



Sida Helpdesk on Human Security



Human Security in Mali

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Section A: The assignment

Background

The context in Mali has changed considerably in the last few years. Progress on poverty eradication, growth and democratization was stalled as conflict erupted in 2012 but resumed in 2013 and is now slowly getting back on track. A preliminary agreement was signed in 2013 setting the frame for peace talks that are still on-going with Algeria as chief mediator. In spite of these negotiations, violent clashes and attacks by armed groups continue in the northern regions of the country. The post-conflict setting in Mali has created new challenges for the Swedish development cooperation portfolio.

Sweden's development work in Mali is currently guided by the strategy for development cooperation with Mali, 2004-2006, prolonged until 2015. This strategy has the overall aim to create opportunities for poor women and men to improve their livelihood conditions within three main cooperation areas: Pro-poor sustainable growth; Democratic governance and social development; and Sustainable development of the natural resource management sectors. A draft proposal for a five -year cooperation strategy with Mali has been developed, and is under consideration. It includes three main results areas: Democratic governance, gender and human rights; Natural resources, environment, climate and resilience; and Human security.

The requested Helpdesk study will be in support of the operationalization of the proposed result strategy, in particular the anticipated new Results Area **Human security**. This Results Area may focus on reconciliation and access to justice, but a wide range of possible issue areas within Human Security are open to consideration. The proposed strategy further aims to explore regional initiatives, as many causes and constraints to building security in Mali are regional in nature.

Based on an understanding of present and future trends and issues in the field of human security in Mali, the Helpdesk is requested to research and prepare a study of potential areas where Sweden could usefully consider developing its support for human security in Mali, under the proposed new Human Security Results area. The initial written ToRs for this study particularly highlighted issues on reconciliation, access to justice and transitional justice, but subsequent guidance from the Swedish embassy in Bamako during a tele-conference clarified that the Helpdesk is requested to address the range of potential human security options for priorities and programmes within the Sweden's new Human Security Results Area. In this context, the study should identify and comment on the capacities and relevance of key stakeholders (state actors, private sector actors, international and national NGOs, likeminded donors and international organizations) that could be potential cooperation/ implementation partners in the upstart and expansion of this new portfolio. Recognising the limitations and constraints of a desk-based study by the Helpdesk, the study should aim at least to provide suggestions of approaches and organisations by which Sida and the Swedish Embassy may be

able to follow-up the potential to support programmes in human security issue areas of interest. Examples of human security projects and programmes in similar geopolitical contexts, in particular in neighbouring countries in the Sahel, could be referred to if deemed relevant for Mali. Finally, it is important that the study includes an analysis of how the Human security sector can complement the other sectors in the strategy (as well as ongoing contributions /programmes) to build synergies within the overall Swedish development cooperation engagement in Mali.

Author: Owen Greene; with inputs from Jens Schjörlien and from a variety of contacts with recent Mali field experience

Section B: Analysis, Issues and Recommendations concerning the development of a new Results Area to enhance Human Security in Mali

Introduction

In Section B, we present our analyses and findings in relation to each of the issues in the Terms of Reference for this Helpdesk study. We examine the issues and options for developing the Human Security results area in some detail, subject to the constraints of a limited, desk-based study. In doing so, we have taken into account a wide range of documentation and other information, including the documentation supplied to the Helpdesk by the Swedish Embassy in Bamako.

We begin with a brief contextual discussion of the current situation in Mali as it relates to Human Security (HS) priorities, and framing the development of a new Human Security Results Area in Sweden's future development co-operation with Mali. In doing so, we assume readers' overall familiarity with the Mali context, drawing for example from the Helpdesk's Report 'Conflict Analysis Mapping of Mali' (submitted in August 2014) and the conflict analyses included in this mapping,¹ and also on more recent analyses of the development of the Mali Peace Accord and the challenges of development and security building.²

The following sub-sections examine in turn potential priority issue areas for developing Sweden's co-operation programmes to promote and improve human security in Mali. This is done first in relation to developing relatively self-standing areas of Sweden's aid support in the context of a new Human Security Results Area. Then we examine opportunities for developing the human security dimension either in close synergy or as a cross-cutting issues with Sweden's other planned results areas; 'natural resources, environment, climate and resilience', and 'democratic governance, gender and human rights'. In each subsection, we take into account existing or planned programmes in Mali - so far as the Helpdesk has information about them on the basis of a desk-based study - and discuss the potential for Sweden to support or complement these. We also draw on experience with similar programmes in other Sahara-Sahel countries and in other regions. The Report concludes with some final remarks, including confirmation that we stand ready of request to further clarify or elaborate. At the end, we provide a summary of the main suggestions and recommendations contained in this Report.

¹ Helpdesk of Human Security, *Conflict Analyses Mapping of Mali*, final revised report August 2014

² There are many such analyses - see for example: ICG; Mali: *la Paix a marche forcee?*, Africa Report No 226, 2 Mai 2015; R. Reeve, *Devils in the Detail: implementing Mali's New Peace Accord*; Oxford Research Group, March 2015; G. Nyirabikali, Mali Peace Accord: actors, issues and their representations, SIPRI, 28 August 2015; G Nyirabikali et al, *Causes et Manifestations des Conflits au Mali: une perspective de la societe civile*; SIPRI 2015.

Human Security in Mali: context and scope

The severity and extent of problems of poverty, insecurity and fragility within Mali and across its Sahara-Sahel borderlands are well-known: they are intense and complex. They also have a long history. The significant progress and positive expectations in at least some sectors of Mali development in the 10-15 years after the Peace Accords in the mid-1990s were constrained by state fragility and resumption of bad, clientelist, governance. They then suffered a severe set-back after the military coup and Tuareg/northern rebellion in 2012, and subsequent further large-scale insecurity, population displacements, humanitarian emergencies, and stabilisation operations. Recovery programmes have received wide international support since 2013, and development programmes have been able to resume in parts of the country. Elections have successfully been held.

However, it is only with the signing on 20 June 2015 of the new Mali Peace Accord by the Mali Government, the Platform of armed groups (the Platform), and most of the Co-ordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) that a framework is in place for sustainable peace, security and development in Mali. Although some 85% of the Mali population live in the South of the country, both experience and analysis show that without progress towards inclusive peace and development that addresses needs and aspirations of the peoples in Timbouctou, Gao and Kidal regions, Mali will remain profoundly fragile, insecure and poor. This is re-inforced by increased political, humanitarian and (in)security linkages between central (Mopti and even Segou) and northern Mali during 2014-15.

We are confident that the Swedish government is not only fully aware of these priorities, but also is already actively engaged in contributing to addressing them— for example through diplomacy and by chairing development sector donor groups concerning northern Mali. However, the Peace Accord remains extremely fragile. For example, intense international pressure was required to persuade key CMA armed groups to sign the Mali Peace Accord by June 2015; levels of commitment to (and shared interpretation of) the Peace Accord are uncertain; confidence is low; and the Accord is vague on many key aspects of its implementation.³

Stabilisation and terrorism prevention challenges are expected (by the Helpdesk, and many others) to endure in the medium-long term at least in Kidal, much of Gao, and in the borderlands with Algeria and Niger. There is a real risk that Mopti as well as much of

³ Op cit

Timbouctou will similarly remain highly insecure, unless local as well as national peace-building initiatives progress.

In addition to the direct challenges of stabilisation and risks of terrorism, this context implies that the tensions between international priorities of short-term stabilisation and counter-terrorism and support for longer-term peace-building and tackling sources of underlying fragility will remain vibrant. This is important, because much of the Malian governing elite and southern Malian population appear to remain unconvinced of the need to make major concessions to the needs and aspirations of the Northern Malian peoples. Unless the international community remains consistently committed to pressing for major reforms to address northern peoples' legitimate concerns, there is a risk that progress towards stabilisation and enhanced levels of development aid for Mali will be used by Malian elites (including some interested Northern groups) to reproduce the patterns of governance and distribution of political-economic benefits that have made Mali so fragile since its independence.

Within this overall context, it is clear that there are many human security issues and challenges to be addressed in contemporary Mali. This is enhanced by the broad scope of the concept of human security. In principle, human security issues in Mali relate to many issues, including:

- a) insecurity from violence and coercion associated with not only the wider conflicts that the 2015 Mali Peace Accord seeks to address but also with local or regional conflicts between or within local or ethnic communities, including cross-border processes and transnational violent jihadi networks or transnational processes, well as crime, domestic violence, and gender-based violence (GBV);
- b) inadequate protection or access to justice from severe abuses of human rights, discrimination, illegal expropriation, and injustice, particularly for marginal or vulnerable groups – including women, youth, displaced people, and local minorities – as well as from risks of violence, injustice and coercion resulting from bad governance or inadequate systems for peaceful settlement of disputes;
- c) humanitarian emergency issues, severe poverty, food and water insecurity, or exclusion from critical natural resources or public services.

There are high and widespread problems and needs throughout virtually all of Mali under each of the above broad headings. In practice, in the context of wider Swedish and Sida policy and programming frameworks – in Mali and globally - we understand that Sweden's proposed new Human Security results area for Mali is *not* intended to focus directly on addressing the third of the above issue areas -humanitarian emergency needs, severe poverty or food or water insecurity, or access to, and resilience of, natural resources or most public services. Rather, we are requested in this Study to examine the potential and options for Sweden to develop a new Results Area for the Mali strategy that addresses selected issues under issue areas a) and b) outlined above; including such issues where they relate to the other two expected Results Areas ('natural resources, environment, climate and resilience' and 'democratic governance,

gender and human rights'). The next sub-sections of this Report therefore explore options on possible programming areas within the framework outlined in this sub-section.

Possible Programming Areas within a 'Human Security' Results Area in Sweden's forthcoming Five Year Development Co-operation Strategy for Mali.

The following sub-sections discuss, in turn, specific areas of possible programme support by Sweden within a Human Security results area, within Sweden's next five year strategy for development co-operation with Mali. Each sub-section addresses a selected issue area within the scope of Human Security issue clusters a) and b) outlined above – selected according to whether, in our assessment, they merit substantial consideration for potential programme support by Sweden/Sida in the Mali context over the next five years.

Contributing to Peace Building and Reconciliation

As discussed, the June 2015 Mali Peace Accord provides an important but fragile framework for peace-building in Mali. It is important that Sweden, and its international and donor partners, provide active support for peace building and associated confidence-building and reconciliation processes in Mali. Overall, this requires peace-building work simultaneously at all levels: national; across the north, centre and south of the country; within each region and district in Mali, within and between communities, and in the borderlands with neighbouring Sahara-Sahel countries. In this context, it is preferable that support from Sweden in this issue area include support for local as well as national peace-building processes, and includes support for peacebuilding in Timbouctou, Gao, and Mopti as well as more readily accessible southern regions.

Such peace-building activities and programmes directly address the aspects of human security identified under bullet point a) in the previous section, and contribute indirectly to all of the other aspects of human security. Sweden's Human Security Results Area would therefore be hard to justify if it did not include support for key aspects of peace-building, confidence-building and reconciliation.

Moreover, it can build on several existing and recent peace-building programmes for which Sweden has provided support. These included not only diplomatic support for the Peace Accord negotiation process and Sweden's contributions to the UN mission, but also, for example, support by Sweden and other donors for: SIPRI & CONASCIPAL's 'Strengthening Civil Society Contributions to Peace, Security and Development in Mali'; Interpeace's 'Inclusive dialogue for the effective implementation of agenda for peace and reconciliation in Mali'; contributions to the 'Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme'; Cordaid's civil society network programme 'Civil Society for a Human Security Strategy in

Mali'; University of Lund studies on conflict and reconstruction in Mali, and aspects of relevant UNDP post-conflict recovery programmes.

There are therefore in principle many options for Sweden to consider in relation to support for peace-building and associated reconciliation and confidence-building processes. In practice, the options are more limited, according to criteria including: availability of capable and effective implementing partners; limits on Sweden's human as well as financial resources for support with appropriate oversight and review; the challenges of designing and implementing peace-building initiatives that are sustainable and conflict sensitive in the Mali context; and ensuring appropriate balance.

We first discuss possible options and approaches to support peacebuilding processes at the national level, and then subsequently discuss possible support for local or community-level peace-building. As will be discussed, there are probably more opportunities at more local levels, but these may pose greater problems in identification, implementing partner selection and donor oversight.

Extending and Deepening National Peace-building processes

The process of further developing and implementing the 2015 Mali Peace Accord at a national level is a prime focus for complex international diplomacy and resources. Although it is very important, the Helpdesk is not aware of any specific gaps of support for the national negotiation process for which Sweden's development assistance could be needed or influential.

However, there certainly continues to be an urgent need to widen engagement in the wider national peacebuilding process beyond the Government of Mali and the political/military leadership of the armed groups and sub-clans of the Platform and CMA represented at the Peace Accord negotiations. In this context, support for civil society groups and for networks of informal/traditional authorities, women and youth to contribute to sustainable national peace-building remain important and fully justified.

Similarly, taking into account that international and regional stabilisation and peacebuilding missions are likely to continue to be needed in Mali for at least the next five years, it is important to consider ways to enhance the extent to which such missions implement UNSC 1325 principles, and are aware and capable of human security priorities in their training and operations. These issues are now briefly discussed below.

Support for Civil Society Networks for National Peace-Building in Mali

The Helpdesk has reviewed available documentation and outputs relating to some civil society national peace-building projects in Mali that have received support from Sweden, including those involving SIPRI, Interpeace, Cordaid, and International Alert. In line with the constraints of this short desk-based study with its wider ToRs, this review does not aim to provide a well-informed evaluation. Instead we aim simply to raise some issues for consideration by Sida/Sweden embassy for future funding in this issue area in Mali. Please

note that this subsection focuses on civil society initiatives that are focussed on contributing to national peace-building – we discuss initiatives for local peace-building separately below.

All of the above civil society peace-building projects appear to have been designed and launched on the well-founded understanding that there is potentially significant public space to enable civil society groups and networks in Mali to engage in dialogues and activities relating to peace-building and reconciliation. But that they are generally relatively weak and fragmented in their capacities and approaches towards peace-building in contemporary Mali. Further Swedish support for civil society studies, dialogues, capacity-building and networks can help to overcome such limitations and enable significant civil society engagement with national peace-building processes – at least in the medium term.

In this context, the development of more inclusive civil society networks is a particular priority, in which northern-based civil society groups can dialogue and co-operate with those from Bamako and the range of areas across Southern and Central Mali, and thus help to contribute to shared understandings and peace-building.

We believe that this rationale is good, and justifies continued support for such civil society programmes to support national peace-building and reconciliation capacities in Mali under a Human Security results area. However we raise the following issues for consideration by Sida as it considers whether and how to support specific proposals.

It is not clear how these civil society peacebuilding network projects aim to connect with, and influence, 'track 1' discussions and processes for the consolidation and implementation of the Mali Peace Accord, the Mali National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) and related national peace-building processes. Wider experience with civil society peacebuilding networks indicates that it can be hard to maintain initial momentum after the formation of such networks unless they progress to develop specific foci for collective advocacy or direct peace-building engagement.

For example, we have studied SIPRI's concept note for follow-on project 'Enabling civil society action towards a durable peace in Mali' (dated 4 March 2015) – provided to us by Sida/Embassy. Although we are broadly sympathetic to this draft proposal, it is remarkably vague on the foci for supporting direct peacebuilding engagements and other key issues. It focuses on developing wider civil society buy-in to the 'Strategic Vision for Civil Society contributions to Peacebuilding in Mali' that the SIPRI project partners developed during the first phase of this project, and providing a platform for discussions around the country on how this vision could be operationalised. Although logical in itself, in a follow-on project we would have hoped for more focus, and it risks remaining relatively detached from wider national peace-building dialogues, or how civil society-government agency dialogues and co-operation might be nurtured. (We recognise that the proposal may well have been further developed by now).

The Interpeace/IMRAP follow-on project concept note ('Phase 2 of Inclusive National Dialogue for the effective implementation of the Agenda for peace and reconciliation in Mali, dated January 2015) is more developed and specific on such matters, and its objective to consolidate a national multi-level permanent 'architecture' for peace-building dialogues sounds promising, but again it is important to develop clarity on how best to influence national level processes.

The justification for supporting civil society research capacities and projects as part of civil society peace-building in Mali needs more elaborated focus. Such research projects can aim to: be starting points for collaboration to build bridges across civil society divides; provide analyses that provide a basis for dialogue; use for advocacy purposes; develop analytical capacities to enable civil society networks to better design peace-building initiatives in specific contexts, and to ensure that these are conflict sensitive; or better inform external actors (such as Government agencies or donors) about contexts or opportunities. However, as civil society dialogues or peace-building initiatives begin to mature, it is important to ensure clarity about which of these objectives are being addressed. At present, it is not clear which of these objectives are important in some of the 'peace-building' projects, risking the effectiveness of research components.

Joining-up civil society initiatives that are intended to contribute to national peacebuilding. Sweden and its partners have supported several promising civil society initiatives to contribute to national peace-building, including those mobilised and supported by SIPRI, Interpeace and International Alert and their regional and local civil society partners. If these are to develop effective influence in national peace-building processes, including the implementation and further development of the 2015 Mali Peace Accord, then they need to be encouraged to enhance co-ordination, and agreement on some areas of collaboration, shared advocacy goals, or division of labour.

As discussed below, we suggest that the time is ripe for Sweden to complement support for national level civil society peacebuilding engagement with more focus on local and community level peace-building, in selected areas.

Promoting UNSC 1325 Implementation in Mali

Sweden has an international reputation for promoting implementation of UNSC 1325, and has presumably been doing so in relation to MINUSMA and other peace missions in Mali since 2013. Our main assessment here is that Sweden should assume that such missions will continue in Mali for at least the next five years, and thus it make sense to consider ways of enhancing human security in Mali by promoting their capacities and roles in protection, participation and empowerment of women and girls in the peace-building and reconstruction

processes. There is much evidence that this is likely to be particularly needed in the Mali context.⁴

There are a range of possible options for doing this, and this desk-based study is not well-positioned for developing specific proposals.

One option is to support for the further development of awareness and training on UNSC1325 implementation at the International Peace-Keeping Training Institute in Bamako. This could be in the context of wider engagement with this Institute to enhance the quality of training on key aspects of peacebuilding, including at community levels, confidence-building, and engagement with youth, women, girls and customary authorities.

Another option is particularly to support the engagement of women in national as well as local peace-building initiatives within the framework of the civil society peace-building initiatives discussed above, including for example in the National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR). We are aware that this is already referenced amongst the objectives of existing civil society initiatives that Sweden has supported, but there appears to be scope for further development in this area.

National initiatives for transitional justice

There were gross abuses of human rights and humanitarian law perpetrated by all sides of the conflicts during 2012-13, and also some subsequently. In this context, there are justifiable calls for transitional justice mechanisms. The Helpdesk is sympathetic in principle to such calls, but cautious in practice in the present Mali context. The process of implementing and further developing the Mali National Peace Accord is likely to remain very fragile, as outlined above. In this context, national initiatives for transitional justice should be led by development of, and agreements within, the national peace accord process. The Swedish embassy is better positioned than the Helpdesk to track local debates about the options in this area, and may wish to consult with members of the Mali National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR).

However, on the basis of the information available to the Helpdesk, we are cautious about recommending that Sweden supports national transitional justice initiatives unless they command some acceptance amongst key parties to the Accord. This is not to neglect the issue of transitional justice more widely. As discussed below, we recommend that Sweden stands ready to support such processes within local or community-level peace-building initiatives, where they become important for context specific reconciliation efforts.

Enhancing peace-building training in relevant peace-keeping training institutes

⁴ See for example, the discussion of gender discrimination in Mali in N. Sow and M. Ag Erless, *Society and Culture in Mali: problems of change*, International Alert/Movement Malivaleurs, 2014.

This option has already been noted in the context of possible support for the International Peace-Keeping Training Institute in Bamako, in the context of UNSC 1235 promotion. But there may be scope to enhance human security by improving the training and awareness of local and regional military and police units of the opportunities for supporting local and wider peace-building in their roles in peace-keeping missions in Mali. Although this is at least a medium-term objective, this is appropriate because it is likely that international and regional peace missions will continue to be needed in Mali for at least a further five years.

Supporting Local-level Peace-building Processes

Conflicts and conflict risks are complex, overlapping and serious through much of Mali and its borderlands, at all levels: within and between local communities; between sedentary or 'indigenous' and displaced peoples, recent settlers, or pastoralists; between government authorities and dissatisfied or competing groups within the South, Centre and North of Mali; 'north-south' tensions; and in relation to transnational and cross-border processes with neighbouring states. This implies urgent need for confidence-building, reconciliation and peace-building activities at all levels and in almost all localities. It also implies many potential opportunities for Sweden to offer support to local peace-building; but also serious challenges for donors in terms of selection and oversight of local peace-building initiatives and implementing partners.

At local and community levels in Mali, traditional, customary or informal authorities and leaders typically play the most important local or community governance and dispute management roles and mechanisms. Engagement of, and with, such authorities is thus likely to be vital for sustainable success of reconciliation or peace-building within and between most communities. Though its recent support for civil society peace-building initiatives – such as the SIPRI project – Sweden has already helped to build the capacity of networks of traditional leaders in Mali, and thus has a basis for taking such initiatives further.

However, it is important to avoid idealising such informal authorities, or placing unrealistic expectations on their capacities. In context of conflicts, or rapid demographic, developmental and societal change, their capacities and legitimacy will be affected, and often challenged or undermined. In clientalist states such as Mali, there are usually complex informal relationships between customary and state authorities and institutions, which can be highly context dependent. Moreover, even in highly fragile states, with weak or dysfunctional formal government institutions, experience across a variety of such countries shows that formal state institutions and decision-makers usually have more than enough capacity to disrupt or block civil society peace-building initiatives with which they are uncomfortable. This implies that effective local peace-building requires the development of cooperation between formal and informal authorities in the relevant localities, with endorsement (or at least toleration) from more senior provincial or traditional leaders.

Community level peace-building also requires wider mobilisation and engagement with other types of actors and sectors of society. Skilled national or international NGOs may play key facilitating roles. Youth need to be involved, for a variety of reasons, including the youthful

demographics of Mali and most other African states, and the risk factors typically associated with marginalised or frustrated young men in a context where powerful actors may be interested in recruitment into armed groups. Women need to be involved, not only because of their potential to contribute to conflict reduction or bridge-building in many contexts, but also because reconciliation between traditional male authorities often proves to be unsustainable if the women in the community remain unreconciled to the peace. Moreover, from a wider human security perspective, it is important that peace-building is an inclusive process rather than simply an agreement involving traditional and formal political leaders. Otherwise there is a risk not only the peace-building arrangements prove unsustainable but also that large sectors of society will not benefit from them as they should.

This approach reflects international best practices, based on lessons-learned as well as peaceful inclusive principles. It is this inclusive peace-building approach, that has been developed and promoted through the SIPRI, Interpeace and other recent civil society peacebuilding supported by Sweden and its partners in Mali since 2013. However, the documentation available to the Helpdesk from these civil society peace-building initiatives focusses on the programmes at national or regional civil society network levels, and does not provide substantial information on the extent to which these initiatives now provide a good basis for local or specific inter-community peacebuilding. They are also unclear about the extent to which they have developed good links required for sustainable peacebuilding with relevant local state authorities and institutions.

Nevertheless, the Helpdesk is reasonably confident that a review of (geographical and identity group) concentrations and local capacities of such existing civil society organisations and networks would quickly reveal that there is now a basis for launching initiating peace-building initiatives in a number of regions and localities of Mali. Some necessary (though not sufficient) criteria for such initiatives include:

- existence of concentrations of civil society ‘peace-builder’s’ capacity, networks and local entry-points involving an appropriate mix of traditional/customary authorities and civil society groups/NGOs with strong representation of women and youth within the region/locality that cross relevant societal or community ‘conflict’ divisions;
- Strong potential for developing at least working links and ‘in principle’ endorsement for local peace-building initiatives with local state authorities and with relevant traditional leaders;
- Availability of national or international civil society capacity to help to facilitate and sustain such a local initiative; including through their good contacts with national authorities and with donors.

The Helpdesk recommends that Sweden encourages its civil society peace-building partners to conduct such a review, if they have not already done so, in order to identify whether and where the conditions realistically exist to mobilise and sustain one or more local peace-building initiatives in identified localities.

Where possibilities are identified, the Helpdesk recommends that Sweden consider actively supporting work to specifically consult with stakeholders and to examine possible approaches towards, and phasing of, a peace-building initiative in that area. This should include an analysis of the relevant conflict issue and dynamics, and of stakeholder interests and concerns. It is important that local and/or inter-community peace initiatives are carefully designed and implemented through a consultative approach, in the context of Mali or any other conflict affected fragile state.

In this context, it is important to consider the extent to which issues of transitional justice should be clearly integrated into any peace-initiatives that receive support from Sweden. In the initial ToRs for this study, this issue was highlighted. Our strong recommendation is that decisions on this need to be highly context specific. Although reconciliation processes often require some form of transitional justice, it is important that the key local stakeholders determine the character or phasing of this dimension of peace-building.

So far in this discussion we have deliberately avoided discussing particular geographical areas. This depends on the outcome of the review of potential opportunities for local peacebuilding initiatives. However, it is important that Sweden aims to develop a relatively balanced portfolio of support for local peace-building initiatives, ensuring for example, that wider ‘north-south’ balance is apparent.

On the basis of the limited information available to this desk-based study, the Helpdesk recommends that efforts are made to identify and develop local inter-community peace-building initiatives in at least two of the following areas - Timbouctou, Mopti, Segou and Gao – as well as in other areas where opportunities exist (such as Sikasso). Constructive local peace-building initiatives in some of these four regions could have a wider symbolic significance for the wider national peace accord process.

We recognise that the Swedish Embassy in Bamako has limited capacity for project management and oversight in the areas of peace-building, as for other sectors where it provides support. In this context, it is important to identify capable implementing partners to co-ordinate and support such local peace-building initiatives.

There are several potential international civil society organisations that are well positioned to undertake such work if they are willing to do so. These include SIPRI, InterPeace and International Alert and their local civil society partners – and there are other potential candidates. *After reflection, we recommend that Sweden remains open to the possibility of supporting more than one of these types of organisations in such work.* It appears to be a feature of the various civil society peace-building initiatives in Mali supported by Sweden and others since 2013 that they are quite fragmented, and overlap in complex ways. It is likely to be more effective for the implementation partners with the best relationships and capacities in each of the localities selected to facilitate the relevant local peace-building initiative, than to simply select one international civil society organisation in a national competitive tender.

In addition to capacities to support and facilitate peace-building initiatives in the selected localities, it is important to ensure appropriate links and communications with local and national authorities. Local peace-initiatives are not sustainable, or properly legitimate, if they do not involve formal authorities in appropriate ways. The Swedish embassy will, in our judgement, be needed to facilitate relationship-building between civil society and local and national state authorities for such local peace initiatives; at least through diplomatic support and accompaniment at key meetings with political or state authorities.

In our early consultations with the Swedish embassy in Bamako, it was suggested that the Helpdesk considers the possibility of establishing a local peace-building initiative funding mechanism, whereby SIPRI or another civil society implementing partners could manage the selection and disbursement of numerous small grants to local civil society groups to support local peace-building initiatives. We have done so.

We are supportive in principle of such an approach; but we believe that it requires clearer focus, guidelines and facilitation capacity in order to have significant prospect of success. Thus, for example, such an approach could be useful as a mechanism to support civil society ‘next steps’ work to conduct the detailed review, consultations and analysis required to develop the basis for launching a local peace-building initiative in a particular area or between selected communities in conflict. However, we doubt that this approach would be sufficient to effectively support local peace-building initiatives once they are launched. As discussed above, these require involvement of key local and national state authorities, and key community authorities and leaders, as well as of a full set of civil society groups that are committed to peace-building. This is likely to require more active support and facilitation by capable international or national implementing partners than a simple funding mechanism would imply or provide.

The Helpdesk was requested to include consideration of the role of the private sector in human security programming in Mali. Experience shows that local business people (or local representatives of national or international enterprises) often have both interest and capacity to support and sustain local peace and security initiatives. Where this is the case, their involvement should be encouraged and accepted by Sweden’s implementing partners, as implied by the requirements of maintain an inclusive approach. However beyond this, in our judgement, approaches towards private sector actors should be very context specific, and not particularly singled out or promoted.

Before ending this sub-section we also highlight an alternative approach towards supporting local or inter-community peace-building. This is to develop the conflict prevention and peace-building dimensions of programmes that Sida or others are supporting in relation natural resource governance, democratic governance and human rights, or other development aid sectors. This option is discussed separately in a sub-section below, and in our view offers equally attractive possibilities to specific local peace-building initiatives.

Enhancing Access to Justice

The overall justice sector is in crisis in Mali. In some ways this has been an enduring systematic crisis. In addition, programmes prior to 2012 to develop and improve the formal justice system which appeared to be making progress before the recent conflict suffered severe setbacks during the conflict and up to today. This is the case not only in terms of management systems, expert human resources and physical infrastructure but also in terms of public reputation and legitimacy. It is particularly the case in the north and centre of the country, but applies across the whole country

The relevance of justice systems, and access to justice, to human security is strong. According to some understandings of the concept of Human Security, access to affordable and adequately fair justice and dispute settlement systems is an intrinsic aspect of the human security. If a narrower understanding of the human security concept is adopted, then functioning justice systems are important to help to prevent violence, coercion and conflict harming individuals and communities. This is partly due to some deterrence effects they may provide, but more because such justice systems enable peaceful dispute settlement and help to prevent coercive or violent approaches. Moreover, justice systems provide mechanisms for redress against acts of violence, coercion and discrimination, particularly for relatively vulnerable or poor sectors of the population.

The support by Sweden for enhancing justice systems, and particularly access to justice, are not only fully justifiable within a Human Security Results area in Sweden's forthcoming strategy, but also a priority. We now consider possible approaches for providing such support.

There are several established and recent donor supported justice sector programmes in Mali. For example, the European Union is supporting the major 'Programme d'appui au secteur de la Justice in Mali' (PAJM)⁵, and several donors support the UNDP programme for 'Restauration de l'Autorite de Etat et Access a la Justice au Nord Mali'⁶. The Helpdesk has examined the detail of each of these programmes, on the basis of information provided by the Embassy of Sweden and also other publically available information. These are both well-justified and substantial programmes, which Sweden should consider as candidates for funding support as part of its next co-operation strategy for Mali.

However, when considering its options in the justice sector, it is important to recognise the limits of such programmes. Both programmes are focussed almost entirely on the development and capacity-building of Mali's formal justice sector. Much of these programmes relate to the rehabilitation of court buildings and infrastructure, and to basic capacity-building and equipment provision.

In the present Mali context, this is understandable and justifiable according to many criteria, including that of state-building. However, it is important to recognise that such programmes

⁵ As detailed in European Union, 'Periode de Demarrage du Programme d'appui au Secteur de la Justice au Mali', Rapport Final, 22 December 2014, EU & IBF International Consulting.

⁶ UNDP, 'Restauration de l'Autorite de Etat et Access a la Justice au Nord Mali', signed January 2014.

are likely to have only very limited impact on human security for most of the population. Above all this is because *most of the population of Mali tend to rely on traditional, customary or informal systems for justice and dispute settlement services, and this is particularly the case beyond Bamako*. In this, Mali is entirely typical of most states in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly fragile and conflict affected countries. There are many reasons for this, including the relative public legitimacy, trust, accessibility, affordability and integrity of traditional or customary systems compared to those of the state.

This is not to idealise traditional systems, which can be discriminatory and raise problems for due process, and have often been undermined or compromised by conflict, clientelist patronage and (in some contexts) by criminal networks – as outlined above. Moreover, experience in similar contexts (the Helpdesk is not aware of specific studies for Mali) indicates that customary justice systems tend to be much better at providing effective justice and dispute settlement services *within* their relevant communities than for *inter-communal* disputes.

But it does reflect the fact that the formal justice system in Mali has profound weaknesses and problems that are unlikely to be more than partially addressed for the foreseeable future through donor-supported programmes such as PAJM or and the UNDP programme to rehabilitate the state justice system in the North.

Surveys of poor and vulnerable people's preferences and priorities in the justice (and security) sector in contexts similar to Mali indicate that, although traditional and customary systems of justice are most widely used and trusted, such people also support enhanced presence of formal justice services. Above all, they want enhanced choice of accessible justice and dispute settlement systems, and improved mutual recognition or co-ordination between the various formal and informal justice mechanisms that are available. For example, women might prefer to approach traditional justice systems to address crimes of violence or theft, but often prefer to have the option of going to formal/state justice systems on issues where societal gender discrimination means that they are unlikely to receive justice through traditional authorities (such as inheritance, property dispute or domestic violence). They also tend to recognise that state political or justice authorities can play important facilitation or adjudication roles where more than one traditional justice system or authority needs to be involved.

We therefore recommend that Sweden focus on supporting measures that have a more realistic prospect of enhancing access to justice by ordinary people than do programmes entirely focussed on capacity-building and reform of the formal state justice system in Mali. These could include the following:

- Support programmes to enhance co-ordination and mutual recognition between formal and informal or customary justice systems. This could include support for national-level initiatives to better enable such co-ordination and/or provincial or district level initiatives in selected areas.
- Support programmes to enhance access to the local formal justice system by vulnerable sectors of the community in selected geographical areas (i.e. localities

where the formal justice system has a presence and shows an interest in enhancing access to justice), for example through the development of basic legal aid facilities; development of local ‘community’ courts in which customary authorities have some representation; development of special local courts designed to enable access to justice for women.

- Support programmes to develop formally recognised dispute settlement systems on particular issues for which there is high demand (for example, land boundary disputes, or disputes relating to access to or ownership of water, land or forest resources).

Within the resource and access constraints of this desk-based Helpdesk study, we have not been able to identify specific initiatives and implementing partners to follow-up on the above suggestions. One starting point for such follow-up might be the programme implementers for the PAJM, UNDP and other formal justice system programmes, to explore potential for complementary or linked programmes in the above areas in certain districts. Another starting point might be Sweden’s implementing partners for its programmes concerned with climate change resilience, natural resource governance or democratic governance programmes, through which district or provincial level opportunities might at least be initially identified.

By the general criterion of enhancing human security through access to justice and peaceful dispute settlement, then programmes would be justified in virtually all parts of Mali. In terms of resilience against violence or wider conflict, perhaps programmes in the north and centre of the country (e.g Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao) may be considered most positively. Finally, there are important potential links in this area with elements of the Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Initiative; for example those concerned with the protection of pastoralist and local border communities.⁷

Security Sector Reform

Security and justice sector reform are recognised as particular priorities in contemporary Mali. This relates to almost every element of the security sector, including police, army, border and customs systems, and democratic governance and oversight mechanisms. The primary motivations for donor support since 2013 have been to contribute to stabilisation, and longer term peace-building and state-building, and in that context also to enhanced democratic control, governance and accountability of the security sector. These are linked in complex ways with counter-terrorism programmes in the north and centre of the country.

Prominent programmes to support SSR in Mali include MINUSMA programmes, including police capacity building, and the EU Training Mission to capacity-build (and to some extent reform) the Malian Armed Forces. As part of the Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Programme, there is support for an on-going detailed and comprehensive security sector analysis, and for strengthening democratic oversight and governance of the

⁷ Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation Initiative 2013-17 (Oct 2013), as discussed particularly in section 5.3 (pp28-30).

police, arms and other key security sector agencies – in which DCAF (the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces) is playing a leading role. UNODC leads a substantial programme to develop the regulatory and legal capacities, as well as information exchange systems, to address transnational trafficking and criminal networks.

There are profound challenges, and problems, concerning security sector reform in Mali. Since 2013, these have included tensions between SSR programmes focussed on enhancing the capacity, presence and effectiveness of the army and police, and their control by the Bamako – based Mali government – on the one hand, and profound reform of the security sector as it relates to the north of Mali as part of a sustainable national peace process on the other. The recent Mali peace accord includes provision for the recognition and potential integration into the formal Mali security sector of ‘legitimate’ northern community security groups. But the design and implementation of this aspect of the Accord is likely to be a central and complex challenge in the context of wider implementation of the Accord.

All of the above SSR programming areas are relevant to enhancing human security in Mali. Thus Sweden may consider contributing support to some of these existing programmes. This includes those of the Danish Initiative framework, where there may for example be opportunities for Sweden to extend or deepen the programme on enhancing democratic governance of the security sector, or to further develop SSR agendas to address the particular needs of women and girls).

We particularly recommend that Sweden focusses on considering opportunities to support community safety and security initiatives in selected parts of Mali. Community Safety and Security programmes are particularly focussed on supporting efforts to address the security and justice needs of communities, and thus adopt a relatively ‘bottom-up’ approach to security sector reform. Thus capacity-building and reform of legitimate providers of local policing services is certainly included within this framework, including ‘community policing’ initiatives. However such support would not necessarily be limited to the formal policing institutions but also to other institutions and resources that provide policing services which are regarded to have a legitimate role by the relevant local communities. Moreover, community safety and security initiatives aim to develop trust and co-operation between all sections of the community and policing (and justice providers), and in this context ensuring the such providers respond to the needs and priorities of vulnerable sectors of the local population, including minorities, women, girls and youth.

The Helpdesk aimed to identify possible implementing partners for community safety and security programming in Mali, within the constraints of this desk-based study; using our contacts in the country. These enquiries had limited results, but confirmed that possibilities for initiatives and programmes in this area are already widely recognised and discussed. There are several international CSOs with relevant experience that are – reportedly – actively

seeking support for such programmes.⁸ However, within the constraints of this assignment, the Helpdesk is not been able to obtain confirmed details of such programmes. We recommend that the Swedish Embassy in Bamako follow-up on this issue, to clarify options and opportunities for providing support this issue area as part of the Human Security component of the next five year strategy.

In terms of geographical priorities for such community security programmes, it would be particularly beneficial in terms of wider national peace-building and resilience against violence if good programmes could be identified and supported in Timbouctou, Gao and Mopti regions, and also in relatively insecure border regions. For example, there may be opportunities of enhancing police and justice rehabilitation programmes or specific community initiatives associated with access to justice or local peace-building initiatives (as discussed above).

Similarly, there may be possibilities of enhancing community security dimensions of the border areas initiatives for protection of pastoralists and local communities within the Danish Regional Initiative framework. However, these are simply preferences. Further investigations may identify better opportunities in other areas of Mali.

SALW control and armed violence reduction

Wide availability and inadequately controlled stock and flows of small arms and light weapons are widely recognised to be a major human security concern in and around Mali. Availability of large stocks of SALW flowing from Libya, together with mobile armed groups, is recognised as a major factor in the conflicts in Mali during 2012-13, and on-going insecurity in the North of Mali. Moreover, the wide availability of SALW is a major source of human insecurity in most parts of Mali. Although these weapons do not in themselves cause conflict and crime, they do greatly contribute to the risks of escalation of conflict and violence, and to the impacts of violence. Use of SALW greatly increases the lethality and impacts of armed violence, and intimidates vulnerable communities in relation to exploitation or expropriation.

Moreover, enhanced controls or reduction of SALW can be important symbols or entry points for peace-building in fragile or conflict affected contexts. The 'Flames de la Paix' of the late 1990s in Mali proved to be powerful confidence-building measures between Tuareg and southern Mali communities and authorities. In many other similar contexts around the world, voluntary weapons hand-in or destruction programmes continue to provide important focal points for local community mobilisation to enhance security and peace.

⁸ For example, a well-informed international source in Mali stated in relation to Community Security and Safety programmes in Mali: "what I hear is that it's an overcrowded place, with everyone trying to work there and the Malian authorities struggling to keep up after being used to years of international indifference. I've only been in touch with DCA, HI and DDG, but it seems everyone is there, so donors have many options to pick from..."

In this context, we recommend that Sweden seriously considers supporting programmes to reduce or control SALW stocks, availability and mis-use as important elements of its Human security results area in its new Mali strategy. In fact, there is a strong basis in place for Sweden to rapidly develop its programmes in this issue area in Mali. Mali has relatively strong national SALW reduction and control policies as part of wider ECOWAS and AU SALW agreements. Moreover, it has a National Action Plan in place for the reduction and control of SALW, and a well-established and active National Commission against the Proliferation of SALW in Mali (CNLPAL). CNLPAL is tasked with co-ordinating and promoting implementation of this national action plan, and also facilitating its further development.

There are many different types of programme that can contribute to SALW reduction and control. In practice, many of the existing donor supported SALW programmes in Mali focus in the area of ‘Physical Security and Stockpile Management’ (PSSM) of authorised SALW holdings. This includes providing or enhancing secure storage racks, buildings and overall facilities for storing police, army and other legitimate holdings of SALW and associated ammunition; and developing systems of marking, record keeping and inventory control – not least so that losses from authorised stock can rapidly be identified and investigated, and sources of diversion closed down. The AU, ECOWAS and UNREC are amongst the important regional organisations that are actively promoting such PSSM programmes in Mali and its neighbouring countries. Germany, USA (State Dept) and other donors are supporting CSOs including Handicap International, Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), Mine Action Group (MAG) and the Danish Demining Group (DDG) to implement such PSSM programmes in Mali.

This PSSM activity and donor support is welcome and valuable, but its limited scope is problematic and implies that there are some important gaps in SALW-related programming that Sweden could usefully help to address. Even within the terms of the PSSM agenda, much of the current SALW control programming is limited to technical measures (rehabilitation of buildings, provision of arms marking machines, etc). For example, experience in many similar contexts shows that there is a big difference between installing SALW physical security and stockpile monitoring capacities and the wider human and institutional engagement and reforms that are needed for these capacities to be used properly. The human and institutional factors are particularly important for ensuring the SALW and ammunition is not regularly lost, stolen or corruptly sold from military, police or other major legal stockpiles in Mali and the wider Sahel; and thus for actually contributing to human security.

In this context, Sweden could consider supporting programmes that build-upon or complement recent or current SALW PSSM programmes which are focussed on the wider training and institutional reforms of the relevant policing, military of other institutions that hold weapons stocks. This would be widely recognised as an important contribution. In some respects such programming would be a combination of SALW and SSR programming, since it would focus on the reform of those parts of the police and security agencies that are responsible for stockpile management and control (and destruction). It is

further important to note that this could be integrated with the types of community safety and security programmes discussed above. Improved controls on holdings of SALW and ammunition by local police and others that provide security services (including tolerated armed groups) has proved to be an important element of such programmes in some other country contexts, and can indeed be a useful entry point to wider confidence-building and community-police relationship building.

However, there is also important scope for supporting wider efforts to enhance SALW destruction and control. Voluntary weapons hand-in or similar confidence and security-building measures can, for example, become important aspects of local peace-building initiatives. Although they would be embedded within such a local peace-building initiatives, such elements would require expert support from appropriately-skilled SALW programme specialists as well as collaboration by the formal police.

If Sweden is interested in further exploring such possibilities, then there are several institutions and organisations based in Mali and in Europe with which to consult. Most importantly, it would be important to consult with the Executive Director of Mali's National Commission on SALW (i.e.CNLPAL). It is active and relatively capable, and well embedded with relevant Mali government ministries and Mali CSOs. Moreover, its Executive Director is sometimes frustrated that donors do not sufficiently consult with it.⁹

In addition, international CSOs with specialist expertise on such SALW programmes are active in Mali – as discussed above – and organisations such as BICC, MAG and the Small Arms Survey can be expected to be very willing to act as consultation partners, if not implementing partners, for such activities.

Finally, it is important to recognise that there are, or should be, close linkages between SALW and armed violence reduction measures in the Mali context. For example, reducing the ready availability of SALW within homes or communities can help to reduce the lethality of GBV. There is substantial experience in other contexts with developing community safety and security programmes that are not explicitly focussed on the security of women and girls but which are designed to enable women's security issues to be better recognised and addressed at local levels, and in this context to develop mechanisms to reduce their vulnerability to GBV. The Helpdesk has not been able to identify specific programmes or implementing partners in Mali in this particular respect, but the civil society networks which Sweden has supported in relation to peace-building networks should be able to provide entry points – as indeed will implementing partners for Sweden's previous strategy where it relates to gender.

⁹ Personal Communication from Executive Director of the National Commission: Dr Brigadier-General Mme Kani Coulibaly.

Human Security: Possible Synergies with Other Results Areas for Sweden's new Strategy.

Sweden has a substantial track record and experiences with development co-operation and support in Mali on the themes: pro-poor sustainable growth; sustainable development of natural resource management sectors, and democratic governance and social development. Moreover, the two main results areas in addition to 'human security' proposed for Sweden's next strategy for Mali are: 'natural resources, environment, climate and resilience', and democratic governance, gender and human rights'. In broad terms there are intrinsic overlaps and synergies between these two other Results Areas and 'human security'. In this subsection we highlight and discuss some specific ways in which synergies could be developed between the human security and other Results Areas for the new Strategy, and where there is potential for cross cutting programmes.

Enhancing human security as an element of natural resource governance programmes

Conflict and disputes relating to water, land or forestry access and rights are widespread in Mali. This includes competition for natural resources within the relatively densely populated areas of the inland Niger Delta (Mopti, Timbouctou, and Gao areas) and borderland areas of Sikasso with Burkina Faso. It also includes widespread tensions between pastoralist communities and between pastoralist and sedentary communities across much of Mali and its borderlands.

A key aspect of enhancing natural resource governance in Mali is to support the development of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms in relation to natural resource tenure and use. This can also make a major contribution to human security from violence, coercion or expropriation.

We therefore recommend that Sweden actively explores possibilities of supporting the wider development and equitable use of peaceful dispute settlement systems in localities and regions in Mali where it also has supported (or plans to support) natural resource governance and sustainable use. The issues and frameworks for supporting such access to justice and dispute settlement mechanisms were discussed in relation to Human security in a previous subsection. There is also potential to support the development and operation of relatively customised dispute settlement and access to justice mechanisms for key issues relating to natural resource governance: such as land tenure, water use, boundary or inheritance disputes. Similarly, there are issues of particular concern to women in this context, whose property or inheritance rights are often particularly vulnerable. Mechanisms to address such problems could preferentially be developed, for wider access by all sectors of the community but in an area of special interest to women.

One way of approaching this is to aim to co-locate Swedish support for the proposed human security programmes to enhance access to justice (as discussed above) with its natural resource governance programmes. This would be a way of enhancing synergies.

An alternative framework would be to provide enhanced support for natural resource governance programmes in Mali in ways that not only enhance and ensure their conflict sensitivity but also include specific support for local peace-building or dispute settlement mechanisms. These would then become cross-cutting programmes combining human security with natural resource governance mechanisms.

More broadly, this provides a framework for Sweden to co-operate with programmes supported by other donors in this sector in ways that enhances their human security impacts. The Helpdesk has reviewed several of the numerous programmes in Mali supported by other donors relating to natural resource use and governance, and associated sustainable agriculture programmes. This has confirmed that there are many opportunities for Sweden to adopt this approach, though it is not possible for us on the basis of available information to prioritise amongst these possible partners. But, for example, the Danish Regional Sahel Peace and Stabilisation programme appears to provide a well designed and developed framework for such co-operation in borderland areas. For example, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's work to manage risks of pastoralist conflicts during times of drought or associated with major herd migration, supported as part of the Danish regional programme, might usefully provide a stimulating example and entry point.

Climate Change and Resilience

Similar observations apply to possible support for programmes to enhance resilience against the impacts of climate change.

'Resilience' is a complex and rich concept. In practice the resilience of a society to natural disasters, climate change, or other 'external' shocks depends greatly of its conflict resilience – that is its capacity to negotiate and develop responses to crises peacefully, and to manage and resolve tensions with recourse to violence. In this context, any programmes that Sweden chooses to support to enhance resilience against climate change could usefully include a substantial component to strengthen dispute settlement and confidence-building measures in the relevant communities.

It is also important to recognise that some national government and donor-supported programmes in the wider Sahel region which are intended to enhance resilience against climate change in fact risk being highly conflict insensitive. These include programmes to reduce reliance on rain-fed agriculture through irrigation or ground-water exploitation schemes. Sweden should not only ensure that the programmes to which it provides support in this sector are conflict sensitive, but also support wider awareness raising on this issue in the Mali government and amongst other donors.

Synergies with Democratic Governance, gender and human rights results area

There are wide opportunities for synergies between this results area and human security – in many ways too wide to discuss with any specificity. For example, we note that in 2015, a key

objective of Sweden's operational area in Mali in relation to democratic governance are '*issues relating to access by women and girls to power, security and opportunity*'.¹⁰ In this context, all of the Human Security programming possibilities discussed above are relevant also to this Results Area, including promoting UNSC 1325 implementation; inclusive local peace-building initiatives; access to justice for vulnerable sector of the community, community safety and security programmes, and violence (including GBV) reduction programmes.

Similarly, as the stabilisation and peace-building process in Mali progresses, inclusive and conflict sensitive governance at a regional or district level becomes increasingly important. If this implies that Sweden prioritises support for good local governance beyond Bamako, then this could link importantly with the local peace-building initiatives discussed above in relation to Human Security.

Final Remarks

In this Helpdesk Report, we have clarified and discussed a range of feasible and important approaches and sectors by which Sweden could significantly contribute to human security in Mali in the proposed human security Results Area in Sweden next Strategy for Co-operation with Mali.

If resources and Sida/Embassy staff capacities are sufficient, we recommend that Sweden's new Results Area should aim to support programmes in most of the main issues areas identified in this report. This need not result in fragmentation or dispersal of effort and impact. There appears, for example, to be significant potential for combining support for local peace-building, access to justice, and community security initiatives in some areas. We believe that there is strong potential not only for specific human security programmes but also for developing the human security dimension in relation to natural resource governance and democratic governance, gender and human rights programmes.

Moreover, it is important in terms of the overall profile of Sweden's support for human security that it includes substantial support for human security in districts in the centre and north of the country as well as nationally and in the South. But this, of course, is a matter for Sida and the Swedish embassy.

In each of the potential areas for Human security programming that we have discussed, we have aimed to identify where programming experience exists in similar contexts in other countries which would usefully inform the development of Sweden's portfolio of human security programmes in Mali. However, in each such sector or issue area, experience in other contexts is rich and complex, and the time and space constraints of this Report have not allowed us to go into detail. However, as Sida and the Swedish Embassy in Bamako begin to

¹⁰ Sida, *Annual Plan for the Implementation of Swedish Development Co-operation with Mali 2015*, (Sida 2014), page 2.

develop and establish priorities for Sweden's portfolio of human security programmes, the Helpdesk would be pleased to further elaborate on lessons or examples from wider experience.

Similarly, as outlined in the introduction, we have not only assumed detailed knowledge and experience with the context in contemporary Mali, with the conflict-related analyses that we summarised and mapped in a previous Helpdesk assignment (Helpdesk, Conflict Analyses Mapping of Mali, final report August 2014), and also with the recent development and debates surrounding the establishment of the Mali Peace Accord in June 2015. In doing so there is a risk that we have insufficiently specified our analysis of the wider context and possibilities in Mali and the Sahel, and thus the basis for our explicit or implicit recommendations for Sweden to promote human security may not always be clear. We similarly stand ready to clarify these, on request.

Summary of main recommendations

On the basis of our analysis of the human security context and priorities in Mali, this Report identifies a number of specific issue areas that are directly relevant to enhancing human security in contemporary Mali, and develops suggestions and proposals for programme support under the new Human Security results Area to which we recommend that Sida and the Swedish embassy devote particular attention. In this final sub-section we briefly summarise our main recommendations and suggestions in each area, for ease of reference. As noted on the 'Final Remarks' section above, we recommend that Sweden aims to develop a portfolio of programme support across a number of these selected issue area, rather than simply select one or two.

Selected Potential Programming Areas within a 'Human Security' Results Area for Mali.

Contributing to Peace Building and Reconciliation

The June 2015 Mali Peace Accord provides an important but fragile framework for peace-building in Mali. Support for Peace-building from Sweden over the next five year should include support for local as well as national peace-building processes, and include support for peacebuilding in Timbouctou, Gao, and Mopti as well as more readily accessible southern regions.

Extending and Deepening National Peace-building processes

The Helpdesk is not aware of any specific gaps of support for the national negotiation process to implement and develop the Mali Peace Accord for which Sweden's development assistance could be needed or influential. However, there is an urgent need to widen engagement in the wider national peacebuilding process to enable civil society groups and networks of informal/traditional authorities, women and youth to contribute to sustainable national peace-building (as well as local, see below).

Support for Civil Society Networks for National Peace-Building in Mali: Continued Swedish support for civil society studies, dialogues, capacity-building and inclusive national networks for national peace-building is well-justified. However when considering specific proposals, we recommend that Sweden strongly encourages these civil society peacebuilding network projects to more directly connect with, and influence, 'track 1' discussions and processes for the consolidation and implementation of the Mali Peace Accord, the Mali National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) and related national peace-building processes. In this context, for example, further support for civil society research capacities and projects as part of civil society peace-building in Mali should be conditional on them developing greater focus and clarity on their objectives in influencing or enhancing the national peace-building process. Moreover, it is important to enhance co-ordination between the several civil

society peace-building networks and programmes, including agreements on some areas of collaboration, shared advocacy goals, and divisions of labour.

Promoting UNSC 1325 Implementation in Mali: Sweden should continue to promote implementation of UNSC 1325 in Mali, on the realistic assumption that MINUSMA and/or other international peace missions in Mali will continue for at least the next five years. Amongst various options are: support for the further development of awareness and training on UNSC1325 implementation at the International Peace-Keeping Training Institute in Bamako; and to support the engagement of women in national as well as local peace-building initiatives within the framework of the civil society peace-building initiatives discussed above, including for example in the National Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) .

National initiatives for transitional justice: There are justifiable calls for national transitional justice mechanisms. The Helpdesk is sympathetic in principle to such calls, but cautious in practice in the present Mali context. In the context of the fragility of Mali National Peace Accord, we recommend caution on supporting national transitional justice initiatives unless they command some acceptance amongst key parties to the Accord.

Enhancing peace-building training in relevant peace-keeping training institutes: we suggest that Sweden considers the possibility of supporting the International Peace-Keeping Training Institute in Bamako, not only for UNSC 1235 promotion, but also to improve and extent the training and awareness of local and regional military and police units of the opportunities for supporting local and wider peace-building in their roles in peace-keeping missions in Mali.

Supporting Local-level Peace-building Processes

There is urgent need for confidence-building, reconciliation and peace-building activities at all levels in Mali, and in most localities. There are important potential opportunities for Sweden to offer support to local peace-building initiatives and processes, which merit overall prioritisation in the portfolio for this new Human Security Results Area.

Sweden has already established a basis for substantially developing its support for community-level peace-building processes in selected localities Effective community level peace-building initiatives need to be inclusive, properly involving relevant traditionand and customary leaders and mechanisms, representatives and networks of youth, women, and locally marginalised as well as majority groups. Sweden's recent support for national civil society peace-building initiatives has already helped to build the capacity of such networks, and links with capable international NGOs which can play key facilitating roles to support local peace-building initiatives..

Encourage, and provide support for, Sweden's civil society national peace-building partners to conduct a review, if they have not already done so, in order to identify whether and where the conditions realistically exist to mobilise and sustain one or more inclusive local peace-building initiatives in identified localities. The Helpdesk is reasonably confident

that a review of (geographical and identity group) concentrations and local capacities of such existing civil society organisations and networks would quickly reveal that there is now a basis for launching initiating peace-building initiatives in a number of regions and localities of Mali.

Where this initial review identifies that conditions appear to exist for supporting effective local peace-building initiatives, we recommend that Sweden consider actively supporting detailed work to specifically consult with stakeholders and to examine possible approaches towards, and phasing of, a peace-building initiative in such areas, including analysis of the relevant local peace and conflict issues and dynamics, and of stakeholder interests and concerns. It is important that such local initiatives are carefully designed and implemented through a consultative local approach. In this context, possible support for transitional justice initiatives as an integral element of such local peace-initiatives should be considered, but decisions on this need to be highly context specific.

A relatively balanced portfolio of support for local peace-building initiatives needs to be developed in order to help ensure conflict sensitivity, ensuring for example, that wider ‘north-south’ balance is apparent. We recommend that efforts are made to identify and develop local inter-community peace-building initiatives in at least two of the following areas - Timbouctou, Mopti, Segou and Gao – as well as in other areas where opportunities exist (such as Sikasso). The Swedish embassy will, in our judgement, be further needed to facilitate relationship building between civil society and local and national state authorities for such local peace initiatives; at least through diplomatic support and accompaniment at key meetings with political or state authorities

There are several potential international civil society organisations that are well positioned to support and facilitate such local peace-building activities with Sweden’s support. After reflection, we recommend that Sweden remains open to the possibility of supporting more than one of these types of organisations in such work, rather than focussing on one specific tender.

On the possibility that Sweden might establish a local peace-building initiative funding mechanism, we find that this could be useful for certain purposes, for example as a mechanism to support civil society ‘next steps’ work to conduct the detailed review, consultations and analysis required to develop the basis for launching a local peace-building initiative in a particular area or between selected communities in conflict. However, we doubt that this approach would be sufficient to effectively support local peace-building initiatives once they are launched.

On the issue of whether and how to promote private sector engagement in local peace-building initiatives, Sweden should always encourage an inclusive approach. Local businesses can sometimes play an important role. However, beyond this, approaches towards private sector actors should be very context specific, and not particularly singled out or promoted.

Enhancing Access to Justice

Support for enhancing justice systems, and particularly access to justice, should be considered to be a priority within a new Human Security Results Area. We now consider possible approaches for providing such support.

There are several established and recent donor supported justice sector programmes in Mali, including the European Union supported ‘Programme d’appui au secteur de la Justice in Mali’ (PAJM)¹¹, and UNDP programme for ‘Restauration de l’Autorite de Etat et Access a la Justice au Nord Mali’¹². These are both well-justified and substantial programmes, to which Sweden could usefully consider contributing. However, when considering options in the justice sector, it is important to recognise the limits of such programmes. Both programmes are focussed almost entirely on the development and capacity-building of Mali’s formal justice sector. They thus help to contribute to state-building, but are likely to have only very limited impact on access to justice for most of the population.

Sweden could usefully particularly focus on supporting programmes that realistically promote local access to justice. Although most of the population of Mali is likely to continue to rely on traditional, customary or informal systems for justice and dispute settlement services, evidence indicates that poor and vulnerable people also support enhanced local presence of fair and accessible formal justice services. In this context, we recommend that Sweden focusses on supporting programmes to:

- ***enhance co-ordination and mutual recognition between formal and informal or customary justice systems.*** This could include support for national-level initiatives to better enable such co-ordination and/or provincial or district level initiatives in selected areas.
- ***enhance access to the local formal justice system by vulnerable sectors of the community in selected geographical areas*** (i.e. localities where the formal justice system has a presence and shows an interest in enhancing access to justice), for example through the development of basic legal aid facilities; development of local ‘community’ courts in which customary authorities have some representation; development of special local courts designed to enable access to justice for women.
- ***develop formally recognised dispute settlement systems on particular issues for which there is high demand*** (for example, land boundary disputes, or disputes relating to access to or ownership of water, land or forest resources).

Security Sector Reform

Security and justice sector reform (SSR) are recognised as particular priorities in contemporary Mali, for human security as well as for statebuilding and peacebuilding. Several existing programmes to support SSR, including those of the Danish Initiative framework, are

¹¹ As detailed in European Union, ‘Periode de demarrage du Programme d’appui au Secteur de la Justice au Mali’, Rapport Final, 22 December 2014, EU & IBF International Consulting.

¹² UNDP, ‘Restauration de l’Autorite de Etat et Access a la Justice au Nord Mali’, signed January 2014.

worthy of support – for example to extend or deepen the programme on enhancing democratic governance of the security sector, or to further develop SSR agendas to address the particular needs of women and girls.

We recommend that Sweden focusses on considering opportunities to support community safety and security initiatives in selected parts of Mali. The Helpdesk has been able to confirm that possibilities for initiatives and programmes in this area are already widely recognised and discussed, and there are several international CSOs with relevant experience that are – reportedly – actively seeking support for such programmes. In this Report we have identified a range of options for such programmes, but developing specific recommendations would require in-country investigation, which we recommend that Sweden undertakes. For a number of reasons, it would be particularly desirable to support such programmes in Timbouctou, Gao and Mopti regions, and also in relatively insecure border regions.

SALW control and armed violence reduction

We recommend that Sweden seriously considers supporting programmes to reduce or control Small Arms and Light Weapons (and ammunition) stocks, availability and mis-use as important elements of its Human security results area. There is moreover a strong basis in place for Sweden to rapidly develop its programmes in this issue area in Mali. Mali has relatively strong National Action Plan in place for the reduction and control of SALW, and a well-established and active Mali National Commission against the Proliferation of SALW in Mali (CNLPAL).

Many of the existing donor supported SALW programmes in Mali focus in the area of 'Physical Security and Stockpile Management' (PSSM) of authorised SALW holdings. This PSSM activity and donor support is valuable, but its limited scope is problematic and implies that there are some important gaps in SALW-related programming that Sweden could usefully help to address. *Sweden could consider supporting programmes that build-upon or complement existing SALW PSSM programmes which are focussed on the wider training and institutional reforms of the relevant policing, military of other institutions that hold weapons stocks.* This could be integrated with the types of community safety and security programmes recommended above, and also be seen as a combination of SALW and SSR programming, since it would focus on the reform of those parts of the police and security agencies that are responsible for stockpile management and control (and destruction).

We further recommend that Sweden considers support for wider efforts to enhance SALW destruction and control, including voluntary weapons hand-in or similar confidence and security-building measures, and a range of other areas on which there is much experience in other similar country contexts. These can usefully be linked to become important aspects of local peace-building initiatives or measures to reduce gender-based violence.

Human Security: Possible Synergies with Other Results Areas for Sweden's new Strategy.

We find that there are intrinsic overlaps and important potential synergies between the two other planned Results Areas proposed for Sweden's next strategy for Mali - 'natural resources, environment, climate and resilience' and democratic governance, gender and human rights', and the new 'human security' Results Area.

We recommend that Sweden Enhances human security as an element of natural resource governance programmes. A key aspect of enhancing natural resource governance in Mali is to support the development of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms in relation to natural resource tenure and use. *We therefore recommend that Sweden actively explores possibilities of supporting the wider development and equitable use of peaceful dispute settlement systems in localities and regions in Mali where it also has supported (or plans to support) natural resource governance and sustainable use.*

We similarly recommend that Sweden considers supporting the development and operation of relatively customised dispute settlement and access to justice mechanisms for key issues relating to natural resource governance: such as land tenure, water use, boundary or inheritance disputes. Similarly, there are issues of particular concern to women in this context, whose property or inheritance rights are often particularly vulnerable. Mechanisms to address such problems could preferentially be developed, for wider access by all sectors of the community but in an area of special interest to women.

One way of approaching this is to aim to co-locate Swedish support for the proposed human security programmes to enhance access to justice (as discussed above) with its natural resource governance programmes. An alternative approach would be to provide enhanced support for natural source governance programmes in Mali in ways that not only enhance and ensure their conflict sensitivity but also include specific support for local peace-building or dispute settlement mechanisms.

Enhance human security as an element of Climate Change and Resilience programmes. Similar observations apply here. Programmes that Sweden chooses to support to enhance resilience against climate change could usefully include a substantial component to strengthen dispute settlement and confidence-building measures in the relevant communities.

Synergies with Democratic Governance, gender and human rights results area

We find that there are wide opportunities for synergies between this results area and human security – in many ways too wide to discuss at this stage with any specificity. For example, *Sweden could more directly link its present prioritisation of 'issues relating to access by women and girls to power, security and opportunity' with human security programme areas discussed above, including promoting UNSC 1325 implementation; inclusive local peace-building initiatives; access to justice for vulnerable sector of the community, community safety and security programmes, and violence (including GBV) reduction programmes.*

Similarly, any Swedish supported programmes to extend and strengthen democratic governance at regional or district level could link importantly with the local peace-building initiatives discussed above in relation to Human Security.