Review Essay:

New directions in Queer Theory:

Recent theorizing in the work of

Lynne Huffer, Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips,

and Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman.

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*Gender, Work and Organization (*Forthcoming)

I grew up in a small mining village in the South Wales Valleys where godliness was a distant second behind cleanliness in the morality stakes. A clean house was far more important than going to chapel if the family was to be 'respectable'. My mother (housework was always the woman's work) did not keep a clean and tidy house or clean and well-fed children, and I bore an incapacitating stain on my psyche of 'growing up dirty' until long after I began my academic career in my 30s. Sometime after my 40th birthday I struggled to tell one of my new academic friends my guilty secret, scared that they would not want to continue a friendship with such an execrable person. When I later stumbled across queer theory I found authors articulating a similar deep, deep sense of shame (see, especially, Sedgwick, 2003, Ch. One). I had found a language that helped me to understand the ways in which intense shame can permeate one's sense of self.

In 'coming out' as having grown up in squalor I wonder what other stigmas are suffered by people who lack a language in which to articulate, understand and challenge their lonely humiliation. In terms of management and organization studies (MOS), what forms of shame do organizations enact upon the bodies and psyches of staff, and how can academics develop a politics and language through which to articulate and fight against that shame? We perhaps need a new 'shame' or 'stigma' theory within MOS, that identifies and fights against ways in which workplaces render subjects abject. Queer theory cannot do this, focusing as it does on sex and sexualities. Although Butler (1993), writes that though her focus is on gender her theories can be applied in other domains, Sedgwick (quoted in Halle, 2004, p. 10) is adamant that 'Given the historical and contemporary force of the prohibitions against *every* same-sex sexual expression, for anyone to

disavow those meanings, or to displace them from the term's definitional center, would be to dematerialize any possibility of queerness itself'. There are arguments against reducing queer studies to lesbian and gay studies (Halperin, 1995; Giffney, 2004) but sex remains the focus of queer theory.

However, current developments in queer theory suggest the possibilities of broadening queer theory's reach in MOS. The texts reviewed here take queer theory in a new direction, and in so doing offer a rationale for what I call an organizational sexology influenced by queer theory. That is, the authors demonstrate ways of theorizing from sex acts that, I will argue, opens possibilities for theorizing from sex and sex acts in organizations.

Where queer theory's original focus was inspired to develop a politics of freedom by Foucault's (1979; 1986; 1992) three volumes on *The History of Sexuality,* the texts analysed find inspiration in another aspect of Foucault's late work, that of an ethics of the self. They either explicitly (Bersani, 2008; Huffer (2013) or implicitly (Berlant and Edelman, 2014) explore Foucault's advocacy of new relational modes. Foucault advocated an ethics of the self located in an 'ego-divesting discipline'. This aims to remove the violence that informs the modern Western subject's struggle to attain subjectivity. Put simply, to be a modern Western subject requires that one aggressively pursues one's own ego identity, and this pursuit requires that we trample all over other people. Ethical action requires the dissolution of the ego, and thus the de-individuation of the 'I'. The texts reviewed here use sex acts as the inspiration for developing such an ethics of the self. I will suggest below that although dissolution of the ego in organizations is probably unwise, these authors' inspirational analysis of and from sex offers a new and valuable mode of theorizing we can use as management and organization theorists without diluting the political power of queer theory.

First I will outline how these ideas are developed in recent works by Lynn Huffer (2013), Leo Bersani (with Adam Phillips, 2008) and Edelman and Berlant (2014)[i], before exploring their implications for organization studies.

Lynne Huffer: Are the lips a grave?

Lynne Huffer's (2013) *Are the lips a grave? A queer feminist on the ethics of sex*, pays homage to Leo Bersani's famous essay, *Is the rectum a grave?* (2010, first published in 1987). We need a brief detour to discuss that essay in order to understand Huffer's work and, indeed, Bersani's more recent writing discussed below. In *Is the rectum a grave?* Bersani began to critique 'the sacrosanct value of [a] selfhood' (Bersani, 2010:30) that leads human beings to the masculine endeavour of killing others in order to protect a self that is no more than 'a practical convenience, promoted to the status of an ethical ideal' that sanctions violence' (ibid). He recognized in that essay that this self is shattered during sex, pointing the way towards an understanding of the possibilities for dissipating the ego that inform his and other's later work[ii]. But the focus of Bersani's early essay was a deconstruction of masculinities and masculine ideals. His essay is a sophisticated discussion of the relationship between sex, power and domination, in which he observes how social structures (which, of course, include organizations) may be derivations and sublimations of this indissociable relationship between sexual pleasure and power[iii].

In that early essay Bersani asked difficult questions about the common understanding amongst lesbian and gay authors that homosexuality is a politically subversive practice – he argued that sexual identity and politics are not necessarily inter-related. Huffer follows Bersani's example, but in her case she questions the ideal of female sisterhood – it is, she argues, the 'abject residue of an ideal we repeatedly fail to achieve' (p. 5). After tracing the falling-out between feminism and queer theory, Huffer seeks to re-unite them through an anti-foundationalist queer feminist ethics. She starts this endeavour by drawing on philosophers such as Butler and novelists such as Collette to develop the ethical question: 'how can the other reappear at the site of her inscriptional effacement?' (p. 54). That is, and here she echoes Spivak's (1988) '*Can the subaltern* speak', the subordinated party in binaries such as man/woman, gay/straight, manager/worker is not allowed to speak, think or have identity save within and through the discourses of the dominant party. Huffer poses the question: how can subordinated subjects appear in their own image rather through those abjected and subordinated ones bestowed on them by the

powerful? She finds inspiration in a 'Foucauldian fascination with desubjectivation and what self-undoing might mean' (p 56), that is, Foucault's attempt, in *The Use of Pleasure* (1986) and *The Care of the Self*, (1992) to 'get free of oneself' through rethinking the self as a technology or practice (p. 87).

This involves firstly questioning the issue of the (female) subject. The woman, she argues, is in a place of 'absolute alterity': her otherness means she does not exist because she 'has been obliterated by the aestheticizing moves of representation' (p. 140). She cannot therefore speak, Huffer writes, but then she questions that statement and finds it erroneous: although she who is unheard occupies the place of 'the unread, the unheard, the illegible', she becomes unread and unheard through a politics of 'multiple, modulated silences over time' (p 141). It is this politics that renders those who speak from the place of the other not *silenced* but *unheard*. The queer feminist ethics that Huffer calls for therefore demands that stories are rewritten so that those who have been rendered un-hearable by power are able to speak *and be heard.* But hearing (and reading) is not a simple process of transmission/reception, she argues, and alongside understanding the abjected party in the binary, the subject who has been unheard, we must also understand the dominant party, the subject who will not hear. This dominant subject for Huffer is the 'modern, moral, Western subject that lurks behind most everything we do, even when we try to dismiss him' (p. 179). A problem for all of us is that this subject is 'an ethical ideal', one we are encouraged to strive to equate ourselves with, if not to become.

The cleverness of Huffer's argument lies in her argument that the Western subject is a split subject that incorporates both a judgemental, moral, masculine, Western self (the super-ego, in Freudian terms) and a silenced, inferiorised, unheard self. Queer theory traditionally locates these oppositional positions in two separate individuals, the subordinate one cowed by a dominant other that depends on the abjected other to sustain its knowledge of its self as normative (Jagose, 1997). Huffer understands the individual subject as someone who moves between dominant and subordinate subject positions, and thus judges self and others in condemnatory and destructive ways at the same time as feeling condemned and destroyed by those very discourses that they articulate.

She illuminates this through a discussion of work/life balance, contrasting her own 'queer feminist "life"' with that of the 'life' imagined in the work/life balance literature. That life, her reading shows, is a heteronormative life, lived in a specific type of family, one that is elevated to an ethical ideal. This modern subject (a parent/worker who struggles for a balance between work and 'life') is figured as modernity's subject, that is, one that is disciplined in all aspects of its life, both work and leisure. Those who cannot achieve this normative, impossible, disciplined subjectivity are rendered abject, as Huffer admits about herself, even as she finds herself struggling to conform with an ideal that she abhors. But 'there must be other ways of thinking about life' (p. 180), she suggests, where 'life' is not the terrain only of those who live within nuclear families.

Thus Huffer's thesis explores how modern Western subjectivities are embedded in and imbued with a violence that limits their potential for becoming. She develops this argument from an identity as a queer feminist who is exploring the potential of Foucault's advocacy of an ethics of the self found in new modes of being that require undoing of subjectivity, or the ego. Huffer does not illuminate how we may do this, but her work sets the scene for a recent text by Leo Bersani, that explores how the self may be shattered by its self.

Leo Bersani: *Intimacies*

The ideas Leo Bersani articulates in some depth in 2008 were already emerging in his early work in 1990 (Dasgupta, 2009), and were also there, as we have seen above, in his 1987 essay. In 2008 he addressed the undoing of subjectivities more directly. In this work, Bersani looks to psychoanalysis as an 'inspiration for modes of exchange that can only take place outside of psychoanalysis' (p.4). He works towards articulating a mode of exchange in which one subject is deeply listened to by the other. For Bersani, this is *jouissance*, that is, 'giving and receiving, through embodied language, the subjecthood of others' (p. 29). This act requires that we learn how to forget about the 'I' who awaits its own turn to speak and thus affirm its self-hood, and become instead a listener that forgets it is a separate and individual self: all there is is a listener listening.

Bersani's first task is to analyse how the 'I's' demand to be a self inhibits that *jouissance*. He argues that the ego's focus solely on fulfilling the desire of the I to become fully itself leads the subject to demand far more from the other than the other can give. The result, always, is failure. The 'I', rather than attaching to a subject, attaches to a yearning desire. That is, there is a yearning desire (for identity) that articulates itself as the 'I' or 'me'.

Bersani then turns to the unsafe sexual practice known as 'barebacking[iv]'. He explores barebacking as 'the ascesis of an ego-divesting discipline' (p. 35), that is, an ascetic discipline in which the desiring 'I' gives way and is 'replaced, inhabited by the other'. He introduces the concept of 'pure love' (p. 52), wherein the subject disappears and there is only acting, but acting without an actor. In other words, rather than, say, a guitarist playing a guitar, woman and musical instrument are so merged that there is nothing but a guitar being played – music is playing. Barebacking becomes a metaphor for the subject who 'allows himself to be penetrated, even replaced, by an unknowable otherness' (53), and so is 'overwhelmed by the massive anonymous presence' to which the subject has surrendered itself (p. 54). The ego, importantly, is not annihilated but disseminated. Thus the yearning desire for self-hood can dissolve.

His argument therefore concerns recognition of *sameness* rather than difference: 'the experience of belonging to a family of singularity without national, ethnic, racial, or gendered borders might make us sensitive to the ontological status of difference itself' (p. 86). Thus barebacking offers a metaphor for the giving up of the concept of the 'I' and the 'me', the selfish self with all its demands and its violence towards others in its desire for assurance of its own existence. Instead, by collapsing the boundaries between the self and others through receptiveness and deep listening to the other, the conditions through which stigmatized identities are constituted disappear, because when there is no identity, there is no dominant subject that relies on an abjected other in order to exist.

Huffer and Bersani therefore use sex (for Huffer her identity as a queer feminist, for Bersani the act of barebacking) to offer a distinct challenge to the category of the self in Western culture. Huffer inspires understanding of the self as a split

subject that judges and chastises its self and others, implying that the self is somehow complicit in its own subordination even as it subordinates and is subordinated by others. Bersani points the way towards overcoming the fear and pain of this subjectivising of subjects through challenging the ego's rule. For Bersani, all judgement about the other, including the internalized other, should dissolve – rather than difference there would be sameness, with each partner in a discussion actively listened to and nurtured. Berlant and Edelman (2014) argue somewhat similarly, but they explore some of the problems of de-individualising the Western subject.

Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman, *Sex, or the Unbearable*

Sex, or the Unbearable (2014), takes the form of a conversation between Berlant and Edelman that evolves through its chapters. Sex is for these authors a site from which to explore 'the scene of relationality by focusing on the "negativity" that can make it so disturbing' (p. i). Sex, again, is a metaphor for undoing: through its intense relation with an other the 'subject's fantasmatic sovereignty' (p. 2) disintegrates, the self (temporarily) dissipates[v]. They explore the implications of this through a dialogue that, they suggest, commits them to 'grappling with negativity, nonsovereignty, and social relation not only as abstract concepts but also as the substance and condition of our responses – and our responsibilities – to each other' (p. ix). That is, how can we (that is, the yearning, aching sovereign 'I') become ethically undone through interaction with others, absorbed into and by them as Bersani advocates, when we are fearful of such undoing and erect strong barriers against it? This, for me, is what they contribute to Huffer's and Bersani's arguments: a more intense exploration of subjectivities and the implications for achieving *im*personal narcissism.

But in addition these two authors offer an intense and highly insightful account of inter-actions between two subjects that, I suggest, could be fruitfully applied to understanding encounters in organizations. They show some of the complexities of relationality: it is violent, pleasurable, productive, a scene of fantasy and misrecognition, all these and more. It is, as Berlant writes (p. 112), a 'converging that is inseparable from abandonment, movement within varieties of

intense stuckness, and foreclosing gestures that are also openings'. Subjects both desire attachment but also resist it, but because all encounters lie within signifying systems we cannot avoid the negativity that informs each and every encounter. But, as Edelman argues, although misrecognition is inevitable we must fight against it. Thus 'Challenging the fixity of "me" and "you" and "everyone we know"' through such conversations enacts a life-generating resistance (or negativity) (115). What, then, of the encounter between, say, manager and staff member? But that is for the future.

To return to the present discussion: whilst Berlant's phenomenology and Edelman's psychoanalysis is different they share with each other and with Huffer and Bersani an understanding that the subject is abjected and subordinated by (aggressive) social norms, and that nonsovereignty, or the undoing of the self, offers a politics of hope. Where Bersani seemed to explore the becoming-ethical of a self somehow isolated from the social, Berlant and Edelman plunge us directly into the scene of encounter. Their goal is thus similar to both Huffer's and Bersani's, but their aim is to better understand the barriers to and difficulties of achieving a dissolution of the self, and their method is a highly reflexive analysis of an encounter between themselves as two subjectivities. They explore their disagreements and failures to agree, because these are 'indispensable to our efforts to think relationality' (p. ix). They find themselves negative about and resistanct towards the fixity of social forms, and explore how their relationality is beset with 'valences of social intensities and fantasies, [and] contradictory pressures implicit in established forms of relation' (p. xiii).

In Edelman's words (p. 69): 'The encounter performed by this dialogue centers on the question of encounter as such: how to live relationality; how to confront our self-division; how to experience the unbearable undoing of the logic that binds us to the world; how to share a thought or an object when the pressure of its handling by another risks breaking the object, our willingness to share it, or our ability to cathect it'.

Berlant and Edelman's interrogation of conversation, or a conversation about their conversations, leads Edelman to write that conversation 'marks the site of a

potential encounter with the unbearable, with the otherness that permits no relation despite our best efforts to construct one' (p. 98), and because the other is always an irreducible other (p. 100), they always remain separate and distinct – there can be no absorption of one in the other, no dispersal of the ego, as Bersani longs for. Berlant's response however is that conversation 'does require nonsovereignty whether or not it feels otherwise or is marked manifestly by controlling gestures' (p. 99). Her position is closer to Bersani's – that is, through speaking and listening we can, in some ways, give up the self and absorb the other's subjectivity.

Their discussions therefore place them in opposing positions. Edelman's argument is that the impossibility of ever knowing the other renders impossible the undoing of one's self through interaction with the other, and Berlant's is that the very possibility of conversation requires that one undoes one's self through absorbing into the self aspects of the other (their words, their ideas, their presence). But Edelman offers some reconciliation: although he is loyal to his perspective that conversation concerns sequences of missed encounters in which we cannot fathom, understand, grasp or hold the other, he nonetheless shifts his position by observing that his conversation with Berlant has shown him that despite the irreducibility of the other it is possible to bring something into being through conversation. Although he and Berlant occupy differing linguistic worlds, somehow they have managed to produce something new, and this is because, he suggests, they have in some ways 'broken down the structuring fantasy of the subject' (p. 108), by which I understand that each has forced the other to reconsider their concept of who they are. Thus, Edelman concludes, conversation (and other encounters) allow subjects to 'encounter the possibility of coming apart' (p. 109).

Berlant elaborates on this position. Yes, encounters are unstable and there is mutual misrecognition, but are these not the very conditions that require exploring if we are to understand relationality? To enter into such encounters, to get inside them, is risky but the risk may lead to the 'attunement' of 'collaborative ordinariness' (p. 110) that makes up the everyday. That is, 'sex, activism, stranger encounters, reading – any collaborative practice – are not just

performances of disavowal of the object's placeholderness but scenes of a drama of attention in which we seek to work our relationality, which is a task alongside of our aims to explain, maintain, and control the encounter' (ibid). Although most encounters are forgettable, those more demanding encounters, with lovers, friends, colleagues, workers or disciplinary agent, that is, 'anyone whose satisfaction matters', reveal how we want more but are afraid of losing what we have. There is thus 'structural generativity' in this 'worlding work' of relationality (p. 111). 'To me', she writes, 'the great pleasure of any collaboration is multiplying idioms and infrastructures for further thoughts that neither of us could have generated alone' (ibid). And indeed there are no alternatives to such world-building.

There is thus a compromise position. In Edelman's words (p. 116) 'In sex, in politics, in theory – in any infrastructure that we can call intimate or invested with the activity of living – we cannot banish the strangeness in ourselves or of anything in the world. While we can point to the impossibility of staying reliable to one's self- and other-directed relations and to the impact of the ways we fail them, though, these contacts can spark new forms of life, of being in the scene of relationality'. So the 'opening up of the encounter between negativity and nonsovereignty' leads Edelman to an understanding of how sex 'breaks us down in multiple, nonidentical ways, all of which are in a complex relation to the fantasy of relation itself' (p. 117).

Edelman and Berlant use sex (see the book's title) as a way of exploring subjectivity, identity and how we become undone within that scene of relationality in which we achieve subjectivity and identity.

Discussion

These three texts together point to new directions in queer theory that focus on Foucault's advocacy of an ethics of the self located in the dissolution of the ego. Each of the texts uses sex and sex acts as the inspiration for or trajectory of their arguments. Huffer, theorizing from her own queer relationship, analyses how the ego informs the seemingly banal and every-day world of work – there is a

version of the 'ideal ego' evident in organizations, and those who cannot achieve it are excluded or excludable. Her argument that individual psyches are located within both sides of the binary, that is, individuals are both oppressors and oppressed, takes us to Bersani's advocacy, via the example of the sexual act of barebacking, of a new relational model of being that involves dissolution of the ego so that self and others merge (Dollimore [1998] and Dean [2000] have argued similarly). Berlant and Edelman acknowledge that there is very little sex in their discussion, which focuses on the intercourse of conversation or non-sexual intercourse, but their text is redolent with sexual metaphors. All these authors also remain true to queer theory's original political imperative – there is no danger that they will water down its power to challenge heteronormativity. It is perhaps this latter point that has limited queer theory's (rather than LGBT theory's) use in organization studies: how can organizational theorists draw on queer theory without damaging the work's political project?

There are therefore two aspects to these texts of note: the way in which the theory is developed, and the theory that emerges from reading these accounts together. I suggest the methodology is relevant to MOS, but the theory is not. The methodology, however, points towards an organizational sexology influenced by queer theory. It suggests the fruitfulness of using sexual acts that take place in organizations as ways of thinking differently about and generating new insights into organizations.

Sex may be everywhere in organizations, (Burrell, 1984; Hearn and Parkin, 1987) but material, embodied sex acts are seemingly absent except at the margins – at Christmas parties, conferences and behind locked doors. If theory is not queer without sex as its subject and object, where then lie the prospects for queer theory (rather than lesbian, gay and transgender studies) in organization studies? I suggest that any acts of coitus in organizations are queer, regardless of the biological sex of the participants. That is, desire, and the desire to be sexually desired, walks organizations' corridors and workspaces (see Harding, Lee, Ford and Learmonth, 2011, for a discussion). But coitus is hidden or excluded, with career damage or job loss the penalties for being caught *in flagrante delicto*. Thus sex is everywhere in organizations but only in the form of libidinal energy:

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coitus is suppressed, shameful, out of place, stigmatised – it is *queer* sex because it brands participants with marks of shame and identifies them as miscreants, bringing punishment on the heads of those 'caught'. Thus when physical acts of sex in organizations come to light, they offer opportunities for developing new understanding and, perhaps, a new politics.

Take, for example, the case of Commander West, the first female commander of a British warship, who in 2014 was removed from her post after her sexual relationship with a male colleague had been discovered[vi]. There is no news about action taken against the man involved in this affair[vii], but Commander West became the subject of much discussion in the British media. This is a report of heterosexual sex between a woman and a man, but the abjection of at least one of the parties, her 'outing' as a sexual being and the subsequent damage to her career, suggests that the situation merits a queer interpretation. Space allows only a brief analysis (see Fotaki and Harding, forthcoming, for a longer discussion).

Firstly, Commander West broke the requirement of organizations that staff desexualize themselves at work (even while the libidinal energy of desire may be desired), and there is something very old-fashioned about this – that open-ness about sex since the 'sexual liberation' movement of the 1960s is absent from workplaces save as banter and joking. Could this be an unexplored form of control that may allow better understanding of control? When that denatured object, 'the' organization, threatens sanctions of shame upon those who dare disobey, does it enact a mechanism of control against which resistance may be particularly difficult, because fighting against such controls requires that one 'comes out' as having committed those organizationally-defined crimes and thus one marks one's self as abject and dirty? Is resistance, perhaps, difficult because it dirties the self?

Secondly, Commander West worked in an environment that, in folklore and song, is regarded as rife with hidden sexual activities. That is, sex is everywhere in the navy but its presence is denied. When this denial becomes unsustainable, as in Commander West's case, the making public of what should be hidden brings

calumny upon the head of the (female but dominant) perpetrator because she has revealed that which cannot be acknowledged.   What theories, then, might emerge from organizational spaces where sex *is* even while it is not? What sort of places might those be and can the ways in which sex is controlled, subordinated and invisibilised within them help us to a new understanding of organizations?

Finally, does Commander West's case offer a metaphor for understanding continuing inequalities between women and men in organizations? If, say, leadership and the leader can be understood only as impenetrable, disembodied and devoid of passion, desire or attraction, does the penetrable female body when it occupies a senior position threaten to undermine the edifice of Western management principles? If the leader is penetrable, can management's place in the hierarchy become delegitimized? Relatedly, what fears of the powerful, penetrative woman come to conscious expression in such an example?

These questions arise from the evidence of one sexual act, and there are many other questions that it poses. But I am suggesting that all acts of coitus in organizations are queer sexual acts because they carry a fear of discovery that will bring down shame and calumny upon anyone caught in the act. This means that, just as Bersani, in particular, has taken one sexual act, barebacking, and developed its implications in unexpected ways, we can perhaps theorise from sexual activities in organizations in order to develop a different understanding of organizations and what it means to be human when employed by them.

But what about the other implication of these queer works for organizations, the possibilities that might arise from letting go of the ego and merging with others so as to bring about a more ethical social world? I hesitate to advocate such a thing, because I am not sure of what may be one's ego while at the workplace. Within process theories of organization (see the papers in Helin et al, 2014, for a discussion) there are some hints that self and organization merge in processes of mutual becoming, so that the self is undone, inundated psychically and emotionally, by 'the organization'[viii]. Rather than there being an *im*personal narcissistic ego, there is one that is, perhaps, an impersonal organizational ego in which the organization possesses the subject and speaks through that subject's

mouth. Letting go of the self may therefore offer fertile territory for the greater penetration of the organization into the self, something we cannot advocate. But do Bersani's arguments hint at ways in which we can repel that organization that desires to take up occupation of our egos? Can the form of exploration undertaken by Berlant and Edelman help us better understand the becoming of the self as organizational self? Until we understand the terms that enable and inhibit our becoming as organizational actors, we perhaps should not aspire to letting go of the ego for fear of how power works on the organizational ego.

However, the ethical turn in queer theory should not only give us cause to halt and consider how organizations predicate against ethical action even as they espouse corporate social responsibility, it offers a new way of thinking about organizations, and organizational ethics, that deserves further exploration.

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[i] There is no specific rationale for the choice of these texts. I came across them when doing a literature search to update myself on recent developments in queer theory, and was impressed at their scholarship and profundity of thought.

[iii] Of interest is Bersani's note that 'the idea of penis envy describes how men feel about having one, and, as long as there are sexual relations between men and women, this can't help but be an important fact *for women'*. (p. 23).

[vi] See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28700446

vii See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2720931/Royal-Navy-blasted-disgracefully-sexist-firing-woman-warship-captain-alleged-affair.html.

viii I argued this through exploring the account of a manager who had been made redundant and found work in another organization (Harding, 2003).