, 2000) alleges that ‘the Holocaust was first marginalized, then came to be centered in American life … as virtually the only common denominator of American Jewish identity in the late twentieth century … [it] filled a need for a consensual symbol’ (Novick, 2000, pp. 6-7).

According to the UN News Center’s press release (United Nations, 2005) ‘General Assembly designates International Holocaust Remembrance Day,’ January 27, 1945 is currently officially recognized as a day of remembrance for Holocaust victims in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany, because it marks the day when an advancing Soviet army liberated the largest Nazi death camp, Auschwitz-Birkenau, in Poland.’

This trend continues: in recent years, two films on the Holocaust have won Best Foreign Film at the Academy Awards; the Polish film Ida (2014), and the Hungarian film Son of Saul (2016). Regarding the former, Hoberman in an article in The Tablet on February 22nd, 2015 (‘Ida wins: The count is now 20 out of 23’) recalls the old adage “‘There’s no business like Shoah business’ … a bitter pun I first heard in the late 1970s, working as intern at YIVO, an institution then primarily staffed by Holocaust survivors and their children,’ and proceeds to detail the statistics of Academy Award-nominated Shoah-related films (Hoberman, 2015).

Son of Saul, although universally praised, also received some extreme criticism. Dan Kagan-Kans, in an article in Mosaic magazine on March 7th, 2016, ‘That Holocaust feeling’ questions the filmmaker’s ‘immersive’, hyper-realistic virtual reality representation and asks ‘why we should apprehend the Holocaust in this especially visceral and immersive way … The important thing is that it would focus not on what the Holocaust felt like but on how to comprehend it, not on the experiential and immersive à la Son of Saul but on the imaginative, intellectual, and moral. Simply to immerse oneself in the mechanics of Auschwitz—what is the point? There is none. Even Son of Saul's makers, in their awkward itch to moralize, however inaptly, acknowledge as much. Judgment, as ever, is all.’ (Kagan-Kans, 2016). John Podhoretz in a response article in the same Mosaic magazine on March 16th, 2016, ‘Why I Don't Watch Holocaust Movies’, finds the act of profit-making from films that deal with the Holocaust deeply offensive, asserting ‘The act of converting the Shoah into a story is itself a violation of its meaning, its force, and its evil’ (Podhoretz, 2016).

As Alvin H. Rosenfeld (2011, p. 15) notes, ‘It is not primarily from the work of historians that most people gain whatever knowledge they acquire of the Third Reich and the Nazi crimes against the Jews, but rather from that of novelists, filmmakers, playwrights, poets, television program writers and producers, museum exhibits …’. 

41 Details of the troubled and ultimately failed prosecution are to be found in Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam’s Judgment at Istanbul: The Armenian Genocide Trials (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011.)
According Rabbi Brant Rosen, writing in the Guardian, Campus BDS activity also receives legitimate political support from anti-Zionist Jews, but the report presents this purely as antisemitism. AMCHA's 'Report on Antisemitic Activity in 2015 at U.S. Colleges and Universities with the largest Jewish undergraduate populations' (AMCHA Initiative, 2016a) claims that 'Recent studies... have suggested alarming rates of antisemitic activity on college and university campuses across the country' and flags 'Targeting of Jewish Students' 'Campus BDS campaigns [which] routinely employ rhetoric and imagery intended to demonize and delegitimize Israel, expression which is consistent with the U.S. State Department definition of antisemitism' (AMCHA Initiative, 2016b).

In the U.S., right wing Jewish organization AMCHA's 'Report on Antisemitic Activity in 2015 at U.S. Colleges and Universities with the largest Jewish undergraduate populations' (AMCHA Initiative, 2016a) claims that 'Recent studies... have suggested alarming rates of antisemitic activity on college and university campuses across the country' and flags 'Targeting of Jewish Students' 'Campus BDS campaigns [which] routinely employ rhetoric and imagery intended to demonize and delegitimize Israel, expression which is consistent with the U.S. State Department definition of antisemitism' (AMCHA Initiative, 2016b).

Meanwhile, liberal Zionist Peter Beinart points out that despite claims in the Wall Street Journal (Yudof and Walter, 2016) and by TruthRevolt (2015) about Vassar College (the latter rates Vassar 10th in the top 10 ‘worst anti-Semitic campuses in the U.S.’) the BDS campaigns there are led by ‘a group of left-wing activists, several of whom are Jewish. One of the most prominent BDS student union activists sits on the board of Vassar’s Jewish Student Union’. ‘(When the fight over BDS is a Jewish civil war: It’s not anti-Semitism that makes pro-Israel Jewish students at Vassar feel uncomfortable, it’s anti-Zionism, sometimes championed by fellow Jews’) (Beinart, 2016).

Other examples of heated interchange over antisemitism and antizionism have occurred in the course of the American Anthropological Association’s ‘vote on the boycott of Israeli academic institutions from April 15 to May 31 [2016] by electronic ballot’ <https://anthroboycott.wordpress.com/> (Anthroboycott, 2017) not to mention targeting of antizionist faculty, including Norman Finkelstein (Cohen, 2007) although Finkelstein would later call time on BDS (Smith, 2015) and also Palestinian-American scholar Steven Salaita, who brought a law suit against the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (‘Salaita v. Kennedy et al’) (Center for Constitutional Rights, 2015) on the withdrawal of the offer of tenure.

Palestine Legal (2015) published a 124-page report on this phenomenon, ‘The Palestine Exception to Free Speech: A movement under attack in the U.S.’ and Jewish Voice for Peace also issued its own report ‘Stifling Dissent’ (Jewish Voice for Peace, 2015). Ali Abunimah, founder of the website Electronic Intifada, dedicates Chapter 6 of The Battle for Justice in Palestine (2014, pp. 169-225) to ‘The War on Campus’, alleging that since antisemitism is low nowadays in the U.S., the David Project has focused its campus advocacy on ‘anti-Israelism’, including recommending witch hunts against academics such as the harassment of Columbia University’s Professor Joseph Massad.

55 Ernst Zündel was deported from Canada where he had lived without naturalisation for 40 years, to stand trial and sentencing for Volksverhetzung (hate speech) in his native Germany. His trial is discussed at length in Robert A. Kahn’s Holocaust Denial and the Law: A comparative study (Kahn, 2004), together with a comparison of the legal systems of Canada, U.S., France, Germany and the U.K. that produced differing legislation and outcomes for controversial Holocaust denials. ‘When the Germans deny the Holocaust, they reawaken doubts that the nation has placed its Nazi past behind it. When the French deny the Holocaust, they revive a debate between those who collaborated and those who resisted the Nazi occupation. … In the United States and Canada, the impetus for prosecutions comes from the large Jewish communities (and Holocaust survivors) who reside there’ (Kahn, 2004, p. 2).

56 On the Underground Archive of the Warsaw Ghetto, also known as the Oyneg Shabes or Ringelblum Archive (after the Sabbath day on which contributors met in secret, and after the historian Emmanuel Ringelblum who coordinated the documentation) the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, Poland, records in 2014 that ‘Until today, the third part of the Archive [on the Jewish Underground], which was to be hidden on 19 April 1943, the night before the outbreak of the uprising in the ghetto, in the brushmaking workshop near the 34 Świętojerska St. (today, the Chinese embassy grounds), was not found. … From the end of the 20th century until the beginning of the 21st century work has been carried on on the preservation and digitization of the documents of the Archive. In the years 2001–2003, a new inventory of the collection was put together. The Ringelblum Archive for over 60 years has been used by historians and yet still the lion’s share of it is little known and requires detailed study. Only a full edition of documents from the Oneg Shabat collections started in the years 1997–2000 and, after a break, continued since 2011, opens new opportunities for Holocaust researchers’ (Blogged at the website of the Jewish Historical Institute, http://www.jhi.pl/en/blog/2014-10-08-ringelblum-archive). However, in an April 22nd 2009 article in Ha’aretz, Jack Khoury (2004) reports that staff at Kibbutz Lohamei Hageta’ot’s Ghetto Fighters Museum (Beit Lohamei Haghetatot) in northern Israel believe that they hold
and have decoded the third archive, ‘Simcha Stein, the museum’s director, said researchers had long been unable to decipher the handwriting in which the so-called Berman Collection [digitalized at <http://infocenters.co.il/gfh/list.asp>] which was an elaborate code. After painstaking research, however, they now believe that the long-searched for third part of the Ringelblum Archive is not hidden in Warsaw, but has actually been in their possession for nearly two decades. “Today, after Sisyphean investigation, we believe it is highly likely that this is indeed the third part of the Warsaw Ghetto archive,” Stein said. … One of the most important documents is the diary of an unidentified girl who hid in a bunker with members of the Resistance. It documents the last six days of the uprising, until virtually the moment German troops burst into her hiding place.’

57 For the latter, the German foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future (Stiftung Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft <http://www.stiftung-evz.de/eng/home.html>) was established only in 2000.

58 See, for example, the Claims Conference on Jewish Material Issues <http://www.claimscon.org/what-we-do/negotiations/open-issues/>

59 ‘Holocaust Reparations: Germany to Pay 772 Million Euros to Survivors’ (Spiegel Online, 2013). The Times of Israel’s David Rising also reports on November 16th, 2012 that ‘Germany increases reparations for Holocaust survivors: In a ceremony at Berlin’s Jewish Museum, finance minister announces help for a rapidly aging, often poverty-stricken population’ (Rising, 2012). Rising cites a comment by former US ambassador to the EU and Claims Conference special negotiator Stuart Eizenstat that he was ‘was very much taken by the degree to which [the Germans] had come to terms with World War II … It’s a very sharp contrast to what Japan has done in recognizing their responsibilities… it’s quite striking,’” and notes in the same article that:

Germany has paid—primarily to Jewish survivors—some $89 billion in compensation overall for Nazi crimes since the agreement was signed in 1952.

In one change to the treaty that Germany agreed to earlier this year, the country will provide compensation payments to a new category of Nazi victims—some 80,000 Jews who fled ahead of the advancing German army and mobile killing squads and eventually resettled in the former Soviet Union. They became eligible Nov. 1 for one-time payments of $3,253. The amendment also formalizes an increase in pensions for Holocaust survivors living in formerly communist eastern Europe to the same as those living elsewhere — $382 per month — from the $255 to $331 they had been receiving.’

60 Reported by Dan Bilefsky in The New York Times, ‘France to Pay Holocaust Survivors Over Deportations’ (Bilefsky, 2014); see also Mémorial de la Shoah (n.d.) ‘Compensation and restitution for Holocaust victims in France’.

Notes for Chapter Four

1 The researcher comes from a feminist peace education background that prefers multiple theoretical perspectives rather than a single, hierarchical framework. With the reservation that all theory is evolutionary, mutable, and contestable, the project has therefore rooted itself in a number of literatures: sociological collective trauma literature, psychological trauma literature, social/political psychology (the two fields frequently overlap) and peace psychology (which often overlaps with social/political psychology), aiming to identify possibilities when applied to intractable conflicts, for which present peacebuilding literature offers no answer. In addition, approaches from critical discourse analysis will be referred to for analysis of national discourse.

2 See, for example, articles linked to by the NPO, the Foundation for the Benefit of Holocaust Victims in Israel (founded in 1994) <http://www.k-shoa.org/?CategoryID=660> (‘New Report paints grim picture of Israel’s Holocaust survivors’ [Sobelman, 2015]; ‘Dichter: Foundation for Holocaust survivors needs private donons’ [Ziri, 2013]; ‘Report: Israel has only five years left for a nationwide push to aid Holocaust survivors’ by Lidar Grave-Lazi [2014]; in 2012, the Foundation was unable to disperse aid, according to a YNet article [Efraim, 2012] ‘Foundation suspends Holocaust survivors’ benefits’).
whole world has so long failed to recognize Palestinians as victims of Zionists. Many also involved in the Holocaust and resent hearing again about Jews as victims of Nazis when the that so few Palestinians visit Yad Vashem. Understandably, many argue that they were not

Emergency Regulations (Absentees’ Property)

homes, and appropriated their land and property under various laws, most importantly the

Notes for Chapter Five

1. ‘The Israeli authorities prevented the internally displaced persons from returning to their homes, and appropriated their land and property under various laws, most importantly the Emergency Regulations (Absentees’ Property) - 1948, and the Absentees’ Property Law – 1950’ notes Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (2011, p. 41).

2. See <http://www.deiryassin.org/pictures.html>, ‘A view from Yad Vashem’: ‘It is unfortunate that so few Palestinians visit Yad Vashem. Understandably, many argue that they were not involved in the Holocaust and resent hearing again about Jews as victims of Nazis when the whole world has so long failed to recognize Palestinians as victims of Zionists. Many also
believe that the Holocaust was (mis)used as a justification or rationalization for the creation of the state of Israel and for the conquest and confiscation of their homes and villages. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate because from Yad Vashem, looking north, is a spectacular panoramic view of Deir Yassin. The Holocaust museum is beautiful and the message “never to forget man’s inhumanity to man” is timeless. The children’s museum is particularly heart wrenching; in a dark room filled with candles and mirrors the names of Jewish children who perished in the Holocaust are read along with their places of birth. Even the most callous person is brought to tears. Upon exiting this portion of the museum a visitor is facing north and looking directly at Deir Yassin. There are no markers, no plaques, no memorials, and no mention from any tour guide. But for those who know what they are looking at, the irony is breath-taking.” (Deir Yassin Remembered, n.d.)

3 According to Salman Abu-Sitta in The Palestine Nakba 1948 ‘A note on the number of refugees’ (http://www.plands.org/en/books-reports/books/the-palestinian-nakba-1948/a-note-on-the-number-of-the-refugees), ‘Using UNRWA records as a guide, the refugees from ‘extra’ villages is 16% or 130,806, giving a total of 935,000 for the 1948 refugees [researcher’s emphasis] (Abu-Sitta, 2000).

To test the accuracy of this figure, let us compare the result with studies by J. Abu-Lughod. She made a careful analysis of British figures and concluded that the refugee population is in the range of 770,000 and 780,000. But her figures include the 1931 figure of 66,000 for Beer Sheba. Curiously this figure has remained static at 66,000 for most studies. If we use the corrected figure of 90,507 in this list as the net refugee population for Beer Sheba, we get 804,000 which is close to our figure. Adding ‘extra’ villages, we get 935,000.

Let us now compare this result with other estimates, quoted by Morris, p. 297. The Israeli estimate is 520,000, which is incredibly low and cannot be substantiated. It is given in order to avoid “hordes of claimants” as “(We) are eventually obliged to accept the return of the refugees”. According to Morris, the Israeli Foreign Ministry admitted that “the real number was close to 800,000”.

The Conciliation Commission on Palestine estimated the number to be 766,000 and the British Foreign Office between 600,000-760,000. A figure which is still widely quoted is 750,000. This figure is an approximation of the figure of 726,000, often found in documents. This figure is patently incorrect. It is based on UN Conciliation Commission document (A/AC.25/Com.Tech/7/Add.1) of 1 April 1949, entitled: Appendix B: “Non-Jewish (sic) Population within the Boundaries held by IDF”. This document gives the figure of 726,800, but it suffers from two basic defects: (1) it quotes the official Village Statistics of April 1945, i.e. it is 4 years behind, and (2) it quotes for Beer Sheba the ever-decreasing number of 53,550. It has therefore to be adjusted for these defects. When so adjusted, it will come to 875,000 and, with the ‘extra’ villages, to about one million.

According to Morris, Arab spokesmen at the time spoke of 900,000 to one million refugees, which was considered by the Israelis as a wild exaggeration. Although the Arab figure does not appear to be based on a rigorous analysis, it turns out to be, after all, not off the mark.

Further analysis of UNRWA records reveal very interesting results about the dispersion of the refugees upon their expulsion. The village population moved en masse to their place of refuge. They first hovered around their village, then moved to the next safe village. Finally they settled in one of the five UNRWA areas. Tracing the movement of the refugees, it was found that fully 72% of all refugees moved to one UNRWA area, and only 20% moved to two areas. Just 8% are dispersed in more than 2 areas. This indicates the monolithic structure of the Palestinian society based on the village unit. This phenomenon is also remarkable given the wars of 1967, 1970 and 1982. As to be expected, refugee movement was largely confined to a particular area grouping as follows: (West Bank and Jordan), (West Bank and Gaza) and (Syria and Lebanon). More than two thirds of the refugees can be found in one of these groups.

Thus in spite of ravages of war and interminable suffering, the Palestinian refugees remain monolithic and traceable to a large degree.”

4 For a discussion of the number of IDPs within Israel and why their numbers may have been neglected, see ‘The Internally Displaced Palestinians in Israel’ by Areej Sabbagh-Khouri in Al-Majdal, Palestinian Citizens of Israel: Defying the Ongoing Nakba, Issue 51, Winter 2012 (Sabbagh-Khoury, 2012).
This socially constructed silence emanates from three factors, according to Winter; firstly, there is ‘liturgical silence’, which is ‘always part of the framing of public understandings of war and violence, since these touch on the sacred, and on eternal themes of loss, mourning, sacrifice and redemption’ (Winter, 2010, p. 4). Then there is ‘political’ or ‘strategic silence’ that may be selected ‘to suspend or truncate open conflict over the meaning and/or justification of violence, either domestic or trans-national. The hope here is that the passage of time can lower the temperature of disputes about these events, or even heal the wounds they cause’ (Winter, 2010, p.5). Finally, there is ‘essentialist silence’, which ‘arises from considerations of privilege … Only those who have been there, so this argument goes, can claim the authority of direct experience required to speak about these matters’ (Winter, 2010, p. 6).

Retorts Daniel Blatman of Morris’s approach, ‘Benny Morris still believes that the role of the historian is no more than to tell his readers what he found in an official archive and in documents issued by some government organization or other. Had the study of the Holocaust, for example, continued to be based on a similar approach – as indeed was the case in German historiography in the 1970s – we would know almost nothing about the Jews’ lives and their efforts to survive during the years of their great tragedy, as we now know thanks to the many testimonies from the survivors themselves.’ (Blatman, 2017).

It is not the goal of this study to take on an account of Palestinian resistance; Yezid Sayigh’s mighty 1997 work, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1920-1993, does that, however, in great depth. For those Palestinians engaged in resistance, it resulted in the ‘transformation of the Palestinian image, from a poor refugee to a revolutionary hero …. Palestinians in the refugee camps spoke about their rebirth as normal human beings after the rise of the resistance in Lebanon… Exile was identified with loss and lack of identity. It was also a lack of dignity, where the Palestinian had no control over his life. Identity was connected and bound to the territory of Palestine. As a result, regaining identity had to be coupled with resistance and struggle’ (Jamal, 2003).


See, for example, ‘Outlawing the Northern Faction of the Islamic Movement - Legal background’ (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015) and Barak Ravid’s ‘Israel outlaws Islamic Movement’s Northern Branch’ (Ravid, 2015).

In the beginning, in April 1945, the Holocaust was not the “Holocaust”’ writes Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander, 2004a, p. 196), describing the slow trickle of information about the atrocities in Nazi-occupied Europe, and the lack of identification with the victims on the part of Americans.

Areej Sabbagh-Khoury and Nadim. M. Rouhana write, ‘Research on the social and political history of the Palestinians in Israel did not address important historical stages in their individual and collective experience. These include, for instance, the critical stage of social and political formation that followed the start of the Nakba and the period of military

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rule (i.e., the stage in which the Palestinians were transformed from a majority into a minority in their own homeland, and from its owners into strangers in it). This stage had a central effect on the configuration of their social identity and social structure, the formulation of their political organizations, and the formulation of their political discourse during that period—as well as on laying the foundation for their future political consciousness. Furthermore, Palestinians did not write their own social or political history during the period of military rule that Israel imposed on them until 1966—the critical period in which the Palestinians lost connection with their people and the Arab nation and environment. In this period, Israel also imposed strict means of control in order to dispossess them of their resources, and to tighten political domination, obstruct nationalist political organization, impose intellectual hegemony, and instill fear of the security establishment’. (Sabbagh-Khoury and Rouhana, 2011, p. 10).

Sorek notes that the emergency regulations also led to the killing of ‘between 2,700 and 5,000 Palestinians’, mostly trying to return home from their land after curfew, including the massacre of Kafr Qasim (October 29, 1956) (Sorek, 2015, loc. 955). Forty-nine men, women and children were killed in the latter atrocity, as Adel Manna discusses (Manna, 2011, p. 76).


According to the right-wing NGO Monitor (https://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/zochrot/) Zochrot funders include Christian Aid, Jewish Voice for Peace and Oxfam.

According to its website, ‘Zochrot and other Israeli NGOs have been fairly successful over the past few years in raising the Nakba to the awareness of the broad Jewish public. The term ‘Nakba’ has become part and parcel of current Israeli discourse; nevertheless, its mere presence still does not mean broad acknowledgement of and accountability for the destruction of hundreds of villages and resulting hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees in the 1948 War.’ (‘Our vision’, <http://zochrot.org/en/content/17> (Zochrot, 2014).

Al Jazeera in Arabic began broadcasting in 1996.
The concept initially emerged through social media, according to a report by Maram Humaid (Humaid, 2018) ‘We want to return to our lands without bloodshed or bombs’: ‘Abu Artema then posted a message on his Facebook page asking people whether they would be interested in a peaceful border protest. The majority of responses applauded the idea, which quickly gained traction and received the backing of Palestinian political parties in the Strip, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah and leftist parties.’

One report quotes Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as saying that the Great March of Return will transform into a general intifada and will continue beyond May 15th ‘The series of weekly violent Palestinian protests known as the March of Return will not end on … Nakba Day, but will continue through Ramadan, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh said this week. Attending a meeting of religious clerics ahead of the month-long fast of Ramadan, which commences May 16, Haniyeh said the protests would not end, as originally planned, as they have “strategic goals.” He did not lay out any specific goals. … Haniyeh added furthermore that the protests would no longer be isolated to the Gaza border and would spread throughout Judea and Samaria.’ (Hamas: March of Return to Continue Through Ramadan, Spread to West Bank.’ [JLBWC Staff, 2018]) The article draws on data from the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il>) (IDF Spokesperson’s Office, 2018) but the comment about indefinite continuance of the Great March of Return can be verified on Hamas’ homepage, ‘He [Haniyeh] confirmed that the peaceful protests would continue after the Nakba Day on May 15 until Palestinians regain their fundamental rights and return to their homelands’ (‘Hamas: Palestinians’ right to return to homeland is inalienable’, 28th April, 2018, <http://hamas.ps/en/post/1286/hamas-palestinians-right-to-return-to-homeland-is-inalienable>). Finally, OCHA (on May 18th 2018) suggests that the demonstrations are set to run until Naksa Day, June 5th (<https://www.ochaopt.org/content/56-palestinians-reported-injured-during-demonstrations-gaza-first-friday-ramadan>) but as we now know, there appears to be no end date in sight.

B’tselem executive director Hagai El-Ad wrote to UN Secretary General António Guterres sharing the names of the victims (publicized in this campaign) and condemning ‘the 35 Palestinians killed and 1,500 injured by live ammunition … the predictable outcome of the manifestly illegal rules of engagement implemented during the demonstrations, of ordering soldiers to use lethal gunfire against unarmed demonstrators who pose no mortal danger. These orders are unlawful under both international law and Israeli law. Responsibility for these fatal outcomes rests with the policy makers and – above all – with Israel’s prime minister, defense minister and chief of staff.’ El-Ad called for the UN to ‘do all in its power – and its responsibility – in order to protect Palestinian lives and uphold international norms.’ <https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files2/publication/20180426_GazaKillings_B%27TselemlLetter_eng> (El-Ad, 2018). As a result, according Israel Hayom, Israel’s ‘national service program suspend[ed] the organization’s eligibility for volunteers, saying campaign violated the law’. (Altman and Israel Hayom Staff, 2018; ‘Rights group B’Tselem loses volunteers after calling for IDF insubordination’.

The post appears on May 3rd, 2018 at https://www.facebook.com/gershon.baskin/posts/10160275190200366

22 The message on Israeli peace activist Gershon Baskin’s Facebook page is:
Gaza sends messages of peace to Israelis
We want freedom
We want peace
We want to live in safety
We want to lift the siege
We want justice and democracy
We want to live equally
We want to live in dignity
The right to travel and travel
Right to treatment
Right to education
The post appears on May 4th, 2018 at: <https://www.facebook.com/gershon.baskin/posts/10160279975250366>

23 The post appears on May 5th, 2018 at: <https://www.facebook.com/gershon.baskin/posts/10160281225100366>
One of the commentators, Rachel Ben-Shitrit, attempted to translate the clip (from Arabic to Hebrew):

'I'll try to translate.
The first woman to speak: the message is a message of peace.
We came here to the border and flew 150 pigeons to send a message to the world and to Israel. We are teenagers with no connection to a political party, sending a message of peace and love. We don't want wars, we don't want people to be killed, we don't want blood. We want to go back to our country through justice.
The second woman: the pigeons represent peace, and so we want to send a message to the other side via these pigeons that people in Gaza are a democratic people, seeking freedom and peace. We want to live in freedom like the rest of the Arab nations.
- sorry for my inaccuracies, my Arabic is not fluent. But I tried as well as I could.'
[Researcher’s translation, from Hebrew to English.]

Notes for Chapter Six


'11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.'.

3 Comments Teitelbaum, ‘The Lebanese continued to present problems with respect to the refugee issue. They did not accept that Resolution 194 offered the possibility of compensation, and were determined to have a specific paragraph against Palestinian resettlement (in Arabic, tawtin) in Lebanon’ (2009, p. 12).

4 On this, Podeh (2007) observes, ‘First, [the API] was not directed at the Israeli government. Based on their hard-line and aggressive image of Sharon, the Saudis assessed that he would immediately reject it; the Initiative was aimed at the peace camp in Israel, with the hope that it would either exert political pressure on the government to accept it or would trigger a change in government. Second, the Saudis hoped that the UN Security Council would endorse the Initiative. Such a step would enable the replacement of UN Resolution 242, which was perceived as inappropriate and too pro-Israel, since it did not relate to Palestinian rights and did not specify the withdrawal of Israel from all the territories.

Notes for Chapter Seven

1 Nets-Zehngut (2016, pp. 49-50) categorizes the forms neatly as ‘popular memory, defined as representations of the past held by society members, best manifested directly in public opinion surveys … official memory—the representations of the past adopted by the formal institutions of the group. … cultural memory—the way the society views its past via, inter alia, newspaper articles, memorials, monuments, films and buildings'.